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Many scholars identify the phrase ‘Christ existing as community’ as a pivotal 
expression in the theological and ethical works of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945). 
Although it is acknowledged that Bonhoeffer adapts the phrase from G.W.F. Hegel 
(1770-1831), the two figures have not been brought together in a sustained critical 
treatment. This gap in scholarship can be partly attributed to Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran 
polemic against philosophical idealism for its susceptibility to the ‘incurvature’ of 
human reason, while Bonhoeffer’s political acts of resistance seem to further 
distance him from Hegel, an alleged proponent of state ‘absolutism’. The primary 
aim of this thesis is to challenge such surface contradictions by providing a nuanced 
account of Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel as he pursues their common interest in 
the ‘revelatory’ quality of a particular faith community. I argue that Bonhoeffer’s 
eclectic use of his source material is rooted in the awareness that Hegel derives core 
aspects of his logic from theological claims. Such philosophical derivation can lead 
to estrangement with its doctrinal origin, which Bonhoeffer identifies in Hegel’s 
‘docetic’ distinction between idea and appearance in the coming of Jesus Christ, as 
well as in Hegel’s diminishment of the ‘confessing’ identity of the church vis-à-vis 
the state. Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer also sees much of value in Hegel’s thought, from 
the socialising notion of ‘objective Geist’ to a trenchant characterisation of the 
‘cleaving’ mind. A secondary aim of the thesis is to present Bonhoeffer’s variations 
on Hegel as a promising resource for theologians in light of a pervasive ‘idealist’ 
legacy in modern theology. To that end, this thesis provides a vital precedent for 
investigation into how faith and reason are socially composed, how a sacramental 
event might be conveyed conceptually, and what forms of recognition exist between 
the state and religious bodies.  
 
Thesis Lay Summary 
 
 
The dynamics of immigration and globalised media have shown that religious claims 
are integral to both domestic policy and foreign affairs. New accounts of secularity 
have thus emerged, resourcing ethical deliberation on how to accommodate a 
plurality of religious and cultural communities. Such a task is complicated by 
appeals to exceptional status that are often rooted in the ‘revelatory’ quality of faith 
communities, which is to say that their forms of life, sacred texts, even the members 
themselves, express the divine being in whom they believe. This quality can be 
central to the identity of adherents and calls for recognition, whether through legal 
exemptions or, in extreme cases, recourse to violence, raising concerns among a 
broader public. Such a central tension to public life is expressed in my research 
question, namely, how might the ethics of a community of faith, rooted in its claim to 
divine revelation, be reconciled with responsible citizenship? This thesis approaches 
the question through a historical and theoretical study of the works of theologian and 
Christian minister Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), particularly with regards to his 
reception of the thought of philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Bonhoeffer is 
unique among European theologians for combining a highly particularist account of 
faith community with a robust notion of citizenship. On the one hand, he holds that 
the church—or by extension its neighbouring faith communities—can only be 
properly understood from within its unique forms of life. On the other, Bonhoeffer 
models how a statement of divine ‘authorisation’ should serve to enhance a religious 
public’s commitment to the rights and dignity of outsiders, to cultural preservation, 
and to the self-critical vigilance shown in habits of confession and forgiveness. In 
order to argue for the simultaneity of these commitments, I show that Bonhoeffer 
carries out a more complex variation on Hegel’s thought than is often recognized, 
particularly with respect to the provocative statement on divine and human agency 
coined by Hegel: ‘God existing as community’. My approach therefore draws on 
recent arguments that Hegel’s interest in theological claims is primarily for the 
diagnostic power of their underlying logic, through which one can identify false 
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The community in itself is what produces this doctrine, this relationship. 
The latter is not something produced from the word of Christ, so to 
speak, but through the community, the church. 
 - G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
 
The Word is the rock upon which the Idealist Geist-monism founders; 
for the Word implies that sin still exists, that absolute Geist has to fight 
for its rule, that the church remains a church of sinners. 






1. Monuments in Philosophy and Politics 
 
 Two starkly different monuments stand behind Humboldt University in Berlin, 
commemorating G.W.F. Hegel and Dietrich Bonhoeffer respectively. The name 
'Hegel' is inscribed on a tall white stone column with no identifying date, place, or 
title. The bust at the top is pitched slightly forward, its eyes focused and intent, lips 
pursed. The purity of the presentation seems to match Hegel's description of the 
philosopher in contrast to the political actor. In a lecture delivered at the university in 
the 1820s, he states that in political history 'the subject of deeds and events is the 
individual in his particular natural make-up, genius, passions, energy, or weakness of 
character—in a word, what makes him this individual'.1 The philosopher who 
surveys that history stands in marked contrast: 
Here on the other hand the productions are all the more excellent 
the less is their merit attributed to a particular individual, the more, 
on the other hand, do they belong to freedom of thinking, to the 
general character of the human being as human being, the more is 
thinking itself, devoid of personality, the productive subject.2 
 
Hegel's remark provides ample material for Søren Kierkegaard’s jest about the irony 
in a claim to discern the course of reason in world history while not being able to 
account for oneself as an existing individual.3 Bonhoeffer will take a similar critical 
line, stating that 'Hegel wrote a philosophy of angels, not of human beings as 
Dasein'.4 
                                                            
1 LHP, 9. 
2 LHP, 9. 
3 'Too bad that Hegel, merely for the sake of illusion, did not have 1843 years at his disposal, for 
then he presumably would have had time to make the test as to whether the absolute method, which 
could explain all world history, could also explain the life of one single human being’. Søren 
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 201. 
4 Idealism, especially as represented by Hegel, appears to have reached a 'synopsis of act and 
being', Bonhoeffer observes, 'if only those doing the philosophising themselves did not founder on the 
resistance of their own reality to this philosophy'. DBWE 2, 42; DBW 2, 35. 
 2 
 In contrast with Hegelplatz, an overtly 'dated' political monument stands within 
the university quad, commemorating twelve individuals. The inscription is dedicated 
'to those who fell in the struggle against Hitler's fascism'. Rather than any facial 
representation, two contorted fists protrude between interlocked iron bars that are 
tightly wound with barbed wire. Names are listed above dates of birth and execution, 
with each of the figures having died between the years 1938-1945. Among the names 
is that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who formerly studied and lectured at the university 
before losing his teaching license for association with an illegal seminary. The 
school now includes his life as part of the collective that commands the attention of 
current students and faculty, as captured in the second half of the dedication: 'their 
death is an obligation to us’. 
The monuments portray two very different people, fulfilling the vocations of 
speculative philosopher and ecclesio-political actor. Although Hegel and Bonhoeffer 
each offered original contributions in their fields, neither understood himself as an 
'individual' thinker. Each sought to articulate the constitutive social aspect of human 
reason, while acknowledging the question of God as integral to this task. Engaging 
their Lutheran tradition in depth, they each worked at the intersection of philosophy 
and theology in order to challenge a sharp distinction between divinity and humanity, 
taking seriously the notion of 'revelatory community'. Convictions about the 'real 
presence' of the Eucharist led them both to articulate an account of God not only 
within, but as human community. These endeavours carried significant ethical 
implications, as shown throughout their highly contested reception histories. 
2. Disruption of the Word: How Does the Community Reveal? 
The title of this thesis expresses Bonhoeffer’s dual portrayal of the Word’s 
relation to community in his reception of Hegel. First, the phrase 'disruption of the 
 3 
Word' can be taken in the subjective genitive sense, that is, the Word as disruptor of 
the community. This reading suits Bonhoeffer's portrayal of Christ as the 'counter-
logos' that confronts a merely 'human-logos', the latter including Hegel's project. 
Bonhoeffer is drawing on a Lutheran commitment to the 'external Word' while 
alluding to Barth's early work that 'abounded with metaphors of disruption, cleavage, 
and faith'.5  
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the disruptive Word responds critically to Hegel’s 
emphasis on the production of doctrine by the spirited community. As Hegel 
polemically states, doctrine is not produced by the 'Word of Christ, so to speak', but 
by the community. In Adams' gloss, Hegel critiques religious thinking because 'it 
treats what it freely produces as something alienly received’.6 Hegel’s response 
overcorrects, however, perpetuating a 'false opposition' that, I suggest, provokes 
Bonhoeffer to accentuate the externality of the Word even as he maintains that the 
present Christ is given in and through the community. I therefore pose Bonhoeffer as 
undertaking an intra-Lutheran response to Hegel on this point, with a view to Adams' 
call for such 'repair'.7  
Nevertheless, the nuance in both Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s positions should 
be acknowledged. Hegel is also conditioned by a Lutheran emphasis on reception. 
Bonhoeffer knows this, having underlined Hegel’s emphatic statement that, with 
respect to ‘positive’ elements of the absolute religion, ‘everything must come to us in 
an external manner’.8 Moreover, Bonhoeffer did not merely swing to an account of 
                                                            
5 Dorrien goes on to note the irony that 'for all of Barth's warnings about the narrowness and 
hubris of theological systems, his dogmatics took on the appearance of a massive new Scholasticism'. 
Gary Dorrien, Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), henceforth 
KRHS, 469, 487. 
6 The critique is summarised with reference to the Phenomenology in Nicholas Adams, The 
Eclipse of Grace: Divine and Human Action in Hegel (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 69. 
7 Adams' own suggestion refers to repair by means of a 'NeoPlatonic strand in Christian negative 
theology'. See Adams, Eclipse, 69. 
8 NL-VPR III, 19. 
 4 
revelation as brute interruption in contrast to Hegel’s primarily ‘immanent’ account 
of community. Indeed, Bonhoeffer’s project in Act and Being was an attempt to 
challenge a reduction of revelation to mere ‘act’, a punctiliar moment of the sermon, 
for instance, rather than the many continuities of a community’s ‘being’. This 
counter-emphasis was already suggested in Sanctorum Communio, in which 
Bonhoeffer adopts Hegel’s notions of a historically conditioned 'objective Geist' and 
a divine, self-revealing subject 'existing as community'.9 Hegel is therefore 
significant to Bonhoeffer’s criticism of Barth, from Barth’s early ‘actualism’ through 
to an alleged ‘positivism of revelation’ in later dogmatics.  
These nuances suggest the need for a second way in which the phrase 
'disruption of the Word' can be taken: the objective genitive sense, that is, the Word 
as disrupted by the community. This reading alludes to Bonhoeffer’s contrast in 
Discipleship between the ‘weakness of the Word’ and the ‘strength of the idea’. It 
acknowledges the way in which Bonhoeffer retrieves an ecclesiology marked by 
suffering and rejection rather than a politics of recognition. Within this framework, 
Bonhoeffer issues a call for ‘qualified silence’ and the renewal of an ‘arcane 
discipline’. These characteristics show the form Bonhoeffer attributes to revelation: 
rather than Hegel’s expansive idea that unfolds into a rationally unified state system 
that overcomes prior separations, Bonhoeffer recovers the church as a distinctive 
community, the suffering body of Christ. Such ‘hiddenness of revelation’ requires 
the perception of a faith irreducible to reasoned assertions. 
The thesis subtitle, which refers to 'revelatory community', is taken from the 
title of the third volume of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. This is 
the text on which Bonhoeffer focused in his 1933 seminar and the place in which 
                                                            
9 'The community of faith is God's final revelation as "Christ existing as community"‘. DBWE 2, 
112; DBW 2, 108. 
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Hegel coins the evocative phrase 'God existing as community'. In Hegel's view, the 
community has an expanding quality: though the Idea is partly derived from 
Lutheran doctrines of Christology and Eucharist, it unfurls outwards into civil 
society and a realised state.10 This philosophical project will be contextualised 
historically, with acknowledgement of the form of community that Hegel advocated 
from his professorial seat at the University of Berlin in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
Insofar as Bonhoeffer also seeks to portray the life of community as 
inextricably bound up with divine revelation, Hegel's project proves congenial to his 
work. However, from his first dissertation onwards Bonhoeffer insistently modifies 
the phrase to 'Christ existing as community'. This variation will be explored 
throughout the thesis as shorthand for a complex engagement with Hegel over 
Christology, ecclesiology, history, and political theory. I will be contextualising 
Bonhoeffer historically as well, showing how he not only critiqued Hegel’s thought 
but responded to the broader movements of deconfessionalisation and church-state 
union that took place during the century of political development between them. 
3. Ferment of the Mind: Tracing Bonhoeffer's Reception 
 
Any student of Hegel's Phenomenology of Geist quickly becomes aware of 
the complications embedded in claims of intellectual 'influence'. In considering 
Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel, therefore, this thesis will not attempt to trace a 
linear transmission. Although the study of 'intellectual genealogies' is common, 
Kwame Anthony Appiah warns, 'that metaphor is perhaps too determinate—in the 
                                                            
10 Houlgate observes that Hegel credits Luther with stressing that 'Christian faith and love are 
properly expressed in the sittlich spheres of family life and civil society'. Stephen Houlgate, An 
Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 263-64. 
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mode of those biblical catalogs of begats—to capture the ferment of the mind'.11 
Appiah prefers to speak of 'matrices’, which involve attending to wider political 
currents as well as the role of a variety of a thinker's peers in order to gain a sense of 
what ideas were 'in the air'.12 The present work will focus on three matrices: texts, 
interlocutors, and political context.  
With respect to the influence of Hegel's texts on Bonhoeffer, the key work is 
the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, which had been newly edited by Georg 
Lasson in Bonhoeffer's time. Bonhoeffer also makes reference to Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Philosophy of Right, and Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences in Outline, to name the most prominent works. During the 
dissertations, many of the Hegel texts to which Bonhoeffer refers come at second-
hand, in and through the work of supervisors. This is partly why I shift focus to 
Bonhoeffer's lectures delivered in 1932-33, as they surround Bonhoeffer's expository 
Hegel seminar. As the seminar notes are fragmentary, however, they will be used to 
supplement observations and critiques Bonhoeffer makes in the lectures delivered 
over that same period rather than forming a study in their own right. 
With respect to Bonhoeffer's interlocutors in the reception of Hegel's works, 
Bonhoeffer received much of his Hegel education from Reinhold Seeberg, his first 
doctoral supervisor, as well as Wilhelm Lütgert, who specialised in idealism and 
supervised Bonhoeffer's Habilitationschrift. Moreover, Bonhoeffer's university 
courses, including a 1927 series on the philosophy of culture by Eduard Spranger, 
                                                            
11 Kwame Anthony Appiah, Lines of Descent: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity 
(Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard University Press, 2014), 4. 
12 He adapts this theory of intellectual growth from sociologist Robert Merton's reference to 
'multiples' in the history of science. Appiah, Lines, 4-5. 
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exposed him to the neo-Hegelian ‘revival’ of the 1920s.13 As his early seminar 
papers show, he was also aware of a larger 'speculative trajectory' that followed on 
from Hegel and minimised confessional and biblical interest.14 Acknowledging these 
important influences among Bonhoeffer's Berlin instructors, I also note the work of 
Bonhoeffer's friend and fellow student, Franz Hildebrandt, who eagerly appropriates 
Hegel for his own dissertation.  
As for the political context within which Bonhoeffer interpreted Hegel, it is 
important to note German Neo-Hegelian currents in his time. Though Bonhoeffer 
was no longer based in the academy after 1936, the effects of thinkers such as legal 
philosophers Carl Schmitt and Karl Larenz would have confronted him on the front 
lines of the church’s response to legal development. Neo-Hegelianism, however 
contestable its claim to Hegel's works, came to present a community that became 
nationalist and exclusive.15 Although Bonhoeffer's response to the so-called 'Jewish 
question' is not related directly to Hegel, then, as that label emerged after Hegel's 
time, it signals the problematic line of transmission that enfolds them both. This 
contextual note should be qualified, however, by the fact that Bonhoeffer did not 
have a monocultural experience of Hegel reception. During his exchange period in 
America, he came across the work of African American thinker W.E.B. Du Bois, 
whose critical readings cut against the grain of the national exceptionalism and 
                                                            
13 Neo-Kantian backgrounds, with emerging movements emphasising synthesis or 'the whole' are 
recounted in Fritz Ringer, Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community 
1890-1933 Reprint ed. (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1990), 305-314, 365, 384-403. 
14 In a 1926 seminar paper on the work of Franz H.R. von Frank, Bonhoeffer begins by stating 
that 'Since Schleiermacher, theology had partly been allowed to grow speculative and wild—this is 
especially evident in Hegel's student Biedermann—and partly was constrained by biblicism. At any 
rate it seemed to have distanced itself a long way from Lutheran-Reformed doctrine'. DBWE 9, 404; 
DBW 9, 17:30. 
15 See Andreas Grossmann, ‘German neo-Hegelianism and the Plea for Another Hegel’, in The 
Impact of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume II, ed. John Walker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 232-259. 
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racialising elements in the American and German Neo-Hegelians with whom Du 
Bois worked. 
The textual basis of this study is important as both Bonhoeffer and Hegel are 
known for their enigmatic writing, as observed by Karl Barth. While Barth praises 
Bonhoeffer’s early ecclesiology, as well as his clear and courageous response to the 
plight of the Jews, he seriously questions the elusiveness of Bonhoeffer's theological 
terms. ‘Do we not always expect him to be clearer and more concise in some other 
context’, Barth writes to a correspondent in response to Bonhoeffer’s criticism, 
‘either by withdrawing what he said, or by going even further?’16 Fifteen years later, 
writing to Eberhard Bethge on the recently published biography of Bonhoeffer, Barth 
opines that systematic theology was not Bonhoeffer’s strongest field and laments that 
his turbulent life and early death stopped short his remarkable potential to evolve.17 
Barth’s counsel to reticence is all the more apt as a preface for research on 
Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Hegel, a figure over whom Barth also counselled a 
certain suspension of judgement. Commenting on Hegel’s far more developed body 
of work and longer reception history, Barth queries whether the true age of Hegel 
was yet to come. Whether or not Hegel would become the Aquinas of Protestantism, 
Barth warns that readers ought to think three times before contradicting him, because 
they would likely find that contradiction already voiced within Hegel's system—and 
given its best possible answer.18 It is a warning often ignored by critics that overstate 
the effectiveness of a young doctoral student's criticism. 
                                                            
16 Karl Barth, 'Letter to P.W. Herrenbrück, 21 December 1952’, in World Come of Age: A 
Symposium on Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. R. Gregor Smith (London: Collins, 1967), 90. 
17 Barth goes on to warn against fixing Bonhoeffer in the trajectory of either predecessor or 
contemporary, speculating on how his own work might be narrowly reconstructed were he to have 
died after the publication of the Römerbrief, or immediately following the 1927 Christliche Dogmatik. 
The latter volume was rejected years later for the new approach that became the multi-volume Church 
Dogmatics. Barth’s letter to Bethge is reprinted in André Dumas, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of 
Reality, trans. Robert McAfee Brown (London: SCM Press, 1971), 239-42. 
18 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (London: SCM Press, 1972), 396. 
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4. Characterising Bonhoeffer’s Reception: Eclectic and Christologically Intent  
This thesis presents Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel as both eclectic and 
Christologically intent.19 The first element is noted by Ferenc Lehel, a student in 
Bonhoeffer's 1933 Hegel seminar, who records his teacher's surprising attempt, given 
an anti-idealistic mood in theology, to 'eclectically' adopt Hegel.20 At one point 
around the seminar table, Bonhoeffer advised his students to respond to Hegel with 
both ja und nein.21 As my expositions will show, Bonhoeffer shows the freedom to 
adopt a Hegelian term of art for his own purpose without thereby importing the entire 
framework, which he may simultaneously seek to counter with his own distinctive 
emphases. Bonhoeffer's approach to Hegel bears comparison with Barth's own self-
description years later: 'I myself have a certain weakness for Hegel and am always 
fond of doing a bit of "Hegeling." As Christians we have the freedom to do this….I 
do it eclectically’.22  
Bonhoeffer's eclecticism is presented here as a welcome change from 
theological approaches to philosophy, particularly Hegel, characterised as 
confrontation or revolt. In Cyril O’Regan’s recent work, Hegel's wholesale revision 
of Christian doctrine is said to provoke a theological response of 'vehement and 
systematic resistance', or 'total confrontation', by Hans Urs von Balthasar.23 
                                                            
19 The combination of terms is inspired by Phil Ziegler, who claims that Bonhoeffer was 'ad hoc 
and tactical' in his use of philosophy. Philip Ziegler, 'Completely within God's Doing' (Lecture, 
Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer Conference, University of Aberdeen, December 12, 2014). 
20 Ferenc Lehel, Dietrich Bonhoeffers Hegelseminar: Nach Aufzeichnungen von Ferenc Lehel, 
ed. Ilse Tödt (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1988), henceforth HS, 9-10. 
21 The initial 'yes' is to the possiblity of Christian knowledge of God, while the 'no' comes at the 
'equation' of revelation and reason. Lehel, HS, 18. 
22 Barth also notes that he can adopt elements of Marxism without thereby being a Marxist. The 
remark was recorded in a conversation with pastors and lay people from the Pfalz, September 1953; 
cited in Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, ed. Eberhard Busch, trans. 
John Bowden (London: SCM, 1976), 387. 
23 These are descriptions of Hans Urs von Balthasar's critical approach to Hegel, which 
nonetheless comes out of 'respect and even affinity'. They are prompted by the fact that Hegel 
'fundamentally revises the grammar of Christian belief'. Part of von Balthasar's response is to reassert 
theology as 'first among equals'. See Cyril O'Regan, Anatomy of Misremembering, Volume 1: Hegel 
(Herder & Herder, 2014) 24, 36, 65. 
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Meanwhile, the term 'revolt' heads Gary Dorrien's presentation of the Barthian 
movement.24 Dorrien sees the broad idealist tradition as vital to contemporary 
progressive theology, although he notes some of its problematic ironies, particularly 
on the subject of racism.25 Such admission seems to make Dorrien more appreciative 
of Barth's conviction that 'a healthy pluralism in philosophy and rhetorical forms is 
needed if theology is to be free to locate the event of correspondence between human 
word and divine truth'.26 Unfortunately, Dorrien largely omits reference to 
Bonhoeffer, who works between Barth and Hegel while incorporating elements of 
race-critical thinking. 
 A more discerning account of Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel can be 
compared to Kierkegaard's own, particularly as Bonhoeffer drew heavily on 
Kierkegaard's thought in order to critique the established order of his own day. 
Scholarship on Kierkegaard and Hegel has gone from claims of an utter lack of 
commonality to a sequence of different postures.27 In contrast to such delineated 
periods, Joel Rasmussen argues that Kierkegaard draws on Hegel for his early 
critique of Romantic irony, continuing to supplement Hegelian philosophy from 
within; in Rasmussen’s words, ‘Kierkegaard’s relations to Hegelianism are creative, 
dialectical and sometimes appreciative, while also highly critical – even in the final 
years of his life’.28 One can compare Merold Westphal's summary account, ‘there is 
                                                            
24 Chapter Eight is titled 'The Barthian Revolt’. See Dorrien, KRHS, 454-529. 
25 See Dorrien, KRHS, 1, 542-49. 
26 Dorrien also notes early concerns over Barth's 'haphazard' use of philosophy and 'dilettantism’. 
Dorrien, KRHS, 482, 486. 
27 These are narrated as an early period of positive influence; middle period of sustained critique, 
largely against Danish Hegelians Heiberg and Martensen; and a final stage where Kierkegaard ‘made 
his peace with Hegelianism' in Joel Rasmussen, ‘Kierkegaard, Hegelianism and the Theology of the 
Paradox’, in ed. Nicholas Adams, The Impact of Idealism Volume IV: Religion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 91-113. 
28 Rasmussen, ‘Kierkegaard, Hegelianism’, 93, 96. 
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appropriation as well as negation, and Kierkegaard is never simply anti-Hegelian’.29 
In light of this precedent, I question an account of Bonhoeffer's reception of 
Kierkegaard in terms of co-belligerency against Hegel.30  
The description of 'eclecticism' must be combined with the observation that 
Bonhoeffer was Christologically intent. Lehel observes that Bonhoeffer read Hegel 
as an ‘ecclesial theologian’ who was not overawed by the system; rather, Bonhoeffer 
was like an expert in the preservation of buildings, one who took more joy in the 
oldest, most valuable parts rather than registering his anger over its flaws.31 To press 
the analogy, even selective appreciation requires a good understanding of the entire 
structure; a dilettante cannot undertake the work of restoration. This is why it is 
significant to hear Bonhoeffer's counsel, offered as a response to one seminar 
student's proud conclusion that Hegel's Philosophy of Religion was not 'truly 
Christian’, that ‘an author should not be attacked or interpreted from one of his 
negative sentences; we should ask what he intends with the whole book’.32  
The attempt at a full and responsible reading of Hegel suits the motivation 
that Rades attributes to Bonhoeffer's research: to recover, in the midst of a crisis in 
German history, his lost cultural inheritance 'in the proper way by reading and then 
                                                            
29 Merold Westphal, ‘Kierkegaard and Hegel’, in ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino, 
The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 101. 
30 The two figures are brought together in a combined ‘attack on idealism’ over epistemology, 
ethics, and finally, Christology and discipleship in Matthew Kirkpatrick, Attacks on Christendom in a 
World Come of Age (Oregon: Pickwick, 2011). Kirkpatrick offers the disclaimer that there is currently 
a debate in Kierkegaard scholarship over whether Kierkegaard was attacking Hegel directly or a later 
manifestation of his thought in Denmark, claiming that Bonhoeffer was not aware of this later 
distinction. Kirkpatrick also relegates Bonhoeffer’s early interest in Hegel to the influence of Seeberg 
as well as the young student’s aspirations within the German academic context. This sidelining is 
furthered by Kirkpatrick’s argument that Kierkegaard’s depiction of the individual is actually 
foundational to Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology—this in spite of his admission of Bonhoeffer’s statement 
that Kierkegaard relies too heavily on a concept of the ‘self-established I’ and has no doctrine of the 
church. Kirkpatrick, Attacks, 82, 132-35. 
31 Lehel, HS, 10; cf. Rades, 'Bonhoeffer', 11. 
32 Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann and Ronald Smith, eds., I Knew Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: 
Collins, 1966), 65. 
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interpreting it'.33 Such broader cultural interest is always framed by Bonhoeffer's 
commitment to the authority of scripture and his Lutheran confession, both of which 
contribute to his readings of Hegel for the work of ecclesial theology. These 
strategies lie behind the reason that Bonhoeffer remained, as Ralf Wüstenberg notes, 
adherent to no single philosophical school.34 
Insofar as Hegel pursues a logical investigation derived from doctrine, 
Bonhoeffer allows this pursuit its own integrity while making clear his resolutely 
theological interest. From his first dissertation, Bonhoeffer employs other disciplines 
in the service of his first-order doctrinal work, as Mawson emphasises.35 Bonhoeffer 
therefore frequently sidesteps philosophical questions, such as when he declines 
debate on the existence of an 'external world', seeking rather to adopt philosophical 
tools in describing the reality of the church. In so doing, he nevertheless 
acknowledges the legitimacy of that different line of inquiry, at one point describing 
theological narrative and the 'timelessness' of idealist concepts through the analogy 
of how sound is perceived differently by musicians and physicists.36  
Keeping a disciplinary distinction in mind should temper Bonhoeffer’s 
language of ‘overcoming’ idealism, as well as his polemical association of the 
                                                            
33 Rades, 'Bonhoeffer', 7. 
34 Wüstenberg makes this point before offering a Hegelian reading of Bonhoeffer’s movement 
between different philosophers. See Ralf Wüstenberg, ‘Philosophical Influences on Bonhoeffer’s 
“Religionless Christianity”’, in Bonhoeffer and Continental Thought, ed. Brian Gregor and Jens 
Zimmermann (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), 146. 
35 The first sentence of Bonhoeffer’s preface to Sanctorum Communio makes this clear: ‘in this 
study social philosophy and sociology are employed in the service of theology’. DBWE 1, 21; DBW 1, 
13. This is emphasised in response to Peter Berger’s criticism that Bonhoeffer does not provide a 
fruitful starting point for the dialogue between theology and the social sciences in Michael Mawson, 
‘Theology and Social Theory—Reevaluating Bonhoeffer’s Approach’, Theology Today 71.1 (2014), 
74. 
36 He writes that with regards to the perception of reality, ‘just as sound lies in different spheres 
of perception for musicians and physicists, so it is with time for idealist epistemology and for a 
Christian concept of person, without the one sphere cancelling out the other’. DBWE 1, 48; DBW 1, 
28. 
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modifier ‘Christian’ with a ‘socio-ethical’ approach.37 This dual posture must be set 
alongside Bonhoeffer’s theological critique of the limits of philosophy, with its 
recurrent depiction of the discipline as susceptible to self-enclosure and the 
‘corruption of the mind’. Nevertheless, the willingness to engage philosophical terms 
is conditioned by his awareness, reiterated in his second dissertation, that the 
transferral of concepts can ‘burst the framework’ of the new host discipline.38 I 
therefore read Bonhoeffer's use of Hegel in light of his larger strategies, whether the 
expositional purpose in lecturing through Genesis 1-3 or the ecumenical intent with 
which Bonhoeffer challenges forms of one-sided and non-historical thinking. It is 
within such overarching purposes that his adoptions of Hegel will be contextualised 
in the chapters to come. 
5. Scholarship on Bonhoeffer's Reception of Hegel 
 
 The primary aim of this thesis is to offer a text-based, diachronic account of 
Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel with a focus on the theme of revelatory community. 
A robust treatment of this relationship remains lacking, even though there has been 
exponential growth in scholarly attention to Bonhoeffer’s oeuvre over the past three 
generations. This gap is partly due to the appropriate scholarly focus devoted to 
completing the Bonhoeffer Works English critical editions in collaboration with the 
German set that was finished right before the turn of the millennium.39 Given the 
recent closure of the English-language canon, there has been a call for rigorous 
‘synoptic’ assessment.40   
                                                            
37 The sound analogy is apt, for Bonhoeffer describes the act of ‘hearing’ revelation as evoking a 
person’s active centres of intellect and will. Borrowing a concept from Seeberg, he describes this 
reception as the ‘formal presupposition’ of his anthropology—the human being defined by the 
‘audibility’ of the Word. See DBWE 1, 63n4. 
38 DBWE 2, 77n89; DBW 2, 71n89. 
39 Volume 17, which features a comprehensive index for the set, was published in 2014 for the 
English editions, and 1999 for the German editions.  
40 This observation leads the collection of essays marking the completion of the critical works in 
English. The editors note that Bonhoeffer is ‘simultaneously the most quoted and the most 
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This thesis follows after the second generation of scholars, who have shown 
more attention to the continuity of Bonhoeffer's corpus while inviting dialogue with 
philosophy and the social sciences.41 Appeals to continuity notwithstanding, it is 
widely acknowledged that Bonhoeffer’s provocative style, ad hoc use of genre, and 
early death make any attempt at the ‘systematisation’ of his fragmentary body of 
work an acute challenge. This period of reception will be represented by the 
influential treatments of Wayne Floyd and Charles Marsh.42 
The strongest recent call for exploring the relationship between Bonhoeffer 
and Hegel comes from Wayne Floyd. In an essay in the important 2008 collection 
Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation, Floyd notes the need for further research into 
how Bonhoeffer’s work relates to the philosophical tradition from Kant to Hegel, 
while charting the most promising studies to date.43 His own earlier work, Theology 
and the Dialectics of Otherness, helped turn attention to Bonhoeffer's philosophical 
inclination while suggesting a strong interpretive line vis-à-vis Hegel: he argued that 
Bonhoeffer's conceptual concerns are given a 'fuller and more nuanced' treatment in 
Theodor Adorno's 1966 work Negative Dialectics.44 The connection is suggestive, 
whether for construing dialectics as a 'tensive-dynamic retention of poles' or for 
                                                                                                                                                                        
misinterpreted Christian theologian of the twentieth century’. Clifford Green and Guy Carter, 
'Foreword', in Interpreting Bonhoeffer: Historical Perspectives, Emerging Issues, ed. Clifford Green 
and Guy Carter (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013), xi. 
41 Key figures here include Clifford Green, Wayne Floyd, and Charles Marsh. See an overview 
of the three generations of reception in Adam Clark and Michael Mawson, ‘Introduction’, in Ontology 
and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship, ed. Adam Clark and Michael Mawson 
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013). 
42 Another unpublished study deserves mention here: Jörg Alfred Rades, "Bonhoeffer and Hegel: 
from Sanctorum Communio to the Hegel Seminar with some Perspectives for the Later Works.” 
Dissertation first draft and quotations [ca. 1983-1989] University of St. Andrews [UTS Archives, 
Bonhoeffer Secondary Papers, Series 2A Box 3]. 
43 See Floyd, 'Encounter with the Other: Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel in the Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, in Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation, ed. Peter Frick (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008), 83, 90-93. 
44 Wayne Floyd. Theology and the Dialectics of Otherness: On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 261. 
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challenging the adequacy of conceptual thinking to a fragmentary reality.45 
Moreover, Floyd effectively raises the troubling relation between anti-Semitism and 
a philosophy of 'totality'.46 Nevertheless, the study dwells more in the late twentieth-
century than in Hegel's own time, and its interest focuses more on the philosophical 
dynamics of Bonhoeffer's thought rather than the centrality of his Christological 
form of response.47 Given Floyd's editorship of Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being, it is 
particularly important to understand the limitations of this interpretive line. 
The developing work of Charles Marsh acknowledges the importance of the 
Bonhoeffer-Hegel relationship only to turn sharply against the association. In his 
1994 work Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Marsh claimed that Bonhoeffer’s socio-
ethical terminology—in oft-cited phrases such as ‘being for others’—can seem 
‘monochronic and thin’ without understanding its passage in and through Hegel’s 
thought.48 Moreover, Marsh suggests a maturing relationship to Hegel's work after 
Bonhoeffer's first dissertation, marked in part by the 1933 Hegel seminar: 
His writings become more attentive to the richness and polyvalence 
of Hegel’s thought. He is less concerned with overcoming Hegel than 
in thinking along with the philosopher on the meaning of God’s 
presence in the complex drama of divine worldliness. Bonhoeffer 
will no longer argue the case that Hegel proffers a crude totality that 
stamps out all particularity and difference, but he will, for example, 
try to think of the totality proper to the biblical witness of God’s 
redemptive story, and in this way revise Hegel’s description from the 
inside out, that is, theologically.49 
 
                                                            
45 Floyd, Dialectics, xvii, 62, 99, 147. 
46 Floyd, Dialectics, 218, 267-68. 
47 Floyd's more recent article casts Bonhoeffer's engagement with Hegel after the dissertations as 
an attempt to recover the 'other' against 'systematic' thinking. See Floyd, 'Encounter', 108-110. 
48 Marsh elaborates that ‘Hegel compelled Bonhoeffer to consider nothing less than the 
ontological and structural reconfiguration of the person in fellowship with God’. Charles Marsh, 
Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of his Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), 175n11. 
49 Marsh, Reclaiming, 91. 
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Readers compelled by Marsh's claim of the 'promise' Bonhoeffer evidently saw in 
Hegel will be disappointed by Marsh's recent dramatisation of the relationship, in 
which he singles out Hegel in especially negative terms.50 The Hegel seminar is 
mentioned as a wistful but ineffectual enterprise, while a 'Hegelian' manner of 
thinking leads to the merger of National Socialist doctrines into Lutheran theology.51  
Along with Marsh’s apparent turn, two factors contribute to the relative 
neglect of Bonhoeffer's relationship to Hegel. First, there is a decided scholarly 
interest in Bonhoeffer's second dissertation, Act and Being, which has been the focus 
of significant philosophically-informed studies by Christiane Tietz, Michael 
DeJonge, and Edward van 't Slot.52 As a result, Sanctorum Communio, which is the 
original context of Bonhoeffer's modification of Hegel's phrase 'God existing as 
community', has not received much detailed attention. One promising recent attempt 
to redress this imbalance has come in the work of Michael Mawson.53 Mawson's 
attention to Sanctorum Communio brings the text in which Bonhoeffer does his most 
overt work with Hegel back into view. This shift is particularly critical as 'Christ 
existing as community' is widely recognised to be a succinct expression of 
Bonhoeffer's project as a whole.54  
                                                            
50 Bonhoeffer's dissertation shows little potential for maturation in this description: 'Bonhoeffer 
had mounted an acrid assault on the German philosophical tradition, hacking through the thickets and 
thorns of Hegelian dialectic in a desperate bid to rescue the sanctity of the social, relational self from a 
world-dominating "Transcendental Ego."' Charles Marsh, Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer (New York: Knopf, 2014), 91-2, 118. 
51 Marsh, Strange Glory, 361, 440n88. 
52 See Christiane Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der Verkrümmten Vernunft. Eine 
Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999); Michael DeJonge, 
Bonhoeffer's Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and Protestant Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Edward van  't Slot, Negativism of Revelation? Bonhoeffer and Barth on 
Faith and Actualism (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015). 
53 The reasons for the neglect of the first dissertation, and the case for its re-examination, are 
explored in Michael Mawson, Christ Existing as Community: The Ethics of Bonhoeffer's Ecclesiology 
(Ph.D. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2012), 7-11. 
54 Martin Rumschiedt identifies the phrase as indicative of Bonhoeffer's 'Hegel-Seebergian 
socializing orientation’. Rumschiedt summarises recurrent usage across the critical editions: the 
phrase occurs fourteen times in DBW/E 1, twice in DBW/E 2,4, once in DBW/E 5,9,13, and three 
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Second, in relation to the dominance of Act and Being in the literature, 
significant scholarly attention has been paid to Bonhoeffer's use of Martin 
Heidegger.55 This is understandable given that Bonhoeffer's second dissertation 
advisor referred to Bonhoeffer as a 'Heidegger man'.56 Bonhoeffer indeed finds 
Heidegger's notion of Dasein useful, claiming that it can resource a 'genuine 
coordination' of act and being that, although reminiscent of Hegel's thought, 
prioritises the temporal bounds of existence.57 Nevertheless, as Jens Zimmermann 
has argued, Heidegger's influence is relatively contained to the second dissertation.58 
As one of Bonhoeffer’s contemporaries attests, in contrast with their speaking 'the 
lofty language of the early Heidegger', Bonhoeffer was especially mistrusted for 
seeming to lean on Hegel in his Christology.59 
A study of Bonhoeffer's engagement with Hegel must acknowledge the 
importance of Act and Being while moving beyond this single work. As Floyd 
observes, although Kant and Hegel are not named as much in Bonhoeffer's later 
writings, this is not because Bonhoeffer has left them behind 'but because, like 
grammar in a sentence, they have disappeared as topics of conversation because they 
have become part of the very structure ordering all topics of conversation that do get 
discussed'.60 This comment picks up on Marsh's earlier statement that most of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
times in DBW/E 10,11,14. Martin Rumscheidt, 'The Significance of Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold 
Seeberg for Dietrich Bonhoeffer', in Formation, 205, 208n26. 
55 For an overview of Bonhoeffer's engagement in Act and Being, with suggestions about his 
ensuing Christology, see Stephen Plant, '"In the Sphere of the Familiar:" Heidegger and Bonhoeffer', 
in Formation, 301-327. 
56 Bonhoeffer's second dissertation supervisor, Wilhelm Lütgert, typecast him as a 'Heidegger 
man’. Lütgert reports that Bonhoeffer's move from Seeberg to him comes through his 'developing 
independently, following Heidegger’. DBW 12, 113. 
57 DBWE 2, 71; DBW 2, 65. Bonhoeffer's engagement with Heidegger was motivated by the 
publication of Being and Time in 1927. 
58 Jens Zimmermann argues that Heidegger's 'deficient hermeneutic ontology (as much as his 
atheism) greatly diminishes his use for Bonhoeffer's own project'. Jens Zimmermann, Humanism and 
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 292. 
59 Helmut Gollwitzer concedes that the attribution seems unfounded, certainly when compared 
with Franz Hildebrandt's ready appropriation. See I Knew, 139. 
60 Floyd, 'Encounter', 113. 
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Bonhoeffer's later engagements with Hegel are 'subtextual’, noting the complication 
involved in coming up with a true alternative.61 Relatedly, as Tietz argues, 
Bonhoeffer's later Ethics consider how the reconciliation effected in the Christ-
reality affects human reason, including a more positive appraisal of the 
Enlightenment.62  
In light of these factors, I shift focus towards Bonhoeffer's years as a 
Privatdozent, the period in which he engages Hegel's primary texts in depth. I show 
that the lectures of 1932-33, surrounding his Hegel seminar, provide the return of 
several themes raised in Sanctorum Communio, such as the transition between the 
primal and sinful states and the foregrounding of Christology. Bonhoeffer's ecclesio-
political work from 1933 onwards is also taken into account, including the 
Finkenwalde training materials, in an attempt to show the 'subtextual' exchanges with 
Hegel. These materials bolster the argument that Bonhoeffer's claim to 'Christ 
existing as community' should be understood as a variation on Hegel that seeks to 
pre-empt what he later terms a 'docetic-idealist ecclesiology'.   
 My thesis is distinct from previous approaches to Bonhoeffer’s reception of 
Hegel in three ways. First, I provide an account of the diachronic movement of 
Bonhoeffer's thought with respect to Hegel, showing the relation between 
philosophical questions raised in the 'academic period' and confessional questions 
raised in his innovative ministerial training—although I trouble this very distinction 
along the way. The thesis therefore proceeds through Bonhoeffer’s texts 
chronologically, although thematic links are drawn across the corpus. Second, in line 
with both Hegel and Bonhoeffer's focus on 'actualisation’, their writings are 
contextualised politically. For example, I situate Bonhoeffer's emphasis on 
                                                            
61 Marsh, Reclaiming, 83. 
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recovering the Lutheran confessional writings against the backdrop of a movement 
of 'de-confessionalisation' in Hegel's time.63 Such historical work allows for a more 
precise account of political difference than the lingering insinuation that Hegel was a 
proto-apologist for the Third Reich. Third, I seek to treat Hegel on his own terms, not 
only with respect to his unique historical context but also according to his texts. By 
beginning with Hegel before moving to Bonhoeffer's critiques or variations, I move 
away from a tendency to speak of 'Hegelian' thinking that too often conflates him 
with the Neo-Hegelianism of Bonhoeffer's time. Following Bonhoeffer's lead by 
holding an expository seminar, alongside his counsel to students to ask what Hegel 
intended by the whole of a work rather than isolated passages, I include detailed 
expositions in each chapter alongside Bonhoeffer's specific interpretations.  
6. Hegel Between Philosophy and Theology 
 In seeking to read Hegel on his own terms, I question whether he should be 
cast as a theologian. Such an explicitly doctrinal project is suggested by Peter 
Hodgson's presentation of him as a 'theologian of Spirit'.64 Hegel's multi-layered 
treatment of Geist, typically translated as 'spirit', understandably leads to the 
assumption by theological critics that he holds a pneumatology. If a theology of the 
Holy Spirit was Hegel's project, it could go a long way to explaining why Bonhoeffer 
often appears to lack this doctrinal locus.65 Bonhoeffer might well be assuming a 
Lutheran 'pneumaticism' that provokes him to foreground what is lacking, namely, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
62 Christiane Tietz, ‘Bonhoeffer on the Uses and Limits of Philosophy’, in Bonhoeffer and 
Continental Thought, 31-37, 41-42. 
63 See Thomas Albert Howard, Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German 
University (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11. 
64 See G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel: Theologian of Spirit. ed. Peter Hodgson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1997). 
65 This charge that Bonhoeffer lacks a pneumatology was reiterated in Rowan Williams, 
'Margins and Centres: Bonhoeffer's Christ', (Hulsean Lectures, University of Cambridge, February 16, 
2016. 
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the distinctive 'mind' and body of Christ.66 Such compensation is true to some extent, 
but it is nevertheless important to make clear that Hegel does not offer a 
'pneumatology’, even though his philosophical account of Geist is informed by 
Trinitarian doctrine.67  
 Although I do not present Hegel as a theologian, I argue that his thought is 
critical for theology. As Nicholas Adams states, with respect to theology Hegel's 
logic 'generates the German philosophical lexicon through which many of the 
imaginative moves in the twentieth century are cast'.68 As a result of such pervasive 
influence, a theologian can be overtly critical of Hegel while still appropriating his 
thought forms.69 I situate Bonhoeffer in a similar relationship to his philosophical 
predecessor, arguing that interpretations of Bonhoeffer's works require fuller 
reckoning with Hegel's thought. Along with presenting a more thorough 
understanding of Bonhoeffer's creative appropriations, then, the secondary aim of 
this thesis is to propose Hegel as a significant thinker for contemporary theological 
engagement. 
 My argument involves taking more seriously Hegel's Lutheran confession. 
This involves questioning contemporary readings that claim he is inadvertently 
heterodox or practically an atheist.70 Hegel was similarly criticised during his own 
life, often for alleged 'pantheism', and so sought to defend himself both in his 
                                                            
66 Hegel is said to radicalise the 'pneumaticism' that was crucial to revelation for Luther. See 
Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (New York: SUNY Press, 1994), 39, 150. 
67 I offer my own definition of Geist in 1.3.1. 
68 Following this influence, Adams continues that 'Hegel's theological innovations are quite 
secondary'. Those innovations, Adams, admits, are vulnerable to critique as heterodox. Adams, 
Eclipse, 4, 220, 226. 
69 Adams uses the example of Barth's criticism that Hegel is Pelagian even while Barth displays 
many neo-Hegelian tendencies in Church Dogmatics. Adams, Eclipse, 3. 
70 In spite of a catalogue of heretical sources, Cyril O'Regan observes that ‘Hegel presumes 
himself not to be deviating from the spirit of Lutheran confession’. O'Regan, Heterodox, 195. Oswald 
Bayer asserts that Hegel's secularisation of Christian freedom, 'which is primarily real only in 
promise', involves a theoretical turn in which 'he is an atheist, despite the fact that he saw himself as a 
Lutheran!' Oswald Bayer, Freedom in Response - Lutheran Ethics: Sources and Controversies, trans. 
Jeffrey F. Cayzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 85. 
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published works and personal correspondence. To take one example, in a late letter 
Hegel gives a vigorous defence against challenges to the integrity of his Christian 
doctrine while challenging rationalist criticism of the Trinity: ‘I am a Lutheran, and 
through philosophy have been at once completely confirmed in Lutheranism. I detest 
seeing such things explained in the same manner as perhaps the descent and 
dissemination of silk culture, cherries, smallpox, and the like’.71 Although there 
would be political elements to such professions, Stephen Houlgate is right to assert 
that it would be 'willful to dismiss this as subterfuge'.72  
 On the theme of confession, this thesis works from Adams' recent 
presentation of Hegel's project as an investigation into forms of thought derived from 
Christian doctrine.73 There is less perceived threat, and so more scope for creative 
appropriation, if Hegel is primary interested in Christian theology in order to 
investigate its underlying logic rather than to articulate an idiosyncratic doctrinal 
statement.74 Moreover, the threat that does exist can be specified more clearly in a 
'turn to the texts' after a period marked by several bold overviews of Hegelian 
thought.75 Adams' treatment is particularly useful as it distinguishes between texts 
and, indeed, both 'epic' and 'dramatic' positions in Hegel's body of work.76  
Adams' account of derivation is apt for the manner in which Bonhoeffer 
views philosophy. Early on, Bonhoeffer observes that German-Continental 
                                                            
71 G.W.F. Hegel to Friedrich August Gottreu Tholuck, July 3, 1826, Hegel: The Letters, trans. 
Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984), 519-20; cited in 
Dorrien, KRHS, 222. 
72 Houlgate, Hegel, 254. 
73 Adams distinguishes Hegel’s interest in philosophy—a ‘second-order discourse’ that 
investigates systems of classification and the rules that govern judgments—from theology as a ‘first-
order’ task of articulating doctrinal loci that takes its categories and rules for judgment for granted. 
Adams, Eclipse,167-68. 
74 Hegel is explicit that logic is his own primary concern, as observed in Adams, Eclipse, xviii. 
75 See Adams' case for close exposition of primary sources, situated within a summary of the 
field, in Adams, Eclipse, xvii. 
76 Adams states that Hegel shows tendencies towards both epic metaphysics, which establishes 
the true nature of reality from a position of supreme insight, and dramatic metaphysics, which begins 
 22 
traditions, including idealism, ‘are based on philosophical-methodological demands 
derived from theological insights’.77 In the later Ethics, he describes the political 
crisis of the early 1940s as an occasion in which many important philosophical 
concepts find a way back to their origin in the church after a period of estrangement. 
The language of estrangement and return is ironic when heard in relation to Hegel, 
whose account of Geist proceeds through this dual movement. In any case, 
Bonhoeffer more often speaks of alliance than threat in his later writings. 
An alternate contemporary reading of Hegel depicts his appropriation of the 
Christian tradition in violent terms. Cyril O'Regan has traced Hegel's varied 
'heterodox' sources, from Valentinian Gnosticism to Lutheran mystic Jacob Boehme. 
Hegel's Lutheran profession notwithstanding, his 'ontotheological redescription' 
involves, inter alia, monophysite Christology, excision of the resurrection, and 
ultimate 'divinisation of the community’.78 O’Regan’s more recent presentation of 
Von Balthasar as a theologian in ‘confrontation’ with Hegel stands as a useful 
contrast to Bonhoeffer, who identifies Hegel's heretical tendencies with respect to 
both Christ and the church while still appropriating what is of value. 
 My thesis comes at a period of renewed interest in Hegel in English 
scholarship. This is marked by a set of recent critical editions that present the 
development of Hegel's various lecture series.79 Hegel's published works are also in 
the midst of being translated for a new set of critical editions.80 In approaching such 
significant translation and editorial work, it is helpful to identify at least three 
dominant schools of philosophical interpretation: the materialist reading based in the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
from the human 'middle' and constructs an account of reality from there. Science of Logic is given as 
an example of the former, with Phenomenology of Geist representing the latter. Adams, Eclipse, 16. 
77 DBWE 15: 443; DBW 15, 437. 
78 See O'Regan, Heterodox, 168, 201, 208, 214, 220. 
79 An ongoing series by Oxford University Press has been reprinting Hegel's lecture series, for 
which Peter Hodgson has been a key editorial figure. 
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Phenomenology which tends to collapse divine agency into an atheistic history; the 
neo-Pragmatist reading for which Hegel works from the Kantian project to articulate 
the social construction of reality; and the metaphysical reading of Hegel, referring to 
the Science of Logic and Encyclopaedia with an emphasis on the concept of 
'infinity’.81 It is a particularly critical time, then, for theological engagement with 
philosophy.82  
7. Chapter Outline  
 The primary aim of Part One, ‘Beyond the Reflective Self’, is to challenge the 
neglect of Hegel's influence owing, in large part, to Bonhoeffer's critical depiction of 
'idealism' as an expression of 'confinement in the self’. While acknowledging that 
Hegel's language of circularity and self-reflection requires scrutiny through the 
Lutheran critique of the sinful 'incurvature' of human reason, I argue that, taken 
alone, this depiction obscures the resources offered by Hegel's construal of the 
'sociality of reason' and his challenge to isolated attempts at moral purity. To show 
that Hegel cannot be summarily dismissed for an alleged sinful 'incurvature' of the 
self, I trace his two critical portrayals of sinful reason that show striking similarity to 
Bonhoeffer's accounts.   
In Chapter One I explore the account of revelatory community in 
Bonhoeffer's two dissertations, beginning with his appropriation of the notion of 
'objective Geist', qualified by the priority of the theological 'Word'. This helps to 
explain Bonhoeffer's variation on Hegel's phrase 'God existing as community', 
namely his change of subject, from God to Christ, and his related shift from the act 
                                                                                                                                                                        
80 Cambridge University Press has published the Encyclopaedia and Science of Logic. The draft 
form of Phenomenology of Geist is currently in circulation and will be published shortly. 
81 The schools are sketched in Graham Ward, 'How Hegel Became a Philosopher: Logos and the 
Economy of Logic’, Critical Research on Religion, I,3 (2013), 272. 
82 Adams notes that theological concerns are often marginal to introductions to German 
philosophy. See Adams, Eclipse, 1-2. 
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of reciprocal confession to intercession. I argue that these are not merely defensive 
revisions but reveal Bonhoeffer's conviction that Hegel's identification of God in the 
act of reconciliation, depicted largely as 'like-mindedness’, does not adequately 
account for the church's persistent, conflicted identity as the peccatorum communio. 
This is tied to Bonhoeffer's claim to the 'hiddenness of revelation’, which marks a 
further departure from Hegel. 
Chapter Two traces Bonhoeffer's retrieval of a theological 'history' that 
begins with the primal state and passes into the state of sin. To that end, I examine 
Creation and Fall, a 1932-33 exposition of Genesis 1-3, to show that Bonhoeffer is 
more indebted to Hegel than opposition to his predecessor’s claim of ‘divine 
knowledge’ would suggest. I argue that although Bonhoeffer takes exception to 
Hegel’s foreshortened reading of the protoevangelium, he adopts a similar account of 
the ‘cleaving’ mind that seeks to know good and evil. This depiction of split 
cognisance informs Bonhoeffer’s subversion of Hegel’s account of a volatile primal 
state, a protology that is elsewhere deployed to explain cultural supersession. Finally, 
I show how this engagement over Genesis 1-3 leads to Bonhoeffer’s claim about the 
Aufhebung of fallen knowledge in his later Ethics. 
 Part Two, ‘The Substitution of Christ’, makes Bonhoeffer's Christology 
lectures a primary resource, following on from my treatment of his dissertations and 
Genesis lectures in Part One. The reason for the centrality of these lectures is 
twofold. First, they are delivered in Summer semester 1933, coinciding with the 
Hegel seminar, Bonhoeffer’s closest engagement with the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion to that point. Second, it is important to compare Bonhoeffer's 
and Hegel’s uses of Christology in order to show the sharp critical edge of an 
‘eclectic’ reception. To this end, I highlight how Bonhoeffer charges Hegel as the 
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most refined examplar of 'docetism', a characterisation that expresses Bonhoeffer’s 
strongest point of departure. Years later, when Bonhoeffer speaks of a 'docetic-
idealist ecclesiology', the background of these Christology lectures helps to narrate 
why he would label a theory of the church as a Christological heresy. Although this 
theological line of criticism shows that Bonhoeffer identified a 'heterodox Hegel', 
this does not keep him from acknowledging Hegel's 'relative right', even in his 
secularisation of the union made present in the sacrament. 
Chapter Three focuses on Bonhoeffer's charge that Hegel’s work is a refined 
form of ‘docetism’, particularly the claim that Hegel’s distinction between ‘Idea’ and 
‘Appearance’ effectively divides a holistic Christology. Bonhoeffer therefore 
narrates a confrontation between the Gegenlogos and the Menschenlogos, setting 
Hegel firmly within the latter. Although Bonhoeffer seeks to depict Christ as the 
logos that disrupts human thought projects, I argue that the Gegenlogos is not 
‘against reason’ tout court. Rather, Bonhoeffer’s Christ disrupts human forms of 
classification that preconceive his freedom even as he remains the ‘hidden centre’ of 
Wissenschaft. To hold these two roles together, Bonhoeffer gestures towards a 
properly Christological use of reason, an endeavour that involves the eclectic use of 
Hegel’s philosophical project. 
Chapter Four treats the theme of Christ's ‘real presence’ as Word and 
Sacrament. I show that Bonhoeffer takes up many of the same emphases as Hegel, 
such as the primacy of truth over feeling and the continual need for mediation 
between members. Nevertheless, he makes a series of departures, particularly 
through the attempt to retrieve the preached Word as Sacrament in its own right 
against Hegel’s neglect of the sermon. This shift is focal to a series of Christological 
retrievals: while Hegel examines the transmission of doctrine by the spirited 
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community, Bonhoeffer argues that Christ is not doctrine but presence; while 
Hegel’s philosophical interest leads him to an account of the self-sufficient ‘Idea’, 
Bonhoeffer emphasises the contingency of ‘Address’. This chapter also provides a 
fuller contextualisation of Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel within a larger Lutheran-
Reformed polemic of the time, particularly Barth’s critique of Luther’s Eucharistic 
theology and the Hegelian response given by Bonhoeffer’s colleague Franz 
Hildebrandt.  
Part Four, ‘The Body of Christ Through “World History”’, traces the broader 
political and historical purview implied by Bonhoeffer’s critique of idealist 
‘confinement of the self’ and his modification of Hegel’s ‘God existing as 
community’. Moving on from Bonhoeffer's Christology lectures, the primary 
resources for this part are his later works, particularly Discipleship and Ethics. I seek 
to show that Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel cannot be reduced to his academic 
period, much less to his second, more philosophically-inclined dissertation. Rather, 
his very recovery of the church's 'confessional' identity is better understood when set 
against Hegel's era of 'deconfessionalisation'. Along the way, direct divergences 
come into view, such as that over the ethical import on the Sermon on the Mount or 
the importance of the Augsburg Confession. These all amount to Bonhoeffer's 
distinct account of revelatory community, which seeks to challenge a 'docetic-idealist 
ecclesiology' through a recovery of the visible church's Lebensraum. 
 Chapter Five challenges a hasty opposition between Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s 
political stances by first distinguishing their contextual readings of the Sermon on the 
Mount. Hegel is shown to style Jesus as a French revolutionary—a necessary but 
passing figure for freedoms later enshrined in the Protestant state. Bonhoeffer, 
diagnosing a ‘docetic-idealist ecclesiology’ to emerge as a result, seeks to resist state 
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overreach by reclaiming Jesus’ call to an ‘unbounded community’. Although these 
Lutheran thinkers read Jesus’ social ethic to different political ends, I argue that this 
should not obscure other points of convergence. Bonhoeffer’s claim in Discipleship 
that the Christ-community exists in a state of non-recognition is therefore set 
alongside two claims in his later Ethics that invite engagement with Hegel: the sharp 
critique of a trajectory of ‘absolute freedom’ emerging from France, and the 
acknowledgement of an embattled alliance between church and remnant-state in the 
preservation of right.  
Chapter Six deals with the intertwined themes of nation, ‘race’, and the shape 
accorded to history. I argue against representations of Hegel's thought that neglect his 
habit of critiquing ‘one-sided’ accounts, including the nationalism of his own time. I 
also trace his claim that the state can forfeit its own 'principle' and so incur guilt in its 
treatment of foreigners, comparing this with Bonhoeffer’s argument against the 
exclusion of Jewish persons. Acknowledging Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s similar 
concern to challenge 'one-sided' national accounts, I then explore the implications of 
Bonhoeffer’s turn from an account of the ‘shapes of Geist’ towards the ‘form of 
Christ’ as a trans-national confessing community. This chapter suggests that 
Bonhoeffer's language of the hidden centre, conditioned by a certain race-critical 
reception of Hegel, offers promise for challenging 'centrist' accounts of history, 





Part One – Beyond the Reflective Self 
 
Chapter One: Revelation as the Peccatorum Communio 
 
It belongs to the essence of the church that it still bears the 
community of sin within itself, and is real only in constantly 
overcoming it. 
- Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio 
 
Introduction 
A critical account of Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel must reckon with the 
alleged 'sins' of idealism. In his two dissertations, Bonhoeffer frequently renders 
idealism as an expression of the ‘confinement’ of the self, vividly portrayed in 
Luther's language of 'incurvature’. In Sanctorum Communio, this typically involves a 
broader 'idealist' foil, though Hegel is often singled out for both critique and 
appropriation.1 In Act and Being, Bonhoeffer makes a clearer distinction between 
'idealists’, therefore providing a more direct criticism of Hegel's language of Geist. 
In his most succinct critique, he states that 'the movement of Geist is turned in upon 
itself. In Luther's words, this is ratio in se ipsam incurva'.2   
 Hegel offers ample material for Bonhoeffer’s depiction of incurvature. To 
take one example, in the culminating section of the Phenomenology on 'absolute 
knowing' Hegel depicts his exercise in speculative philosophy as 'Geist knowing 
itself as Geist', narrating that '"I=I" is the self-reflecting movement'.3 The material 
surrounding Hegel's 'reflective' statements therefore seems to require little 
                                                            
1 In a lengthy footnote on idealism, Bonhoeffer highlights an issue of central concern, that is, the 
basis upon which the common nature and equal value of individuals is attempted, either by 
participation in universal reason (Kant-Fichte) or in objective and absolute Geist (Hegel). That 
notation includes figures such as Schleiermacher, and elsewhere he will even identify idealist 
tendencies in Kierkegaard. DBWE 1, 193-98n68; DBW 1, 130-33n68. The use of a composite foil is 
ironic given that Bonhoeffer criticises Hegel for the loss of personal distinction in rendering a 
collective. 
2 DBWE 2, 41-42; DBW 2, 34-35. 
3 PhG §798, 803. 
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investigation by Bonhoeffer critics, for whom this is a clear case of a thought project 
marked by 'self-confinement’.4 The charge has a long history in Bonhoeffer 
scholarship.5 
While such a line of criticism is important, I argue that the allegation of 
idealist 'self-confinement' has to be brought into fuller reckoning with Hegel's vision 
of the 'sociality of reason’. Only then can attention be focused on Bonhoeffer's most 
effective theological variations. Rather than locating Bonhoeffer's contribution as a 
philosophical shift from the closed to the open self, I show that his concerns are 
expressed by a change of subject from God to Christ and a change of act from 
reciprocal confession to intercessory prayer. I then contextualise these changes with 
the interests that will be explored throughout the thesis, namely, Bonhoeffer's 
attempt to reclaim the 'Word before Geist' and his emphasis on the 'hiddenness of 
revelation’.  
Investigation beyond the charge of self-confinement is crucial to an account 
of Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel, given that the Hegel-inspired phrase ‘Christ 
existing as community’ has been elevated to a focal point for Bonhoeffer's thought. 
Insofar as Hegel’s logic in this phrase challenges strong oppositions between divine 
and human agency, it is well suited to Bonhoeffer’s project of how revelation 
‘becomes’ the community.6 As it happens, Bonhoeffer, channelling Luther, regularly 
                                                            
4 For example, Rumscheidt writes that what had troubled Bonhoeffer ‘about the philosophy of 
idealism and the liberal theologies that built on it was the confinement to the self’. See Rumscheidt, 
‘Significance', in Frick, ed., Formation, 208. 
5 Bethge’s biography claims that Bonhoeffer’s second dissertation is ‘essentially addressing 
philosophers, whom he found guilty of the original sin of idealism, namely confinement in the self’. 
He continues that the philosophers did not recognise themselves in this characterisation, and he later 
sides with critics about Bonhoeffer's conceptual oversimplifications. Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: A Biography, Revised Edition, ed. Victoria Barnett, trans. Edwin Robertson et al 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000), 133-35. 
6 An example of this is Bonhoeffer’s most assured statement that ‘the church is the presence of 
Christ in the same way that Christ is the presence of God. The New Testament knows one form of 
revelation: Christ existing as community’. Bonhoeffer claims that ecclesial acts such as intercessory 
prayer must be ‘viewed from two angles’, challenging a stark division between human action and 
divine will. DBWE 1, 141, 186-7; DBW 1, 87, 124. 
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reverses subject and predicate in speaking of Christ and the church, making it 
difficult to discern the line between the social processes of confession and 
forgiveness, much less intercession, and divine revelation.7 As a result, Oswald 
Bayer challenges Bonhoeffer for not sufficiently differentiating Christology and 
ecclesiology, singling out ‘Christ existing as community’ as a ‘not unproblematic 
form’. In the same work he criticises Hegel for giving up the ‘externality’ of the 
Word, even that of the Host.8 It is worth a closer investigation, then, of both Hegel's 
project and the original context of Bonhoeffer's modification, which has largely 
fallen from view.9 
1.1. From Self-Confinement to Reciprocal Confession 
The charge that idealism expresses a sinful incurvature of the self, posed by 
Bonhoeffer and frequently adopted by critics, is here held up against Hegel's texts. I 
argue that Bonhoeffer's critical line on his predecessor will not be understood unless 
their common interest in reciprocal confession is acknowledged. I therefore show the 
importance Hegel gives to verbal confession over and against the moral isolation 
shown by the 'beautiful soul’. Such 'confessing' community may still be 'confined’, 
however, if moral isolation is overcome but an oppositional logic between human 
selves and divine agency remains. I therefore also treat Hegel’s challenge to such 
opposition in the phrase ‘God existing as community’. I conclude by showing how 
confession is similarly integral to Bonhoeffer's vision of community.  
                                                            
7 Among Luther’s phrases to which Bonhoeffer refers: ‘We are God through the love that makes 
us charitable toward our neighbour’. DBWE 1, 178-80; DBW 1, 117-18. 
8 See Oswald Bayer, Martin Luther’s Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation, trans. Thomas 
Trapp (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008), 271, 251. 
9 In the afterword to the German critical edition of Sanctorum Communio, Joachim von Soosten 
already observes that ‘in the debate over Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, this phrase has almost taken on a 
life of its own; consequently, its original meaning in Bonhoeffer has been almost totally obscured’. 
DBWE 1, 295; DBW 1, 311. 
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1.1.1. Hegel on the Confessions of the Beautiful Soul 
 Hegel's account of the 'sociality of reason' involves an incisive critique of the 
self-confined thinker. He then calls for acts of self-renunciation, or 'confession’, in 
order for a state of 'like-mindedness' to come about.10 Hegel therefore critiques the 
self that is buffered from the demands of reasoned exchange through his 
characterisation of the beautiful soul.11 He writes:  
It lacks the force to relinquish itself, that is, lacks the force to make 
itself into a thing and to suffer the burden of being. It lives with the 
anxiety that it will stain the glory of its inwardness by means of 
action and existence. Thus, to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees 
from contact with actuality, and it steadfastly perseveres in its 
obstinate powerlessness to renounce its own self, a self which has 
been intensified to the final point of abstraction…In this transparent 
purity of its moments it becomes an unhappy, so-called beautiful soul 
[schöne Seele], and its burning embers gradually die out, and as they 
do, the beautiful soul vanishes like a shapeless vapour dissolving into 
thin air.12 
 
In Hegel’s social logic, withdrawal leads towards the dissolution of the self, an ironic 
judgment because it is self-renunciation from which it fled.  
As Hegel develops this characterisation, the isolation of the beautiful soul 
shows itself accompanied by ‘judgmental consciousness’ about others’ moral 
actions. This is played out in his comment on the proverb ‘no man is a hero to his 
valet’.13 The valet sees how the master eats, drinks, and dresses, but this is not 
merely observation of the needs of a finite being. Rather, the valet imputes morally 
                                                            
10 The terms ‘minded’ and ‘like-minded’ are adopted from Terry Pinkard. 
11 This characterisation can be applied to Hegel's contemporaries, including Romantic 'ironists' 
such as Friedrich Schlegel, who highlighted the purity of one's own conscience in a given situation 
over and against the demand of general principles. Others might withdraw from action altogether in 
the 'rigorist' purity of their moral vision.  The different types provide for 'the very modern frenzy' for 
'counteraccusations of hypocrisy’, setting the stage for a 'fully modern Christian reconciliation that 
overcomes the partiality in such fragmented points of view’. Terry Pinkard, Hegel: A Biography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 215-16. 
12 PhG, §658. 
13 PhG, §665. On a biographical note, Hegel once donned a valet's costume for a New Year 
costume ball. He claims to have acquired it on the spot from the court doorman. Pinkard, Hegel, 248. 
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questionable motives to the contingency that compromises any action. In one 
example Hegel gives, if the master’s action is accompanied by fame, then the valet 
judges ‘this inwardness to be a craving for fame’.14 The valet’s imputation of motive 
is hypocritical because it ‘pretends that such judgment is not merely another manner 
of being evil but is rather itself the rightful consciousness of action’.15 'Evil' here is a 
reference to acting according to ‘one’s own inner law and conscience’.16 Given that 
the valet does not acknowledge he is also bound in this moral tension, such 
judgments show pusillanimity—an apt term for contraction of the self.17 The valet is 
a 'pure "particularist"', in Pinkard's words.18 
In Hegel’s account, this judgmental consciousness is called to confess its own 
‘evil’.19 In so doing, the confessant should expect a level of reciprocity, an 
acknowledgment of ‘selfsameness’ by the one who hears.20 If this is rejected, the 
confessor shows not only self-deception but a refusal of community and its 
sustenance in language:  
But following on the admission of the one who is evil—I am he—
there is no reciprocation of the same confession…the judging 
consciousness repels this community from itself; it is the hard heart 
which exists for itself and which rejects any continuity with the 
other…[the ‘confessant’] sees the other as somebody who refuses to 
let his own inwardness step forth into the existence of speech and as 
somebody who contrasts the beauty of his own soul to the soul of one 
                                                            
14 PhG, §665. 
15 PhG, §666. 
16 ‘It in fact confesses to being evil by way of its affirmation that it acts according to its own 
inner law and conscience in opposition to what is recognised as universal’. PhG, §662. 
17 Hegel’s edelmütig and niederträchtig are translated by Pinkard as ‘noble-minded’ and ‘base’, 
largely echoing A.V. Miller. Brandom renders edelmütig as ‘magnanimous’ and niederträchtig as 
‘pusillanimous’, referring to them as Hegel’s meta-attitudes towards the relations between norms (a 
term which mirrors Hegel’s use of necessity). See Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust: A Semantic 
Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology. 5.13.p.110-1, cf.161. This is available in its pre-publication draft 
form at http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/spirit_of_trust_2014.html (accessed July 31, 2014) 
18 Pinkard, Hegel, 248. 
19 Looking ahead to LPR, Hodgson notes that 'evil' becomes a rendition of 'sin’. See Hodgson, 
Hegel and Christian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 151n12. Bonhoeffer uses the 
terms Sünde and Böse interchangeably in the chapter on confession in Life Together. See DBWE 5, 
108; DBW 5, 93-94. 
20 PhG, §666. 
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who is evil. He sees the judgmental consciousness as somebody who 
sets his own stiff-necked selfsame character in opposition to the 
confessing consciousness, and he sees the utter silence of someone 
who keeps himself locked up within himself, who refuses to be 
discarded vis-à-vis an other.21 
 
The admission of the one who is evil—I am he [Ich bin’s]—is likely a reference to 
Isaiah 47:10, in Luther’s translation: Ich bin’s, und sonst keiner!—‘I am, and there is 
no other!’22 Identifying this allusion, Pinkard points out that the confessant speaks of 
‘having cleaved only to his own way of judging’.23  
This confession is rebuffed by the hard heart that denies continuity, revealing 
its solipsism by refusing even to speak in response. The alternative to such refusal is 
the movement toward forgiveness, which must be verbalised; ‘here once again we 
see language as the existence of Geist [Sprache als Dasein des Geistes]. Language is 
self-consciousness existing for others’.24 The necessarily spoken word reveals that 
the hard heart of judgmental consciousness has been broken. This involves 
acknowledging its share in a history of evil as well as responsibility for the work of 
reparation.25  
In this account of moral withdrawal and the alternative call to confession, 
Hegel employs a social logic derived from the heart of the Christian tradition. 
Though he does not share Hegel’s interest in religion, Robert Brandom comments 
that the use of forgiveness to convey this process of recognition invokes the petition 
of the Christian prayer in which one asks for one's sins to be forgiven as one forgives 
                                                            
21 PhG, §667. 
22 Is. 47:10, NRSV: ‘You felt secure in your wickedness; you said, “No one sees me.” Your 
wisdom and your knowledge led you astray, and you said in your heart, “I am, and there is no one 
besides me.”’ 
23 Terry Pinkard, ‘Semantic Self-Consciousness: Brandom on Hegel’ (Essay presented at the 
conference Language and Modernity, Freie Universität Berlin, 19-21 June, 2014), 12. 
24 PhG, §652. 
25 In Brandom’s version, forgiveness looks back over the evil aspect in the confessant’s history 
and recognises one’s own share in it. This is extended into what he calls ‘retroactivity’ in the concrete, 
practical response the confessor offers in restitution. Brandom, Spirit of Trust, 5.14. 225-9. 
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the sins of others.26 Brandom proposes the term ‘trust’ to convey the anticipatory 
aspect of a community venturing reciprocal confession, moving away from ‘irony’ 
by simultaneously acknowledging and invoking the authority of others to forgive.27 
In this account, Hegel’s treatment of confession troubles demarcation between the 
epistemic and the ethical, categories Bonhoeffer will distinguish sharply.28 The very 
process of knowing involves verbal, interpersonal relinquishment of erroneous, 
partial views.  
Anticipating Bonhoeffer’s own critique, there are two reasons to challenge 
Hegel’s depiction of confession and forgiveness. First, it can give rise to claims of a 
'Whiggish' process of revision, which Brandom presents along the lines of common 
law judges in deliberation, whereas institutional history offers a different story.29 The 
assumption being challenged here is that a rational actor will knowingly and 
willingly renounce evil, that is, deficiency with respect to a truly common mind. 
Bonhoeffer will take a similar critical line by articulating a fuller concept of sin and 
therefore the unreliability of conscience. 
Second, and relatedly, Hegel shows an ambivalence about, even attraction to, 
the figure of the 'beautiful soul’. For instance, Hegel employs the figure with 
reference to the earlier harmony of Greek politics before the fragmentary nature of 
modern life. In his 1809 Nuremberg address on Gymnasium education, Hegel 
advocates training in classical Greek sources by casting their value in secularised 
                                                            
26 The religion chapter of the Phenomenology comments back on a development already 
completed in the Spirit chapter, in which it is presented ‘in a more perspicuous form’. Brandom, Spirit 
of Trust, 5.14. 166-7, 219-20. 
27 Brandom, Spirit of Trust, 5.15. 220-1. 
28 Bonhoeffer’s claim that with regards to reality the ‘social’ category cannot be derived from the 
‘epistemological’, for this would be to change it into a different category. DBWE 1, 45; DBW 1, 26. 
29 Pinkard points out the stark contrast shown by the historic institution of such a procedure: 
‘After violently subjecting the Anglo-Saxon king and his subjects at Hastings, William sent out judges 
to various parts of his new domain to establish a “common law”. There the object was not to 
rationally extend some old rulings but to displace the old rulings root and branch and replace them 
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religious terms.30 He speaks of the higher paradise of Geist, characterising it with the 
image of the beautiful virginal bride, which had been associated with the 'beautiful 
soul' in Germany, particularly Württemberg. Hegel’s appreciative usage shows that, 
in spite of his earlier criticism, he remains somewhat in thrall to the persona.31  
1.1.2. Hegel on Knowledge of the Appearing God 
 The section on confession and forgiveness from the Phenomenology leads to 
a form of Geist that reveals the life of God in the midst of community. Confession 
shows that the 'hard heart' has been broken and that universality has found new 
recognition; as a result, 'the wounds of Geist heal and leave no scars behind'.32 
'Partitioned thought' is renounced as 'this first subject, which casts its actuality aside, 
makes itself into a sublated ‘this subject' [aufgehobenen Diesen], and thereby 
exhibits itself in fact as the universal'.33 The 'word of reconciliation' is 'existing 
Geist', which is to describe 'a reciprocal recognition which is absolute Geist'.34 God's 
appearance occurs in the knowing: 
The reconciling yes, in which both I’s let go of their opposed 
existence, is the existence of the I expanded into two-ness, which 
therein remains selfsame and which has the certainty of itself in its 
complete self-emptying and in its opposite – It is God appearing [der 
erscheinende Gott] in the midst of those who know themselves as 
pure knowledge [Wissen].35 
  
This is a strong example of Hegel's account of Geist as a rationally actualising—in 
this case, through the verbal acts of confession and reconciliation—social field 
                                                                                                                                                                        
with a new authority, one backed up by more than semantic sanctions. There was little to no 
“forgiveness” practiced there’. Pinkard, ‘Self-Consciousness’, 7-8. 
30 In his words, classical works offer a 'profane baptism' into 'taste and science'. The address is 
cited and summarised in Pinkard, Hegel, 283-5. 
31 As noted in Pinkard, Hegel, 284. 
32 PhG, §669. 
33 PhG, §670, alt. 
34 PhG, §670. 
35 PhG, §671. 
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within which God appears.36 The 'appearing God' of the Phenomenology provides a 
resonant background for Hegel's phrase 'God existing as community' from the later 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.  
 In the Lectures, Hegel challenges a firm barrier between academic disciplines 
by claiming that philosophy is, in its own peculiar way, Gottesdienst, or 'worship'.37 
Hegel's interest in the 'life of God' perceived in rational, communal processes of 
knowing continues as he argues repeatedly against the conviction of the age 'that 
God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings’, an immediacy 
then equated with religion.38 The further reason for this strong claim about 
philosophy is Hegel's challenge to theology about its own self-alienation, as seen in 
his portrayal of the theologian as the 'countinghouse clerk or cashier', bustling around 
with the 'alien truths of others'.39 Such activity leads, he claims, to the mere 
'knowledge that God is' and an arbitrary extension into ethics.40 In contrast, Hegel 
articulates Geist both philosophically—as a 'self-manifesting, a being for Geist’—
and, 'to put the point more theologically, God's Geist is [present] essentially in his 
community; God is Geist only insofar as God is in his community'.41  
 As Hegel is often accused of conflating God into community with such 
language, it is worth noting his early salvo against those who protest on behalf of a 
related set of distinctions. Such interventions cannot be simply invoked against 
philosophy as though they were novel, he claims: 'as if anyone who has not totally 
                                                            
36 God's appearing is in the 'minded' community, which implies the limitation of theology 
attempted through mere nature. Hegel makes this explicit in LPR II1, 120-21; VPR 1II, 89-90. 
37 The first part, 'The Concept of Religion', regularly states the distinction between philosophy 
and theology, even as Hegel seeks to challenge a firm division by appealing to their common interest 
in 'eternal truth’. LPR I, 79; VPR I, 64. 
38 Hodgson notes that Jacobi is primarily in view, although Schleiermacher's project is also likely 
intended. LPR I, 85-86; VPR I, 70. 
39 Relatedly, he goes on to speak about an adherence to the 'letter' in study of the Bible, rather 
than the animating spirit through which it is grasped. LPR 1, 92-94; VPR I, 76-77. 
40 LPR 1, 93; VPR I, 77. 
41 LPR 1, 90; VPR 1, 74. 
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neglected his education would not know that the finite is not the infinite, that subject 
is different from object, immediacy different from mediation'.42 The point is to think 
through such basic oppositions: 
We cannot point out earth apart from the heavens, and vice versa. 
Immediate and mediated knowledge are distinct from one another, 
and yet only a very modest investigation is needed in order to see 
that they are inseparable. Hence, before one is ready to proceed to 
philosophy of religion, one must be done with such one-sided 
forms.43 
 
Hegel thus introduces his term of art: 'Here is a unification in which the difference is 
not extinguished, but all the same it is sublated’.44 Hegel's argument here has been 
picked up by recent critics who have sought to argue against a loss of distinction 
between such pairings as divine and human agency, suggesting a ‘Chalcedonian 
logic’ at work, that is, a logic of ‘distinctness-in-inseparable unity’.45  
 True to Hegel’s characterisation of Geist, such 'Chalcedonian logic' is 
actualising, which is to say that it finds expression in ethical life. The emphasis on 
ethics comes in a lecture that reprises the theme of confession and forgiveness. Hegel 
depicts the experience of 'remorse and repentance in the inmost self', which involves 
a turn from 'the passions and intentions of particularity'.46 While this necessarily has 
its start within, it does not end there: 
This experience of nothingness can be a bare condition or single 
experience, or it can be thoroughly elaborated. If heart and will are 
earnestly and thoroughly cultivated for the universal and the true, 
then there is present what appears as ethical life. To that extent 
ethical life is the most genuine cultus.47  
                                                            
42 LPR 1, 97; VPR 1, 80. 
43 LPR 1, 98; VPR 1, 81. 
44 LPR 1, 99; VPR 1, 82. 
45 Drawing on the work of Martin Wendte, Adams uses Chalcedon as a model for describing 
Hegel’s logic of ‘distinctness-in-inseparable unity', opposing this to Manichean forms of thought. 
Adams, Eclipse, 6, 22-23. 
46 LPR 1, 194; VPR 1, 335. 
47 LPR 1, 194; VPR 1, 335. This phrase is marked in NL-VPR III, 236. 
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Hegel sees the church's particular claim of reconciliation to spread outwards. This is 
not to let go of its founding realisation, however, for he quickly states that 
'consciousness of the true, of the divine, of God, must be directly bound up with it'.48 
As a result he claims that philosophy is itself a 'continual cultus'.  
 The ensuing depiction of 'God existing as community' has to be read in light 
of these claims, for the community, however specific in its Lutheran Protestant—
which is to say, modern—form proceeds to a unifying state settlement. Such 
elaboration had not happened in the time of early Christianity, in Hegel's view, for 
there were culturally limiting factors surrounding Christ's appearance. Hegel 
therefore styles Jesus as a revolutionary, with the Kingdom of God as a negation of 
Jewish and Roman forms of life.49 Though vital and sure to prevail, the new religion 
Jesus preaches 'does not actually exist as a community'.50 It is therefore predictable 
that Jesus' life ends in an event of 'civil dishonour', although even this event would 
later be 'transfigured'.51  
 Besides, the implication runs, if one were looking for confirmation one 
should look to the community in which Jesus' aims are realised. In Hegel's famous 
line, 'the community itself is existing Geist, Geist in its existence, God existing as 
community'.52 This is the third moment, he continues, culminating aspects of the first 
(universality, not yet disclosed) and second (concrete, other-being) moments in the 
broader schema of the lectures. Although these ‘moments’ are loosely associated 
with Father and Son, they are not a clear 'modal' sequence. The complexity is clear in 
how the second moment is narrated 'such that the external appearance when inverted 
                                                            
48 LPR 1, 194; VPR 1, 335. 
49 LPR II1, 194-95; VPR 1II, 150-51. 
50 LPR II1, 194; VPR 1II, 150. 
51 LPR II1, 205; VPR 1II, 161. 
52 LPR II1, 256; VPR 1II, 198. 
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becomes the first moment and is known as the divine Idea, the identity of the divine 
and the human'.53 The third moment, Hegel continues, 'is this consciousness of God 
as Geist. This Geist as existing and realising itself is the community'.54  
 Hegel's dual emphasis on the reasoning character of the community and its 
need for confession is captured well by Rowan Williams. Williams explains that for 
Hegel the ‘life of God’ is expressed in the movement towards a community marked 
by ‘the making of rational connections, the overcoming of otherness not by reduction 
to identity but by the labour of discovering what understanding might be adequate to 
a conflictual and mobile reality without excising or devaluing its detail'.55 Williams 
ends this particular essay with reference to the social practices of religious tradition 
‘whose mark of godliness is self-critical vigilance (what used to be called 
repentance, I think)’.56 Williams' parenthetical reference raises the theological 
evocation that lies behind much of Hegel's thought, a theological background that 
Bonhoeffer will seek to retrieve.  
1.1.3. Bonhoeffer on the Confessing Community 
 As Hegel before him, Bonhoeffer sees confession as constitutive of the 
revelatory community. In his later Ethics, he calls for a recovery of the ‘divine office 
of private confession’ in order to reclaim a concrete ethics.57 In the same work, 
Bonhoeffer criticises the moral actor who not only distances herself from public life 
but judges others who take up such involvement. In one of six ethical orientations 
subject to Bonhoeffer’s critique, the ‘privately virtuous’ person is faulted for 
isolation:  
                                                            
53 LPR II1, 257; VPR 1II, 198. 
54 LPR II1, 257; VPR 1II, 198. 
55 Rowan Williams, ‘Hegel and the gods of Postmodernity’, Shadow of Spirit: Postmodernism 
and Religion, ed. Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick (London: Routledge, 1992), 76. 
56 Williams, 'Hegel', 79. 
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In flight from public controversy this person or that reaches the 
sanctuary of a private virtuousness…in voluntarily renouncing public 
life, these people know exactly how to observe the permitted 
boundaries that shield them from conflict. They must close their eyes 
and ears to the injustice around them. Only at the cost of self–
deception can they keep their private blamelessness clean from the 
stains of responsible action in the world.58 
 
If boundaries are not crossed and otherness remains absolute, the ensuing moral 
isolation becomes self-destructive or hypocritical. This buffered self bears likeness to 
Hegel’s ‘beautiful soul’, particularly as Bonhoeffer goes on to show the attendant 
contempt she holds for others.  
 Bonhoeffer's emphasis on reciprocal confession can be traced back through 
his works. In Life Together, Bonhoeffer invokes Luther to comment that the 
Christian life is ‘unthinkable’ without confession to another person.59 This is not 
solely confession to a cleric’s hearing, but a broad charge among believers. In terms 
reminiscent of Hegel’s symptoms of the hard heart, Bonhoeffer warns that if only 
one person hears confessions without himself confessing to another, he is liable to 
exercise a kind of spiritual tyranny in the community.60   
The importance of confessing one's sin to another is so critical that 
Bonhoeffer intertwines it with the 'confession' of doctrine. The verb bekennen thus 
takes on a dual meaning in his work: the first is to a scripturally derived theological 
statement of belief, a profession such as that adopted as the distinguishing mark of 
the ‘Confessing Church’ over and against the ‘German Christians’; the second is to 
                                                                                                                                                                        
57 ‘The Protestant church lost its concrete ethics when ministers saw themselves no longer 
permanently confronted with the questions and the responsibilities of the confessional’. DBWE 6, 395; 
DBW 6, 399. 
58 DBWE 6, 79-80; DBW 6, 65-66. 
59 DBWE 5, 114; DBW 5, 99. 
60 DBWE 5, 116, 124; DBW 5, 100, 139. When Bonhoeffer directed Finkenwalde seminary he 
ensured that each of his trainees were paired to act as confessors, with student Eberhard Bethge 
serving as his own. See Marsh, Strange, 235-7. 
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the admission of sin.61 This wordplay is particularly bold in an essay in which the 
international recognition of his church body was at stake:  
The Confessing Church [Die Bekennende Kirche] does not approach 
confessionally different churches as its mortal enemies who are 
intent on its demise; rather, it enters into such contact bearing its own 
share of the guilt [Schuld] for the inner turmoil of Christendom, 
enters into that guilt, and, amid all false theologies it may encounter 
along the way, acknowledges first of all its own guilt and the 
inadequate power of its own proclamation. It acknowledges God’s 
incomprehensible ways with the church. It is terrified by the serious 
nature of any church schism and by the burden such would impose 
on subsequent generations. It hears here the summons and 
admonition to accept responsibility and penitence. Given this 
situation, it will experience the entire distress of its own decision 
anew, and its own confession here will first of all be a confession of 
sin [Sündenbekenntnis].62 
 
In this dual use of bekennen, Bonhoeffer expresses that the church is composed 
through confession in two forms: doctrinal content and corporate penitence.63 It is 
striking that in the onset of the Kirchenkampf Bonhoeffer challenges an appeal to the 
‘purity’ of the Confessing Church, recognising the dangers of a beautiful corporate 
soul. 
1.2. The Turn to Intercession 
 Having acknowledged Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer's shared interest in auricular 
confession, I now consider the variations that attend Bonhoeffer's use of Hegel's 
phrase 'God existing as community'. I argue that the context of Bonhoeffer's change 
of subject, from God to Christ, is related to his change of act from reciprocal 
confession to intercessory prayer. These changes together express Bonhoeffer's 
                                                            
61 This latter meaning is also specifically indicated by the verb beichten. 
62 ‘The Confessing Church and the Ecumenical Movement’ appeared in August 1935 in the 
periodical Evangelische Theologie. See DBWE 14, 407, cf. 393-94n1; DBW 14, 393. 
63 Bonhoeffer’s dual sense of ‘confession’ holds together what Andrew Shanks, explicating 
Hegel, pulls apart in his book’s driving contrast: ‘truth-as-correctness’ and ‘truth-as-openness’. 
Unsurprisingly, Shanks allows that Nazi Germany is a case in which this breaks down, in which 
 43 
Christological specification, namely that the revelatory community is bound together 
by divine-human intercession and an ensuing ethic of standing in the place of 
another. Such an emphasis is required given Bonhoeffer's charge that idealism does 
not take seriously enough the obduracy of sin. 
1.2.1. Bonhoeffer on the Divine-Human Intercessor as Subject 
 Although Bonhoeffer emphasises auricular confession throughout his oeuvre, 
it is important to note its relative absence surrounding his most prominent use of the 
phrase 'Christ existing as community’. Near the end of Sanctorum Communio 
Bonhoeffer anticipates the emphasis on confession shown in later works by noting, ‘I 
consider it the most important task for today to make private confession of sin 
[Privatbeichte] a living source of strength for the church community’.64 
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer relegates his claim about recovering private confession to a 
footnote. The main body of text contains little elaboration on the act; in fact, in the 
most likely section for confession to be featured, directly prior to the forgiveness of 
sins between Christians, Bonhoeffer substitutes an extended treatment of intercessory 
prayer.  
 It is suggestive that the only time Bonhoeffer attributes the phrase ‘Christ 
existing as community’ to Hegel occurs as he elides verbal confession for a treatment 
of intercessory prayer. In an addition made while preparing the dissertation for 
publication, Bonhoeffer states: ‘when one person intercedes in the name of Christ on 
behalf of the other, the whole community—which actually means “Christ existing as 
community”, to use a modification of the Hegelian concept—participates in that 
                                                                                                                                                                        
‘openness’ meets its limits and ‘reluctant schism’ is warranted. See Andrew Shanks, A Neo-Hegelian 
Theology: The God of Greatest Hospitality (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), 25. 
64 DBWE 1, 248; DBW 1, 170 n117. In her recent Ph.D. thesis at the University of Cambridge, 
Nicola Wilkes takes this claim as indicative that confession is a central concern in Bonhoeffer's work. 
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person’s prayer'.65 The ensuing treatment of intercessory prayer shows that an 
acknowledged lack in Hegel’s project does not keep Bonhoeffer from appropriating 
his predecessor’s attempt to think divine and human agency together. This approach 
can be contrasted with those critics who merely identify the difficulty of envisioning 
petitionary prayer in light of Hegel's project.66   
 The act of intercession leads to a core theological, and derivatively ethical, 
posture: Stellvertretung, or 'vicarious representative action'. Confessional 
reciprocation is elided and not taken as a motivating factor. Rather, in the cases 
mentioned—Moses and Paul for the people of Israel, the church on behalf of the 
unknown sinner—there is no indication that confession is forthcoming. The 
displacement of confession suits Bonhoeffer's narration of the prior intervention of 
God-in-Christ. His language of vicariousness first emerges from the biblical concept 
of how God might regard a whole community as if all had repented.67 It is also the 
first instance of the key refrain he will later attribute to Hegel: ‘It is “Adam”, a 
collective person, who can only be superseded by the collective person “Christ 
existing as community”’.68  
 The act of intercession involves Bonhoeffer's own form of expansion beyond 
ecclesial bounds, even in this allegedly 'ecclesiocentric' book and well before the 
daring prison letters. The act is part of the 'self-renouncing work' that constitutes 
community, elaborated as part of Bonhoeffer's discussion of the church’s ‘being-for-
each-other [Das Füreinander]’. This involves advocacy to the extreme point of being 
                                                            
65 DBWE 1, 189; DBW 1, 126. 
66 As one example, Taylor admits to being baffled at the form of Hegelian prayer, picturing it 
along the lines of contemplating identity rather than taking the form of petition. Charles Taylor, Hegel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 494. O'Regan asserts that 'one cannot pray' in the 
Hegelian system. O'Regan, Anatomy, 131. 
67 This is in response to Abraham’s intercession for Sodom. DBWE 1, 120; DBW 1, 75. 
68 The verb rendered 'to supersede' is ablösen. DBWE 1, 121, alt.; DBW 1, 72. 
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willing to curse oneself out of communion with God for the sake of others.69 
Drawing on the scriptural accounts of how Moses and Paul were willing to set 
themselves outside of communion with God for the sake of their people, Bonhoeffer 
writes that this is ‘the abyss into which intercession can lead the individual'.70 Given 
his own identification with Moses near the end of his life, having assumed guilt 
within his nation and facing the prospect of dying before seeing the land on the other 
side of war, this early reference foreshadows the cost of his own action.71  
Even in a figure unknown to the one praying, such as the case of prayer for 
the ‘sins of the unknown sailor’, Bonhoeffer writes that ‘in intercession I step into 
the other’s place and my prayer, even though it remains my own, is nonetheless 
prayed out of the other’s affliction and need. I really enter into the other, into the 
other’s sin and affliction’.72 This is no gift of empathy; one finds such vicariousness 
through recognising a common culpability for the sins of the world, the ‘bonds of 
guilt’ that are most concentrated in the execution of Christ.73 In this way, 
intercessory prayer is the spoken word that enacts the unfolding consciousness of the 
peccatorum communio, the communion of sinners. It is a bold politics of identity.74 
 Bonhoeffer's treatment of intercession employs Luther to bring pressure to 
bear against Hegel's syntax of divine-human agency. This is seen in the provocative 
                                                            
69 It is said of Bonhoeffer’s forebear that ‘so nervous is Luther of founding justification in nobis 
that he speaks of a willingness to be damned as the one assurance of salvation’. See Matt Jenson, The 
Gravity of Sin: Augustine, Luther, and Barth on the homo incurvatus in se (London: T&T Clark, 
2006), 78. 
70 In so doing, Paul is an example of obedience ‘to the command that we should unreservedly 
surrender ourselves to our neighbour. But precisely for this very reason, he remains where he wishes 
God to ban him from, namely in the most intimate community with God’. DBWE 1, 185; DBW 1, 123. 
71 Bonhoeffer’s poem ‘Death of Moses’ reveals how he identified with the patriarch. See Craig 
Slane, ‘The Death of Moses: Why Moses?’ in Bernd Wannenwetsch, ed., Who Am I? Bonhoeffer’s 
Theology through his Poetry (London: T&T Clark 2009), 228-230. 
72 DBWE 1, 186-7; DBW 1, 124. 
73 DBWE 1, 187; DBW 1, 124-5. 
74 Guido De Graaff considers the resonances between a Christological account of intercession 
and the notion of 'civic sacrifice’. With a view to longstanding structural injustices, particularly those 
related to race, he queries how intercession relates to the question of who 'goes first'. See Guido De 
Graaff, 'Intercession as Political Ministry', Modern Theology 32:4 (October 2016), 504-521. 
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statement that ‘in our intercession we can become a Christ to our neighbour'.75 
Bonhoeffer characterises the church’s posture of being 'with' and 'for' one another as 
‘structural’ realities, including the bold statement from Luther that 'we are God 
through the love that makes us charitable to our neighbour'.76 As von Soosten points 
out, ‘this inseparable connection between ecclesiology and Christology, which 
already is present in Luther, can be pressed by Bonhoeffer to the point where the two 
become indistinguishable'.77 Bonhoeffer nevertheless sounds his recurrent caveat, 
familiar to his treatment of idealism, that this is not to imply ‘any mystical notions of 
blurring the boundaries of the concrete reality of I and You’, even if desire is 
singular and ‘the positions resulting from sin are, as it were, exchanged, or 
transformed'.78  
 Intercession across conflict becomes a stronger, more tensile bond for 
members. It also keeps at the fore the singular divine-human intercessor in whom the 
community is held together, its actualisation of that reconciliation notwithstanding. 
In the Hegel seminar it is observed that, as thinking is itself mediation, the mediator 
becomes 'superfluous' for Hegel, an observation Bonhoeffer seems to grasp already 
in this first dissertation.79 The shift to intercession allows Bonhoeffer to 
simultaneously articulate the 'hidden' quality of the revelatory community, its 
expression of Christ even in contingent, sinful history. Finally, the move avoids the 
risk of Geist seeming a new form of 'immediacy' that foregoes conflict.80 
                                                            
75 DBWE 1, 187; DBW 1, 125. 
76 WA 10/1:100; LW 11:412, as cited in DBWE 1, 178-9; DBW 1, 117-18. Bonhoeffer also makes 
reference to the work of his contemporary Berlin church historian Karl Holl, who claimed that the 
Reformer drew a strong link between Christ’s justifying work and the communal structure of the 
church. 
77 von Soosten, ‘Afterword’, DBWE 1, 293-4; DBW 1, 310. 
78 DBWE 1, 179-80; DBW 1, 118. 
79 HS, 11. 
80 Bonhoeffer will pick up this theme in Discipleship, where, writing against claims to 
'psychological immediacy' between church members, Bonhoeffer insists that intercession is in fact, 
'the most promising way to another'. DBWE 4, 96; DBW 4, 91. 
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1.2.2. Bonhoeffer on the Simultaneity of Sin 
 Intercession implies an ongoing dynamic of sin that obstructs communal bonds 
and requires intervention, a frank theological admission that recovers a dynamic 
missing in idealism. Bonhoeffer claims that the idealist concept of ‘imperfection’, as 
expressed in Kant, cannot satisfactorily account for acts of 'intentional evil', even 
within the church.81 He also resists the 'Hegelian position', which he takes to imply 
that the empirical church-community’s action 'as a whole’ amounts to the action of 
the Holy Spirit, so opening God to the objective Geist's susceptibility to evil.82 
Bonhoeffer states: 
For the Lutheran concept of the church it is crucial that the 
sanctorum communio always has been a community of sinners and 
remains so. This fact is ultimately the reason why the Hegelian 
theory is untenable. Absolute Geist does not simply enter into the 
subjective Geister, gathering them up into the objective Geist; rather, 
the Christian church is the church of the Word, that is, of faith. Real 
sanctification is only a precursor of the last things. Here we still walk 
in faith, which means we can see nothing but our sin, and accept our 
holiness in faith.83 
  
While the community has been given a new direction in Christ’s activity, Bonhoeffer 
refers to the fact that sinfulness remains active, even in church councils.84 He claims 
that such an understanding has been a new direction in recent theology, with likely 
reference to the work of Karl Holl.85 
 Such statements show Bonhoeffer applying the dynamism of the Lutheran 
simul not only to the individual sinner but also to the community as the peccatorum 
communio. The church is revelatory insofar as it lives out a historical dialectic: 
                                                            
81 Bonhoeffer claims that Luther’s concept of the iustus peccator remained foreign to Kant. 
DBWE 1, 210-14; DBW 1, 142-45. 
82 DBWE 1, 214; DBW 1, 144-45. 
83 DBW 1, 212; DBW 1, 143. 
84 DBWE 1, 214; DBW 1, 145. 
85 See DBWE 1, 213n268, cf. Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 68. 
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bearing the divisive effects of sin, coming to perceive its reality by faith, and actively 
turning away. In short, the church is the body of Christ ‘only insofar as God’s own 
self is at work in the act of repentance'.86 Further qualifying his use of Hegel's 
phrase, Bonhoeffer claims that only the community that is ‘holy in its sinfulness’ can 
stand as ‘Christ existing as church-community'.87  
 The acknowledgement of sin shows the other way in which Bonhoeffer 
construes revelation to be hidden in the peccatorum communio. The presence of sin 
does not entail the absence of revelation but rather reveals the one who exists as sin-
bearer, liberating the community to both acknowledge its own guilt and learn to bear 
the guilt of others. Such acknowledgement opens the Christ-community to a new 
form of social basic-relation: Stellvertretung, 'vicarious representative action'—first, 
by Christ alone, then derivatively by members for one another. Such a dynamic has 
to be kept in mind in Bonhoeffer's most assured deliveries of his core, Hegel-inspired 
refrain, such as when he states that ‘the church is the presence of Christ in the same 
way that Christ is the presence of God. The New Testament knows a form of 
revelation: “Christ existing as church-community”’.88  
 Revelation in the sinful community, not revelation in human persons 'as 
such', provides texture to accounts of how Bonhoeffer modifies Hegel. As Marsh 
argues with respect to Act and Being, Hegel's account of divine self-knowing is 
appropriated by Bonhoeffer with two differences: first, the freedom of God is 
preserved against a notion of the community as prerequisite for self-knowledge; 
second, the ‘transsubjective divine self-understanding’ is in the complex operations 
of community, apart from any individual act or the dialectical transcendence of the 
                                                            
86 DBWE 1, 214; DBW 1, 144. 
87 DBWE 1, 214; DBW 1, 144. 
88 DBWE 1, 141; DBW 1, 87. 
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Word alone.89 While these are helpful insights, Marsh makes little reference to the 
obstructive effects of sin as revelation occurs over and through communal reality.90 
1.3. Geist and the 'External' Word 
Having considered the pervasive sociality of Hegel's conception of reason, I 
have begun to show Bonhoeffer's qualifications to an account of reciprocal 
confession. In this section I provide further background to Bonhoeffer's variation on 
Hegel's view of community. To that end, I first summarise Hegel's broader notion of 
Geist, showing how any individual self is woven into a rationally actualising social 
field. I then trace Bonhoeffer's appropriation of Hegel's 'objective Geist’, noting his 
resistance to atomistic forms of thought driven by 'fear of Hegel’. Bonhoeffer's 
retrieval of the 'Word before Geist' is then traced, work that involves disrupting 
Hegel's trajectory through a theologically-conceived history of primal state, sin, and 
revelation. I conclude by questioning whether Bonhoeffer's claim to the reception of 
such a Word obviates the act of reflection. 
1.3.1. Hegel's Geist as Rationally Actualising Social Field 
 This first section offers a preliminary description of Geist in Hegel's usage, 
providing background to Bonhoeffer’s use of the term. Geist will be left untranslated 
for this exposition in order to avoid the unfortunate choice between 'spirit' and 'mind', 
while attempting to retrieve the latter meaning that is lost in the currently dominant 
rendition ‘spirit’.91 I particularly want to avoid a conflation of Geist and the 'Holy 
Spirit’, a relationship Hegel does not cleanly differentiate but which, I venture, is not 
identification without remainder. He will at times make reference to the Holy Spirit, 
the person who seems the primary referent for some uses of his term Geist, but I 
                                                            
89 Marsh, Reclaiming, 100-1. 
90 This criticism is made in Mawson, Christ, 171. 
91 The 1910 translation by J.B. Baillie was titled Phenomenology of Mind, a rendition of Geist 
also employed in Peter Singer, Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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argue that these are in the minority.92 My argument draws on Adams' claim that 
Hegel's 'spirit' is not the Holy Spirit, particularly not with respect to the Trinitarian 
life ad intra. It is, rather, predominantly a way of 'qualifying human action’.93 I 
acknowledge the theological importance, then, of reclaiming a 'divine actor with 
hypostatic density’.94 
 Hegel's account of Geist can be described as a rationally actualising social 
field. The indefinite article allows for the various expressions of Geist—those of 
individuals, peoples, and world—that exist in a 'reciprocally dependent' 
relationship.95 Hegel therefore speaks of philosophically conceived history in terms 
of tracing the 'shapes of Geist;' individual comprehension cannot stand alone, as it 
were, but needs to apprehend broader historico-cultural movements.96 Hegel's 
interweaving of the variety of levels, indicated by hybrid terms such as Volksgeist 
and Weltgeist, are constituent parts of his account of  'absolute' Geist.97  
 First, Geist is rational, which means that it is intelligible or, rather, 
intelligibility. Geist is therefore expressed in the broader ethos of Wissenschaft, with 
speculative philosophy as the discipline expressing it most clearly.98 When it comes 
to the final 'shape' of Geist in the Phenomenology, Hegel speaks of 'Geist knowing 
                                                            
92 Hegel therefore largely avoids O'Regan's charge that he denies the personhood of Geist in his 
distinctive form of Sabellianism. O'Regan, Anatomy, 261. 
93 Adams, Eclipse, 46. 
94 This is O’Regan’s description of von Balthasar's theological response to Hegel, which seeks to 
move beyond 'a name whose referent is the appropriating community in which it is supposed to 
inhere’. O'Regan, Anatomy, 200. 
95 This claim is offered in Robert Brown and Peter Hodgson, 'Editorial Introduction: Analytic 
Summary of the Texts’, in G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Vol. 1 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13. 
96 ‘Both because the substance of the individual, the world spirit, has possessed the patience to 
pass through these forms over a long stretch of time and to take upon itself the prodigious labour of 
world history, and because it could not have reached consciousness about itself in any lesser way, the 
individual spirit itself cannot comprehend its own substance with anything less’. PhG, §29. 
97 Inwood identifies nine different ways in which Hegel employs the term Geist, claiming that 
they are 'systematically related phases in the development of a single Geist’. Michael Inwood, A 
Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 275-76. 
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itself in the shape of Geist, that is, it is comprehending conceptual knowledge 
[begreifende Wissen]’.99 The emphasis on conceptual clarity differentiates Hegel 
from other 'expressivist' accounts, for in Taylor's words: 
the essence of subjectivity is rational self-awareness, that self-
consciousness must be in the clear medium of conceptual thought 
and not in cloudy intuition or ineffable vision. Hence rationality, too, 
is for him a condition of integral expression or freedom, and 
reciprocally [sic].100 
 
This elevation of thought over 'feeling’, particularly in religious expression, is 
conditioned by Hegel's influential disagreements with Schleiermacher.101 Ultimately, 
Hegel states a consummative quality to Wissenschaft following on the content of 
religion.102 Philosophical inquiry plays a leading role in the movement of Geist, not 
only discovering these shapes but instantiating them; thinkers perform true work, or 
'labour’.103  
 Hegel's depiction of reason is profoundly shaped by Lutheran theological 
claims, particularly those surrounding the movement of incarnation and cross.104 
Thought is articulated as a passage of self-emptying, even death: 'Geist only wins its 
truth by finding its feet within its absolute disruption’.105 Hegel's claims to the self-
reflection of Geist have to be conditioned by his statement that Geist is neither 
marked by self-withdrawal nor absorption in what is known, but rather a process of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
98 The disciplinary claim is found in PhG, §37. The broader academic currents of 
Wissenschaftsideologie are traced in Zachary Purvis, Theology and the University in Nineteenth-
Century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77-85. 
99 PhG, §798. 
100 Taylor goes on to mention the Romantics and the Sturm und Drang movement as the 
background against which Hegel defined himself. Taylor, Hegel, 89. 
101 Dorrien states that Hegel understood Schleiermacher's finer distinctons, such as that between 
'sensibility' [Empfindung] and 'feeling' [Gefühl]. In spite of his important similarities, however, Hegel 
often 'resorted to polemical blasting’. Dorrien, KRHS, 213. 
102 Hegel states that 'the content of religion expresses what Geist is earlier in time than science 
[Wissenschaft] does, but it is science which is Geist's true knowledge of itself’. PhG, §802. Pinkard 
claims that Hegel's view in 1806 is that religion is 'subordinate' to philosophical reflection. Pinkard, 
Hegel, 217. 
103 See Adams, Eclipse, 91-3. 
104 This is famously expressed in the reference to the 'Golgotha of absolute Geist' in PhG, §808. 
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self-emptying.106 Therefore, the apprehension of the rational aspect of reality is not 
immediate but requires the subject's division, both from 'nature' and within herself, 
on the way to the mediated recovery of unified reason.107  
 Second, the rational character of Geist is actualising. Hegel claims that 'the 
force of Geist is only as great as its expression’.108 Moreover, the 'propelling' 
movement of Geist's self-knowledge is called the work that Geist 'accomplishes as 
actual history [wirkliche Geschichte]’.109 Hegel's account draws on an Aristotelian 
characterisation of reason as 'purposive activity’, with the related notion of reason as 
inseparable from material embodiment.110 Reason, apprehending the 'Idea’, is not a 
separate arena that can be dualistically conceived; a constitutive aspect of reason is 
that it is efficacious, leading to establishment as a particular community. Mirroring 
the journey of individual Geist, different 'shapes' occur across historical or cultural 
milieux. Nevertheless, there is continuity between the shapes such that one can speak 
of phenomenology of Geist in the singular: Hegel looks back on 'a languid 
movement and succession of [Geister], a gallery of pictures’, of which each is 
'endowed with the entire wealth of Geist’.111  
 Third, Geist is social. Hegel argues that self-consciousness exists only in the 
encounter, even opposition, with another irreducible self-consciousness. In this 
famous passage, he leads up to the shorthand phrase that conveys the social space 
constituting mind: 
By a self-consciousness being the object, the object is just as much 
an I as it is an object. – The concept of Geist is thereby on hand for 
                                                                                                                                                                        
105 PhG, §32. 
106 PhG, §804. 
107 See Taylor, Hegel, 84-86. 
108 PhG, §10. 
109 Note that Hegel states 'as' rather than 'in' history, a claim that bears comparison to 'God 
existing as community’. PhG, §803. 
110 PhG, §22. Taylor refers to 'hylomorphism' for the relation of matter to form that Hegel adopts 
from the Aristotelian tradition. Taylor, Hegel, 82. 
 53 
us. What will later come to be for consciousness will be the 
experience of what Geist is, that is, this absolute substance which 
constitutes the unity of its oppositions in their complete freedom and 
self-sufficiency, namely, in the oppositions of the various self-
consciousnesses existing for themselves: The I that is we and the we 
that is I.112 
 
In Pinkard's gloss of the concluding line, 'we are each "minded" only to the extent 
that others are so "like-minded."'113 This interpersonal language segues into the 
manner in which Geist actualises as institutions, from the entirety of the state through 
to a couple's marriage, with their respective linguistic and cultural components. This 
is what is intended by the term 'objective Geist' that Bonhoeffer will appropriate: the 
manner in which social relations should be accounted for not merely by summing up 
individual wills, but by seeing the way in which their interplay exhibits a 'life of its 
own’. 
 Fourth, and finally, Geist is a field—a term taken in its metaphorical and 
geographical senses. A metaphorical 'field' can refer to an arena of knowledge, which 
captures part of what Hegel intends but does not include the concrete sense in which 
he sees Geist to both emerge and find its actualisation. The sense in which 'field' is 
also a specific territory is evident when Hegel discusses the geographical and 
climatic conditions to world history that either enable or hinder the emergence of 
Geist. When Hegel speaks of Volksgeister, then, he intends to convey not only the 
meeting of minds that makes up a culture, but its material, even topographical 
conditions.  
As Volksgeist suggests, a brief, general definition of Geist must be further 
specified according to Hegel's various hybrid terms.114 Nevertheless, taking Geist as 
                                                                                                                                                                        
111 PhG, §808. 
112 PhG, §177. 
113 Pinkard, Hegel, 217. 
114 A task to which I return in 6.5.1. 
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a rationally actualising social field provides a strong basis for comparison with 
Bonhoeffer’s own interpretation of Hegel’s term of art. 
1.3.2. Bonhoeffer's Appropriation of Objective Geist 
Hegel's theory of 'objective Geist' provides Bonhoeffer with a key concept of 
mediating institution that serves his ecclesiology. In Sanctorum Communio, 
Bonhoeffer adopts the notion of Geist as a collective spirit and rationality that 
inheres within different groups, such as family, civil society, and state. Bonhoeffer's 
adaptation of 'objective Geist' is the point at which he issues his clearest appreciation 
of Hegel.115 The statement is tied to his deepest critical point: 
The tragedy of all idealist philosophy was that it never ultimately 
broke through to personal Geist. However, its monumental 
perception, especially in Hegel, was that the principle of Geist is 
something objective, extending beyond everything individual—that 
there is an objective Geist, the Geist of sociality, which is distinct in 
itself from all individual Geist. Our task is to affirm the latter without 
denying the former, to retain the perception without committing the 
error.116 
 
This statement shows that Hegel provides Bonhoeffer with an alternative theory to 
'atomistic' philosophies.117 Bonhoeffer's concern in nevertheless preserving 
'individual' Geist leads him towards critical variation: ‘our turning against idealist 
theory is clear; equally clear, of course, is what we have to learn from it’.118  
What 'we have to learn' consists of a vital theory about the historical, 
institutional aspects of 'revelatory community’. Objective Geist is both generated by 
                                                            
115 Bonhoeffer footnotes his reference with suggestions for pursuing this whole subject in 
Hegel’s Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. See DBW 1, 62n29. See also DBWE 1, 
197n68. 
116 DBWE 1, 74; DBW 1, 46. 
117 The concern with individualism emerges at several points in the two dissertations as 
Bonhoeffer refers to a nominalist position on the individual along with other views he terms 
“atomist.” DBWE 1, 38-39; DBW 1, 21-22. At one point he states that nominalism is utterly alien to 
Idealism, even claiming it as a tradition that fails to see humanity in light of the unity of God, here 
referencing Seeberg. DBWE 2, 49n18, 102; DBW 2, 43n18, 98. 
118 DBWE 1, 75n43; DBW 1, 47n43 [SC-A]. 
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social formation and generative in turn: ‘it has an active will of its own that orders 
and guides the wills of the members who constitute it and participate in it, and that 
takes shape in specific forms, thereby providing visible evidence that it has a life of 
its own’.119 Objective Geist therefore provides a contrast to both 'unformed' and 
'subjective' Geister by offering a ‘structure’ formed through the convergence of 
wills, a third entity that exists independently from them.120 It is this ‘metaphysical 
hypostatizing’ that sociology has sought to move beyond, a movement Bonhoeffer 
describes as motivated by the 'fear of Hegel’, which draws back from the challenge 
his notion of Volksgeist poses to individualism.121 This challenge is taken up by 
Bonhoeffer, who goes on to claim that Christ's work resulted in a history that 
‘manifests the community’s objective Geist in its being and becoming, in transmitted 
forms and structures, and in current vitality and activity’.122  
What Bonhoeffer would 'turn against' is the idealist tendency to relinquish 
individual Geist in favour of a corporate spirit. Notably, Bonhoeffer distinguishes 
Hegel as better at preserving the individual than other idealists.123 Nevertheless, 
Bonhoeffer claims that this problematic, general trend arises because idealism lacks a 
‘concrete concept’ of the person:  
Everywhere we find the same picture. The Geist is one, eternally 
identical, transpersonal, immanent in humanity; it destroys the 
concrete person, and thus prevents any concrete concept of 
community, instead replacing it with the immanent unity of 
Geistenheit.124 
                                                            
119 DBWE 1, 209; DBW 1, 141. 
120 DBWE 1, 97-98; DBW 1, 62. 
121 DBWE 1, 102; DBW 1, 65. 
122 DBWE 1, 209; DBW 1, 140. 
123 Following Bonhoeffer’s diagnosis that Fichte’s ‘great self’ of the state requires too much 
surrender from individuals, he claims that Hegel is able to maintain a clearer sense for concrete 
individual life. See DBWE 1, 193-8n68; DBW 1, 130-133n68. Still, Bonhoeffer's concern is expressed 
by citing Hegel's statement that ‘Geist has reality, and individuals are its accidents’. DBWE 1, 103; 
DBW 1, 66. Bonhoeffer’s reference is Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Natural Right and 
Political Science. 
124 DBWE 1, 194-98; DBW 1, 131 
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Bonhoeffer argues that this results from confusing the categories of the 
'epistemological' and the 'social’. The social category, he claims, allows for the 
thinker to be shaken out of its claim to universal validity through a barrier that 
confronts the ‘self-knowing and self-active Geist’.125 Bonhoeffer therefore 
entrenches his account at the encounter of the ‘You’—another self-conscious spirit, a 
‘being of alien consciousness’.126 Rather than the intimate language of encounter of 
some personalist philosophy, the agonistic encounter of wills marks Bonhoeffer’s 
sociality: interpersonal encounter entails that 'each one wrestles to overcome the 
other’, a phenomenon that reveals 'the fundamental significance of sociality of the 
human Geist'.127  
 In Bonhoeffer’s estimation, such conflictual encounter is more dynamic than 
'organic' or 'metaphysical' models of human sociality. While an appeal to 
confrontation between self-consciousnesses may challenge some idealists, however, 
it does not so easily break with Hegel, whose master-slave dialectic requires 
reckoning. Bonhoeffer's more effective response comes in his attempt to differentiate 
the dynamics of objective Geist according to its theological 'state’. For instance, 
conflict is seen as either productive or stultifying depending on whether it occurs 
within the primal, sinful, or revelatory state. 
 Bonhoeffer's characterisation of Geist in the primal state offers his freest 
adoption of Hegel's social philosophy, as mediated through his doctoral supervisor 
Reinhold Seeberg.128 Bonhoeffer speaks of Geist as a 'web of sociality' that involves 
                                                            
125 His ensuing use of the term ‘real dialectic’ picks up Eberhard Grisebach’s critique of idealist 
philosophy, prioritising instead the existential confrontation between persons. DBWE 1, 45; DBW 1, 
26. 
126 DBWE 1, 71; DBW 1, 44. 
127 DBWE 1, 72; DBW 1, 45. 
128 Bonhoeffer begins by crediting his doctoral supervisor Seeberg with retrieving the notion of 
'sociality' as inherent in primal state. Bonhoeffer notes that the first one to explore this is 
 57 
both personal 'openness' and 'closure’.129 As to personal openness, Bonhoeffer 
claims that there is no a- or pre-social centre; 'I and You' cannot be conceived apart 
from their unity.130 Thinking and willing only come about through the 'reciprocal 
interaction with other minds [Geistern]’.131 Here Bonhoeffer demurs, asking if it is 
still intelligible to speak of I and You: ‘Does not everything that appears individual 
merely participate in the one, supra-individual working of Geist [Geistwirken]?’132 In 
response he treats personal being as also structurally closed. Using the image of a 
sea of surrounding Geist, Bonhoeffer states: 'The more the individual Geist develops, 
the more it plunges into the stream of objective Geist, the more it becomes a bearer 
of objective Geist, and this immersion is precisely what strengthens the individual 
Geistigkeit’.133 This description is, as Mawson notes, hard to distinguish from 
Hegel's account of the 'deepening of individual subjectivity—"in and for itself"—
through an existence that recognizes and is directed towards an other’.134 
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer's qualified appreciation of Hegel is shown by the fact that 
he sets this initial account of Geist in the primal state—an implicit reminder of his 
claim that idealism does not reckon with the pervasive effects of sin.135 In light of the 
change in conditions, Mawson states that Bonhoeffer comes to offer a 'Hegelianism 
without closure’.136 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Schleiermacher, who only went so far as marking the union of self-consciousness and species 
consciousness. DBW 1, 64n1. Although a significant early influence, references to Seeberg wane after 
Bonhoeffer's dissertations, whereas he goes on engaging Hegel through the 1930s. For a fuller account 
of Seeberg's influence on Bonhoeffer, both positive and negative, see Rumscheidt, ‘Significance’, in 
Frick, ed., Formation, 202. 
129 DBWE 1, 65; DBW 1, 39. 
130 Bonhoeffer challenges the formulation of Fichte’s synthesis of the realm of Geist for first 
conceiving an I and You separately and then proceeding to inquire about unity: ‘The question of the 
alien psyche, the question how one finds one’s way to the other, is not sufficiently informed by the 
fact of the unity of all activity of spirit’. DBWE 1, 75-76; DBW 1, 47-48. 
131 DBWE 1, 68-9; DBW 1, 42. 
132 DBWE 1, 73; DBW 1, 45. 
133 DBWE 1, 73; DBW 1, 46. 
134 Mawson, Christ, 101. 
135 Mawson, Christ, 129. 
136 Mawson, Christ, 104. 
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 Given that the primal state has been irretrievably lost, Bonhoeffer's narration of 
objective Geist is conditioned by the states of sin and revelation. These states are 
then conveyed through the scriptural figures of Adam and Christ, through whom 
Bonhoeffer seeks to develop Geist-language as a corrective to Hegel’s account. In 
Sanctorum Communio, these figures are introduced through the notion of the 
'collective person [Kollektivperson]’.137 Even after the primal state, Bonhoeffer's 
account of the revelatory community retains Hegel's language. Bonhoeffer speaks of 
the 'objective Geist' of the church as the bearer of the historical influence of Jesus 
Christ and the social influence of the Holy Spirit in cooperation.138  
 The Holy Spirit has a key role in 'actualising' the church in Sanctorum 
Communio, revealing Bonhoeffer's selective willingness to work in pneumatology.139 
While Christ’s redemptive work through death is singular, he states, it is of a piece 
with the Holy Spirit’s extension into the empirical form of the church; ‘In the 
resurrection [the church] is “created” only insofar as it has now run the course of its 
dialectical history’.140 Then, in a description that previews his later engagement with 
Hegel on this point, Bonhoeffer describes the transitional period between incarnate 
Christ and the outpouring of the Spirit in these words: 
The time between the resurrection and the ascension and the time 
after Pentecost are different insofar as in the first case the disciple-
community lives in Christ as its Lord and life-principle, whereas in 
the second case Christ lives in the community. Formerly the disciple-
                                                            
137 In granting this key status to the collective person, Bonhoeffer sees himself to be preserving 
the core ideas of ‘romantic-idealist philosophy’ while sustaining his pursuit of a ‘concrete 
philosophy’. This allows him to both incorporate the socio-ethical conflict that is the I-You relation, 
while also providing for the 'collective person' to confront its members in turn. DBWE 1, 105n142 
[SC-A]. 
138 DBWE 1, 210; DBW 1, 141. Bonhoeffer's emphasises the 'magisterial' bearing of the Spirit in 
its confrontation with the human will in his early 'Seminar Paper on the Holy Spirit According to 
Luther' treats Luther's Disputations of 1535-45. See DBWE 9, 325-370; DBW 9 355-410. 
139 Pace critics such as David Höhne and Rachel Muers. See Mawson, Christ, 185-86. 
140 DBWE 1, 152; DBW 1, 96. 
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community ‘represented’ Christ; now it possesses him as revelation, 
as Geist.141 
 
Bonhoeffer then asks how Christus-Geist and 'the Holy Spirit of the sanctorum 
communio' are related to the objective Geist of the empirical church-community.142 
He holds that continued reference to the presence of Christ is needed because the 
Spirit is never conceived as bearing a body, citing Seeberg to dismiss the notion of 
the Spirit becoming ‘incarnate’ in the church, largely due to the complication of 
human sinfulness. How the revelatory community exists simultaneously as 
peccatorum communio leads him to highlight the recurrent need for a disruption of 
the Word. 
 Although Bonhoeffer does not use the concept of ‘objective Geist’ as overtly in 
Act and Being, he carries on using collective figures. In that work, Bonhoeffer argues 
that one cannot simply appeal to the primal state, or protology, in ethics: 'concepts of 
being, insofar as they are acquired from revelation, are always determined by the 
concepts of sin and grace, "Adam" and Christ’.143 Lengthy treatments follow on the 
different modes of perception and social postures respective to Sein in Adam and 
Sein in Christus.144 Representations of collectivity will feature in his later polemics, 
releasing him from the temptation to vilify individual enemies of the church.145 
1.3.3. Bonhoeffer’s Recovery of the Word Before Geist 
 The previous section has shown Bonhoeffer's appropriation of objective 
Geist, from which he distinguishes the action of the 'Christus-Geist’. Such distinction 
                                                            
141 DBWE 1, 152; DBW 1, 96. 
142 DBWE 1, 210; DBW 1, 141. 
143 DBWE 2, 32; DBW 2, 26. 
144 These are contrasted in part C of the work. DBWE 2, 136-161; DBW 2, 135-162. 
145 Bonhoeffer writes that the breach between the Confessing Church and the German Christians 
is not ‘a judgment concerning Christian or unchristian persons, but rather one concerning the spirit of 
a church that has been recognized and condemned as an antichristian spirit…The issue here is not 
persons but churches, a matter of Christ and the Antichrist’. DBWE 14, 406; DBW 14, 391-2. 
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is primarily conveyed through his theologically rich concept of the 'Word’.146 In 
Sanctorum Communio, the Word is the mediatorial action shared by Christ and the 
Spirit as a disruption of the constantly encroaching dynamic of sin. Claiming 
theological priority to Hegel’s account, Bonhoeffer comes to speak of the necessity 
of recovering the 'Word before Geist’. 
 The Word provides, first, the mediated presence of Christ—a substitution for 
Hegel's predominant language of ‘God’ or Geist. The 'Spirit-impelled' Word is also 
the Word 'of the crucified and risen Lord of the church’.147 It is the Word of Christ 
that makes present the 'actualised' community, for 'every word of Christ comes out of 
that community and exists only in it’.148 Such actualisation requires, however, 
revelation of the enduring sin that idealist accounts have not adequately fathomed. 
Bonhoeffer asserts: 
The ‘Word’ is the rock upon which the idealist Geist–monism 
founders; for the Word implies that sin still exists, that the absolute 
Geist has to fight for its rule, that the church remains a church of 
sinners.149  
 
Given that Bonhoeffer had spoken about the 'stream of Geist' in the primal state, the 
Word as a rock vividly portrays disruption to that flow.  
 Bonhoeffer's retrieval of the 'external' Word becomes more pointed in Act 
and Being. He states that 'what reason can perceive from itself (as Hegel puts it) is 
revelation, and so God is completely locked into consciousness’.150 Bonhoeffer 
continues that human 'reflection’, as it takes the form of religion, is equated with 
                                                            
146 Bonhoeffer's Christologically and scripturally determined concept of the Word will be 
capitalised to indicate its technical usage, which is further explored in 4.2.2. Along with a basis in 
Luther’s theology, Bonhoeffer’s rich conceptuality for the Word is drawn, in part, from the work of 
Karl Barth. For the early works that are the subject of this chapter, Bonhoeffer had access to Barth's 
Romans as well as the essays collected in The Word of God and the Word of Man, which he acquired 
in 1924-25. See Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 73.  
147 DBWE 1, 157; DBW 1, 100. 
148 DBWE 1, 158; DBW 1, 101. 
149 DBWE 1, 212; DBW 1, 143. 
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revelation, a merger that means 'there is no room for faith and Word, if they are seen 
as entities contrary to reason’.151 Bonhoeffer does not say that the faith-creating 
Word is necessarily and thoroughly 'counter-reason;' rather, he wants to re-establish 
its priority to Geist. Previewing his later recovery in the wake of Hegel's post-
confessional philosophy, Bonhoeffer cites the claim from the Augsburg Confession 
that Deus non potest apprehendi nisi per verbum.152 Bonhoeffer's confessional 
emphasis on the Word is an attempt to disrupt the notion of what he perceives as the 
pervasive assumption of idealism, namely, 'the inmost identity of I and God’, picking 
up from the expression that 'like is known only through like’.153 Hegel roots the 
claim to identity in creation according to the 'image and likeness of God’, although 
acknowledging that it is by no means an 'immediate' reality; Bonhoeffer seeks to 
show the extent of the loss of likeness brought about by the Fall.154  
 Returning to Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer's emphasis on the Word 
allows him to maintain the apparent opposition of the Lutheran simul. Opposing a 
claim to 'organic' unity in the church, Bonhoeffer claims that the Word must 
rhythmically disrupt, and rebuild, communal life. The Word's disruption entails both 
the encounter of the living Christ and the hearing of scripture, particularly in 
preaching.155 This means that Bonhoeffer disavows knowledge through ‘speculative 
theories’, which likely includes Hegel's social philosophy, or any proof ‘generally 
necessary’ on the basis of creation; rather, ‘all statements are possible only on the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
150 DBWE 2, 53; DBW 2, 56. 
151 DBWE 2, 53; DBW 2, 46. 
152 The reference is taken from Augsburg Confession 2,67, cited on DBWE 2, 53; DBW 2, 47. 
Rumscheidt suggests the translation 'God does not let the divine self be known or grasped save in and 
through the Word alone’. Compare Article IV, 67 in 'Apology of the Augsburg Confession’, The Book 
of Concord, ed. and trans. Theodore Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 116. 
153 DBWE 2, 53; DBW 2, 47. 
154 Bonhoeffer will proceed to engage Hegel over Genesis 1-3 as an extension of this early 
conviction that the Word precedes Geist, an interaction treated in Chapter Two. 
155 The encounter with Christ as the Gegenlogos will be examined in Chapter Three, while the 
Word as preached Scripture and Sacrament will be the subject of Chapter Four. 
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basis of our understanding of the church, i.e., from the revelation we have heard’.156 
The Word is the only fixed point for the community, around which the church is 
broken up into the ‘community-of-the-cross’ and built up as the ‘Easter-
community’.157  
 The prioritisation of hearing over conceptual 'structure' is related to the 
philosophical importance of language for Bonhoeffer. In a brief but suggestive 
reference he states that 'the social phenomenon of language is so closely related to 
thought that one may surely say that it is chiefly language that renders thought 
possible—hence the ordering of language before thought, and word before Geist 
(Hamann)’.158 Reference to the work of J.G. Hamann comes in Bonhoeffer's attempt 
to retrieve a biblical framework that precedes the conceptual field that is Geist.  
 The emphasis on language over shapes of Geist helps to explain Bonhoeffer's 
criticism of idealist notions of time. He identifies the problem of time in elaborating 
his concept of the person ‘over against and beyond idealism’s understanding’, which 
he characterises, from epistemology through ethics, as ‘essentially a timeless way of 
thinking’.159 Idealism has no conception of movement, Bonhoeffer continues, 
describing the dialectic of mind as abstract and metaphysical, while that of ethics 
ought to be concrete.160 Such concretion is found, he claims, in the 'historical 
dialectic' of theological thinking about the church.  
As with many aspects of Bonhoeffer's idealist foil, the charge of timelessness 
is difficult to apply against Hegel, who is a profoundly historical thinker. It is likely 
best to understand Bonhoeffer's characterisation working with those elements in 
                                                            
156 DBWE 1, 65; DBW 1, 39. 
157 DBWE 1, 213-14; DBW 1, 144. 
158 Bonhoeffer does not appear to be consulting Hamann's texts directly; Clifford Green traces 
the reference to Windelband's History of Philosophy. DBWE 1, 69n24; DBW 1, 42. 
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Hegel's philosophy that make a claim to a-temporality for the 'concept'.161 In one 
memorable rendition, Hegel's concept is said to be 'de-tensed’.162 Nevertheless, 
Hegel does not see 'absolute knowing' as an ultimately one-sided settlement, for he 
makes reference to a 'unity of thought and time’, seeking to preserve several 
'historicist' convictions.163 
While Bonhoeffer would be suspicious of the elevation of a 'de-tensed' 
concept, his primary concern is with a theological history, that is, the determinative 
states named primal, sinful, and revelatory. For now, Bonhoeffer seeks to prise apart 
an a-temporal concept, which is to say, to reintroduce a 'real historical dialectic’. He 
does this in order to re-examine its theologically-narrated constitutive parts, arguing 
that: 
The concept of Christian community proves to be defined by an inner 
history. It cannot be understood ‘in itself’, but only in a historical 
dialectic. The concept is split within itself; its inner history can be 
seen in the concepts of primal state, sin, and revelation, all of which 
can be fully understood only when seen as intending community….It 
belongs to the essence of the church that it still bears the community 
of sin within itself, and is real only in constantly overcoming it.164 
 
Bonhoeffer adds that 'in this respect we differ fundamentally from idealism, for 
which origin and telos stand in real, unbroken connection, the synthesis of which is 
expressed in the concept of essence’.165 It is clear that Bonhoeffer's stake in the 
authoritative form of the biblical witness, which Hegel largely characterises as 
                                                                                                                                                                        
159 Bonhoeffer notes that epistemology has had its effect on ethics. His original dissertation had 
included the statement that ‘Idealism can also be beaten with its own weapons on this point of the 
problem of time’. DBWE 1, 47n48. 
160 DBWE 1, 48-49; DBW 1, 28-29. 
161 Hegel describes time as 'the destiny and necessity of Geist that is not yet consummated within 
itself’. Once 'the concept grasps itself, it sublates its temporal form’. PhG, §801. 
162 The term is attributed to O'Regan in Adams, Eclipse, 201. 
163 The claim to unity occurs in PhG §803. 
164 DBWE 1, 58-9; DBW 1, 221 [SC-A]. In the later published version, Bonhoeffer speaks of a 
'real historical dialectic’, alluding to Grisebach's criticism of idealist dialectics as divorced from 
existential reality. See DBWE 1, 62n2. 
165 DBWE 1, 62; DBW 1, 36. 
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sequential 'representation’, will be a regular tension between them. That argument is 
inaugurated by Bonhoeffer's claim to the Word before Geist. 
1.4. History and the Hiddenness of Revelation 
In this section, I first treat Hegel's critique of a thinker who remains with the 
'Word’, showing his conviction that revelation entails not only a distinctive 
confessional community but unfurls into an integrated theory of the state. I then turn 
to Bonhoeffer's language of the 'hiddenness of revelation’, showing how he takes 
seriously that revelation needs to be actualised in historical conditions while also 
showing an element of eschatological reserve. I show that this claim fits with his 
more conflictual view of objective Geist, for in contrast to Hegel's 'reconciling yes’, 
Bonhoeffer's divine-human intercessor is revealed . 
1.4.1. Hegel on Revelation as a State 
Hegel's account of the 'appearing God' is motivated by trends in the 
'apophaticism' of his day, as several proximal figures, influenced by Romantic 
'intuitionism’, questioned whether discursive knowledge of God was possible.166 
Hegel responds not only that such knowledge is possible, but that its revelatory scope 
expands beyond both the individual knower and the initially ecclesial practices of 
confession and forgiveness. There is thus a certain ambiguity to the term 'community' 
in his phrase 'God existing as community’, for the conciliatory practice of the 
'confessing' church expands into a broader political body.167 This theme will be 
picked up in a late address on the Augsburg Confession, in which Hegel asserts that 
the Lutheran Reformation cannot be shut away from either the mind or social 
                                                            
166 Hegel's differentiated responses to Jacobi, Schelling, and Schleiermacher, are summarised in 
O'Regan, Heterodox, 31-38. 
167 Bonhoeffer's variation on the phrase to 'Christ existing as community' therefore not only 
specifies the subject but also the community as that of the church. The critical editions suggest as 
much, translating Gemeinde as 'church-community’. I acknowledge the interpretive acuity, though I 
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organisation: 'if religion is reformed, the political, legal, and ethical system should 
also be reformed’.168  
Given that Bonhoeffer makes reference to J.G. Hamann for his phrase 'Word 
before Geist’, it is instructive to see Hegel's own critique of Hamann's work as it 
clearly shows the conviction of an expanding revelatory scope. The issue of 
'development' to thought is central to Hegel's review of Hamann's life and writings. 
On the one hand, Hegel acknowledges the profoundness of Hamann's orthodoxy, 
which is expressed in 'the fiercest, most independent spirit’.169 Hegel affirms 
Hamann's challenge to certain 'so-called Enlightening' approaches to scripture that do 
not recognise the subjective element in interpretation.170 On the other hand, Hegel 
sees Hamann's narrow applications of scripture to lack the scope of God's own work 
of revelation: 
Hamann did not go to the effort which, if one may put it so, God did, 
albeit in a higher sense, to unfold [entfalten] in reality the balled core 
of truth which he is (ancient philosophers said of God that he is a 
balled sphere) into a system of nature, into a system of the state, of 
justice and morality, into a system of world history, into an open 
hand with fingers outstretched in order to grasp and pull unto himself 
the human spirit which is not merely and abstruse intelligence, a dull, 
concentrated weaving in itself, not merely a feeling and practicing, 
but rather a developed [entfaltetes] system of intelligent organization 
whose formal peak is thought.171 
                                                                                                                                                                        
do not think it best to specify the term that Bonhoeffer left as it was—and this in a language that 
commonly hybridises terms. 
168 See G.W.F. Hegel, ‘Address on the Tercentenary of the Submission of the Augsburg 
Confession’ (25 June 1830), in Political Writings, L. Dickey and H.B. Nisbet, eds. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 189. 
169 G.W.F. Hegel, ‘Hamanns Schriften’, Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik  nos. 77-80 and 
107-14 (October and December 1828); Hegel on Hamann, trans. Lisa Marie Anderson (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2008), 6, 30. 
170 Hegel observes that this originality plays out in an approach to scripture that exposes 
'Wolffian abstraction' as a part of 'the so-called Enlightening which had the impudence to boast of the 
authority of the letter which it alone could interpret was playing a false game, since the meaning 
which exegesis brings is also an understood, subjective meaning’. Nevertheless, Hegel frequently 
finds fault in Hamann's idiosyncratic and underdeveloped readings. Among many comments on 
Hamann's form of devotion, Hegel mocks Hamann's claim that 'reading the Bible and praying is the 
work of the Christian’. Hegel on Hamann, 12, 16, 30. 
171 Hegel on Hamann, 39. 
 66 
 
Hegel claims that instead of taking up the potential of thought, Hamann remained in 
a stunted polemic: 'speaking at large and at random, against thought and reason in 
general’.172 This distrust of reason meant that Hamann would not move from the 
scriptural base into proper doctrinal development, remaining with merely 'an 
intensive, subjective unity’.173 To this extent, Hegel's critical review of Hamann 
highlights a stubbornness with the Bible and orthodox confessions that locked him 
into a form of superstitious struggle with the Enlightenment, as it were. 
Hamann's demurral at the 'unfolding' of thought requires further 
consideration. Though it is insufficient to pose the difference between Hegel and 
Hamann as that between 'secular' and 'confessional' uses of language, these terms 
serve to raise the issue of particularist language as distinguished from the integrated 
state about which Hegel would write.174 On this matter, Hegel's review, which 
largely deals with Hamann's biography, does not delve deeply enough into their 
differences with respect to the linguistic basis of thought.175 Nonetheless, 
Bonhoeffer's use of Hamann is primarily in support of his own attempt to linger with 
the biblical-theological witness and, as I will show, ecclesial confessions. Hegel's 
critique of Hamann therefore intimates an attempt at expansion with the phrase 'God 
existing as community' that Bonhoeffer will seek to call back to its ecclesial roots. 
1.4.2. Bonhoeffer's 'Revelation in Hiddenness' 
 While the 'actualisation' of the Word is crucial for Bonhoeffer, his polemic 
against idealism includes reference to the 'hidden' quality of the revelation. Although 
the language of hiddenness is present from the first dissertation, the phrase 
                                                            
172 Hegel on Hamann, 39. 
173 Hegel on Hamann, 40. 
174 See Stephen Dunning, The Tongues of Men: Hegel and Hamann on Religious Language and 
History (Missoula, MN: Scholars Press, 1979). 
175 See Anderson, 'Introduction', in Hegel on Hamann, xv. 
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'revelation in hiddenness' is used in a paper from Bonhoeffer's fellowship year in 
New York. There he contrasts truly historical revelation with the transparency of 
history before a certain form of rationality, that is, the manner in which 'revelation in 
ideas means revelation in openness’.176 'Revelation in hiddenness' marks a departure 
from Hegel's account of unfolding clarity, one of the reasons Bonhoeffer's phrase can 
appear, in the words of his professor at the time, 'a perverse expression’.177 It is 
worth exploring the early appearance of this language, because Bonhoeffer will go 
on to speak of Christ as the 'hidden centre of Wissenschaft' and the church as the 
'hidden centre of Weltgeschichte’.  
 In Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer's characterisation of hiddenness is 
elaborated in the relation between present historical form and eschatological reserve. 
This is part of his attempt to work between the projects of Troeltsch and Barth, an 
endeavour for which Hegel's 'God existing as community' proved indispensable.178 
Depicting these two points of reference as giving rise to two one-sided impulses, 
Bonhoeffer claims that the historicising error confuses the church with religious 
community, while the religious error confuses it with the Realm of God itself. Just as 
for Hegel Geist is actualising because that which is rational is efficacious, so 
Bonhoeffer is not interested in speaking about the Word in a manner separate from 
socio-historical continuities. Asking what it is to believe in the church, Bonhoeffer 
replies that it is to believe ‘that God has made the concrete, empirical church 
                                                            
176 The essay, 'The Christian Idea of God', is written in English. DBWE 10, 451; DBW 10, 429. 
177 The comment is written in the margin by Professor Eugene Lyman, from whom Bonhoeffer 
took two courses in the Philosophy of Religion. DBWE 10, 457n49; DBW 10, 38n38 (attributed to 
Korr). Bonhoeffer's Professor went on to challenge him for drawing a dichotomy between a meaning, 
'transparent to the eternal spirit’, and the singularity of historical fact. 
178 As Mawson observes: 'Bonhoeffer’s adoption of this Hegelian formulation indicates a desire 
to similarly identify the church as revelational in a strong sense. In other words, this formulation 
indicates Bonhoeffer’s break from Barth’s dialectical antithesis between revelation and the church, 
and also Troeltsch’s sense in which religious values and ideals are on some level separable from 
contingent historical and social forms. Following Hegel, Bonhoeffer holds that the Christian 
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[Kirche] in which the Word is preached and the sacraments are celebrated to be 
God’s own community [Gemeinde]’.179 His initial attention is therefore on the 
religious error, which he charges with circumventing ‘God’s will that God’s 
revelation, both in Christ and in the church, be concealed under the form of historical 
life’.180  
 It is therefore in conflict, not necessarily Hegel's 'reconciling yes’, that the 
God-human unity appears. The 'Geist-unity of the community' is a synthesis willed 
by God, already established and hidden from human perception. In fact, Bonhoeffer 
states that it is a ‘reality precisely where the seemingly sharpest outward antitheses 
prevail…When one person clashes with another, it might very well lead them to 
remember the One who is over them both, and in whom both of them are one’.181 In 
terms Bonhoeffer draws from Luther, the church is ‘not “unanimity in Geist,”  but 
the “unity of Geist.”’182 After all, historical becoming is not sustained by romantic 
feelings of solidarity, but is paradoxically most evident where there is no other 
affinity between individuals. Bonhoeffer argues that it is precisely at the site of 
conflict—between ‘Jew and Greek, pietist and liberal’—that this is most evident, for 
the opposed parties rhythmically confess faith, gather to communion, and intercede 
for one another in prayer.183 This has implications for church polity; against the 
‘despisers of the historical nature of the church’ to whom Bonhoeffer frequently 
alludes, the church is reticent in its judgments, putting up with the hiddenness of this 
divine-human mode of working.184   
                                                                                                                                                                        
community is integral to how God is revealing and working out his purposes in the world’. Mawson, 
Christ, 198. 
179 DBWE 1, 280; DBW 1, 191. 
180 DBWE 1, 126; DBW 1, 79. 
181 DBWE 1, 192; DBW 1, 129. 
182 DBWE 1, 193; DBW 1, 129-30. 
183 DBWE 1, 281; DBW 1, 192. 
184 Bonhoeffer favours the growth and individuation to come from the preached word in a 
broadly composed Volkskirche, rather than a seemingly solidified Freiwilligkeitskirche. The church 
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In relation to the claim of revelation in hiddenness, Bonhoeffer builds an 
eschatological reserve into his attempt to convey the real and whole presence of 
Christ. Alongside his appropriation of Luther’s saying that church members ‘become 
Christ’ to one another, he claims that they can only do this through faith. Here one 
encounters ‘an eschatological prolepsis, where the You reveals itself to the I as 
another I…as Christ’.185 Although ecclesial members know a ‘real presence’ in their 
exchanges, this remains proleptic: 'the unity is complete, but it is full of tension, and 
this points to an eschatological solution that is still hidden from us’.186 This present, 
qualitative perception tends to relativise the thought that revelation could ultimately 
unfurl in history. With Hegel likely in view, Bonhoeffer states: 
'We walk by faith, not by sight’. This remains true as long as there is 
history. For us, this leads to the basic insight that history, and 
consequently even the end of history, is incapable of bringing the 
ultimate solution. It further follows that the meaning of history 
cannot consist in a progressive development, but that 'every age is in 
direct relationship with God' (Ranke).187  
 
It is only in the age to come that ‘the objective Geist of the church really has become 
the Holy Spirit, the experience of the ‘religious’ community now really is the 
experience of the church, and the collective person of the church now really is 
‘Christ existing as church-community’.188 Bonhoeffer's freedom in referring to 
‘objective Geist’ is not evidenced in his discussion of the sinful or revelatory states; 
it is only in the fullness of the eschaton that union is consummate. Until then, the 
condition of hiddenness remains. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
will 'thus perhaps tend many a budding life that later become dangerous to it’. DBWE 1, 222-23; DBW 
1, 151. 
185 DBWE 1, 213; DBW 1, 144. 
186 DBWE 1, 203; DBW 1, 136-7. 
187 The parenthetical reference is to the historian Leopold von Ranke, who taught in Berlin in the 
nineteenth-century. DBWE 1, 282; DBW 1, 193. 
188 DBWE 1, 288; DBW 1, 198. 
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1.5. 'Suspending' Reflection? 
 Having acknowledged Bonhoeffer's recovery of the 'Word before Geist' in 
Sanctorum Communio, this concluding section dwells on his language for the 
reception of revelation. I focus on a paired distinction for types of consciousness that 
has been claimed as a departure from Hegel. These are presented in Act and Being as 
ways of understanding 'how human beings stand in light of revelation’.189 
Bonhoeffer differentiates 'direct consciousness' and the 'consciousness of reflection:' 
the former is 'purely "outwardly directed"' and the latter has consciousness as its own 
'object of attention’.190 The pair is then associated with the terms actus directus and 
actus reflexus.191 Bonhoeffer's elaboration shows his concern with how reflexive 
thought can displace the intentionality involved in the act, drawing again on the 
language of 'confinement-to-the-self [In-sich-bleiben]’.192  
 Hegel offers ample material for being characterised as a spokesperson for the 
'reflexive act’. In the Preface to the Phenomenology, Hegel speaks of the subject in a 
process of 'self-restoring sameness, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness’.193 
Rather than having original or immediate unity, the subject undergoes 'the coming-
to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its 
beginning’.194 Although 'otherness' is referenced, as well as the necessity of 'self-
emptying' in cognition, critics of Hegel frequently claim that these are merely 
passing moments in a self-directed movement that obviates genuine difference. 
                                                            
189 DBWE 2, 28; DBW 2, 23. 
190 DBWE 2, 28; DBW 2, 23. 
191 The terms are drawn from Franz Delitzsch's System der biblischen Psychologie (1855), which 
draws on an early Protestant distinction between 'direct faith’, fides directa, and 'reflexive faith', fides 
reflexa. DBWE 2, 28; DBW 2, 23. 
192 DBWE 2, 29; DBW 2, 24. 
193 PhG §18. 
194 PhG §18. Bonhoeffer has this section underlined in his edition. See PhG-NL, p.20. This 
reference to cognition as a circle reappears in §802 as the 'circle returning back into itself’. 
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 Bonhoeffer criticises the concept of Geist, for all its dynamism, as a sign of the 
incurvature of reason, singling out Hegel among idealists. He laments a certain loss 
of Kantian reserve, which allowed for the 'suspension' of thought:  
If in original transcendentalism the human Geist was suspended 
between transcendence and, consequently, irrevocably in reference to 
[it], now the movement of Geist is turned in upon itself. In Luther's 
words, this is ratio in se ipsam incurva. Geist has, in principle, come 
to rest. Only in the power of remaining in itself is Geist enabled to 
step outside of itself. Accordingly, Geist remains fully in control of 
itself in this movement and never gets into the embarrassing position 
of merely 'being in reference to transcendence’.195 
 
The reference to Luther's description of reason as curved in on itself, rather than to 
other passages in which he speaks of the self curved in on itself, shows how this 
might apply to Geist as an entire social field. Bonhoeffer is clearly skeptical about an 
ensuing combination 'boundlessness' and enclosure.196  
 More work is warranted on the critical application of the 'incurvature' of 
reason to the pursuit of 'encyclopedic' knowledge. Such an endeavour would require 
study of the way in which Hegel's view of philosophy as an 'encompassing' 
endeavour led to a significant speculative trajectory in nineteenth-century 
theology.197 Bonhoeffer knew Hegel's claim that the 'true is the whole’, and so would 
have been aware of the irony of characterising such an encyclopedic claim as liable 
to a thinker's sinful contraction of reality. That critical vantage point lies behind 
Bonhoeffer's attempt to claim a disruption of the Word, which he will later style as a 
form of 'counter-reason’, or Gegenlogos. 
                                                            
195 DBWE 2, 41-42; DBW 2, 34-35. 
196 In a later paper delivered at Union Seminary in New York, Bonhoeffer conveys Barth's 
energetic 'attack on idealism' with these words: 'Barth sees in the essential boundlessness of thinking, 
in its claim a closed system, in its egocentricity a philosophical affirmation of the theological insight 
of the Reformers, which they expressed in terms of cor curvum in se, corruptio mentis’. DBWE 10, 
472-3; DBW 10, 445-6. 
197 Hegel's influential claim for Wissenschaft is cited within an overall encyclopedic movement 
by theologians such as Karl Rosenkranz and Philipp Marheineke in Purvis, University, 171-80. 
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 For now, I seek to trouble the assumption that Bonhoeffer dismisses Hegel 
with his apparent preference for 'direct consciousness’, or the direct act, as alone 
indicative of the posture of faith. Such opposition is presented in Marsh’s account: 
the actus directus is Bonhoeffer’s shorthand for the manner in which the person is 
summoned to obedience through direct intentionality towards Christ, before and 
beyond speculative self-reflection.198 Although Marsh acknowledges that a subtlety 
of distinction is required between reflection and action, he concludes by saying that 
reconciliation is finally consummated in philosophical thought for Hegel, and in 
obedience to Christ for Bonhoeffer.199  
 There is a danger in leaving an ultimate opposition between obedience and 
thought, particularly given Bonhoeffer's claim to unite pairs. While Marsh is right 
that Bonhoeffer's characterisation of the reconciled state differs from Hegel, I argue 
that Bonhoeffer’s distinction between the direct and the reflexive act should neither 
be read oppositionally, nor as a primary or sustained divergence from Hegel. In this I 
follow Joshua Kaiser's argument that these dual aspects ultimately come together in 
the church, for Christ resolves the tension by becoming both subject and object of 
faith.200 As a result, the obedient act does not need to replace the reflective act, even 
as the latter cannot subsume the former. 
                                                            
198 Marsh states that 'the new I in Christ does not venture forth in a gesture of trying to re-contain 
the world as identity (in universality), but it is called out in simple obedience, not to return as a 
recovered I but to remain, extended in life with others, always more than the I. This transformation 
illustrates the inner content of community or its intrinsic reference’. Marsh, Reclaiming, 108. 
199 He later states that ‘Bonhoeffer activates Hegel’s dialectic toward compassionate engagement 
and self-forgetfulness at the point where, for Hegel, it becomes the complete recovery of subjectivity 
through universal self-knowledge’. See also notes of congeniality in Marsh, Reclaiming, 108-9, 
181n137. 
200 Joshua Kaiser, Becoming Simple and Wise: Moral Discernment in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 
Vision of Christian Ethics (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2015), 36. 
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 As Hegel before him, Bonhoeffer often thinks in pairs, with his discussion of 
direct and reflexive acts seguing into his dominant pair of act and being.201 These 
titular terms pose the question of how revelation is uniquely conceived in terms of a 
pair.202 Bonhoeffer's ambitious resolution requires the unique epistemological site of 
the church.203 From that base, Bonhoeffer redeploys a key Hegelian term of art to 
claim that: 'the dialectic of act and being is understood theologically as the dialectic 
of faith and the community of Christ. Neither is to be thought without the other; each 
is 'sublated' [aufgehoben] in the other’.204 Bonhoeffer had earlier claimed that the 
problem of act and being had been bequeathed to theologians by the idealist 
tradition, and this statement shows him using one of its tools to work towards a 
unity.  
 It is contested, however, that Bonhoeffer uses aufheben towards conceptual 
unity in a manner reminiscent of Hegel. In the English critical edition, the passage 
cited above in which act and being, or faith and the community, are to be aufgehoben 
in one another, translates the key term as 'suspended’.205 Explaining the translation 
choice, the editor, Wayne Floyd, claims that Bonhoeffer differs from Hegel in that he 
does not see these two elements as a 'dialectical process moving toward an ultimate 
synthesis of apparent opposites’.206 He therefore opts for translating the verb as 'to 
suspend’, in order to connote the 'tensile, unresolved state of human existence as 
                                                            
201 The set of pairs is intricately connected, as shown in Bonhoeffer's transition in DBWE 2, 29; 
DBW 2, 24. 
202 Bonhoeffer offers a classificatory sketch of his theological contemporaries in relation to these 
two categories to begin his work. See DBWE 2, 25-27; DBW 2, 21-22. 
203 Neither concept is sufficient on its own, for Bonhoeffer claims that revelation must be 
thought 'within the concreteness of church-conception [Kirchengedankens]’, and therefore through a 
sociological category that can unite act and being. This is to say that revelation must 'yield an 
epistemology of its own’. DBWE 2, 31; DBW 2, 26. 
204 DBWE 2, 31, alt.; DBW 2, 26. Bonhoeffer's scare quotes are original, suggesting both 
appropriation and critical distance from its use in Hegel. 
205 DBWE 2, 31. 
206 DBWE 2, 31n20. 
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Bonhoeffer portrays it philosophically’.207 Floyd’s choice can be explained in part 
through his earlier work in which he argued for Bonhoeffer's similarity to a later use 
of dialectics by Adorno.208 There he spoke of Bonhoeffer's Act and Being as offering 
a 'dialectic suspended in motion’, resisting the way in which the 'search for mutuality 
subverts difference’.209 This has a decidedly ethical edge, as Floyd linked identity 
thinking and anti-Semitism.  
 While I acknowledge Bonhoeffer's concern with the loss of personal Geist in 
claims to the whole, it is not clear that construing the pair in suspension avoids the 
problems of what has been called a 'stalled dialectic’, with each component 'ever 
bringing the other to birth’.210 This is a concern with respect to 'faith' and 
'community’, particularly insofar as Bonhoeffer is seeking to move away from the 
limitations of an actualistic account of faith, though ever maintaining its capacity to 
disrupt, towards the stability that comes through the community in which it is held. 
 Hegel himself thought deeply about such entrenchment, which he saw caused 
in part by faith conceived in abstraction.211 In the Phenomenology, he shows how a 
narrow, Enlightenment-based 'pure insight' sets itself against a pietistic form of 
'faith’.212 In so doing, insight not only reacts against a pre-existing entity, but helps to 
produce its opponent and so ends up 'struggling with itself’.213  Both mirror one 
another in their presumed 'purity’, failing to see the way each is intertwined in the 
other, not least through a shared history. Hegel's own account of revelatory 
                                                            
207 The other option Floyd provides is 'to subvert’, tending towards the negative. DBWE 2, 
31n20. 
208 See Floyd, Dialectics, 261. 
209 Floyd, Dialectics, 93, 137. 
210 The phrase is adapted from remarks by Terry Eagleton. 
211 Hegel depicts this dynamic in the 'Enlightenment Struggle with Superstition’. PhG, §541-
§573. 
212 PhG, §548. 
213 PhG, §548. 
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community seeks to move beyond such a dichotomous account of reason and faith, 
particularly as he narrates the process of doctrinal transmission.  
In light of a series of translations that avoid the standard translation of 
Hegel's term of art aufheben, it is worth reviewing his own explanation of the term. 
In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel uses the example of an ‘I statement’, in which the 
knowing self is distinguished from animals and nature more generally.214 The 
thinking 'I' is in the position of 'ideality' or Geist, set over and against 'reality' or 
nature. The problem, however, is that nature is 'not something fixed and finished for 
itself’.215 Hegel continues by his characteristic emphasis that 'Idea' infuses reality in 
an implicit manner that needs to be made explicit. The point is unity: 'nature achieves 
its end and truth only in spirit, and spirit for its part is similarly not just an abstract 
beyond of nature; rather, it exists and validates itself as spirit only insofar as it 
contains in itself nature as sublated’.216 Hegel then makes an aside on the dual 
meaning of the verb, aufheben, which means both 'clearing out of the way or 
negating’, using the examples of a law or institution, and 'preserving’, using the 
example of that which is 'taken out of harm's way and put in a safe place’.217 He 
argues that this combination of negative and positive meanings in a single word is 
neither a 'coincidence’, nor should it be reason for making the German language an 
'object of reproach' for such apparent confusion. Rather, he claims that in the dual 
sense in linguistic usage 'we should recognize the speculative spirit of our language 
                                                            
214 I am working from Hegel's succinct statement in EL. The original was published in 1830; the 
Lasson edition, with which Bonhoeffer would have worked, was published in 1905. Hans-Richard 
Reuter notes the likely allusion to §96 from that work in DBW 2, 26n18. 
215 EL, §96. 
216 EL, §96. 
217 EL, §96. The reference to taking something out of harm's way is significant in view of his 
pejorative view of the merely natural state, which is destructive when left to its own devices. On the 
other hand, the danger of this term is clear when one thinks of another culture or religion as 
undergoing sublation. 
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that transcends the either/or of mere understanding’.218 English has sought to follow 
suit with 'sublation' as the typical rendition for Hegel translators and critics.219 
 What, then, might it mean for Bonhoeffer to claim that the dialectic of act and 
being, theologically transposed into the question of 'faith' and the 'community of 
Christ’, is to have each of its components 'sublated' in the other? It would mean that 
there is an integral link between the act of faith and the encompassing being of 
community: faith cannot be abstracted out from the church's communal life, nor can 
‘positive’ communal life endure without the animation of belief. Were this unity not 
to be found, merely opposing one form of revelation to the other leads to the 
impoverishment of each; the point is the union of act and being.220  
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have sought to give a fuller account of Bonhoeffer’s selective 
use of the resources of philosophical idealism. I have done this by complicating the 
charge of idealist ‘confinement in the self’ as far as Hegel’s work is concerned. 
Hegel's critique of the ‘beautiful soul’ and the call to confession reveal a social logic 
derived from Christian theology that is congenial to Bonhoeffer’s criticism of the 
‘privately virtuous’ and his own confessional emphasis. Moreover, Hegel’s concept 
of 'objective Geist' provides Bonhoeffer with an account of the 'sociality of reason' 
that suits his project.  
Acknowledging commonality has helped to clarify Bonhoeffer's variations on 
Hegel’s phrase ‘God existing as community’. These have been identified as a change 
in subject, from God to Christ, and a related change in act, from reciprocal 
                                                            
218 EL, §96. 
219 Inwood traces the origin of the English  'sublate' to the Latin sublatus, past participle of 
tollere—an ambiguous verb that means both to raise up and to destroy or remove. The defects of the 
term are that it is not common in English (in contrast to German), and that it does not have a strong 
third sense: as Hegel himself notes, tollere does not carry the meaning 'to keep or preserve’. Inwood, 
Dictionary, 283-85. 
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confession to intercession. Both variations are framed by Bonhoeffer's larger claim 
of a 'Word before Geist’, a theological narrative of states through which he can 
emphasise the obstructive effect of sin as well as the eschatological dynamic to the 
revelatory community. Bonhoeffer therefore speaks of the simultaneity of the 
peccatorum communio as the site of revelation, a conviction related to his language 
of 'revelation in hiddenness’.  
 Bonhoeffer's variations pose the question of how the peccatorum communio 
can be revelatory. For Hegel, God appears in the word of reconciliation, in the 
overcoming of ‘minded’ oppositions. Bonhoeffer’s variation makes intercession a 
prior response to another’s sin, pre-empting the act of confession—a necessity in 
light of sin's tenacity in obstructing like-mindedness. He therefore reveals a deeper 
constitutive bond underlying what is evoked by the sins of others, namely the 
intervention of Christ. This is not to separate the act of intercession from the 
imperatives of social exchange, the latter so perceptively traced by Hegel. However, 
Bonhoeffer does provide an account that Kirchenkampf perhaps best reveals the logic 
of how divine and human agency relate. It can thus provide hope for theologians and 
ethicists as they respond to sin and broken trust among intersecting communities—
standing in the place of fellow sinners through vicarious prayer, advocacy, debate, 
and the confessions these entail. This can only occur, however, insofar as Christ is 
‘subject’ of the ethical task entrusted to a communion of sinners.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
220 Bonhoeffer's distinctive usage of aufheben is given a more extended treatment in 2.5. 
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Chapter Two - A Cleaving Mind: The Fall into Knowledge 
 
Tob and ra are concepts that express what is in every respect the 
deepest divide in human life. The essential point about them is that 
they appear as a pair, that in being split apart they belong 
inseparably together. 
   - Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall 
 
Introduction 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer delivered his lectures on Genesis 1-3 at the University of 
Berlin under the title Schöpfung und Sünde.1 The course was one of several 
treatments of Jewish scripture in order to rethink ethical life under the emerging 
Third Reich, an exegetical habit that led to fines and publication bans in subsequent 
years.2 He delivered the lectures in winter semester 1932-33, during which time 
Adolf Hitler was appointed German Chancellor. A day after that momentous event, 
Bonhoeffer recounted the irreducible ambiguity of the Fall, which he cast in the 
‘twilight’ while reminding students that the name Lucifer means ‘Light-bearer’.3  
Along with thinly-veiled reference to contemporary events, the term ‘Light-
bearer’ is one of several echoes of Hegel’s lecture on the same passage, also 
delivered at the University of Berlin a century earlier. Bonhoeffer had the three 
volumes of his predecessor’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion at hand, newly 
edited by Georg Lasson. They contain Hegel’s most explicit and sustained work with 
biblical text, which is likely why the section titled “Representation of the Fall” is one 
                                                            
1 This original course title was changed to Schöpfung und Fall when the volume was published 
in 1933, avoiding the repetition of Emanuel Hirsch’s title from 1931. The critical edition offers a 
composite text of Bonhoeffer’s manuscripts, the 1933 publication text, and student notes recorded 
between November 8, 1932 and February 21, 1933. See John de Gruchy, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, 
DBWE 3, 2,12-16. 
2 Bonhoeffer’s 1940 volume on the Psalms incited a fine from the Reich Board for the 
Regulation of Literature. Wise to the terms in play, he defended his work as purely ‘scientific 
exegesis’. Though the fine was retracted, Bonhoeffer was banned from further publication. See 
Geffrey B. Kelly, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, DBWE 5, 143. 
3 The political context is noted in DBWE 3, 107-8n12; DBW 3, 99-100n8. 
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of the most heavily marked in Bonhoeffer’s set.4 Along with providing a key 
secondary text for his Genesis lectures, the volumes serve Bonhoeffer’s preparation 
for a Summer 1933 seminar focused on Hegel’s work.  
There are noticeable asymmetries between Hegel and Bonhoeffer. The 1932-
33 term is the first and only time Bonhoeffer delivered his lectures on Genesis. He 
was twenty-six years old when he began his study, holding the position of 
Privatdozent. As a brief comparative, Hegel was a professor in his fifties when he 
delivered his lectures multiple times over a period of ten years (the Lasson text with 
which Bonhoeffer worked is a composite). We can therefore expect the maturity and 
scope of their respective treatments to differ.  
The differences between the two lecturers must be considered alongside their 
significant similarities, however. Along with working at the same university a 
century apart, Hegel and Bonhoeffer share a commitment to the Lutheran tradition as 
a serious element of their respective projects, while both engage critically with Kant 
and subsequent idealists. Interpretive care is therefore required to discern whether we 
can discern Hegel’s direct influence in Bonhoeffer’s depiction of anxiety at being 
caught in the fallen state of life ‘in the middle’. Further complicating their relation is 
the fact that Bonhoeffer rarely names his interlocutors in the Genesis lectures, having 
published the first edition without footnotes.5 
In this chapter, I argue that Hegel’s account of the fallen state provides a 
compelling critique of moral cognisance, one which informs Bonhoeffer’s attempt to 
subvert a pejorative characterisation of the primal state. To make this case, I first 
highlight a central difference in how the thinkers approach ‘divine knowledge’, 
rooted in their respective readings of the protoevangelium. In the second section I 
                                                            
4 The uniquely sustained nature of Hegel’s work with Genesis is noted in Hodgson, Christian, 
151. 
 81 
show Bonhoeffer’s alliance with Hegel in articulating moral cognisance as a state of 
perpetual ‘cleaving’ – a drive to know good and evil that in turn divides the knowing 
subject. Section three contrasts Hegel’s depiction of primal humanity as a volatile 
composite of nature and spirit with Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on completion in order to 
show how Bonhoeffer deploys this account of cleaving thought to subvert Hegel’s 
claim to know the beginning. In the fourth section, I investigate the political subtext 
of the lecturers’ employment of first personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’ to signal how 
the biblical depiction of the Fall conditions their inquiries. Finally, I treat echoes of 
Creation and Fall in Bonhoeffer’s later Ethics, proposing that his reference to the 
Aufhebung of the knowledge of good and evil reveals a segue to reconciliation that 
extends his critical variation on Hegel. 
2.1. To Break and To Bind:  Relating the Two Lecturers 
Although Bonhoeffer is sharply critical of 'idealism’, this posture does not 
amount to a clean break with Hegel. This is partly due to the comprehensiveness of 
his predecessor’s philosophical method, with its variegated depiction of rationality. 
As Judith Butler observes, reading after Hegel allows no easy departure: 
The question that emerges in a consideration of post-Hegelians is 
whether the “post-” is a relationship that differentiates or binds or 
possibly does both at once. On the one hand, references to a 
“break” with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because 
Hegel has made the very notion of “breaking with” into the central 
tenet of his dialectic.6 
 
The suggestion of a simultaneous act of breaking and binding raises the complexity 
of Hegel’s logic, which is part of its appeal to Bonhoeffer. Before turning to specific 
critiques, then, it is important to note how Hegel’s philosophy is related to the 
interpretation of the biblical text.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
5 See de Gruchy, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, DBWE 3, 15. 
6 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France, Second 
Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 183-84. 
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2.1.1. Biblical Evocation in Hegel’s Thought 
In assessing Bonhoeffer’s theological exposition, it is important to understand 
his interest in a nineteenth-century exercise in the philosophy of religion. The appeal 
comes in part through Hegel’s critique of purely ‘biblical’ thought, as indicated in 
the following statement: 
It helps not at all to say that one’s thoughts are based on the Bible. 
As soon as these thoughts are no longer merely the words of the 
Bible, there is given to their content a form, more specifically, a 
logical form.7 
 
Hegel is well aware that any such logic is conditioned by the presuppositions of a 
particular age. In his own time, he observes that readers bring to the Bible ‘the 
notions that [humanity] by nature is good or that God cannot be known’.8 As 
Bonhoeffer challenges similar presuppositions, Hegel’s investigations of ‘logical 
form’ prove useful to his task. Insofar as Hegel articulates a logic that Bonhoeffer 
sees as germane to the text, he works with it, while using the same criterion to 
subvert other claims.  
 Hegel’s interest in logical form raises the question of whether 
‘representation’ [Vorstellung] is given a diminished status in his thought in favour of 
philosophy according to the ‘concept’ [Begriff]. His treatment of Genesis 3 is titled 
‘The Representation of the Fall’, which begins with an observation about the ‘great 
contradictions’ contained in the text.9 Moreover, Hegel’s earlier comments suggest 
philosophy as a superior mode of reflection to, for instance, sequential biblical 
narrative. As he states in the introduction of the third series of lectures, ‘the witness 
                                                            
7 LPR III, 23; VPR III, 24. 
8 LPR III, 23; VPR III, 24-25. 
9 LPR III, 152-153; VPR III, 121-122. 
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of Spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the concept 
develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions’.10 
Tempering an apparent supersession, however, Hegel follows this statement 
by criticising the position that opposes ‘faith and thought’ by claiming the latter as 
the sole means to ‘the truths of religion’.11 He argues instead that ‘the witness of the 
Spirit can occur in manifold and various ways; it is not to be expected that for all of 
humanity the truth is made manifest in a philosophical way’.12 The needs of a person 
differ, he continues, and as such external ecclesial authority, miracles and, indeed, 
biblical representational language are meaningful expressions of Geist. Adams 
comments that this statement shows Hegel preserving the integrity of the posture of 
‘faith’ that philosophers, particularly the Aufklärer, need to take seriously to avoid 
constructing a false opposition.13 As such, the ‘concept’ does not ultimately supplant 
the biblical language but, in Adams’ definition, ‘signals an atemporalized form of 
what appears narratively as a process’.14  
Hegel’s criticism of the false opposition between faith and reason is one 
example of how his work with thought forms can prove useful to theologians. In 
Adams’ interpretation, Hegel offers a ‘triadic’ form of thinking in which two 
components, such as subject and object, maintain their integrities even as they are 
mutually constituted as a pair. This logic of pairs aims to overcome false and hasty 
oppositions such as that between divine and human action.15 As such, it is an 
                                                            
10 LPR III, 20; VPR III, 22. 
11 LPR III, 21; VPR III, 22-23. 
12 LPR III, 21; VPR III, 22-23. 
13 Adams continues that Hegel implies ‘the faith is constant while the thinking is variable’, with 
traditional representation not falling into the same problems as misguided forms of thought. Adams, 
Eclipse, 175. Stephen Houlgate also argues against an interpretation of Hegel as offering ‘rival 
accounts’, noting that for Hegel philosophy ‘clarifies and confirms the perspective of faith’. See 
Houlgate, Hegel, 247, 251. 
14 Adams, Eclipse, 216. 
15 Adams, Eclipse, 9, 162. 
 84 
enterprise that has appealed to Bonhoeffer from his first dissertation, in which he 
appropriated Hegel’s phrase ‘God existing as community’.  
The logic of pairs is complicated when good and evil are the two terms under 
consideration. Hegel and Bonhoeffer are both conditioned by a Lutheran suspicion of 
moral knowledge, alert to the risk of apprehending that pair which has alone been 
forbidden. This leads them to an intricate, paired portrayal of the ‘cleaving’ mind, as 
will be shown in part two. First, however, it is important to deal with Bonhoeffer’s 
statement that suggests mere opposition to Hegel’s project. 
2.1.2. Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Hegel’s ‘Divine Knowledge’ 
The claim that Hegel and Bonhoeffer employ a similar depiction of the fallen 
mind, derived from the scriptural account, must contend with Bonhoeffer’s 
apparently stark opposition to Hegel’s project. At one point the young theologian 
claims that postlapsarian knowers are those who ‘are between good and evil and so 
stand between two possible states of having fallen away’. This is, he continues, ‘not 
Hegel’s divine knowledge [Hegels göttliches Wissen] of what is good and evil’.16 
Bonhoeffer’s target appears to be Hegel’s comment on God’s acknowledgment that 
the human couple has ‘become like us’ in Genesis 3:22. Hegel opines that the 
statement is not ironic but rather confirms that the knowledge of good and evil 
belongs to the divine image that is humanity.17 Martin Rüter and Ilse Tödt take this 
statement to be Bonhoeffer’s critique of Hegel’s apparently positive construal of the 
Fall as an event that ‘creates’ humanity, in a sense.18  
                                                            
16 This statement is not included in the main body of the text, but features in Hilde Pfeiffer’s 
notes from the beginning of the ninth lecture. Compare the statement recorded by Ferenc Lehel, the 
student from whom we also have a detailed record of the 1933 Hegel Seminar: ‘[according to] Hegel 
human beings have God’s knowledge of good and evil [der Mensch [hat nach] Hegel Wissen Gottes 
um Gut und Böses]’. See DBWE 3, 93n37; DBW 3, 87n28. 
17 This association is drawn by the critical edition. See the editors’ note in DBWE 3, 93n37; 
DBW 3, 87n28. 
18 Rüter and Tödt describe Hegel as seeing ‘dividedness’ as a necessary, indispensable 
characteristic of humanity. See ‘Editors’ Afterword’, DBWE 3, 160; DBW 3, 149-50. 
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The claim that God confirms the serpent’s promise seems a straightforward 
instance of the ‘heterodox Hegel’.19 However, this label risks missing a crucial 
aspect of the exposition, for Hegel inserts a telescoped account of salvation history 
into God’s claim that humanity ‘has become like us’. He reads the protoevangelium 
into the divine confirmation of Genesis 3:22 rather than locating it in the traditional 
3:15, where the promise of the ‘seed’ is implicit in the curse, a move shown in the 
following comment: 
The serpent, therefore, has not lied, for God confirms what he has 
said. Much difficulty has been encountered in the interpretation of 
this text, and some have gone so far as to explain God’s statement as 
irony. The truer interpretation, however, is that by this “Adam” the 
second Adam or Christ is to be understood.20  
 
This remarkable statement shows that knowledge is not a self-enclosed process in 
Hegel, for it can only unfurl in light of the singular figure who appears in the 
‘fullness of time’, to use one of his oft-cited verses from Galatians. In light of this 
coming, the Fall can be seen as fortunate. 
It would, of course, be uncharacteristic of Hegel to claim knowledge, divine 
or otherwise, as an immediate acquisition. As Wolfhart Pannenberg observes, critics 
often miss the fact that Hegel’s talk of identity, such as that between the finite and 
infinite, is never immediate but rather a ‘negative unity’, that is, ‘mediated by the 
negation and superseding of the finite’.21 Along the way to such union, Hegel offers 
a set of resources for an exegesis of the Fall narrative, such as his characterisation of 
postlapsarian knowledge as ‘evil’, exposing humanity’s deficiency before the Christ 
event. This is the point at which Bonhoeffer finds Hegel congenial, even if he will 
                                                            
19 This problematic aspect to Hegel’s account of the Fall is linked to the Gnostic affirmation of 
the serpent in  O'Regan, Heterodox, 163. 
20 LPR III, 157; VPR III, 126. 
21 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel’, in Basic 
Questions in Theology, volume three, trans. R.A. Wilson (London: SCM, 1973), 162. 
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not follow his predecessor towards an ultimate identification of human and divine 
knowledge.22  
Although Hegel’s account alludes to the promise of the second Adam, it 
nevertheless appears as an immanent motion of thought, expressed in such claims as 
‘knowledge heals the wound that it itself is’.23 The notion that the endeavour of 
Wissenschaft can be ‘therapeutic’ had deep personal meaning for Hegel, as revealed 
in earlier private correspondence.24 Hegel’s claim that knowledge, depicted as ‘evil’, 
is also the source of reconciliation—‘both sickness and healing’—is vigorously 
marked in Bonhoeffer’s edition of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.25 
Bonhoeffer’s own account emphasises the distinction between divine address and 
human reception because of the inescapably fallen dynamic of thought. For Hegel, 
Vernunft, ‘reason’, is no longer compromised in this manner, leading Bonhoeffer to 
claim that such an approach leads to ‘enthroning reason [Vernunft] in the place of 
God’.26 In contrast, Bonhoeffer asserts reconciliation sola fide: ‘Unity is grounded in 
faith alone. Faith is the truly good thing in God’s eyes’.27  
Nevertheless, as the Genesis lectures conclude Bonhoeffer accents the 
incapacity to think beyond the cursed aftermath of Eden. The reality of sin leaves 
him reticent to claim the protoevangelium. Bonhoeffer rather questions how Adam 
could know anything beyond present subsistence, depicting the gospel account of 
                                                            
22 The citation above, in which Hegel identifies the second Adam, is underlined in Bonhoeffer’s 
edition with a question mark written into the margin. See NL-VPR III, 126. 
23 LPR III, 155; VPR III, 124. 
24 Advising his friend Karl Joseph Windischmann in 1810, Hegel wrote that ‘it is science 
[Wissenschaft] which has led you into the labyrinth of the soul, and science alone is capable of leading 
you out again and healing you’. Pinkard cites this letter in relation to Hegel’s own dark period, which 
Hegel spoke of as a ‘mood of the soul, or rather of reason’. It was both an exhausting depression and, 
ultimately, a turning point in his life. See Pinkard, Hegel, 225. 
25 NL-VPR III, 110. 
26 DBWE 3, 27; DBW 3, 26. 
27 DBWE 3, 93n37; DBW 3, 87n28. This is one student’s rendition of a lecture’s opening 
summary. 
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Golgotha as a ‘strange paradise’, inaccessible to the fallen mind as Eden.28 This 
reticence surrounding the promise is further indicated by the statement that ‘in the 
world of tob and ra even revelation must veil itself’.29 
The concluding reference to the veil is one of the ways that Bonhoeffer’s 
Genesis lectures persist with the conditions of the fallen state, somewhat in tension 
with the strong eschatological and Christological account he offers in the 
introduction. The lecture series begins with the bold statement that the church of 
Christ lives, thinks, acts, and proclaims its message ‘from the end’.30 This has 
exegetical implications, as the church thus ‘reads the whole of Holy Scripture as the 
book of the end, of the new, of Christ’.31 Finally, Bonhoeffer claims that taking into 
account the ecclesial character of the Bible, alongside requisite historical and 
philological research, lies at the base of the claim that theological exposition has 
Wissenschaftlichkeit, the ‘nature of a science’.32  
While these eschatological and Christological statements represent a great 
deal of Bonhoeffer’s theological project, I aim to show his complementary interest in 
critiquing claims to know the beginning because of conditions ‘in the middle’, 
specifically, the split cognisance to emerge from the Fall. Bonhoeffer’s articulation 
of the ‘middle’ condition requires him to attend patiently to the cursed aftermath of 
Genesis 3. Such tight focus may be partly motivated by his hesitation at Hegel’s bold 
account of thought exercised in light of the consummate religion, as intimated in the 
blinding glare of his protoevangelium.33 This does not mean that Bonhoeffer retreats 
into the Unwissenheit with which he characterises the ‘first Adam’, however. Rather, 
                                                            
28 DBWE 3, 146; DBW 3, 136. 
29 DBWE 3, 124; DBW 3, 116. 
30 DBWE 3, 21; DBW 3, 21. 
31 DBWE 3, 22; DBW 3, 22. 
32 DBWE 3, 22-23; DBW 3, 22. 
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in the Christology lectures, delivered immediately after Creation and Fall in the 
summer of 1933, he confronts his audience with the revelation of Christ as Logos 
and therefore the ‘centre of science [Wissenschaft]’, albeit the ‘invisible, 
unrecognized, hidden centre’.34  
Further research is required into how Bonhoeffer articulates a Logos 
Christology that does not only ‘counter’ fallen human reason but becomes its 
reconciling centre. However, for the time being Bonhoeffer’s Genesis lectures linger 
in this particular canonical location. Notwithstanding the introductory statements 
about reading ‘from the end’, Bonhoeffer persists in asking how thoroughly the Fall 
impedes reason. As such, he does not follow a longstanding Christian inclination to 
supersessionism, giving Jewish scripture a fuller hearing despite the increasingly 
hostile political environment of the 1930s. As I will now show, Bonhoeffer’s 
resistance is motivated by a depiction of the fallen mind strikingly similar to Hegel’s 
account of divided consciousness. 
2.2. Similarities on the ‘Fallen’ Mind 
As I will demonstrate in this part, neither Hegel nor Bonhoeffer speaks of 
moral decision as the clean cutting away of one option, the evil, for another, the 
good.35 Rather, they both indicate that the fallen moral subject simultaneously grasps 
for a unified knowledge of good and evil while knowing herself divided by the 
attempt. I will render this dual dynamic with the English ‘cleaving’, with both 
meanings—‘to cling’ and ‘to split’—in operation. With respect to the ‘knowledge of 
good and evil’, I will employ the hyphenated ‘good-evil’ to pronounce the dynamic 
                                                                                                                                                                        
33 Some of Bonhoeffer’s most emphatic marginalia occur around Hegel’s statements of God’s 
entire revelation, after which nothing divine remains secret. See NL-VPR I, 75. 
34 See DBWE 12, 301, alt.; DBW 12, 281. Bonhoeffer adds that Christology only becomes the 
centre of scholarship as it comes ‘from outside’. 
35 The notion of cutting away is implied in the classical Latin dēcīdere (‘to cut off, to cut down, 
to mark out, carve’) that lies beneath the English ‘decide’. 
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of inseparability, or indeed bondage, emphasised by Hegel and Bonhoeffer in every 
act of judgement. 
2.2.1. Hegel on the Reflexive Division of Judgment 
Hegel reads the ‘representation of the Fall’ in Genesis against one-sided 
accounts of human nature as good or evil. He defines these two options as follows: 
humanity is by nature good, which is to say, ‘implicitly Spirit and rationality, created 
in and after the image of God;’36 humanity is by nature evil, namely, the mode of 
existence that ‘remains within the circle of his desires, and whose law is that of 
natural immediacy’.37 Rather than siding with one, Hegel claims that the two must be 
thought together and, therefore, apart: 
It is false to ask whether or not humanity is good by nature. This is a 
false way of posing the question. It is just as superficial to say that he 
is equally good and evil….Both good and evil are posited, but 
essentially in contradiction, such that each of the two presupposes the 
other. It is not that only one exists; rather they both exist in this 
relation and are opposed to each other.38 
 
Meanwhile, Hegel’s pairing of this antithesis does not at first suggest an untroubled, 
panoptic view ‘about’ good-evil; rather, this knowledge exposes the subject’s own 
division between the pair.  
Hegel conveys this reflexive aspect of division by playing on the etymological 
base for Urteil, ‘judgment’, which shares a root with teilen, ‘to divide’.39 As the 
subject judges, she expresses her cleaving mind. Hegel is targeting a dominant 
contemporary notion that humanity is ‘by nature’ good, using strong terms to trouble 
moral deliberation:  
In terms of content, it means that the human has elevated himself to 
the knowledge of the difference [between good and evil], and that 
this knowledge is the source of evil, indeed is evil [böse] itself…For 
                                                            
36 LPR III, 138-39; VPR III, 113-14. 
37 LPR III, 140; VPR III, 115. 
38 LPR III, 142; VPR III, 116. 
39 The link is noted in Hodgson, HCT, 153. 
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knowledge and consciousness in general mean a judging or dividing, 
a self-distinguishing within oneself…In this disunion only evil is 
contained, and hence it is itself evil.40  
 
On this account there is clearly no neutral standpoint ‘suspended’ between two 
options. As Peter Dews comments, ‘to treat this opposition as if it were a genuine 
equipolarity is already to have embraced the bad’.41 The act of eating from the tree 
thus leaves the knower in a state of tragic irony, for the attempt to know the good 
inevitably reveals one’s separation from the good.42 However well-intentioned moral 
choice may be, it is always already self-indictment. 
 By Hegel’s account the human person cannot simply surface by choosing the 
good, nor do the pair separate by nature of their own discord. He states, ‘this is not, 
however, a contradiction that simply falls apart but rather one that simultaneously 
holds itself together’.43 This ‘bound opposition’ is depicted by the term Entzweiung, 
in which the term zwei, two, is embedded.44 This term is customarily used in the 
story of the Fall where elsewhere Entfremdung features. Hegel’s claim to 
simultaneity can be rendered by the duality of the English ‘cleaving’, with the 
meanings ‘to cling’ and ‘to split’ both in operation.45 Along with its meaning for the 
mind of any given person, it should be noted that the theme of rupture is part of 
Hegel’s early argument that the need for philosophy ‘arises out of a need for social 
                                                            
40 LPR III, 158; VPR III, 127. This is briskly stated earlier as well: ‘it is not the case that 
contemplation has an external relation to evil; rather contemplation or knowledge is itself what is 
evil’. LPR III, 143; VPR III, 109-10. 
41 Peter Dews, The Idea of Evil (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 90. 
42 Nicholas Adams’ unpublished paper, ‘Hegel Reads Genesis’, has been helpful in developing 
this insight. 
43 LPR III, 138; VPR III, 113. 
44 Commenting on Hegel’s early writings, Pinkard shows how Hegel uses the term to articulate 
the encounter between two agents, in which the rational will disrupts [entzweit] itself into ‘two 
powers, two characters’. He shows how Hegel’s Jena drafts on this theme contribute to an emerging 
theory of ‘recognition’ in Pinkard, Hegel, 189-193. 
45 For the English editors, ‘cleavage’ and ‘cleaving’ are leading options to render Entzweiung, 
whereas Entfremdung is conveyed as ‘estrangement’. See the more recent critical edition: G.W.F. 
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. III, ed. Peter Hodgson, trans. R.F. Brown, P.C. 
Hodgson, et al. (Oxford University Press, 2007), based on the Jaeschke German edition. Relatedly, 
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life to overcome or heal its internal ruptures’.46 This term encapsulates Hegel’s 
conceptual depiction of the biblical account that, as I will now show, is adopted by 
Bonhoeffer to convey the cleft ground on which the quest for moral knowledge 
proceeds. 
2.2.2.  Bonhoeffer on the Presumptuous ‘Creator-Human’ 
Bonhoeffer’s early salvo against Hegel’s claim to ‘divine knowledge’ can be 
further qualified by the observation that he sounds very much like Hegel in his own 
treatment of Genesis 3:22. He comments: 
 
There can at this point be no more doubt that the serpent was right 
in the promise it made. The Creator confirms the truth of that 
promise: Humankind has become like one of us. It is sicut deus. 
Humankind has got what it wants; it has itself become creator, 
source of life, fountainhead of the knowledge of good and evil.47 
 
Bonhoeffer elaborates on the ontological pretension in the knowledge claimed by 
such likeness, going so far as attributing ‘aseity’ to the fallen knower.48 He thus 
leaves the newly designated Schöpfermensch, ‘creator-human’, to bear the weight of 
‘divinisation’, living anticlimactically as ‘solitary lord and despot of its own mute, 
violated, silenced, dead, ego-world [Ichwelt]’.49 Although the creature is preserved, 
Bonhoeffer accentuates the terminal condition of this all-too-human god. Throughout 
the manuscript he employs two different Latin phrases to set the proper creaturely 
image of God [imago dei] apart from the serpent’s promise to be ‘like God’ [sicut 
deus].50 Bonhoeffer persists with this opposition in expositing Genesis, leaving to his 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Adams makes reference to the duality of the English ‘cleave’ in explaining aufheben, or ‘sublation’, 
in Eclipse, 32. 
46 Pinkard, Hegel, 157. 
47 DBWE 3, 142; DBW 3, 131. 
48 DBWE 3, 113; DBW 3, 105. 
49 DBWE 3, 142; DBW 3, 131. 
50 For example: ‘the fall really makes the creature—humankind-in-the-imago-dei—into a 
creator-sicut-deus’. DBWE 3, 116; DBW 3, 107-8. 
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Christology lectures the sustained confrontation between the presumptuous 
Schöpfermensch with the true Gott-mensch. 
While Bonhoeffer places a stronger emphasis on how mortality undercuts 
human likeness to God, his depiction of postlapsarian knowledge bears striking 
resemblance to Hegel. He claims that good and evil represent the ‘deepest divide’ in 
human life, employing the same term Entzweiung that he has marked in Hegel’s 
Lectures.51 His ensuing depiction has three similar components, which suggest the 
term ‘cleaving’ can also represent Bonhoeffer’s own account. First, there is a drive 
for a perception that attempts to get the human mind ‘around’ good-evil, presuming 
externality from the pair. Thus, humanity seeks knowledge ‘about’ God, ‘about’ 
good and evil [um Gott, um gut und böse].52 Second, this externalising attempt is 
given the lie through the perpetual division of the subject: the fallen knower is denied 
the panoptic view, being ‘bound to the depths’ of this knowledge.53 Bonhoeffer 
deepens this internalisation by using the affective hybrid terms lustvoll-gut and 
leidvoll-bös.54 Third, there is the inseparable combination of the drive for external, 
unified perception and the reflexive division that binds the subject in turn: the pair 
good-evil is ‘the deepest divide in human life’, and yet ‘in being split apart 
[Zwiespaltigkeit] they belong inseparably together’.55  
Two of the presuppositions brought to scripture in Bonhoeffer’s own time 
deserve mention. First, this pejorative take on Wissen is strategic for his critique of a 
sanguine view of Gewissen, ‘conscience’, particularly as rendered in Karl Holl’s 
                                                            
51 NL-VPR III, 158. 
52 Note that Bonhoeffer replaces the preposition in with um in a later version. DBWE 3, 113n7; 
DBW 3, 105n8. 
53 This is in contrast to the imago dei is ‘bound to the word of the creator’ from which its life is 
sustained in the unity of obedience. DBWE 3, 113; DBW 3, 105. 
54 He claims that good and evil form ‘an ultimate split [Zwiespalt]’ that reaches back to the fuller 
conceptualities of the ‘pleasurable’ [lustvoll] and ‘painful’ [leidvoll], terms drawn from Hans Schmidt. 
DBWE 3, 157; DBW 3, 167. 
55 DBWE 3, 88; DBW 3, 82-83. 
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claim that Luther offers a ‘religion of conscience’. Bonhoeffer repositions this term 
within the divided state of knowing: ‘Before the fall there was no conscience. Only 
since humankind has become divided from the Creator are human beings divided 
within themselves [in sich selbst entzweit]’.56 Second, Bonhoeffer’s critique of 
ethical claims based on the Schöpfungsordnungen, ‘orders of creation’, remains in 
view although he does not develop his alternative ‘orders of preservation’ as 
thoroughly in these lectures as elsewhere.57 This critical stance is adopted in the face 
of contemporary accounts by theologians such as Paul Althaus that serve to locate 
the Völker in a mythic protology. Bonhoeffer’s depiction of split cognisance helps to 
trouble claims to think back to the unalloyed good of the primal state, rendering 
appeal to creation orders highly contestable. This has significant political effects as 
Bonhoeffer later develops his account of the göttlichen Mandaten, ‘divine mandates’, 
over against göttlichen Ordnungen, ‘divine orders’, with respect to Luther and heirs 
such as Hegel and Althaus.58 In Creation and Fall, however, further work is required 
to subvert Hegel’s attempt to know the beginning. 
2.3. Divergence over Protologies 
Having shown the similarities in Hegel and Bonhoeffer’s portrayals of the 
cleaving state of fallen cognisance, I now turn to their descriptions of prelapsarian 
humanity. Reference to states before and after the ‘Fall’ are used advisedly, for 
Hegel is critical of the ‘contradictions’ endemic to the sequential form of 
representation in the biblical account. Bonhoeffer is more willing to speak in terms 
of sequence, though he will also note ‘ambiguities’ inherent in such depiction.  
                                                            
56 DBWE 3, 128; DBW 3, 120. 
57 As Rüter and Tödt comment, Bonhoeffer’s most forceful comments against creation orders 
come earlier in 1932, with his alternative language of ‘orders of preservation’ playing only a 
‘subsidiary role’ in Creation and Fall. See ‘Editors’ Afterword’, DBWE 3, 148-9; DBW 3, 138-9. 
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As I show in this section, Hegel depicts primal humanity as a compound of 
‘nature’ and implicit ‘spirit’, with the emergence of the latter leading to the division 
of cognisance. In contrast, Bonhoeffer gestures at a state of primal unity that fallen 
cognisance cannot apprehend, emphasising discontinuity. In short, Bonhoeffer 
arrests Hegel’s trajectory to ask whether their common characterisation of split 
cognisance truly conditions, and so delimits, rational inquiry. 
2.3.1.  Hegel on Primal Volatility 
Hegel articulates the primal state through the concepts Natur and Geist, a pair 
that has a long history in theological and philosophical anthropology. In Hegel’s 
iteration, Natur, ‘nature’, is the base mode of human life. It is characterised as an 
unliberated state in relation both to self and external nature, a state ‘of desire or 
appetite, of rudeness and self-seeking, of dependence and fear’. This dependence can 
be ‘either mild or savage’ given region and custom.59 Hegel describes it as ‘self-
seeking’, drawn by goals that relate to a person’s ‘singularity’ as ‘opposed to the 
universal’, this narrow scope signalled by the term ‘immediacy’.60 He also makes 
clear that the issue is not fleshly constitution simpliciter but a manner of life 
‘submerged in corporeality’.61 Insofar as it is associated with the body while not 
directly identifiable with it, Natürlichkeit resembles the Apostle Paul’s 
characterization of life ‘according to the flesh’.62 It is worth repeating, however, that 
the temporal process involved in this trajectory means that Hegel locates this 
‘fleshly’ state before the Fall. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
58 Bonhoeffer develops his four ‘mandates’ of work, marriage, government, and church, which 
are rendered as ‘divinely imposed tasks as opposed to determinate forms of being’. DBWE 6, 68-75; 
DBW 6, 54-61. 
59 LPR III, 124; VPR III, 97. 
60 LPR III, 132; VPR III, 104. 
61 LPR III, 161; VPR III, 129. 
62 This comparison to the biblical portrayal of life kata sarka is drawn in Hodgson, HCT, 149. 
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Geist, ‘spirit’ or ‘mind’, is the higher mode of human life for Hegel. It is 
spoken of as a movement of ‘elevation’ or ‘raising up’, though the spatial metaphor 
should not be associated with incorporeality.63 Terms of movement are important 
because spirit is not yet ‘explicit’ in the primal state; the human is ‘internally and 
intrinsically, namely, Spirit as such, the image of God’.64 This latent quality is that 
alone through which humankind is able to discern the voice of God in natural 
phenomena such as thunder.65 The language of internality should not mislead, 
however, for Geist is manifest in cohesive social relations, leading Pinkard to speak 
of ‘mindedness’ and ‘like-mindedness’.66 Insofar as Geist remains implicit, though, 
the primal state itself is deficient, which Hegel conveys with the term böse, ‘evil’.67  
The ‘evil’ in question is not active malevolence but rather incompletion; ‘a 
lack because Spirit should not exist in itself; it is Spirit only because it exists for 
itself…being-in-itself, or existence according to nature, ought to be sublated’.68 
Hegel’s primal human state thus presages the knowledge of good-evil, that is, ‘this 
stepping forth is already contained in the natural state itself’.69 This is not to say that 
original deficiency is entirely regrettable; it is a state that ‘ought not to be, i.e., ought 
to be annulled—not one, however, that ought not to occur: it has occurred because 
man is consciousness….The latter is the eternal history of humanity’.70 In light of 
this, one may well ask why such a step would be forbidden by God.71 
                                                            
63 LPR III, 115; VPR III, 91. 
64 LPR III, 134; VPR III, 106. 
65 LPR III, 121; VPR III, 90. 
66 Pinkard, Hegel, 219. 
67 O’Regan notes that this designation—human being as essentially evil rather than good as 
prius—is one instance of ‘swerve’ from the normative Christian tradition among several in the 
creation narrative alone. See O'Regan, Heterodox, 169-170. 
68 LPR III, 134; VPR III, 106. 
69 LPR III, 140; VPR III, 114. 
70 LPR III, 154; VPR III, 123. 
71 Acknowledging this question, Hodgson claims that such seeming ‘contradictions’ in the 
representational form of the Fall ‘reflect the ambiguities that are present in consciousness and 
knowledge—ambiguities that only speculative thinking is able to grasp’. Hodgson, HCT, 150. 
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Volatility is an apt descriptor for Hegel’s composite of Geist and Natur.72 
The stirring motion, and resultant struggle, form the base of an Aristotelian 
trajectory. As Adams demonstrates, reference to Geist as the an sich image of God—
‘implicit’ in Hodgson’s translation—invokes Aristotle’s state of ‘potentiality’. This 
is on a trajectory towards ‘actuality’, Hegel’s für sich, and ultimately ‘completion’, 
Hegel’s an-und-für-sich.73 The primal human is not ‘evil’, or deficient, all the way 
down; Geist teems within the natural state and will emerge through knowledge, 
however costly the passage. 
Alongside this Aristotelian framework, Hegel’s account is motivated by a 
polemic against the ‘barren viewpoint of the pedagogy of our time’.74 Many of his 
contemporaries' approaches to education assumed human nature as good, which 
Hegel notes as an interpretation of the human person not ‘in accord with his Idea’ but 
merely empirically, that is, ‘good without mediation of the negative’.75 Such a view 
explains away that which ‘ought not to be’ in pupils as due to external factors rather 
than being rooted in the subject, a superficial view which Hegel charges with the 
nurture of vanity.76 It is likely that Rousseau's Émile, ou De l'Éducation is in view, 
although Hegel is also engaging contemporary debates about properly German 
‘cultivation’.77 As Hodgson summarises, the pedagogical approach targeted here 
‘regards civilisation as contaminating an original innocence and fails to recognise the 
                                                            
72 My use here draws out the etymological link to the Latin volāt- (participial stem of volāre, ‘to 
fly’) as an allusion to spirit’s urge towards ‘elevation’. 
73 Adams, Eclipse, 57-8. 
74 LPR III, 130; VPR III, 102-3. 
75 LPR III, 130, 296; VPR III, 102-3, 221. See also Hodgson, HCT, 149-50. 
76 LPR III, 130; VPR III, 103. 
77 Pinkard outlines the debate over true and false Bildung in Hegel’s early political context, as 
well as its distinction from mere ‘education’, with brief reference to the French context, in Pinkard, 
Hegel, 49-54. 
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necessity of discipline and acquired knowledge’.78 Such acquisition requires the 
maturation of responsibility and, with it, guilt, from the formerly innocent. Hegel 
states: 
The original condition of the human, which is superficially 
represented as the state of innocence [Unschuld], is the state of 
nature, the animal state. Humanity is properly speaking culpable; in 
so far as he is good, he ought not to be so in the sense that a natural 
thing is good. Rather his guilt [Schuld] and will ought to come into 
play; it ought to be possible to impute [moral responsibility] to him. 
Guilt means, in a general sense, the possibility of imputation. The 
good man is good by and through his will, and hence by means of 
his guilt.79 
  
The prefix Un- in Unschuld indicates the deficiency of the primal state, while at the 
same time foreshadowing the way in which human beings come to know better. To 
capture this critical edge, Unschuld for Hegel might be better rendered as 
‘guiltlessness’ or even ‘irresponsibility’. The claim to such deficiency is the key 
point at which Bonhoeffer turns against his predecessor in his description of 
protology. 
2.3.2.  Bonhoeffer on Original Unity 
In Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer had grounded his discussion of the 
primal state with a reminder of how this state unsettles reflection on the person ‘as 
such’, a preview of his future engagements with Hegel. Distancing himself from 
accounts of continuity or development, Bonhoeffer claimed that: 
[In idealism,] sin and salvation are realities that do not alter the original 
essence of things. For us, though, the doctrine of the primal state is 
significant precisely because it enables us to grasp concretely the reality 
of sin, which infinitely alters the essence of things.80 
 
                                                            
78 Hodgson names this pedagogical account as ‘philanthropinism’. He goes on to note figures 
who depict a state of original perfection, including Schelling, against whom Hegel also wrote. See 
HCT, 149-150. 
79 LPR III, 141; VPR III, 115. 
80 DBWE 1, 62; DBW 1, 36. 
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It is this alteration that makes Bonhoeffer suspicious of even the biblical writer's 
ability to depict the primal state, much less Hegel's own.  
For Bonhoeffer the creaturely state is not deficient, but nor is it mature; he 
avoids linguistic cues that place the original creation on a developmental trajectory. 
When Bonhoeffer does employ the term Natur, therefore, he qualifies it in a manner 
that calls to mind Hegel’s account. Arguing for humanity’s rule over the created 
world as an expression of Geist embedded in Natur, he states that it is not as though 
‘nature were something foreign to spirit’.81 Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on original unity 
creates a contrast to Hegel’s view of the incipient division of the primal state: ‘in my 
whole being, in my creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world; it bears me, 
nurtures me, holds me’.  
Bonhoeffer's depiction of the unified state of Geschöpflichkeit contrasts with 
the fatally ‘cleaving’ state of the Schöpfermensch. To this end, he elsewhere shifts 
from the term Natur to speak of an image of God composed of ‘earth’: ‘As such 
creatures, human beings of earth and spirit [Mensch aus Erde und Geist] are “like” 
God, their Creator’.82 In his copy of Hegel's lectures, Bonhoeffer reacts to the claim 
that humanity should not be innocent but rather schuldig, ‘guilty, responsible’, with 
several exclamation marks.83 In his own lectures, he insists that Adam’s ‘distinctive 
characteristic’ is ‘utterly unbroken unity [Einheit] of obedience, that is, Adam’s 
innocence [Unschuld] and ignorance [Unwissenheit] of disobedience’.84 Against the 
implications of Hegel’s Unschuld, Bonhoeffer seeks to avoid suggesting, by the 
negative prefix un-, a moral ‘capacity’ yet to be exercised.85  
                                                            
81 DBWE 3, 66, alt; DBW 3, 62. 
82 DBWE 3, 79; DBW 3, 74. The phrase Der Mensch aus Erde und Geist serves as the title of his 
entire lecture on Genesis 2:7. 
83 NL-VPR III, 107. 
84 DBWE 3, 84, alt.; DBW 3, 79. 
85 I am indebted to a conversation with Bernd Wannenwetsch for this insight. 
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The claim to unity is made insofar as the human creature is recipient of the 
divine Word, free from an incipient division: 
Only the Creator knows what the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil is up to this point; Adam does not yet know it. As one who lives 
in the unity [Einheit] of obedience Adam does not comprehend that 
which is two–sided [Zwiefache]; as one who lives in the unity of the 
knowledge of God as the centre and the boundary of human life 
Adam cannot conceive of the breaking apart of that knowledge into 
good and evil. Adam knows neither what good nor what evil is and 
lives in the strictest sense beyond good and evil; that is, Adam lives 
out of the life that comes from God, before whom a life lived in 
good, just like a life lived in evil, would mean an unthinkable falling 
away.86 
 
The allusion to Nietzsche for the phrase ‘beyond good and evil’ polemically renders 
the non-deficiency of this state.87 While Bonhoeffer is sympathetic to Hegel’s 
insistence on the assumption of Schuld, ‘guilt’ or ‘responsibility’, in ethical life after 
the Fall, he cordons off the primal state from such necessary development. After all, 
such retrojection seems suspiciously like the account of a fallen knower who, in 
seeking a unitive account, effectively divides what was once whole. 
Bonhoeffer observes that this state of human unity in obedience fits the 
biblical witness to creation’s Vollendung, ‘completion’. Commenting on Genesis 
1:28-31, he highlights God’s recognition of the goodness of creaturely being and the 
bestowal of divine blessing in the work’s completion. Bonhoeffer then depicts 
Sabbath rest as a state of wholeness misunderstood by those who ‘impudently’ 
contrast it with their own vitality and ‘thereby defend and glorify struggle and 
unrest’.88 Bonhoeffer does not name his target, but the ‘vitalism’ of emerging Third 
Reich propaganda is likely in view.  
                                                            
86 DBWE 3, 87-8; DBW 3, 82. 
87 Bonhoeffer makes a related reference to Nietzsche in a 1929 lecture, claiming that he did not 
‘discover’ this state that transcends moral division; completion in God’s limitless love belongs to the 
‘original, albeit concealed’ Christian witness to creation. See DBWE 10, 363; DBW 10, 327. 
88 DBWE 3, 70; DBW 3, 65. 
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Alongside that contemporary political concern, it is worth noting that Hegel’s 
primal state does not offer a robust account of Sabbath as a grounding dynamic of 
the primal state. Rather, as Dews comments, Hegel stands out for the manner in 
which he ‘emphasizes antagonism, conflict, and suffering as fundamental features of 
reality’.89 In light of Bonhoeffer’s awareness of Hegel’s pejorative view of the 
primal state, it is worth reconsidering whether Bonhoeffer spoke against those who 
seek to not only to ‘defend’ but to ‘unite and glorify struggle’, that is, those who 
locate an incipient division in the primal human, one continuous with later 
maturation.90 
Just as Adam cannot think fallen humanity, so Bonhoeffer claims that the 
‘cleaving’ mind cannot access the primal state of existence. The danger of such an 
attempt is signalled early in the lectures when Bonhoeffer identifies a temptation for 
the philosophically-interested exegete. Commenting on the ‘beginning’ of Genesis 
1:1-2, he says that one attempt at knowledge of this state can come through ‘the one 
who has been a liar from the beginning’.91 Bonhoeffer then gives ‘the evil one’ direct 
address: ‘I am the beginning and you, O humankind, are the beginning. You were 
with me from the beginning. I have made you what you are, and with me your end is 
sublated’.92 Bonhoeffer likely has Hegel’s dual meaning in view as he has just 
referenced ‘the Hegelian question’ of a beginning point for the philosophy of 
religion.93 His use of the term aufheben is likely a way of showing the susceptibility 
of even dialectical thinking, which he will elsewhere employ, to the fallen condition 
                                                            
89 Dews, Evil, 85. 
90 DBWE 3, 70, emphasis mine; DBW 3, 65. The word translated ‘defend’ here is verteidigen 
even though vereinigen, ‘to unite’, actually features in the 1933 publication—a transcription the 
editors claim is ‘clearly by mistake’. 
91 DBWE 3, 28; DBW 3, 27-28. 
92 DBWE 3, 28 alt.; DBW 3, 28. 
93 DBWE 3, 27; DBW 3, 26. To represent this duality, and the apparent villainisation of Hegel, I 
opt for the technical English term that unites the aspects currently divided between text and footnote. 
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of knowing when its ambition exceeds creaturely bounds. In particular, it signals 
resistance to what Bonhoeffer seems to sense is lost in Hegel’s reference to ‘finitude’ 
as lacking truth or in need of ‘negation’.94 The placement of Hegel’s term of art in 
the tempter’s mouth is mischievous, as Bonhoeffer elsewhere quips to the effect that 
the score turns out so well because Hegel leaves the devil out of the game.95 
To resist one of the temptations involved in seeking to know the beginning, 
Bonhoeffer articulates a familiar depiction of the one knowing good-evil: 
What is important to understand, however, is that this story claims 
us not as listeners with the gift of imagination but as human beings 
who, no matter how much they stretch their imaginations and all 
their other mental or spiritual powers, are simply unable to 
transport themselves to this paradise ‘beyond good and evil’, 
‘beyond pleasure and pain;’ instead, with all their powers of 
thinking, they remain tied to this torn–apart world, to antithesis, to 
contradiction. This is so because our thinking too is only the 
expression of our being, of our existence, which is grounded in 
contradiction. Because we do not exist in a state of unity, our 
thinking is torn apart as well.96 
 
In order to convey this inaccessibility, Bonhoeffer distinguishes pre- and post-Fall 
cognisance by altering his diction and syntax. For the prelapsarian, Bonhoeffer 
renders God’s knowledge of the tree and his prohibition to humanity with the phrase 
der Baum der Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen.97 This changes in his lecture on the 
opening of the fallen couple’s eyes in Genesis 3:7, briskly titled Das Neue, from 
which point he renders fallen human knowledge as Das Wissen um gut und böse.98 
The shift from Erkenntnis to Wissen and the move from the genitive construction to 
                                                                                                                                                                        
As it is, the translator notes that in light of Hegel’s usage this can also read ‘your end has been raised 
up to me’. See DBWE 3, 28-29n12. 
94 This temptation passage may help to illumine Bonhoeffer’s exclamatory markings at Hegel’s 
description of how Das Endliche undergoes sublation, even negation, leading to affirmation as 
infinite. NL-VPR I, 218. 
95 This note is found on a paper left in Bonhoeffer’s copy of Hegel’s lectures, filed in the estate 
as NL A 31,4. Its contents are transcribed as ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffers Hegel-Zettel’ in Hegelseminar, ed. 
Ilse Tödt, 107-08. 
96 DBWE 3, 92; DBW 3, 86. 
97 DBWE 3, 87; DBW 3, 82. 
98 DBWE 3, 122; DBW 3, 114-15. 
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the preposition um signal a more ‘externalised’ stance of knowing. By altering these 
terms, Bonhoeffer signals that split cognisance conditions himself and his lecture 
audience in their wissenschaftlich inquiry. As I will now show, such a self-critical 
move is already suggested by Hegel. 
2.4. The Politics of Knowing: Supersession from Scripture to Culture 
In this section I consider the critical range of Hegel and Bonhoeffer’s account 
of the ‘cleaving mind’ by showing their reflexive use of pronouns as lecturers. In 
particular, I trace their use of the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’ to perform the implications 
of the Genesis text. For instance, Hegel’s use of the first person singular suggests a 
pedagogical willingness to inhabit perception ‘according to nature’. This promising 
move is circumscribed, however, by the distance he maintains from other cultures 
insofar as they are described in primitive terms. In contrast, Bonhoeffer would not 
map protology onto other peoples, given that his far more positive account of the 
state is lost to all. He therefore shows a more expansive use of ‘we’ in assuming the 
guilt of a postlapsarian division of thought. 
2.4.1. Hegel on the Primal State of Others 
As a lecturer, Hegel regularly employs the third person singular to describe 
the object of his inquiry.99 However, he makes a suggestive departure by employing 
the first person singular in describing division: 
Evil first exists within the sphere of estrangement: it is the 
consciousness of being-for-oneself vis-à-vis an other, but also vis-
à-vis an object that is inherently universal in the sense of the 
concept or rational will. I exist for myself for the first time by 
means of this separation, and therein lies the evil. To be evil means 
in an abstract sense to isolate myself.100 
 
                                                            
99 E.g. ‘the natural man does not exist in the form that he ought to…’ LPR III, 123; VPR III, 97. 
100 LPR III, 143; VPR III, 109. Adams identifies this switch to the first person singular in another 
passage of the lecture manuscript in ‘Hegel Reads Genesis’. 
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Hegel’s use of the first person singular to inhabit the ‘natural’ person is apt, for 
narrow preoccupation with the self is a primary characteristic of ‘natural’ humanity. 
His pronominal turn can be understood as an enactment of his pervasive claim that 
‘contemplation or knowledge is itself what is evil’.101 This suits Hegel’s approach to 
the philosophy of religion is intended as no mere ‘historical’ curiosity but an 
explication of humanity according to the ‘concept’, with present-tense implications.  
Hegel’s use of the first person plural may at first seem unremarkable, though 
investigation of his other works reveals a disturbing cultural constriction.102 In his 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, delivered over the same decade as his 
course on the philosophy of religion, Hegel’s pejorative terms for the primal state 
feature as he summons his audience in 1820s Berlin to consider the developmental 
stage of other cultures. In a section entitled ‘The Natural Context or the Geographical 
Basis of World History’, he overlays an ‘implicit’ divide in protology on other 
peoples, as shown in the following observation: 
Thus, in Africa as a whole, we encounter what has been called the 
state of innocence, in which man supposedly lives in unity with God 
and nature. For in this state, man is as yet unconscious of himself. 
The spirit should not remain permanently in such a state, however, 
but must abandon this primitive condition….Man is not truly a 
human being until he knows what goodness is, has experienced 
opposition, and become divided within himself. For he can only 
know what is good if he also has knowledge of evil. For this reason, 
the state of paradise is not a perfect one….For the concept of the 
spirit is only potentially present, and it has wrongly been assumed 
that it already existed in reality.103 
 
Hegel’s ensuing commentary on accounts of intra-African slavery shows the 
disturbing political import of his contemporised use of protology. On the one hand, 
he makes the unequivocal claim that ‘[s]lavery ought not to exist, as it is by 
                                                            
101 LPR III, 143; VPR III, 109-10. 
102 E.g. ‘we need only briefly to be reminded…’ LPR III, 126; VPR III, 99. 
103 LPWH, 178. 
 104 
definition unjust in and for itself’.104 On the other, such injustice is explained as 
characteristic of the primal state, conceding the educative effect slavery can have for 
those peoples who have allegedly not yet emerged into the necessary divide of 
consciousness.105  
At least Hegel acknowledges an initial barrier to thought at the level of cross-
cultural understanding. ‘We’ have great difficulty understanding the African context, 
he states, as it is ‘remote and alien in relation to our own mode of consciousness’.106 
However, while this other culture cannot be accessed through the feeling of those in 
the lecture hall, much less an actual voyage, he maintains that it is ultimately 
accessible through the mediation of thought.107 The exercise reveals a troubling 
cultural assumption embedded in Hegel’s philosophy: it is an inquiry that presumes 
the ‘rational state’ of his Germanic audience.  
Enslavement is not the only historical dynamic at stake in Hegel’s remarks. 
Chillingly, he also speaks of the native peoples of the New World, those who 
exhibited ‘a purely natural culture which had to perish as soon as the spirit 
approached it’.108 Identifying the peoples of America as ever ‘physically and 
spiritually impotent’, it is little surprise that ‘the natives were gradually destroyed by 
the breath of European activity’.109 
Hegel’s comments show the terrible political corollary of his 
contemporisation of a deficient primal state. Such fatal cultural divisions offer a stark 
example of a broader Enlightenment understanding that ‘reason could only come to 
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maturity in modern Europe’, in the words of Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze.110 Although 
Hegel’s more cautious, retrospective approach should be distinguished from the 
stronger regulative appeal of Kant’s racial theories, the political outworking of his 
views take their place within a broader movement of ‘providential historicism’ that 
has frequently undergirded colonial projects.111 It is one of the complex, sometimes 
‘savage’, ironies of the spread of idealism. 
2.4.2. Bonhoeffer on ‘Our’ Urgeschichte 
Bonhoeffer is also susceptible to showing the prejudice of his cultural 
location. For instance, disturbing statements from the late 1920s reveal his own 
attempt at an historicised account of providence that oversees the expansion of one 
people at the cost of another.112 This material has been recently criticised by Reggie 
Williams, who argues that it took work alongside African Americans in Harlem to 
unlearn the disregard for others’ lives that characterises some of Bonhoeffer’s earlier 
lectures, emerging as they did from a wounded nationalism after the 1914-18 War.113  
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer’s use of the first person pronoun is both more 
expansive and self-indicting than Hegel’s. This is partly because he does not 
contemporise the primal state, much less one that is deficient, but also because he 
leaves behind the attempt at a providential historical account. Acknowledging that 
any attempt to think protology is inevitably conditioned by ‘our’ cleaving form of 
thought, Bonhoeffer underscores the first person plural in the assumption of guilt: 
This is God’s word; this is an event at the beginning of history, 
before history, beyond history, and yet in history; this is a decision 
that affects the world; we ourselves are the ones who are affected, 
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113 Reggie Williams, Bonhoeffer’s Black Jesus (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014), 10-15. 
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are intended, are addressed, accused, condemned, expelled; God, 
yes God, is the one who blesses and curses; it is our primeval 
history [Urgeschichte], truly our own, every individual person’s 
beginning, destiny, guilt, and end—so says the church of Christ.114 
 
Bonhoeffer is sure to render the address of God’s Word as ‘external’ in an effort to 
exceed both the presuppositions of an age and cultural borderlines. To this end, he 
regularly reminds his Berlin lecture audience of how this text challenges the 
presumption of Wissenschaft. Bonhoeffer thus oscillates from the third to the first 
person plural, in a single passage speaking of human beings who, with ‘all their other 
mental or spiritual powers, are simply unable to transport themselves to this paradise 
“beyond good and evil,”’ continuing that this is the case ‘because our thinking too is 
only the expression of our being, of our existence, which is grounded in 
contradiction’.115  
Tellingly, Bonhoeffer’s nostra culpa keeps him from merely scapegoating the 
classical German philosophers. At one point he places himself and his audience 
between the poles of confidence in reason represented by Kant and Hegel, 
identifying shared anxiety at the prospect of an unknown beginning.116 Bonhoeffer 
extends this collective identification from Idealist philosophers to include the biblical 
writer. Remarkably, he claims that the biblical account bears the marks of split 
cognisance, as suggested by the fact that the Fall takes place in the Zwielicht, 
‘twilight’. The poorly illumined scene means that its actors will often be mistaken, 
nuances of expression lost. This setting signifies the ambiguity of an event in which 
evil comes through good creatures, such as the serpent and tree, a troubling duality 
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which ‘must on no account be crudely simplified and its two aspects be torn 
apart’.117 Bonhoeffer states: 
For precisely this twilight, this ambiguity, in which the creation here 
stands constitutes the only possible way for human beings in the 
middle to speak about this event—and the Yahwist too was a human 
being in the middle.118 
 
Though conceding the way in which scripture itself is conditioned by the human 
incapacity to know its beginning, Bonhoeffer nevertheless claims it as the site 
through which God’s word breaks in on the cleaving tendency of fallen thought.119 It 
is only in this way that the twilight allows discernment of a form—the Adam who 
‘disturbs and criticises us’.120 The claim to this disruptive word thus seeks to reverse 
the judgment Hegel and others visit on primal humanity, even on the ‘primitive’ 
form of the text. 
2.5. The ‘Sublation’ of Ethics? 
Bonhoeffer’s work with the Genesis text, read after Hegel, provides a radical 
critique of the lecture theatre as a site for moral knowledge. This final section 
considers the reach of that challenge in light of the reception of the later Ethics. I 
argue that Bonhoeffer carries forward many aspects of his engagement with Hegel 
over Genesis 1-3, with implications for the translation of allusive terms such as 
Aufhebung. To this end, I make a parallel case to Garrett Green’s thesis that Barth’s 
‘sublation of religion’ reflects his own Hegelian form of thought, entailing a subtlety 
that ought to trouble assumptions beyond schools of theology. 
Bonhoeffer takes up key ‘logical’ terms derived from his exegesis of Genesis 
1-3 in the 1942 Ethics manuscript entitled ‘God’s Love and the Disintegration of the 
World’. He refers to the knowledge of good and evil as Wissen um Gut und Böse, his 
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earlier differentiated construction for the postlapsarian state.121 Moreover, he 
regularly repeats the claim that such knowledge entails a state of Entzweiung with 
respect to the origin, which editor Clifford Green links to the reference to the world’s 
‘disintegration’ in the manuscript title.122 Bonhoeffer therefore dismisses 
psychological analysis as subject to this ‘law of disunion’ and thus no ultimate 
source of reintegration.123 There is little doubt that Bonhoeffer’s onslaught intends a 
thoroughgoing negation of the ‘cleaving’ tendency in human thought.   
Such negation has been briskly presented in English translations of the 
Ethics, particularly as this section has previously featured as the first chapter of 
Bonhoeffer’s proposed book. Bethge’s longstanding rendition reads that insofar as 
‘the knowledge of good and evil’ appears to be the aim of all ethical reflection, the 
discipline of Christian ethics must work ‘to invalidate’ this knowledge.124 The more 
recent critical edition differs from this direct negation to render Bonhoeffer’s bold 
statement thus: 
The knowledge of good and evil [Wissen um Gut und Böse] appears 
to be the goal of all ethical reflection. The first task of Christian 
ethics is to supersede [aufzuheben] that knowledge. This attack on 
the presuppositions of all other ethics is so unique that it is 
questionable whether it even makes sense to speak of Christian 
ethics at all.125 
  
The translation is an improvement in that it moves beyond sheer negation. 
Nevertheless, in light of Bonhoeffer’s sustained engagement with Hegel’s thought 
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over the Genesis materials, it is worth closer consideration that the verb he uses is 
aufheben.126  
As this chapter has shown, Bonhoeffer does not employ philosophically-
freighted diction uncritically. He is willing to place the verb on the lips of the 
tempter, serving to warn exegetes that the ‘evil one’ can use a philosophical term of 
art just as he might employ scripture. Nevertheless, I have sought to argue that 
Bonhoeffer does not merely demonise the Hegelian terms he encounters, naively 
thinking he can ‘break’ with his predecessor. The markings in his personal copy of 
Hegel’s lectures show a clear interest in how Christianity might serve as the 
‘sublation’ of Entzweiung.127 Insofar as Bonhoeffer does differ, he likely intends to 
redeploy the term to his own ends. 
 Bonhoeffer’s particular usage can be seen in 'God's Love and the 
Disintegration of the World' when he later makes reference to the one who lives from 
‘the Aufhebung of the knowledge of good and evil’.128 This state is characterised by 
newfound unity in that it is no longer torn between various ethical possibilities; the 
person has ‘only the one option of being elected to do the one will of God in 
simplicity’.129 Although the term 'simplicity' [Einfalt] suggests an account of 
instinctive obedience over and against reflective moral deliberation, this is to miss 
the nuance of Bonhoeffer's diction. As Kaiser argues, the initial tension between 
direct response and reflection emerges into a new unity rather than a one-sided 
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solution.130 Indeed, Kaiser acknowledges that Bonhoeffer's account of simplicity is 
conditioned by the incorporation of human moral knowledge.131 
 Bonhoeffer's appeal to simplicity is therefore better understood as a contrast 
with two particular views of moral reflection. First, Bonhoeffer is reacting to the 
depiction of ethics as an arena of 'tragic conflict’. In this he is reacting against 
Eduard Spranger, whom he cites as saying that the 'point of decision of specifically 
ethical experience is always conflict’.132 As his ensuing treatment of Antigone 
shows, Bonhoeffer claims that a mindset that only sees conflictual laws in operation 
belongs to a pre-Christian manner of thought. For the New Testament, ethics is not a 
matter of conflict; reappropriating Spranger's reference to 'ethical experience’, 
Bonhoeffer claims that 'the rediscovered unity, the reconciliation has become the 
ground’.133 As a result, 'there is nothing problematic, tortured, or dark about the 
living and acting of human beings, but instead something self-evident, joyous, 
certain, and clear’.134  
 On the theme of overcoming conflict, it is worth noting that Bonhoeffer's 
depiction of the 'cleaving' mind in Ethics carries a series of philosophical 
implications. The Entzweiung of the knowledge of good-evil contains a number of 
cleavages that are 'variations' [Spielarten] on that central division. These variations 
include, inter alia, the split between idea [Idee] and reality, reason [Vernunft] and 
instinct, universal and concrete, individual and collective.135 Of particular note given 
Bonhoeffer's criticism of Hegel's Christology, another such cleavage is that between 
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'necessity and freedom’.136 Although Bonhoeffer does not develop the nature of these 
divisions here, allowing a fuller comparison with Hegel's extended treatments of 
such themes, they serve to show that simplicity is not to be confused with resignation 
to 'one-sidedness’.  
 Second, Bonhoeffer's account of simplicity stands in distinction to self-
knowledge as a means of self-justification. In other words, it is a form of action that 
foregoes the ‘knowledge of one’s own goodness’.137 Bonhoeffer therefore refers to 
the ‘simple act’ rather than one which is innocent or guiltless. While the 
undividedness of the act is paramount, this is not merely to reinstate the conditions of 
primal existence; 'being in Adam' has, in that sense, been irretrievably lost. After all, 
when it comes to the post-Fall world, Bonhoeffer is sympathetic to Hegel’s claim to 
the necessity of Schuld. Bonhoeffer therefore proposes that ‘the structure of 
responsible action involves both willingness to become guilty [Schuldübernahme] 
and freedom’.138 Insofar as moral deliberation assures a moral actor that she is in the 
right, it threatens to replace a response to God's will that may well require the 
assumption of guilt.   
 The ground for assuming guilt is the person and decisive action of Christ, 
who bore guilt on behalf of humanity and embodies the good in and for his people. 
Christine Schliesser has shown that Bonhoeffer's references to becoming guilty 
through responsible action are thoroughly grounded in his Christology.139 Schliesser 
traces how Bonhoeffer's theme develops from earlier works, in which the emphasis 
was on sharing in others' guilt or seeking out the guilty, to Ethics, in which guilt is 
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actively incurred in one's own action.140 Counterintuitively, therefore, it is precisely 
the acceptance of guilt that is paired with the 'simple, i.e. "untragic" Christian life’.141 
After all, Bonhoeffer's later theory was worked out in light of his renunciation of 
American refuge in order to take part in political resistance to his homeland regime, 
action which led many in the church to suspect and even disown him.142 Even such 
guilt does not entail tragedy, however, for it is grounded in a reconciled relationship 
with God.  
Meanwhile, a crucial matter of translation appears at the hinge point between 
Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s account of the cleaving mind and the reconciliation that 
comes through the revelation of Christ in the church. Bonhoeffer’s unmodified use of 
Aufhebung suggests he is willing to let the allusion to Hegel stand, qualifying his 
account contextually rather than avoiding, or altering, key terms. Thus, for a 
translator to take one side of this ambiguous term is likely to offer too much 
interpretive help, well considered though the reasons may be. The case for retaining 
the dual sense of the term aufheben is particularly compelling in light of 
Bonhoeffer's explicit mention, in other writings from the period, that this is precisely 
what he intends. In his account of the primus usus legis, Bonhoeffer claims the use of 
the law as '"sublated" ["aufgehoben"] (in the double sense of the word) by the 
gospel. It is broken and fulfilled [durchbrochen und erfüllt]’. This is particularly 
significant to the fate of the knowledge of good-evil because Bonhoeffer notes the 
ways in which this first use of the law is susceptible to the 'righteousness of works’, 
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giving rise to human presumption and sin.143 The translator for this critical edition 
explicitly notes the use of a standard translation of Hegel's term.144  
The translation of key philosophical terms has implications for the extent of 
Bonhoeffer’s reception, particularly whether he is read beyond theology faculties. 
This concern is at the forefront of Garrett Green’s challenge to the longstanding 
translation of Karl Barth’s term Aufhebung as the ‘abolition’ of religion. Green 
claims that as Barth goes on to speak of ‘the true religion’, this rendering has been 
‘wholly misleading’ with the result that Church Dogmatics is neglected in the 
Religious Studies canon.145 To counter this tendency, Green argues that the term’s 
technical aspect has to be preserved because ‘[a]s in Hegel, so in Barth, Aufhebung is 
a key to the logic of the argument, a logic that can be appropriately termed dialectical 
for both, though in quite different senses’.146 Thus, Green argues that Barth’s claim 
of revelation as the Aufhebung of religion ought to be translated as ‘sublimation’ 
rather than ‘abolition’, although I would argue that there are good reasons to stay 
with Green’s earlier suggestion of ‘sublation’.147 
If this logical dynamic should be preserved in Barth’s writings, the need to 
express critical variations on Hegel is all the more acute with Bonhoeffer. On the one 
hand, Bonhoeffer’s radical critique of ethics draws on Barth, an influence 
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particularly evident in his call to Christian deliberation ‘as the critique of all 
ethics’.148 On the other, he is not wholly within the Barthian circle, as from his first 
dissertation he sought to start reflection from the doctrine of the church, socialising 
basic Christian concepts with a turn on Hegel’s phrase ‘God existing as community’. 
This mediating instinct is identified by Bonhoeffer’s contemporary Franz 
Hildebrandt, who would characterise his friend as attempting to work with categories 
drawn from both Barth and Hegel.  
In summary, Bonhoeffer scholarship has moved on from a translation of 
Aufhebung that suggests sheer negation and its various translation choices are well 
considered. However, I argue that in light of Bonhoeffer’s critical engagement that 
stretches back to Genesis 1, it is important to signal ongoing reference to Hegel’s 
term of art in the translation of Aufhebung, even as Bonhoeffer forges his alternative 
account of reconciliation. Further research will be required to distinguish their 
respective accounts of the 'simplicity' of thought on the other side of division.149 The 
claim of the current chapter is that such a project would have to take account of a 
robust engagement that reaches back to Genesis 1. Moreover, it has traced an 
incisive account of the ‘cleaving mind’, drawn from the biblical text and 
philosophical engagement, across the current division of academic faculties. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Hegel’s account of the fallen state provides 
Bonhoeffer with a compelling critique of moral cognisance, while provoking him to 
thereby subvert his predecessor’s judgement on the primal state. To make this case, I 
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have traced Bonhoeffer’s opposition to Hegel’s account of ‘divine knowledge’ while 
showing that there is nevertheless alliance in a scripturally-derived depiction of the 
fallen mind. I render this as a state of perpetual ‘cleaving’ – a drive for unity in the 
knowledge of good-evil that in turn divides the knowing subject. I have then shown 
how Bonhoeffer uses the characterisation of a ‘cleaving’ mind against the claim to 
know the beginning, particularly Hegel’s depiction of primal humanity as a volatile 
composite of nature and spirit. Bonhoeffer’s changes of diction from nature to earth, 
and guiltlessness to wholeness help to resist the prelapsarian divide suggested by 
Hegel’s terms. In short, Bonhoeffer is for Hegel by employing a similar depiction of 
the cleaving state of thought after the Fall, but against Hegel by inhabiting this 
condition in order to subvert claims to know the beginning. This is the negative 
corollary of Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the eschatological and Christological 
reorientation of theological ethics 
Finally, I have begun to explore the political import in Hegel and 
Bonhoeffer’s respective uses of the first person pronoun, showing how they 
understand their own inquiries to be conditioned by the text. I note Hegel’s 
suggestive use of the first person singular as an enactment of the ‘natural’ human, 
while showing how his first person plural is elsewhere allied to a prejudiced account 
of other cultures as ‘primitive’. This is contrasted with Bonhoeffer’s explicit use of 
the pronominal ‘we’ in his attempt to critique judgement rendered against the Bible’s 
account of pre-fallen humanity, so attending to the divine word that comes through 
such ambiguous figures. I have also gestured towards the way Bonhoeffer’s later 
claim to the Aufhebung of the knowledge of good and evil remains a critical response 
to Hegel, with implications for English translation. This leads Bonhoeffer to claim 
                                                                                                                                                                        
149 Hegel speaks of the need for the 'cleavage of the simple [Entzweiung des Einfachen]’. That 
division is not recalcitrant, as he goes on to speak of the 'simple unity [einfache Einheit] of the 
 116 
that truly Christian ethics requires negation towards a renewed form of life that 
combines simple unity of obedience with the assumption of Schuld. In providing the 
background for such variation, this essay has sought to show the demanding task 
required of lecturers who would take up Hegel and Bonhoeffer’s attempts to address 
a contemporary, fallen humanity – ‘us’.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
concept’. PhG §18, alt. §795. 
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Part Two – The Substitution of Christ 
 
Chapter Three - Christ As Idea? The Charge of Docetism 
 
One can legitimately ask who only after the self-revelation of the 
other to whom one puts the question has already taken place, after 
the immanent logos has already been sublated. 




This chapter considers Bonhoeffer's polemic against Hegel’s alleged 
reduction of Christ to 'Idea'. In his 1933 Christology lectures, Bonhoeffer makes the 
charge that the most refined example of a ‘docetic’ tendency can be found in Hegel’s 
work. He specifies that while Hegel does not claim Christ’s appearance is mere 
illusion, the distinction between ‘Idea’ and ‘Appearance’ turns into an opposition 
that should be avoided by a holistic Christology. Bonhoeffer therefore narrates a 
direct, personal confrontation between the Gegenlogos, Christ as 'counter-reason', 
and the Menschenlogos, 'human reason', with the latter exemplified by Hegel. This 
confrontation would seem perpetual, given Bonhoeffer's radicalisation of Christ's 
posture pro me. 
Although Bonhoeffer clearly seeks to depict Christ as the logos that disrupts 
human thought projects, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s Gegenlogos does not present a 
figure ‘against reason’ tout court. Rather, Bonhoeffer’s Christ 'counters' human 
forms of classification that obstruct his freedom to challenge preconceived notions, 
including the attempt of reason to 'self-negate'. Although the dialectic is narrated as a 
contest of wills, Bonhoeffer gestures towards a properly Christological use of reason 
to emerge from the confrontation, an endeavour for which he selectively adopts 
Hegel. Bonhoeffer's polemic must be contextualised, therefore, alongside his 
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statements of a renewed form of reason, even Wissenschaft, of which Christ is the 
'hidden centre'.  
 In light of Bonhoeffer's polemic against Hegel's alleged reduction of Christ's 
person to ‘idea’, it is ironic that Bonhoeffer goes on to himself employ 'structural' 
rather than personal language in his account of Christ as ‘centre’. Referencing 
Bonhoeffer's proximity to a Hegelian ontology, André Dumas expresses concern 
over how Bonhoeffer seems to follow Hegel in construing Christ as a principle: ‘the 
incarnation is in danger of becoming one of the ongoing structures of becoming, and 
of being universalized as it is depersonalized’.1 Hegel's own Christology has been 
criticised along similar lines, that is, for minimising the unique encounter between 
persons.2  
Along with narrating Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel, I seek to provide a 
nuanced reading of Hegel's texts for further theological engagement. First, I trace 
Hegel’s attempt to honour the singularity of Christ while developing an account of 
necessity that is not opposed to freedom. I also challenge the charge that Hegel offers 
a modalist account, although acknowledging that he overcorrects in the effort to 
challenge 'externalised' forms of knowing in Christology, such as historical-
rationalist 'proofs' and the evidence of miracles. Finally, I follow a recent argument 
that a Logos-Christology becomes the beginning point of Hegel's philosophical task. 
Such a case fits my overall interpretive framework that Hegel develops a logic 
derived from Christology rather than attempting wholesale theological revision. If 
this is Hegel's task, then Bonhoeffer can criticise episodes of estrangement, even 
contest disciplinary priority, while still pursuing an expansive claim to reality as a 
unity in Christ. Bonhoeffer’s opposition to Hegel can then be seen beyond the 
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necessary confrontation of Christ as ‘counter reason’; it is an attempt to renew the 
Christological source of a broader project, for which Bonhoeffer does not shy from 
the term Wissenschaft. 
3.1. Idea and Appearance: A Classification that Divides?  
This first section considers Hegel’s prioritisation of the Idea in thinking about 
the person of Christ, his farewell discourses and ultimate departure. While I 
challenge interpretations of Hegel that suggest his thinking dispensed with Christ, I 
argue that Hegel's philosophical ‘elision’ entails that his emphasis on Christ’s 
singularity is not sufficiently maintained as the form of the spirited community. This 
assumption provokes Bonhoeffer’s challenge to the opposition between idea and 
appearance, which he claims to express a docetic tendency.  
3.1.1. Hegel on the Relation of Idea and Appearance 
There are four pertinent aspects to the distinction between Idea [Idee] and 
Appearance [Erscheinung] in Hegel’s treatment of Christ in the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion.3 First, the Idea is the way in which the human person rises 
above the merely natural state. As I have shown in Hegel’s treatment of Genesis, life 
according to nature is ‘evil’ and isolated, requiring the elevation that comes through 
consciousness of the divine Idea. The latency of the ‘image of God’ means that 
separation between divine and human nature is not final; ‘rather the truth is their 
identity’. Alluding back to the ‘primal’ state he derives from Genesis, Hegel claims 
that the human spirit thus holds an ‘exigency for reconciliation’. It is this implicit 
truth that unfurls into the consummation of Christianity, namely, the ‘transfiguration 
of finitude’ accessible to all people.4  
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Second, the Idea is external to the person. As that which must ‘come to’ the 
subject, the Idea transcends attachment to narrower determinations.5  It is not 
ultimately alien, but calls forth what is implicit in the nature-spirit compound that is 
the human subject. Hegel does not speak of the Idea as a foreign imposition, although 
it may first appear this way to natural consciousness; it is more properly understood 
as an evocation, drawing forth what is latent in the finite human subject. Such trans-
temporal consciousness—‘elevated above all locality, nationality, condition, life-
situation’—has radical implications for human equality, with slavery becoming 
unconscionable.6  
Third, the Idea is not abstract but given in a single, concrete Appearance. As 
Hegel states, ‘the unity [of divine and human nature] should disclose itself in a 
wholly temporal, completely common worldly appearance in one particular man’.7 It 
can only be human, for it is only the human that is Geist in the sensible order; 
instances such as the burning bush do not count. Moreover, the Appearance goes 
beyond language as Hegel emphasises that this figure is not merely a teacher, 
whether of morality or even of the Idea; rather, he is ‘the immediate certainty and 
presence of divinity’.8 Such immediacy makes this a ‘concrete’ occurrence in which 
both divine and human natures ‘set aside their abstraction vis-à-vis each other’.9 In 
other words, particularity cannot be spoken of ‘in general’, for that would not 
provide the bold, defining encounter required. This is why ‘the unity in question 
must appear for others as a single, exclusive man’.10 Hegel underlines this claim by 
                                                            
5 LPR III, 170; VPR III, 131. 
6 LPR III, 170; VPR III, 131. 
7 LPR III, 171; VPR III, 131. 
8 LPR III, 171; VPR III, 132. 
9 LPR III, 174; VPR III, 135. 
10 LPR III, 181-2; VPR III, 136. 
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drawing attention to logical construction: ‘[The Idea exists] in this individual just as 
the singular exists as a predicate in a particular judgment’.11 
Hegel specifies that the Idea is not conveyed in multiple incarnations. ‘In one, 
all’, he asserts, remarking that ‘in several, divinity becomes an abstraction’.12 He 
then addresses the foil of multiple incarnations with an expanded rationale: 
God appears as a single person to whose immediacy all sorts of 
physical necessities are attached. In Indian pantheism a countless 
number of incarnations occur; there subjectivity, human being, is only 
an accidental form, and in God it is only a mask that substance adopts 
and changes in an accidental way. God as Spirit, however, contains in 
himself the moment of subjectivity and individuality; his appearance, 
accordingly, can only be a single one, can take place only once.13 
 
This statement shows the work an interpreter has to do in suggesting that so long as 
the Idea remains, the appearance is replaceable. Such an interpretation is 
nevertheless suggested by Hodgson, who seeks to 'extend' Hegel's work by claiming 
that the exclusivity of the figure of Christ is not required by Hegel’s philosophical 
principles—principles that evidently precede theological claims. Hodgson regards 
Hegel’s attempt at differentiation from the ‘several’ of Indian religion to be merely 
accommodation of ‘normative Christian doctrine’, a concession later readers can 
expand in light of postmodern, pluralist consciousness.14 He thus prises apart the 
Idea of divine-human unity and a single, determinative Appearance in his 
representation of Hegel’s work.15 
                                                            
11 LPR III, 173; VPR III, 133. Earlier, he reiterates das Ist, ‘the Is’, several times, reinforcing the 
identification of divine and human through a word central to Luther’s own defence of the real 
presence. 
12 LPR III, 173; VPR III, 132-3. The notion of several incarnations in ‘Indian’ thought is thus 
superficial, that is, ‘counter to the concept of individual subjectivity’. 
13 LPR III, 183; VPR III, 138. 
14 Hodgson, HCT, 161-2. 
15 It is worth noting that this interpretive move fits Hodgson’s editorial decisions, making the 
current English critical edition differ from that which Bonhoeffer read. For instance, Hodgson gives 
the English title ‘Incarnation’ to Lasson’s chapter ‘The God-Man and Reconciliation’. He claims that 
Hegel rarely uses the latter hyphenated term—that on which Bonhoeffer insists—preferring terms 
such as ‘appearance’, ‘becoming’, or ‘unity’. LPR III, 221n1. Hodgson’s broader interpretative stance 
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 Hegel’s commitment to normative doctrine leads to his own critique of 
docetism in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, delivered in the same decade 
as the Philosophy of Religion series. Here he comments on Christ’s particularity 
more directly: 
It is not enough that the concrete moment in God should be known, 
for it is also necessary that this representation of God should be 
known as tied to humanity; it should be known that Christ was an 
actual man. That is the tie with humanity in its thisness [als Diesen]. 
The moment of being this one is the great moment of shock in the 
Christian religion; it is the binding together of the most shocking 
antithesis.16 
 
Hegel follows this statement by noting that the ‘greatness of the Idea could only 
emerge after the initial Appearance’, that is, the development of doctrine in the 
spirited early church.17 He plots this bold statement of Christ als Diesen between the 
two alternate positions of Gnosticism and Arianism. In Gnosticism, Hegel sees that 
the immediate presence of the individual is ‘etherealized into the form of the 
spiritual’.18 In Arianism, Hegel notes that the individual is acknowledged but is not 
linked to the ‘self-determining of the divine idea’, that is, the Logos.19 Between these 
two views, Hegel claims that early theologians held to a unity of ‘divine and human 
nature’ in this individual, which therefore ‘entered the consciousness of the 
church’.20 
Fourth, and finally, the Idea conveys that although the Christ event is 
concrete, it neither proves too much on its surface nor is it left as a brute, 
meaningless contingency. Hegel's distinction between Idea and Appearance is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
that Hegel is ‘reconstructing’ Christian theology, should be taken into account in evaluating such 
editorial decisions. 
16 LHP III, 27; VGP 4, 14-15. 
17 LHP III, 27; VGP 4, 14-15. 
18 LHP III, 28; VGP 4, 16. 
19 LHP III, 28; VGP 4, 16. 
20 LHP III, 29; VGP 4, 16. 
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motivated in part by his argument against what has been called 'empirical-rationalist 
advocacy' that seeks unambiguous historical proofs.21 Hegel instead makes clear that 
Christ’s Appearance, specifically its content as ‘the unity of the finite and the 
infinite’, can be confirmed in consciousness only through the inner ‘witness of the 
Spirit’.22 He connects this biblical phrase to his own discipline by claiming that it is 
philosophy’s task not to leave this internal testimony mute.23 Hegel thus makes a 
strong claim to overcome the merely ‘empirical’ reading of the human Christ that 
even heretics acknowledge.  
In speaking of the ‘witness of the Spirit’, Hegel tends to speak of awareness 
of the divine nature within that which is already perceived as human. For instance, 
his treatment of Jesus’s mere humanity, compared to that of Socrates, seems to 
suggest that natural perception can grasp the human ‘side’ while spirited perception 
then awakens to the divine.24 The following passage describes the awareness of the 
religious subject, which is to say, recipient of the outpouring of the Spirit: 
The condition of the mere man is changed into a condition that is 
thoroughly altered and transfigured by the Spirit, so that the nature of 
God is disclosed therein, and such that this truth obtains immediate 
certainty in accord with the mode of appearance.25 
 
This is a key difference from Bonhoeffer’s later account: for Hegel, there is an 
overarching claim to unity between the natures, but he seems to assume that the 
human is understood while the divine is hidden. Bonhoeffer's account of unity 
overtly resists the categorisation of natures in advance, claiming that the person of 
                                                            
21 The terms come from O'Regan, Heterodox, 215. 
22 LPR III, 191; VPR III, 148-9. I will translate Geist as Spirit when Hegel employs such evident 
references to biblical phrases and Christian doctrine. 
23 ‘Philosophy must explain that this is not merely a mute inner witness but also is present in the 
element of thinking’. LPR III, 191; VPR III, 148-9. 
24 As he claims slightly earlier, ‘Christ is a man like Socrates, a teacher…who brought men to 
the awareness of what the truth really is and of what must constitute the basis of human 
consciousness. But according to the higher mode of contemplation, the divine nature has been 
revealed in Christ’. LPR III, 216; VPR III, 170. 
 124 
Christ is conditioned by 'revelation in hiddenness' all the way down, including his 
humanity. Thus Bonhoeffer's continuing emphasis on the need for revelatory 
encounter with the whole, present person of Christ. 
3.1.2. Noli me Tangere: Hegel on Christ’s Departure 
 In light of Hegel’s broader argument against miraculous verification, his 
attempt to downplay Christ’s sensible presence should be understood as a polemic 
against attempts to read too much from the surface of historical events, a ‘spiritless’ 
mode of argumentation. In light of contemporary interest in historical study of Jesus’ 
life and proofs derived from miracles, Hegel seeks to affirm the historical nature of 
Jesus of Nazareth while rooting confirmation of ‘the Christ’ in a spirited form of 
knowing: 
The history of his teaching, life, death, and resurrection [has] taken 
place; thus this history exists for the community, and it is absolutely 
adequate to the Idea. This is what must be regarded as the crucial 
point; this is the verification, the absolute proof of a single individual; 
this is what is to be understood as the witness of the Spirit, the Holy 
Spirit. It is the Spirit, the indwelling Idea, that has attested Christ’s 
mission, and this is the verification for those who believed and for us 
[who possess] the developed concept.26 
 
Hegel’s shift to the ‘witness of the Spirit’ seeks to avoid the tendency to lay the 
burden of proof on Christ’s historical performance of miracles. Nevertheless, he does 
not settle with a Spirit devoid of history, seeking rather ‘the relation of sensible 
confirmation and sensible occurrence, taken both together, to Spirit, to the spiritual 
content’.27 
In Hegel’s larger project of epistemology and political philosophy, the 
concern with ‘spiritless’ argument can be traced back to a critique of the external 
                                                                                                                                                                        
25 LPR III, 217; VPR III, 171. 
26 LPR III, 242-43; VPR III, 185-86. 
27 LPR III, 250; VPR III, 192. 
 125 
authorities of a merely ‘positive’ religion. In a 1795 essay, he provides a negative 
contrast to the broadly participatory ownership of a Volksreligion, an ideal inspired 
by the harmony of the ancient Greek polis.28 In contrast to this, Hegel sets the 
positivity of Judaism and many expressions of Christianity, which offer ‘a virtue 
grounded on authority (which is either meaningless or a direct contradiction in 
terms)’ rather than ‘a free virtue springing from man’s own being’.29 Nothing 
contributes to an external, ‘positive’ authority in religion, he continues, so much as 
an appeal to miracles, which inappropriately became the sole reason for reverencing 
Jesus.30 
Returning to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel can be seen 
acknowledging the importance of miracles in the formation of the community while 
still relativising their importance.31 Citing Jesus’ critical words about a faith that is 
utterly dependent on signs and wonders, he observes that a certain curiosity about 
miracles ‘presupposes doubt and disbelief’.32 In this section, Hegel is interested in 
the movement towards certainty, which requires a genuine faith that ‘exists in the 
Spirit’. This is what allows the community to believe in Jesus even when the sensible 
appearance no longer provides confirmation.33 It is also what allows him to avoid an 
opposition between sensible externality and consciousness, a ‘fundamental 
separation’ that ‘brings with it the possibility of error, deception, and lack of the 
education necessary to form a correct conception of a fact’.34 Hegel is not 
                                                            
28 See Andrew Shanks, Hegel’s Political Theology (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 27. 
29 G.W.F. Hegel, ‘The Positivity of the Christian Religion’, in Early Theological Writings, trans. 
T.M. Knox (Chicago, IL: University if Chicago Press, 1948), 71. 
30 Hegel, ‘Positivity’, 78-79. 
31 He states that they provide not ‘immediate verification’ but ‘relative verification’. LPR III, 
243; VPR III, 186. 
32 LPR III, 243; VPR III, 186. 
33 LPR III, 245; VPR III, 188. 
34 LPR III, 250; VPR III, 192. 
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abandoning historical facts so much as seeking their fuller, more truthful 
perception.35 
It is in the polemic against an overreliance on the miraculous ‘proofs’ in 
confirming Jesus’ identity that Hegel characterises spirited knowing, for which 
‘sensible history exists in essence only as accomplished—sublated [aufgehoben] to 
the right hand of God’.36 A great deal depends on Hegel’s claim that Christ’s 
sensible presence is ‘sublated’. Others, including Bonhoeffer, would more closely 
follow traditional doctrinal claims of Christ’s having been ‘raised’ or having 
‘ascended’.37 In contrast, Hodgson glosses Hegel’s Aufhebung in this instance as ‘an 
annulling of [Christ’s] sensible presence, yet a preservation of his real presence and 
its transfiguration into the modality of Spirit’.38 'Modality' is, of course, a highly 
contestable term in light of its ready association with the heresy of that name. 
 Although Hegel's focus clearly shifts to the form of knowing brought about 
by the indwelling Spirit, at several points he associates this Spirit with the Son. For 
example, he observes that although Christ is dead and his sensible body has been 
raised, his promissory statements of presence entail that ‘“with you, in you,” he is the 
Holy Spirit’.39 Hegel continues by oscillating between statements that the community 
is Spirit and that Christ is in its midst.40 Moreover, he notes the fullness of the 
presence borne by the Spirit, stating that ‘God as Spirit appears only as “triune”: he 
is his manifestation, [his] self-objectification while remaining identical with 
                                                            
35 Pace Marsh's claims that Bonhoeffer’s commitment to the historical concreteness of Jesus, and 
not just his historically redemptive benefits, differentiates him from Hegel, who seems ‘indifferent’ on 
the former. Marsh, Reclaiming, 102. 
36 LPR III, 246; VPR III, 189. 
37 Hodgson offers the other options Hegel might have chosen, including aufgestanden, erhoben, 
aufgegangen. LPR III, 301, n. 32. 
38 LPR III, 301, n. 32. 
39 LPR III, 237; VPR III, 180. 
40 LPR III, 238; VPR III, 183. 
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[himself] in his objectification; eternal love’.41 These statements reinforce the thicker 
doctrinal ‘presupposition’ that lies behind Hegel’s reference to Geist, calling into 
question the charge of modalism.42 
Hegel’s foils of empirical-rational ‘proofs’ and merely ‘positive’ authority 
should be kept in mind when reading Hegel's frequent allusions to Jesus’ farewell 
discourses. Emphasising the need for Christ to go away along with the promise that 
the Spirit will guide the disciples into all truth, he uses the term ‘sublation’ with 
reference to the sensible immediacy of the man who is at the same time the 
‘divestment of the divine’.43 The formation of the community is then glossed as 
occurring when ‘the transition from externality to internality receives—a Comforter, 
who can come only when sensible history in its immediacy has passed by’.44 I 
propose that such claims can be summarised as an emphatic statement of the Noli me 
tangere—Jesus’ words to Mary not to cling to his bodily form in light of the 
ascension. The phrase is apt insofar as Hegel resists both empirical ‘proofs’ of 
divinity and the ‘fetishism’ of a certain appearance.45 It should be used advisedly, 
however, for Hegel does not comment on the resurrection appearances themselves.  
The lack of resurrection commentary has caused some critics to claim that 
this credal moment lacks importance for Hegel’s thought. For instance, O’Regan 
asserts that in Hegel’s account the post-resurrection encounters are ‘excised and 
replaced—one might say elided’.46 O’Regan’s more recent work intensifies the 
charge to that of a ‘pneumatological displacement’ of the risen body: the Spirit 
becomes the ‘deep ground’ of the other Trinitarian persons, ‘relativizing them 
                                                            
41 LPR III, 240; VPR III, 184. 
42 O’Regan claims that Hegel offers a ‘dynamic, narrative modalism’ in Heterodox, 137-39. 
43 LPR III, 189-90 / VPR III, 147-8. 
44 LPR III, 214 / VPR III, 168-9. 
45 Hegel ‘equally refuses atheism’s fetishism of absence’. O'Regan, Heterodox, 199. 
46 O’Regan, Heterodox, 214-15. 
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ontologically’.47 In tension with this description, O’Regan states that Hegel carries 
over a 'cross-contracted' vision, with reconciliation remaining unfinished.48 
I propose that Hegel's relative lack of interest in the resurrection accounts as 
an 'ellipsis' rather than a replacement, much less a displacement. While both suggest 
a gap, an ellipsis marks a background that is simply not taken up for the present. This 
is Hegel's prerogative as a philosopher: he has just as much right to draw 
'eclectically' from the doctrinal deposit. Even so, Hegel does in fact acknowledge the 
resurrection. Although a philosophy of religion is not accountable to the 
comprehensiveness involved in biblical commentary or systematic theology, he 
makes reference to a central creedal article: 
I need only to recall the well-known form of this perception: it is the 
resurrection and ascension. This exaltation, like everything that 
precedes it, has appeared for immediate consciousness in the mode of 
actuality….God as reconciled, as love, and this exaltation of human 
nature to heaven, where the Son of Man sits at the right hand of the 
Father, [where] the identity of divine and human nature and the glory 
of the latter appear to the spiritual eye in the highest possible way.49 
 
One of the reasons Hegel quickly moves on from this widespread belief is that, 
considered alone, it gives only a ‘one-sided’ account. He is clearly not indifferent to 
this historical claim in Christian doctrine, but wants to do reparation for a lesser-
emphasised claim, that is, the movement from the one risen body to the many to 
whom, or rather as whom, reconciliation extends.  
Adams argues that Hegel’s ‘change of subject’ from Christ to the Spirit is not 
a displacement. Although a key biblical metaphor for community is not cited, Adams 
argues that:  
                                                            
47 O'Regan identifies Hegel's model for such displacement as identified as Joachim of Fiore. 
O’Regan, Anatomy, 195-97, 261. 
48 O'Regan, Anatomy, 188, 196. 
49 LPR III, 207-8; VPR III, 163. 
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the logic of Paul’s talk of the body of Christ as the community’s 
participation in God’s life is exactly the logic that Hegel is 
describing: a radical explosion of agency from the single body to the 
infinitely dispersed body—infinitely dispersed across space (many 
bodies) and time (many generations). This interpretation of Hegel’s 
remarks about subjectivity avoids any sense that the community is 
competing with Jesus Christ for agency.50 
 
This quotation captures the more expansive sense of Geist employed by Hegel. 
Nevertheless, it raises a question that Bonhoeffer will press: what is lost when a 
trope, or indeed a body, becomes logic? Does Christ remain the directive ‘head’, 
indeed the ‘sacred head sore wounded’, of a social body marked by suffering? 
Bonhoeffer calls into question Hegel’s ‘explosion of agency’ by pronouncing Jesus’ 
starkly counter-cultural, even counter-ecclesial, commands, as I will show in Chapter 
Five. Before considering these lines of interrogation, however, I turn to Bonhoeffer’s 
claim that Hegel’s distinctions become hardened into opposition. 
3.1.3. Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Idea-Appearance Opposition  
The question of the 'historical' Jesus was significant during Bonhoeffer's 
time, as was a line of 'Hegelian' readings that sought to think through such division. 
In the 1933 Christology lectures, Bonhoeffer claims that then-contemporary interest 
in the historical Jesus was limited by a preconception of history that reduces the 
‘event’ that is Christ.51 A competing line of interpretation to such historical-critical 
reduction was revealed in the linkage of seemingly allegorical exegesis with the 
methods employed by 'any Hegelian’.52  In Karl Schmidt’s correspondence with 
Bonhoeffer opines in a paraphrase of Hegel's Philosophy of History: 'make whatever 
you will out of Jesus historically and exegetically, the only question is what the idea 
                                                            
50 This is part of Adams’ broader claim that it is ‘easy to think Hegel is abolishing distinctions 
rather than overcoming false oppositions’, Adams, Eclipse, 203-4, cf. 193. 
51 DBWE 12, 336; DBW 12, 320. 
52 Karl Ludwig Schmidt wrote Bonhoeffer in 1936, asking how trends in allegorical exegesis of 
the Old Testament were different from the methods employed by any Hegelian. DBWE 14, 259; DBW 
14, 243. 
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is’.53 This portrayal can be compared with O'Regan's claim that for Hegel the 
historical Jesus is to be surpassed for the Christ of faith.54 In both cases, Hegel’s 
attempt to hold together Idea and Appearance is deemed insufficient. 
Such a division helps to indicate why Bonhoeffer begins his lecture on 
docetism by critiquing the distinction between the ‘idea’ of divine-human unity and 
the singular ‘appearance’ of Christ in history. On first reading, it can seem as though 
Bonhoeffer is criticising philosophical classification altogether. This is particularly 
so when he places the idea-appearance distinction among pairs of terms with long 
resonance in the history of thought: 
It can be demonstrated that [in] every abstract doctrine of God and in 
every concept of redemption, there is at bottom the same 
presupposition, namely, the opposition between idea and appearance 
[der Gegensatz von Idee und Erscheinung]. The appearance of the 
human being is his individuality, and the idea of the human being is 
his human nature. The appearance is that which is accidental, and the 
idea is the substance.55 
  
Bonhoeffer’s reference to ‘concepts of redemption’ contextualises this passage 
amidst his acknowledgment of the good intentions that give rise to such distinction. 
In this case, the early church attempts to unite humanity through a common essence 
or nature so as to be comprehensively recipient of Christ’s redeeming work.  
Such well-intentioned classifications can harden into oppositions, however. 
As discussed in the first chapter, Bonhoeffer’s willingness to engage philosophical 
terms is tempered by his awareness that the transferral of concepts can ‘burst the 
framework’ of the new host discipline. In the Christology lectures, he seeks to guard 
the integrity of Christ’s human nature against being portrayed as merely a ‘garment’ 
                                                            
53 The excerpt comes from Hegel's treatment of the Roman world. DBWE 14, 259; DBW 14, 243. 
54 O'Regan, Heterodox, 191. 
55 DBWE 12, 335, alt.; DBW 12, 319. 
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or ‘stained-glass window’.56 That is precisely the way in which divisive categories 
can render him, however: ‘Jesus as a human being is accidental, as opposed to 
[gegenüber] the substance that is God’.57 Bonhoeffer is not challenging the propriety 
of these descriptive terms for other endeavours, for which they may well serve; he 
attacks their reception into Christology without questioning what is thereby lost. 
 In short, when Bonhoeffer is against docetism, he is against a set of 
philosophical classifications insofar as they can be held independently from 
encounter with the singular hypostatic union. Such terms of classification 
preconceive the personal union that is Christ rather than being derived from him. 
Bonhoeffer makes the antecedent status of such thinking explicit: ‘Thus there is a 
philosophical presupposition in docetism. If one does not rid oneself of this 
presupposition—about idea and appearance—one will never be free of docetism in 
some form’.58 This citation helps to show the character of the ‘reason’ against which 
Bonhoeffer sets the person of Christ: his term Menschenlogos is shorthand for 
classifications-become-division that effectively ‘break down’ the irreducible union of 
natures.  
Bonhoeffer identifies this presupposition in several expressions, naming 
Hegel after a long course of Greek philosophical categories. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges Hegel’s refinement among others who hold the docetic 
presupposition, making clear that Hegel’s language of appearance [Erscheinung] is 
not mere illusion [Schein].59 Moreover, Bonhoeffer distinguishes Hegel from his 
reception among theologians, singling out A.E. Biedermann, a mid-nineteenth 
century Hegelian Reformed theologian whom he claims renders Jesus’ historical 
                                                            
56 DBWE 12, 333; DBW 12, 317. 
57 DBWE 12, 335; DBW 12, 319. 
58 DBWE 12, 335; DBW 12, 319. 
59 DBWE 12, 337; DBW 12, 321. 
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reality as ‘incidental’. Biedermann attempts to clarify the ‘ambiguous’ relationship 
between person and principle, a limitation he sees in Hegel’s project.60 Skeptical of 
such later clarifications, Bonhoeffer returns to Hegel as his primary interlocutor, 
whose work he terms the most ‘brilliant exposition’ of docetism, acknowledging 
Hegel’s philosophy as the way in which ‘the concept of idea versus appearance has 
been brought to fulfillment [Vollendung]’.61 Needless to say, it is ironic for 
Bonhoeffer to claim that Hegel’s account of consummation is in fact a divided form 
of thought. 
Bonhoeffer’s critique of the idea-appearance distinction in his docetism 
lecture can be understood in part through his appraisal of Greek philosophical 
influence on doctrine. He claims that the antithesis between idea and appearance is 
typical of Greek thought, which is therefore more susceptible to docetism than 
Jewish thinking; the latter, he observes, lacks the presupposition opposing the two.62 
Bonhoeffer’s criticism of the divisive use to which Greek thought forms can be put 
does not mean he denies early theologians the right to spirited interpretation, as his 
treatment of Chalcedon shows. He sees Chalcedonian doctrine to function 
negatively, cancelling out speculation over ‘natures’ in order to focus attention on 
the whole person. This means an opposition to ‘preserving clearly what belongs to 
God and what to humanity’.63 Such a claim fits with Bonhoeffer’s shorthand 
distinction between a focus on the ‘how’ question in Christology at the expense of 
the ‘who’ question that is personal address—and so the origin of properly theological 
thought. This resistance to the ‘how’ question should not be overstated, for 
Bonhoeffer maintains several orthodox assumptions about the two natures and the 
                                                            
60 Claude Welch, ‘Introduction’ in God and Incarnation in Mid-Nineteenth Century German 
Theology: Thomasius, Dorner, Biedermann (Oxford, 1975), 17. 
61 DBWE 12, 337 alt.; DBW 12, 321. 
62 DBWE 12, 337; DBW 12, 321. 
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communicatio idiomatum. Nevertheless, Chalcedon, in Bonhoeffer’s estimate, has 
‘gone beyond the “how” question’.64 Here he turns against his background of liberal 
Protestant reservations that see Chalcedonian language as a subjection of Christology 
to Greek thought, claiming that it is actually a liberation from the constrictions such 
concepts can entail.65 
The adoption of Chalcedon’s negative function leads Bonhoeffer to a series 
of critiques against both Luther and his own contemporaries. For instance, he claims 
that Luther’s discussion of ubiquity does what is ‘forbidden by Chalcedon’ in setting 
out two distinct natures with their respective sets of attributes that are then 
communicated.66 Bonhoeffer also singles out Ritschl’s Christology insofar as it 
places Christ under the ‘value-judgment’ of his Gemeinde, going on to say that while 
liberal theology has a great deal to say about Jesus’ humanity, this too is bound by a 
pre-existing ideal rather than being derived from the gospel witness itself.67 
Bonhoeffer’s argument against a ‘pre-existing ideal’ again shows his resistance to a 
theological tendency to claim ideas independently from their roots in Christian 
doctrine, with its attendant historical conditions.  
Bonhoeffer's claim that Greek thought is more susceptible to docetism than 
Jewish thinking shows the influence of his teacher Adolf von Harnack. Bonhoeffer’s 
theological debt to Harnack is profound, as he acknowledges multiple times.68 
Significantly for the present study, Bonhoeffer’s relationship to Harnack shows his 
willingness to persistently engage a thinker whom he acknowledges as susceptible to 
                                                                                                                                                                        
63 DBWE 12, 346; DBW 12, 332. 
64 DBWE 12, 353; DBW 12, 340. 
65 This point is made by Bernd Wannenwetsch, ‘The Whole Christ and the Whole Human Being’ 
in Christology and Ethics, ed. F. LeRon Shults and Brent Waters (Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 79. 
66 DBWE 12, 343; DBW 12, 329. 
67 DBWE 12, 337; DBW 12, 321. 
68 The young lecturer attended Harnack’s home seminars throughout the 1920s, complemented 
by regular personal interactions. Bonhoeffer’s appreciation is expressed in his delivery of Harnack’s 
eulogy. See Rumscheidt, 'Significance', 211. 
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the charge of heresy. A brief account of Harnack’s position, briefly compared with 
Hegel’s own, is helpful for understanding Bonhoeffer’s own presupposition in 
handling Greek categories. 
Harnack’s History of Dogma distinguishes the original ‘gospel of Jesus 
Christ’ from later Greco-Roman philosophical categories, including the conceptions 
of Hellenistic Jews.69 Harnack describes a certain ‘depotentiation’ that reflection 
brings to the original gospel event, one furthered by its ‘settlement on Greek soil’.70 
He even suggests an analogous relationship between the development of Catholic 
doctrine and Gnostic ‘hellenizing’ trends.71 Looking back to the vitality of the first 
century, before and as the New Testament is written, Harnack begins his History of 
Dogma with critical questions for the early stages of Greco-Roman influence: 
How, and by what influence was the living faith transformed into the 
creed to be believed, the surrender to Christ into a philosophic 
Christology…prophecy into a learned exegesis and theological 
science, the bearers of the spirit into clerics…the ‘spirit’ into 
constraint and law? There can be no doubt about the answer: these 
formations are as old in their origin as the detachment of the Gospel 
from the Jewish church.72 
 
Bonhoeffer shares his teacher’s resistance to Greek philosophical categories and 
emphasises the retrieval of the Gospel narratives, which provide the shape of 
Christology that conditions his thought on community.  
Harnack’s influence leads Bonhoeffer to differ from Hegel significantly, as a 
revealed by a brief comparison with the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Hegel 
is critical of attempts to return to a primitive ‘purity’ of the early church and is 
                                                            
69 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, Volume I, trans. Neil Buchanan (Edinburgh: Williams 
& Norgate, 1894), 57. 
70 Harnack, Dogma I, 53. 
71 Harnack, Dogma I, 226-27. 
72 Harnack, Dogma I, 46. 
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certainly critical of Jewish thought.73 He therefore challenges a return to ‘the plain 
strand of God’s Word’ in the New Testament which requires an ‘unravelling’ of the 
doctrinal system ‘determined by means of the Idea and according to the Idea’.74 As a 
rhetorical climax, Hegel observes that even the scriptural text itself undercuts a 
return to the ‘original’ gospel accounts:  
It can almost be said that if our intention is to lead Christianity back 
to its first Appearance, then we are leading it back to the standpoint 
of spiritlessness, for Christ himself said: ‘The Spirit will only come 
after me, when I am gone’.75  
 
Hegel asks pointedly why those in his time would claim to ‘bring spirit to bear on the 
letter while denying the same right to the church fathers’, making a strong case for 
doctrinal development.76 
3.2. Toward the Whole, Present Christ 
In this section I first consider the overall structure of Hegel’s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, noting that among his three ‘elements’ the second treats the 
objectivity of the Son in a manner that seems to ‘pass’. I show instead that the 
elements are not sequential events in the life of the Godhead, but logical aspects of 
the Trinitarian relation that Hegel finds useful for philosophy, while focusing on the 
event of reconciliation in the knowing human subject. I acknowledge, however, that 
Hegel's settlement raises the perennial question of whether a divine 'interlocutor' 
remains. This backdrop makes Bonhoeffer's contrasting emphases understandable. I 
show how Bonhoeffer shares an account of the insufficiency of the an sich, although 
he departs from Hegel by lingering on, indeed radicalising, the posture of Christ pro 
                                                            
73 For Hegel the conceptual oneness of Jewish thought is not yet complete in spirit. See LPR III, 
172; VPR III, 133. 
74 LHP III, 24; VGP 4, 11. 
75 LHP III, 26; VGP 4, 14-15. 
76 LHP III, 24; VGP 4, 12. 
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nobis. Finally, I trace Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the freedom of Christ over and 
against Hegel’s claim to a unity of rational necessity and freedom. 
3.2.1. Hegel’s Second ‘Element’: The Passing of Otherness? 
 Along with Hegel’s discussion of the singular, historical appearance of 
Christ, the figure of the Son of God functions as a structuring principle within the 
lecture series. In a summary statement, Hegel speaks of three moments, or elements, 
in ‘concrete representation’: first, there is the ‘essence’ of God, the one who ‘himself 
is his activity’; second, there is the production of ‘objectivity’, ‘distinction’, and 
‘finitude’: the Spirit gives testimony ‘that God has a Son’; third, as with the Son, ‘the 
Spirit objectifies itself as the unity of the first and the second moments’.77 Hegel 
elaborates that this third moment is the point at which the distinction of the second is 
'sublated [aufgehoben]'. Even so, as a relationship of ‘eternal love’ the two remain 
independent—‘it expresses an identity into which the extremes are not absorbed’.78  
 It is important to note that it is not the hypostasis of the Son, but the 
economics of him as 'other-being' that is at stake. ‘For in the Idea’, Hegel claims, 
‘the other-being of the Son is a transitory, disappearing moment, not a true, 
essentially enduring, absolute moment’.79 What is transitory is Christ as known 
before the coming of the Spirit and the Eucharistic rite; in short, prior to indwelling 
union with the believer. These subsequent acts, in which the indivisibility of the 
Trinity is all the more evident, give rise to a form of knowledge that Hegel sees as 
promising for his philosophical account. As noted earlier, however, Hegel often 
claims a close relationship between Christ and the Spirit, as shown in his statement 
that ‘Christ is for Spirit’.80  
                                                            
77 LPR III, 252-53; VPR III, 196-97. 
78 LPR III, 253; VPR III, 197. 
79 LPR III, 265; VPR III, 203. 
80 LPR III, 263; VPR III, 202. 
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 Although Hegel uses the term ‘moments’, his final claim to unity reveals that 
these are not a strict sequence in which one ‘person’ is replaced by the other. It is 
possible for religious expression to stick with only one, such as Hegel’s immediate 
example of how Catholicism majors on the second moment—an objectified form that 
lacks a spirited form of knowing.81 Hegel's foil of Catholicism is most clearly 
described in his comments about eucharistic practice, which will be treated in the 
following chapter. 
 Before treating the sacraments, it is crucial to clarify the placement of the Son 
within the overall structure of Hegel's treatment of the 'consummate religion’, for the 
charge of docetism may yet apply to an apparent ‘passing’ of the moment of the Son. 
This clarification requires attention to different editorial practices in the English and 
German critical editions. For example, in the translation of the Lasson edition with 
which Bonhoeffer worked, the three main sections are entitled the Kingdom of the 
Father, of the Son, and of the Spirit. It is typical, in the English volumes edited by 
Hodgson, to similarly associate each of three parts with one person of the Trinity. In 
the more recent composite volume, Hodgson shifts to headings of the First, Second, 
and Third ‘Elements’, though still associating, for instance, the final element with the 
Spirit. In an editorial note on the material’s order, he offers his interpretation of these 
headings: 
The idea of God ‘develops’ (for the consummate religion, at least) in 
terms of the three moments of the Trinity—in representational 
language, the ‘persons’ of the Father, Son, and Spirit; in conceptual 
language, the moments of divine self-identity, self-differentiation, and 
self-return. These yield the three ‘elements’ that constitute the 
substance of Hegel’s speculative redescription of the Christian 
religion.82 
 
                                                            
81 LPR III, 253; VPR III, 197. 
82 Hodgson, ‘The Lectures of 1824’, in LPR III-CR, 185n65. 
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This editorial remark has been recently called into question by Adams, who claims 
that Hodgson’s headings obscure the source material. Adams challenges the common 
interpretation that Hegel seeks to redescribe Christian theology in a strong sense, 
mapping ‘conceptual language’ on top of ‘representational language' in a one-to-one 
relation.83  
Against Hodgson’s claim to one-to-one correspondence, Adams argues that 
the three elements are ‘enumerations of logical steps, not events in the inner life of 
God’.84 Rather than depicting God as undergoing a journey through separation to 
return to a unified, or ‘mature’, state, Adams claims that Hegel is working from 
different aspects to Trinitarian doctrine, namely, ‘talk of pure activity, talk of 
separation, and talk of unity, and that this talk is guided by a logic that can, with 
some care, be investigated and identified’.85 If Hegel is pursuing a primarily logical 
investigation, this entails his relative disinterest in the question of whether or how the 
Father is reconciled to the Son.86  
 Insofar as Hegel treats Jesus’ final words on the cross, his interest in 
completion is focused on how human knowing is conditioned by the claim ‘it is 
finished’. He writes that in order to affirm that the subject should come into restored 
relation as a ‘child of God’, one must affirm ‘the idea that reconciliation in and for 
itself is finished in the divine Idea’.87 Hegel continues that this is said to make its 
                                                            
83 This is contrasted with the German critical edition arranged by Walter Jaeschke, in which the 
sections are simply titled First, Second, and Third Elements, all set beneath the larger category of 
‘concrete representation’—a category that only covers the Son in Hodgson. Moreover, Adams notes 
that Hodgson adds the title ‘Spirit’ to the Third Element heading with no warrant in the source 
material. See the comparative chart in Adams, Eclipse, 189-91. 
84 Adams, Eclipse, 200. 
85 Adams, Eclipse, 200. 
86 Adams, Eclipse, 210. 
87 LPR III, 331; VPR III, 198-199. Adams observes an echo of Luther’s translation of Jesus’ 
word of completion from the cross in the Passion narrative. Adams, Eclipse, 210. 
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‘appearance’ to human consciousness, which can then take the truth as certain.88 
Such certainty leads to a doctrinal presupposition, such that Christology is not itself 
investigated but used as a departure point for inquiry. In other words, Hegel does not 
reason out the process of reconciliation, particularly insofar as it may involve Father 
and Son; as Adams remarks, ‘the claim about reconciliation is already operative 
before any thinking gets underway’.89 
3.2.2. Hegel’s Third ‘Element’: Loss of A Divine Interlocutor? 
 Critics have asked whether Hegel's emphasis on a unitive account of knowing 
has led to the conflation of the divine actor with an all-too-human Geist. As the 
preceding exposition has shown, Hegel makes a close association between God and 
reasoned human exchange. Much of this comes from Hegel's claim that his 
exploration into truth, a process that can only be vindicated in its exposition, lies in 
'apprehending and expressing the true not as substance but rather even more as 
subject’.90 While this philosophically-freighted statement cannot be treated here in 
depth, it can be said that Hegel 'refuses to think the being of God independently of 
thinking the thinking of human beings’.91 From this, Adams asks whether God 
remains 'truly other' for Hegel, a question he claims cannot be answered satisfactorily 
because of Hegel's 'opaque ontology’.92  
 Interpreters of Hegel have frequently resolved this opacity towards the 
community of 'mindedness' over against traditional notions of a divine agent and 
interlocutor. Alexandre Kojève's introductory lectures to Hegel, delivered shortly 
after Bonhoeffer's dissertations, claim as much: 'the divine interlocutor is fictive’, 
                                                            
88 LPR III, 331; VPR III, 198-99. Adams comments that Hegel does not claim the truth to be 
certain, but rather that the community ‘takes the truth to be certain’. Adams, Eclipse, 211. 
89 Adams, Eclipse, 213-14. 
90 PhG, §10. Hegel states this as a different direction from Spinoza's account of unifying 
'substance’. See Taylor, Hegel, 87. 
91 Adams, Eclipse, 15. 
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with everything taking place within the savant.93 In a more recent example, Pinkard 
claims that Hegel turns from 'the transcendent metaphysical God of orthodox 
Christianity' to 'what is divinely immanent within human life itself as the human 
community has come to understand itself’.94 Other critics oscillate between Geist as 
subject and God. For example, Taylor poses the equivocation 'Geist or God' several 
times, also using the representative term 'cosmic spirit’.95 Hodgson and Brown state 
that the Weltgeist is 'a form of absoluter Geist or God’, continuing that 'God is the 
ontological ground, but this ground is of such a nature that it requires actualization in 
the ‘thick’ community of human Sittlichkeit (ethical life) because the triune God is 
absolute intersubjectivity’.96  
 Such interpretations compel a closer examination of Hegel's controversial 
claim to 'God existing as community’. The syntax is important to this widely 
misunderstood phrase. Logically, it challenges the opposition of divine and human 
agency without conflating them. This is shown by Hegel's choice of the term ‘as’ and 
the fact that subject and predicate are not reversed.97 Alongside Hegel’s syntax, I 
have argued that it is important to acknowledge his enduring Lutheran profession.  
 Appeals to orthodoxy were necessary at the time, because Hegel's daring 
formulae drew suspicion of pantheism from contemporaries. Hegel knew the 
professional costs of such a charge, having witnessed the pantheist controversy while 
                                                                                                                                                                        
92 Adams therefore suggests a shift towards the question of how divine action is related to human 
action. Adams, Eclipse, 15, 37. 
93 The lectures were delivered from 1933-39 in Paris. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction à la 
lecture de Hegel (1947), ed. Raymond Queneau (Gallimard, 1968), 459. 
94 He continues that '[w]hat we take as sacred – the divine – are the things that for us have come 
to have absolute value (that is, in Hegel’s words, what ‘exists in and for itself’)’. Terry Pinkard, 
Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
219-20. 
95 At the same time, he gives a nuanced treatment that shows differentiation on several levels. 
Taylor, Hegel, 80-87. 
96 Brown and Hodgson, 'Editorial Introduction', LPWH I, 13. 
97 ‘The false opposition between spirit and community, and thus between God and community, is 
overcome in a logic in which spirit is a predicate of community, and community is a predicate of God. 
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in seminary and weathering the attack himself at various points in his life.98 Hegel's 
lectures therefore include his defence against the association of pantheism and 
'identity-philosophy’, claiming not only that such a view is not his own, but that '[i]t 
has never occurred to anyone to say that everything, all individual things 
collectively, in their individuality and contingency, are God—for example, that paper 
or this table is God. No one has ever held that’.99 Hegel's frustration with this 
criticism leads him to say that not only does philosophy have to become polemical 
but it has to begin from the exposition of primary elements.100 This is part of the 
reason why the present thesis contains detailed exposition, trying to render Hegel on 
his own terms rather than those hastily applied by others—including, admittedly, 
Bonhoeffer's late charge of Hegel's 'pantheism’.101  
 Returning to the definition of Geist as a rationally actualising social field, I 
suggest that for Hegel the divine persons are not merely equated with Geist without 
remainder. I therefore hold back from the equivocal statement of 'Geist or God’, 
while acknowledging that Hegel implies that God's agency is manifest in and as a 
series of rationally actualising social fields. Set against this backdrop, Bonhoeffer's 
strong emphases make sense, particularly his shift to Christ's presence pro nobis and 
resistance to rational 'necessity’.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
It is vital to observe that it is not a logic in which God is a predicate. The logic is not reversible: it has 
a single directionality’. Adams, Eclipse, 208. 
98 Pinkard notes several episodes, culminating in the historical irony that Schelling was 
appointed Hegel's successor, with a mandate 'to stamp out the dragon seed of Hegelian pantheism’. 
Pinkard, Hegel, 30-31, 257, 528, 559. 
99 He goes on to distinguish even 'Oriental' religion and 'Spinozism' from this charge, providing 
more precise labels for their claims. LPR 1, 123; VPR 1, 273. 
100 LPR 1, 127; VPR 1, 276. 
101 In a famous letter to Bethge dated July 16, 1944, Bonhoeffer offers the 'philosophical closing 
line’, abruptly classifying Kant as a Deist, Fichte and Hegel as pantheists. However, he does not state 
this as a rejection so much as a development that cannot simply be rejected. These broad stroke 
philosophical positions show that 'the autonomy of human beings is the goal of thought’. As this is an 
element of the world 'come of age’, Bonhoeffer observes that there is no going back behind this goal 
to a medieval 'heteronomy, in the form of clericalism’. Rather, intellectual integrity demands a new 
'nonreligious' interpretation: 'Before God, and with God, we live without God'. DBWE 8, 477-79; 
DBW 8, 530-34. 
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3.2.2. From an sich to pro nobis: Bonhoeffer’s Present Christ 
 Bonhoeffer’s lectures treat the subject of Christology, in distinction to the 
third part of Hegel’s philosophy of religion that works with a broad Trinitarian 
structure. In terms of Hegel's 'elements’, Bonhoeffer primarily deals with 'otherness', 
the so-called 'kingdom of the Son'. Given this difference, it is worth noting 
Bonhoeffer's own arrangement and emphases before identifying a common feature 
between them. Bonhoeffer’s lecture series is structured into two parts: the ‘present 
[gegenwärtige]’ Christ and the ‘historical [geschichtliche]’ Christ. The claim to the 
‘present’ Christ shows Bonhoeffer’s distinction from Hegel’s claim to the witness of 
the Spirit as basic in the community’s Geist, for Bonhoeffer claims that the church’s 
witness is that in which Christ is ‘present in history…Nunc et hic’.102 Bonhoeffer 
draws on one of Luther’s sermons to claim that the ascension means Christ has come 
closer than in his previous historical appearance.103 This is not to divide the two, 
however; Bonhoeffer’s unitive purpose is clear when he insists that even this larger 
structural pair is to be thought together, beginning the second part with the claim that 
‘the Christ who is present today is the historical Christ’.104 Such temporal 
transposition is the positive corollary of Bonhoeffer critique of Hegel’s alleged split 
between ‘Idea’ and ‘Appearance’. 
Bonhoeffer states that Christ’s ‘presence’ is entailed by his posture pro me, to 
be distinguished from being an sich. The interest in thinking Christ beyond a kind of 
self-enclosure is clear: ‘I can never think of Jesus Christ in his being-in-himself [An-
Sich-Sein]…Christ is not in-himself [an sich] and also in the community, but the 
                                                            
102 DBWE 12, 310; DBW 12, 291-2. 
103 ‘When he was on earth, he was far away from us here. Now that he is far from earth, he is 
near to us’. Martin Luther, ‘Sermon on Ascension Day’ (1523). WA 12:562, 25-6; cited in DBWE 12, 
312; DBW 12, 293. 
104 He immediately goes on to deconstruct the distinction between the ‘Jesus of the Synoptic 
Gospels’ and the ‘Christ of Paul’. DBWE 12, 328; DBW 12, 311. 
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Christ who is the only Christ is the one present in the community pro me’.105 These 
terms echo Hegel in asserting the insufficiency of the an sich, as if the first element 
could be taken alone. Although Bonhoeffer speaks of the ‘in itself’, however, he does 
not care to continue with Hegel’s subsequent technical terms, likely because he is 
suspicious of the apparently self-reflexive language maintained through Hegel’s für 
sich and an-und-für sich.106  
Bonhoeffer seeks to avoid language that implies a kind of self-enclosure or 
incurvature—as in the longstanding Augustinian-Lutheran depiction of sin. He tends 
to depart, therefore, from Hegel's Aristotelian trajectory in favour of theological-
historical 'states:' primal, sinful, revelatory. In thinking of the God-human, the Christ, 
Bonhoeffer would want to avoid these associations all the more. Instead of the 
second element in Hegel’s trajectory, the für sich, he opts for Luther’s pro me to 
render Christ’s posture towards each individual within community. Bonhoeffer 
amplifies the present communal encounter through speaking of the pro nobis, or its 
otherness through the terms für-andere-Dasein. He is working with a radical version 
of Luther's emphasis on the presence of Christ pro me, a theme that Kierkegaard also 
develops.107 As Ziegler argues, this theme is linked to Bonhoeffer's arguments 
against a 'necessity' to the incarnation and for the 'external' quality of the Word.108  
Bonhoeffer next claims that the Christ who is present is also the ‘whole 
Christ’. This term invokes Lutheran polemics against the extra Calvinisticum, that is, 
the claim that a part of Christ is ‘reserved’ from the sacramental encounter. Along 
with his interest in the sacrament, Bonhoeffer’s reference to the ‘whole Christ’ 
                                                            
105 DBWE 12, 314; DBW 12, 296. 
106 Hegel will speak of Christ's singularity on this trajectory: Christ is to be distinguished from 
other finite beings who do not exist ‘in and for themselves’.  LPR III, 173; VPR III, 133. 
107 See Philip Ziegler, 'Christ for Us Today: Promeity in the Christologies of Kierkegaard and 
Bonhoeffer', International Journal of Systematic Theology 15:1 (January 2013), 25-41. 
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functions in these lectures to resist a division between history and later communal 
faith or, relatedly, appearance and idea: ‘It is the Christ of history, the whole Christ, 
whom we ask and who answers’.109  
This encounter is the only truthful beginning point for theology; thought 
should begin from the God-human union rather than from pre-understood categories 
of divinity and humanity. Insofar as Hegel tends to align Christ’s human nature with 
natural perception and divine nature with the spiritual, Bonhoeffer would see such 
classification as an incipient opposition to resist in speech derived from the 
hypostatic union. The following statement shows Bonhoeffer insistence on the 
hybrid form of the ‘human-God’ before any other Trinitarian ‘element’: 
Who is with us here and now? The answer is: the human-God 
[mensch-Gott] Jesus. I cannot know who the human Christ is if I do 
not simultaneously think of the God-Christ and vice versa. God in his 
timeless eternity is not God. Jesus Christ in his humanity, limited in 
time, is not Jesus Christ. Instead, in the human being Jesus Christ, God 
is God.110 
 
This is elaborated when Bonhoeffer comments on the ‘likeness of the flesh’, 
asserting that this biblical phrase ‘is not God veiled in the human being; instead, the 
God-human as whole is hidden’.111 Such a claim shows Bonhoeffer’s maintenance of 
concealment in revelation, a dynamic that evokes faith. 
 In summary, Bonhoeffer would find common cause with Hegel’s resistance 
to empirical-rationalist proofs of Christ’s deity. The difference lies in his emphasis 
on the 'whole' Christ’s agency in self-revelation in and through the witness of the 
Spirit. Bonhoeffer does this in order to resist divided forms of thought: whether 
between idea and appearance or the perception of natures. The narratival language of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
108 Ziegler states that Bonhoeffer 'with a worried glance towards Hegel, is constrained to argue' 
for God's freedom in the incarnation. Ziegler, 'Promeity', 32, 39. 
109 DBWE 12,  310; DBW 12, 291. 
110 DBWE 12, 313; DBW 12, 294. 
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the exalted and humiliated states provide him with a way of maintaining witness to 
the 'whole' Christ. Bonhoeffer claims that the ‘stumbling block’—the biblical idiom 
for his opening language of Gegenlogos—is not that God takes human form, but that 
of ‘the God-human’s humiliation’.112 The humiliation is, again, not that of the divine 
nature, but the whole Christ’s submission to the ambiguity of history, the ‘incognito’.  
3.2.3. Resisting Rational 'Necessity' 
If Hegel will claim that Christ is 'the monstrous reality whose necessity we 
have seen’, Bonhoeffer can be seen to emphasise the former—the 'offense' of 
reason—over and against the claim that the occurrence was in some sense necessary. 
This is clear in Bonhoeffer's statement against the notion that God’s historical 
appearance in history is ‘essential’, which he claims is to make a principle out of that 
which is impossible or ‘inconceivable’ [Unbegreiflichkeit]. Bonhoeffer therefore 
critiques a broader historical schema in which Christ’s appearance is related to prior 
historical figures and their attendant conceptualities, rather than being the startling 
novum that expresses God’s free grace.113 
Along with the attempt to single Christ out in historical process, Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of necessity seeks to preserve divine freedom and the contingency of 
interpersonal encounter. Necessity, which he finds embedded in Hegel’s language of 
the idea, constrains a theological commitment to divine mercy: 
For with this [idea-appearance] distinction such idealism abolishes 
the first premise of all theology, that God, out of mercy freely given, 
truly became a human being, rather than becoming, out of necessity, 
the realization of some human principle.114 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
111 DBWE 12, 313, alt.; DBW 12, 294-5. 
112 DBWE 12, 314; DBW 12, 295. 
113 DBWE 12, 325; DBW 12, 307-8. 
114 DBWE 12, 338; DBW 12, 322. A series of exclamatory markings can be found in 
Bonhoeffer's linkage of incarnation and necessity in NL-VPR I, 161. 
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Before repeating Bonhoeffer’s polemic, it is important to observe that, on Hegel's 
terms, freedom and necessity are not mutually exclusive. Wolfhart Pannenberg 
argues that freedom cannot simply be ranged against Hegel's appeal to necessity.115 
Significantly for this inquiry, Pannenberg criticises Wilhelm Lütgert, who supervised 
Bonhoeffer’s Habilitation, for a crude interpretation on this count. He takes issue 
with Lütgert’s claim that Hegel could not account for the simplest ‘Our Father’ 
encounter as his God was idea rather than person. Pannenberg claims that the only 
way to make sense of such ‘crass ignorance’ is by recalling that accusations against 
Hegel are often made by means of ‘a set of logical deductions from a polemic 
construction’.116 Bonhoeffer appears to know, or come to know, better, for it is noted 
in the Hegel seminar that for Hegel the freedom of Geist ‘is a process in which 
necessity has been incorporated’.117 On Houlgate's reading, then, 'Hegel never 
subordinates God—or reason—to any alien necessity’.118 
To understand the aspect of Bonhoeffer’s criticism that does land, the better 
question is perhaps to ask whose freedom can coincide with necessity. Bonhoeffer’s 
own comment on the ‘Our Father’ in the Hegel seminar shows his issue to be the 
historical constraints under which God is placed; he states that for Hegel it is not ‘thy 
will be done’ but ‘thy will is done’.119 While he does not go so far as to say prayer is 
impossible for Hegel, he does see the encounter to lack the open, divine personal 
agency that motivates intercession. Bonhoeffer therefore seeks to emphasise divine 
agency anew within Hegel’s Geist, indeed, to rearticulate Christ and the Holy Spirit’s 
‘majestic’ bearings within the community. 
                                                            
115 Pannenberg refers to Hegel’s Science of Logic in which, he paraphrases, ‘“freedom” is called 
“the truth of necessity” which has its form in the concept, i.e.  in the subject. See Pannenberg, 
'Significance', 164. 
116 Pannenberg, ‘Significance’, 170-1. 
117 Lehel, HS, 35. 
118 Houlgate, Hegel, 253. 
 147 
The claim to majesty raises the question of predestination, of God’s right to 
act as ‘arbiter’ over the community. Hegel opposes a doctrine of election, singling 
out what he takes to be the Calvinist doctrine that few are chosen, which he calls an 
‘unhappy fate’.120 Against this supposed randomness, Hegel speaks of an ‘exigency 
for reconciliation’ embedded in each subject and ready to be called forth. This 
signals a point of departure for Bonhoeffer who, along with Reformed dialogue 
partners such as Barth, seeks to preserve the divine agency shown in the freedom to 
choose—even if it means responding to Hegel's concern by going beyond the ‘few’. 
Such a retrieval of election requires a much stronger Christology, of course; Hegel's 
ellipsis means that his best option is to dismiss the doctrine of predestination. 
As an ecclesial theologian, Bonhoeffer is interested in how divine freedom is 
recurrently exercised in the community. As a result, his claim for freedom against 
rational necessity emerges in his section on how Christ is present as Word.121 
Bonhoeffer claims this form of presence allows revelation to a certain person at a 
certain time rather than being an idea that is accessible to all. The verbal encounter, 
particularly through preaching in the community, is thus expressive of ‘both the 
contingent character of [God’s] revelation and his commitment to humankind’.122 
This leads Bonhoeffer to revisit his positive estimation of Hegel’s language, which 
he again modifies by giving primacy to Christ’s presence as preaching over, even 
against, the ‘objective Geist of the community’.123 While Hegel might concede 
preaching as an element of Geist, Bonhoeffer’s emphasis is understandable as the act 
of preaching is hardly named as constitutive, or indeed disruptive, in Hegel’s 
                                                                                                                                                                        
119 Lehel, HS, 107. 
120 LPR III, 173; VPR III, 133. 
121 This is one of a three-fold presence in Bonhoeffer’s first part of the lectures. The others are 
Christus als Sakrament and Christus als Gemeinde. 
122 DBWE 12, 317; DBW 12, 298-9. 
123 DBWE 12, 317; DBW 12, 299. 
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description of the community. It is through the divine Word in preaching, however, 
that constricting forms of human reason can be disrupted—and oriented anew. 
3.3. Christ Against Reason? 
 In this section I consider how Christ is treated by both Hegel and Bonhoeffer 
as Logos, ‘Word’ or ‘Reason’. I first trace the way in which Hegel takes the Logos as 
a starting point for his philosophical project, noting that although this is primarily a 
contact point between divine and human reason, he does observe the initial 
‘monstrosity’ of this claim. I then show how Bonhoeffer places the Menschenlogos, 
with which he identifies Hegel’s claim to rational necessity, into confrontation with 
the person of Christ, whom he styles the Gegenlogos. While I acknowledge 
Bonhoeffer’s insistence that Hegel’s attempt gives in to a one-sided resolution—the 
assimilation of the God-human logos by the all too human—I nevertheless argue that 
Bonhoeffer’s critique is not against reason tout court. In fact, when Bonhoeffer 
speaks of the manner of thought to emerge from confrontation he selectively 
employs Hegel's terms. 
3.3.1. The Logos as Inception of Hegel’s Philosophy 
Hegel’s early ‘theological’ writings show a departure from ecclesial 
practices, particularly those that seem to demand passive obedience, while revealing 
an enduring interest in the person of Jesus Christ. Although these essays from the 
1790s mark Hegel’s departure from the profession of church theologian, Graham 
Ward argues that they also provide the site from which he comes to speak 
philosophically, namely, a Logos Christology.124  
Hegel’s 1795 essay ‘Life of Jesus’ begins with direct allusion to the prologue 
of John’s gospel. Ward comments that these opening lines invoke the neo-Platonic 
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notion of the logos spermatikos, enriching the Kantian view of reason that otherwise 
informs the essay.125 The interest in a pervasive logos becomes the basis for Hegel’s 
emerging philosophical project to develop a ‘mythology of reason’ that can be the 
basis for a new Volksreligion.126 In a significant but fleeting reference, Ward 
connects Hegel’s Logos-based insistence on mediation to Bonhoeffer’s own claim to 
'the Son of God the Mediator' who creates a 'breach' with the immediacies of the 
world.127 While Ward is right to point out how Hegel and Bonhoeffer share a critique 
of immediacy, their articulations of the mediator differ significantly. This is clear in 
Bonhoeffer's posing of a Gegenlogos to the Menschenlogos, associating Hegel’s 
project with the latter. 
Before proceeding to Bonhoeffer’s material, I offer two observations about 
Hegel's ensuing use of the doctrine of Christology. First, Hegel is often more 
interested in depicting how a form of thinking about Christ's two natures can be 
redeployed in thinking about other pairs—the ‘Chalcedonian logic’ referred to 
earlier. Second, as Hegel's later writings show, a commitment to the Logos does not 
lead to some sort of immediate intuition. Rather, he claims that Christ counters forms 
of human understanding, necessary as such confrontation turns out to be: 
God appears in sensible presence; he has no other form than that of the 
sensible mode of Spirit, which is that of an individual human 
being…Now this is the monstrous reality whose necessity we have 
seen.128 
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
124 Ward’s reading, in contrast to divisions in schools of thought between the Phenomenology 
and the Logic, uses Hegel’s early 'theological' works and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion—
texts which similarly engage Bonhoeffer. Ward, ‘Logos', 271. 
125 Ward, ‘Logos’, 274. 
126 This goal is stated in the 1796-97 essay, ‘The Earliest Programme for a System of German 
Idealism', the authorship of which is doubtful but which displays common interests held by Hegel and 
Hölderlin. See Ward, ‘Logos', 279. 
127 Ward cites from Discipleship without elaboration on their differences on this point. Ward, 
'Logos', 285n7. 
128 LPR III, 177; VPR III, 137. 
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This final sentence needs to be parsed carefully. The ‘monstrosity’ [Ungeheure] 
refers to the initial scandal the God-human poses to ‘imagination and 
understanding’.129 Hegel’s account thus clearly acknowledges the affront in Christ’s 
Appearance to typical human modes of thought. Its ‘necessity’, meanwhile, comes in 
that this Appearance is not ultimately against reason, evoking as it does a more 
robust form of thought. Finally, the claim ‘we have seen’ is tied to his claim that this 
‘Appearance of God’ only occurs as being for an other, the community.130 
3.3.2. Bonhoeffer’s Menschenlogos-Gegenlogos Dialectic 
Bonhoeffer presents the scene of confrontation through depicting the ‘human-
logos’ [Menschenlogos] against which Christ is ‘counter-logos’ [Gegenlogos].131 
Menschenlogos here represents those human systems of classification that provide a 
structure into which Christ then fits, that posit an idea of natures in reconciliation for 
which Christ’s hypostasis is a ‘piece of evidence’ rather than serving as its 
presupposition. It is also characterised as ‘immanent’ knowledge or that which is 
‘within history’, Bonhoeffer continues, arguing that it is not possible ‘to fit the Word 
made flesh into the logos classification system [Logos-Ordnung]’.132 It is important 
to observe that Bonhoeffer does not style a purely divine element, whether reason or 
revelation, as the Gegenlogos; the contrarian force comes from the logos that is this 
inseparably God-human person—significantly, he does not speak of the Gottlogos. 
Unity precedes the confrontation with human thought. 
In the struggle between the Menschenlogos and the God-human Gegenlogos, 
it is significant that Bonhoeffer uses the term ‘lordship’ [Herrschaft] for the self-
                                                            
129 This is stated directly in LPR III, 182; VPR III, 136. 
130 LPR III, 177; VPR III, 137-8. 
131 ‘Counter-logos’ is the improved translation of the current critical edition. A previous 
translation referred to the Gegenlogos as ‘anti-Logos’. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology, trans. 
John Bowden (London: Collins, 1966), 29. 
132 DBWE 12, 302; DBW 12, 282. 
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perception of the former.133 Though Bonhoeffer does not make explicit reference to 
Hegel’s well-known master-slave dialectic, he is also working with a life-and-death 
struggle that cannot be satisfied by initial one-sided dominance. In Hegel’s dialectic, 
slavery is the settlement to emerge from a struggle between two figures relinquished 
at the point of death. In Bonhoeffer’s version, the Menschenlogos kills the 
Gegenlogos and is then confronted anew on the other side of the grave.134 Here 
Bonhoeffer's persistence in thinking Christ as God-human unity comes to the fore, as 
this struggle is not that between finite and infinite or human and divine: ‘The 
become-human [Der Mensch-Gewordene] must be hung on the cross by the human 
logos [Menschenlogos]’.135 
Hegel’s larger project is named explicitly in Bonhoeffer’s narration of this 
contest. As the following citation reveals, Bonhoeffer is well aware of the cunning of 
reason in his predecessor’s account: 
The logos repeats its old question, that of how this demand can be met 
within history. Thus the logos stays with the question of ‘how’. The 
logos sees that its lordship [Herrschaft] is being threatened from 
outside. It meets the demand made upon it by negating itself. That is 
the last thing it has the power to do. It is what Hegel did in his 
philosophy. Thus what the logos does under attack from the other 
Logos represents not philistine self–defence but rather a great insight 
into its power of self–negation [Selbstverneinung], for self–negation 
signifies the self–affirmation [Selbstbejahung] of the logos. So it 
appears that the attack on the final presupposition has failed, for the 
logos has assimilated the counter Logos into itself [in sich 
aufgenommen].136 
  
There is a clear acknowledgment here that any claim to divine-human unity for 
Hegel is always a ‘negative unity’ rather than a reality immediately accessible to the 
                                                            
133 DBWE 12, 302, alt.; DBW 12, 282. 
134 DBWE 12, 305; DBW 12, 286. 
135 DBWE 12, 305-6; DBW 12, 285-6. 
136 DBWE 12, 302, alt.; DBW 12, 282. 
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human mind.137 Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer’s final line makes clear that he sees 
Hegel’s divine-human reconciliation as ‘one-sided’, an ultimate assimilation by the 
Menschenlogos. 
As a result of this verdict, Bonhoeffer overrides Hegel's claim to a form of 
reason in which revelation is embedded. First, his characterisation of the ‘immanent 
logos’,138 with which he includes Hegel’s philosophy, shows him operating with a 
spatial metaphor that Hegel seeks to move beyond in his conceptual thought.139 
Second, Bonhoeffer makes the bold claim that the only remaining question—‘who 
are you?’—is that which is asked by ‘horrified, dethroned human reason 
[Vernunft]’.140 In Vernunft, Bonhoeffer chooses a significant term for Hegel insofar 
as it has a unitive power beyond the limits of ‘understanding [Verstand]’. A final 
example of Bonhoeffer’s disregard for Hegel’s technical language comes when he 
describes the problem with a historical scheme that preconceptualises the coming of 
Christ: ‘The godhead is already known before its revelation, the truth is already 
known as absolute idea’.141 This language of a time ‘before revelation’ runs 
roughshod over the way in which Hegel’s ‘absolute Idea’ seeks to challenge both 
sequential thinking and an enduring split between human thinking and divine 
revelation. Having judged that revelation is not given its due in Hegel’s philosophy, 
however, Bonhoeffer renders it thus. 
                                                            
137 Wolfhart Pannenberg notes that critics often miss how Hegel’s talk of unity or identity 
between the finite and infinite is never immediate; it is always ‘mediated by the negation and 
superseding of the finite’. See Pannenberg ‘Significance’, 162. 
138 DBWE 12, 303; DBW 12, 283-4. 
139 In critiquing the adoption of Hegel by process theologians, David Brown notes that ‘what 
they forget is that the root meanings of “immanent” and “transcendent” are based on spatial imagery, 
and hence that their meaning is not primarily conceptual at all’. See David Brown, Continental 
Philosophy and Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 54. 
140 DBWE 12, 302; DBW 12, 282. 
141 DBWE 12, 333; DBW 12, 317. The indefinite article from the English translation ‘as an 
absolute idea’ as it does not appear in the original. 
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As Bonhoeffer seems to issue a thoroughgoing challenge to reason, it is 
important to note the rationality—logos, even Wissenschaft—that he identifies with 
Christ throughout the lecture series. Rather than depicting Christ as against reason 
tout court, Bonhoeffer affirms Christology as ‘the invisible, unrecognized, hidden 
centre of scholarship [Wissenschaft]’.142 Language of the hidden centre that comes 
from ‘without’ shows that in Wissenschaft as in the church’s witness, Christology is 
always a dialectic—it is in proclamation that the church holds its silence.143 In 
Bonhoeffer’s account, it is inquiry characterised by Chalcedonian reticence. 
The apparent placement of Christ ‘against reason’ is further qualified by an 
ambiguous statement at the close of Bonhoeffer’s lecture on docetism. He is 
recorded to claim that ‘the rupture [Riß] in every kind of docetism is its closeness to 
rationalism.144 Interestingly, this line may be falsely noted, for Pfeiffer’s notes record 
‘what is so captivating [Das Bestrickende] is the nearness to rationalism’.145 The 
alternate notation suggests that Bonhoeffer may not merely assert his polemic but 
argues against the acknowledged appeal that ‘rational’ Christology holds for him. 
3.3.3. Thinking After Confrontation: Employing Hegel’s Terms  
I have described Bonhoeffer's Menschenlogos as a system of classification 
that divides a holistic account of Christ’s person while constraining the freedom he 
exercises. It is this system that Christ ‘counters’ as the Gegenlogos. In the following 
section, I show that while Bonhoeffer criticises Hegel for one-sided resolution 
between human and divine logoi, he nevertheless selectively adopts Hegel’s terms to 
render human reason conditioned by Christology—or, indeed, the person of Christ. 
                                                            
142 DBWE 12, 301; DBW 12, 281. The language of hiddenness, which might imply immanence, 
is combined with a claim to ‘externality’: Christology only becomes the centre of scholarship as it 
comes ‘from outside’. 
143 In the opening lecture Bonhoeffer states that ‘in proclaiming Christ, the church falls on its 
knees in silence before the inexpressible, the arrēton’. DBWE 12, 300; DBW 12, 280. 
144 DBWE 12, 338; DBW 12, 322. 
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In following through the confrontation of the Gegenlogos, Bonhoeffer does not 
merely persist with an apparent voluntarism.  
Although Bonhoeffer does not always honour Hegel’s technical meaning for 
certain terms, he employs similar terms of ‘sublation’ and ‘presupposition’ to 
articulate human thought after confrontation with Christ. These terms appear when 
Bonhoeffer seeks to trouble the line between academy and church, with the latter 
characterised by a Christological form of thought. As the following citation reveals, 
he is not abandoning the claims of reason, here largely in terms of Wissenschaft, but 
relocating them: 
The ultimate question for critical thinking is that it must ask who but it 
can not. That means that one can legitimately ask who only after the 
self-revelation of the other to whom one puts the question has already 
taken place, after the immanent logos has already been sublated [ist 
aufgehoben]. That is, the question of who can only be asked on 
condition that the answer has already been given. And this in turn 
means that the Christological question can only be asked, as a 
scientific [wissenschaftlich] question, within the sphere of the church 
[im Raum der Kirche], and the presupposition of it is the fact that 
Christ’s claim to be the Word of God is a just claim.146 
 
There is a multi-pronged polemic here. Most significantly, Bonhoeffer claims that 
truly wissenschaftlich inquiry should not be set against the church’s faith claim, for it 
is itself indebted to it.147 Here Bonhoeffer tries to work between Harnack and Barth, 
arguing for a new unity between scholarly inquiry and ecclesial testimony, although 
his polemic against Hegel and his heirs leads Bonhoeffer to press the latter.  
The citation above shows Bonhoeffer employing aufheben, taking up Hegel's 
well-known term of art. Care has to be taken in the translation, with particular 
                                                                                                                                                                        
145 DBW 12, 322n86. 
146 DBWE 12, 303, alt.; DBW 12, 283-4. 
147 As background, in a letter from Adolf Harnack to Bonhoeffer dated December 22, 1929, he 
claims that ‘our theological existence is additionally threatened by contempt for academic theology 
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attention to each context, in order to avoid the assumption that Bonhoeffer imports 
Hegel's technical usage wholesale. His appraisal of Hegel's logos is that its 
movement remains 'immanent:' undergoing self-negation and self-affirmation, this 
version of the Menschenlogos evades fatal confrontation with the Gegenlogos. It is 
understandable, then, that even when the immediate context engages Hegel, such as 
when Bonhoeffer speaks of Hegel's particular account of the Menschenlogos having 
'assimilated the Gegenlogos into itself’, his ensuing use of aufheben avoids the 
standard term of translation: the human logos cannot be the presupposition, 
Bonhoeffer argues, for it is ‘dead, condemned, superseded [tot, gerichtet, 
aufgehoben]’.148  
Were the immanent logos to be merely 'abolished’, however, this would be 
devastating for the human vocation of thought, negating Bonhoeffer's other 
affirmations of wissenschaftlich inquiry—and the suggestion of 'elevation' insofar as 
the church becomes the true home of knowledge. Bonhoeffer therefore has the 
difficult task of articulating a recognisable form of human reason that has undergone 
mortification and vivification. I argue, therefore, that Bonhoeffer's usage of the verb 
should recall Hegel, even as his other recoveries—an ecclesial emphasis on the 
whole Christ, freely disrupting the human logos—are taken into consideration. 
'Sublation' is therefore performed on human reason in Bonhoeffer's account, even as 
its double sense remains suggestive: Christ’s self-revelation is the event through 
which the ‘immanent logos has been sublated [ist aufgehoben]’.149 Avoiding this 
duality leads to an interpretation of Bonhoeffer's later speech about faith as a gift 
                                                                                                                                                                        
and by unscientific theologies’. The line is an allusion to the historian’s debate with Karl Barth in the 
early 1920s. See DBWE 10, 196-7, alt.; DBW 10, 160. 
148 DBWE 12, 302; DBW 12, 282. 
149 DBWE 12, 303, alt.; DBW 12, 283-4. 
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entails that Christ comes to 'supersede’, which is to say, 'replace or succeed' the 
human self.150  
Turning to the use of the term ‘presupposition’, there is further convergence 
between Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer's projects. For Hegel, ‘positing’ conveys the 
attempt of the individual to ‘set forth’ the divine Idea through action or piety. Such 
subjective ‘positing’ remains ‘one-sided’ unless its presupposition is first recognised 
to be based on an Idea that precedes and enfolds the subject: the prevenience of the 
divine nature ‘in and for itself’.151 Following from this, the work of reconciliation is 
to proceed not as a claim derived from the subject alone, which is nothing in itself, 
but from the deeper ground of a unity already accomplished. Although Bonhoeffer 
remains suspicious of Hegel for reasons noted above, his project shares a similar aim 
to root thought in the Christ event, which alone forms the inquirer’s ‘presupposition’. 
Bonhoeffer claims that the person of Christ, thought in Chalcedonian reticence, must 
be the ‘presupposition [Voraussetzung]’ for thinking; this in contrast to treating 
Christ as the ‘piece of evidence [Beweisstück]’ provided to reinforce prior human 
conceptuality.152 Bonhoeffer’s statement is couched in his broader resistance to a 
division between Christ’s person and reconciling work. Nevertheless, he clearly 
shows a desire to think from the hypostatic union in a manner that sounds similar to 
Hegel’s emphasis on the difference between ‘positing’ and ‘presupposing’.  
                                                            
150 In a later essay on baptism, Bonhoeffer states that faith as a revelatory event means that 'das 
Ich is entirely superseded [aufgehoben]—"I…no longer I" (Gal. 2:20!)’. DBWE 16, 558; DBW 16, 
571. The English editorial note claims that aufheben 'does not seem to be used in this instance in a 
technical Hegelian sense, as is often the case in Bonhoeffer’s writings. Rather, the more literal "to 
supersede" is used here, meaning "to take the place of; replace or succeeed."…Christ, therefore, 
supersedes the self, that is, causes the self to be set aside and then takes the place of it’. DBWE 16, 
558n48. 
151 Hegel illustrates this complex claim through Kant and Fichte’s moral theory, namely, that a 
person can do good only on the presupposition of alignment with a moral order. The act may not lead 
to prosperity, but it nevertheless goes beyond the arbitrary act of a subject; ‘the good will thrive in and 
for itself’. LPR III, 175-6; VPR III,136. 
152 DBWE 12, 301, alt.; DBW 12, 281. 
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3.4. A Christological Form of Thought? 
 I have shown that Bonhoeffer opposes speech about the distinction between 
the 'idea' and the 'appearance' of Christ in much the way that Luther resists talk of 
natures conceived in advance. This is one of the extended ways in which Chalcedon 
carries on its negative function, as Bonhoeffer puts it, cancelling speculation over the 
natures that begin elsewhere than the unity. Bonhoeffer's emphasis is clearly on the 
whole person of Christ, for whom even the conjunctive phrase 'divine and human' is 
awkward. It is hard to imagine, then, Bonhoeffer making reference to a 'universal 
incarnational principle’, as one critic renders Hegel's treatment of religion.153 
Bonhoeffer’s polemic must, however, reckon with a series of passages in which he 
employs the 'idea' of Christ, that is, a uniting-distinguishing form of thought, when 
speaking about the unity of reality as a whole.  
 While Bonhoeffer resists an apparently pre-determined 'idea' of Christ, he 
does not shy from experimenting with forms of thought evoked by Christological 
doctrine. In Ethics, Bonhoeffer deploys a Christological argument against a dualistic 
conception of reality in what he terms 'Pseudo-Lutheranism'.154 Against this 'two 
realm' view, he states that there is 'only the one realm of the Christ-reality 
[Christuswirklichkeit]’.155 As a result, the 'worldly' and the 'Christian' are not to be 
conceived in a 'static independence' over and against one another; the pair exist in a 
‘polemical unity’.156 In a similar vein, Bonhoeffer alludes to Chalcedon in 
articulating the 'two kingdoms' doctrine: the Zwei Reiche is a unity that 'as long as 
                                                            
153 This principle is the presupposition that stands at the 'origin of religious consciousness per 
se’. James Yerkes, The Christology of Hegel (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978), 164. 
154 'In Pseudo-Lutheranism the autonomy of the orders of the world is proclaimed against the law 
of Christ’. This is one iteration of a longstanding 'two realms' [Zwei Räume] mode of thinking that has 
taken various forms throughout Christian history. DBWE 6, 56; DBW 6, 41. 
155 DBWE 6, 58; DBW 6, 43-44. 
156 DBWE 6, 59; DBW 6, 45. 
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the earth remains, must never be mixed together, yet never torn apart'.157 He will go 
on to speak of the 'form of Christ' as a means of narrating the relation between 
ecclesial and other political bodies in the world-historical arena.  
Bonhoeffer's language for the 'two kingdoms' brings to mind Hegel's own 
attempts to think of pairs in a relation of both distinction and inseparability. As noted 
above, Adams argues that Hegel displays a 'Chalcedonian logic’.158 Specifying 
Hegel’s reception of Chalcedon, his logic sounds similar to Luther’s polemic against 
the habit of delineating Christ's attributes according to 'pre-conceived' natures. 
Treating a series of philosophical terms, Hegel states that there is a certain 
'clumsiness' in the expression '"unity of subject and object" or of "the finite and the 
infinite."'159 The problem is that the respective components 'mean what they are 
outside of their unity, and therefore in their unity, they are not meant in the way that 
their expression states them’.160  
 Bonhoeffer's deployment of Christology as an expansive claim to unified 
reality has raised concern among critics. Dumas acknowledges Bonhoeffer’s 
criticism of Hegel over human autonomy and the anonymity of Geist, but argues that 
a danger remains in the claim to 'Christ-reality:' 
So we must say that there is a Lutheran emphasis in Bonhoeffer 
(similar to that found in Hegel) that troubles us here, in which the 
incarnation is in danger of ceasing to be the word of revelation to 
reality and of being transformed into the ongoing structure of reality. 
Only in an eschatological sense can it be claimed that theology is a 
patent ontology.161   
 
                                                            
157 DBWE 6, 112; DBW 6, 102. Clifford Green identifies the allusion in DBWE 6, 112n39. 
158 Adams, Eclipse, 6, 22-23. 
159 PhG, §39. Hegel's larger interest in this paragraph is the relation between the true and the 
false. 
160 PhG, §39. 
161 Dumas, Reality, 235. 
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Dumas adds that while Hegel lacked a differentiated eschatology, Bonhoeffer 
maintained this distinction, as seen through the penultimate-ultimate schema in 
Ethics. More recently, Marsh has pressed the question of how Ethics takes on a 
monistic tone, asking if Bonhoeffer perpetuates the loss of distinction previously 
criticised in Hegel.162 Marsh judges that Bonhoeffer qualifies unity as preserving 
distinction, and is therefore best described as speaking of a ‘shared reality’ rather 
than a ‘necessary identity’.163  
 I raise Bonhoeffer's uses of Christology in this more 'structural' sense to 
provide fuller context for his critique of the 'idea' of Christ. I argue that Bonhoeffer's 
critique should be seen not as total resistance to the conviction that Christology can 
form reflection, or that the Logos can be the inception of a philosophical project. 
What Bonhoeffer's criticism does provide is a constant check on the way that idea-
appearance can become ultimately divisive, calcifying into opposition. Insofar as 
Christ is first spoken of as a whole, truly present person, Bonhoeffer is willing to see 
that singular body as the mystery revealed, the underlying unity of the 'the 
revelational with the rational’.164 Moreover, the 'one Christ-reality' must be held 
alongside Bonhoeffer's language of the 'form of Christ' also found in the Ethics. This 
latter term is irreducibly ecclesial, as it is employed to speak of the alternating 
acceptance or rejection of Christ-as-community among the peoples. 
Conclusion 
I have shown that Bonhoeffer’s charge of a ‘docetic’ tendency serves to 
critique philosophical classifications that crystallise into thought forms that divide 
what Christology would keep united. Although Hegel’s distinctions are the most 
                                                            
162 Marsh points out that Bonhoeffer uses hineingenommen rather than aufgehoben. Marsh, 
Reclaiming, 104. 
163 He also states that this unity is mediated by the specific person of Christ rather than the self or 
the body per se. Marsh, Reclaiming, 105-6. 
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refined in a long line of attempts, Bonhoeffer nevertheless attributes such a ‘docetic’ 
tendency to him. A distinction between idea and appearance, just as that between 
divine and human natures, do not serve Bonhoeffer’s intent to articulate the present, 
whole Christ. Bonhoeffer therefore develops his account by pronouncing what Hegel 
diminishes: Christ's enduring posture pro nobis in contrast to the sublation into 
Geist; Christ's freedom for 'arbitrary' encounter in contrast to a universalising 
necessity. 
Having presented Bonhoeffer's confrontational language of Christ as the 
Gegenlogos, I have complicated his critique of Hegel in two ways. First, I have 
argued that Bonhoeffer's purpose is to re-introduce process into thinking derived 
from the Christ figure. He thus does not remain with a Christ that counters human 
reason tout court, but ventures his own attempt to see Christology as a form of 
reason. This leaves a need to develop vocabulary for the human thinking that 
emerges from such confrontation, for which I have shown Bonhoeffer to employ key 
terms from Hegel. Second, as several critics have noted, Bonhoeffer develops his 
own uses of the 'idea' of Christ, which is to say, a Christological form of thinking. In 
other words, he deploys Chalcedonian formulae to overcome dualities of thought 
between, for example, the two kingdoms or, indeed, revelation and reason. This is 
not ultimately in contradiction to Bonhoeffer’s sharp polemic on behalf of the 
undivided person of Christ. Rather, insofar as the present-historical person is not 
marginalised, his is the body in which all things are held together. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
164 He claims that such unity is a perception of faith. DBWE 6, 59; DBW 6, 45. 
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Chapter Four - Beyond the Bare God:  Christ as Word and Sacrament 
 
The church’s answer to [the understanding] of Christ as doctrina, as 
generalised truth, is to maintain that Christ is sacrament, which means 
that in his essence, he is not doctrina. This refutes the error that Christ 
is only an idea and does not exist in both history and nature. 
 
- Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology Lectures 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter treated what Bonhoeffer was against in his Christology 
lectures, namely, a ‘docetic’ tendency in Hegel’s presentation of Christ that 
effectively divided the appearance of the historical figure from the idea of divine-
human unity. I argued that although Hegel does not offer a strictly modalist account, 
his emphasis on the Johannine farewell discourses and language of ‘sublation’ rather 
than ‘ascension’ entail a strong turn to the Holy Spirit’s permeation of communal 
Geist. Hegel was thereby developing his early interest in an expressive Volksreligion 
that is not dependent on external authority, while also arguing against an 
overemphasis on historical proofs surrounding Jesus' life. This background helps to 
explain Bonhoeffer's strong Christology, an attempt to retrieve 'hypostatic density' in 
the foreground of a 'pneumatic' field. 
This chapter turns to the theme of Christ's presence as Word and Sacrament. 
A key emphasis for Luther, as for Bonhoeffer after him, is that God is always 
mediated to the community: the living Christ is a ‘real presence’ as preached Word 
and Sacrament. I argue that a key element to Bonhoeffer’s modification of Hegel’s 
phrase to ‘Christ existing as community’ is the attempt to retrieve the preached Word 
as Sacrament in its own right. It is the Word that orients Bonhoeffer’s account of the 
real presence of Christ as Sacraments that animate his form as community. Although 
Bonhoeffer takes up many of the same emphases as Hegel, such as the primacy of 
truth over feeling and the continual need for mediation between members, he makes 
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a series of departures: Hegel examines the transmission of doctrine by the spirited 
community, whereas Bonhoeffer argues that Christ is not doctrine but presence; 
Hegel’s philosophical interest leads him to an account of the self-sufficient ‘Idea’, 
whereas Bonhoeffer emphasises the contingency of ‘address’; Hegel’s critique of the 
positivity of religion and desire for a broadly-based Volksreligion lead to 
ambivalence about the material elements of worship, whereas Bonhoeffer dwells on 
the Word's material expressions. These differences show that Hegel, for all his 
emphasis on mediation, may well be subject to Luther's criticism of theologians who 
speak of the 'bare God', or 'God merely as such', to which Bonhoeffer alludes in the 
Hegel Seminar.1  
This chapter also provides a fuller contextualisation of Bonhoeffer's reception 
of Hegel within a larger Lutheran-Reformed polemic of the time. I show that 
Bonhoeffer’s theology of the Word is significantly influenced by Barth, who 
throughout the 1920s criticised elements of Hegel’s thought as an outworking of an 
error in Lutheran Eucharistic theology. While Bonhoeffer is sympathetic to Barth’s 
criticism, he also appreciates the vigorous defence of Luther’s est by his colleague 
Franz Hildebrandt. Bonhoeffer’s shared emphasis on the est reveals that his recovery 
of the Word does not draw him wholly into the 'Barthian circle'. If Hildebrandt 
absorbs Hegel uncritically, indeed emphatically, I argue that Bonhoeffer’s 
contrasting caution does not mean utter abandonment.2 
 The differences in Hegel and Bonhoeffer’s arrangement of their lecture 
material should be observed. As an exercise in the philosophy of religion, Hegel 
                                                            
1 HS, 29. 
2 This is the manner in which it is presented by DeJonge:‘Bonhoeffer’s rejection of classical 
Lutheran speculation implies a rejection of Hildebrandt’s Hegelian-Lutheranism’. Michael DeJonge, 
‘The Presence of Christ in Karl Barth, Franz Hildebrandt and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Yearbook, no. 4 (2009-10), 113. See also Hans-Jürgen Abromeit, Das Geheimnis Christi. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffers erfahrungsbezogene Christologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1991), 206f. 
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speaks of the different stages of the ‘consummate’ or ‘revelatory’ community, from 
origin to existence and realisation. Bonhoeffer’s exercise in Christology, meanwhile, 
is ordered through the ‘form’ of Christ as Word, as Sacrament, and as community. 
Note that the heading is singular; these are not plural Gestalten, but a unified tri-fold 
form from which each component must be taken into account as elaboration on 
Bonhoeffer’s refrain ‘Christ existing as community’.  
4.1. Contextualising Reformed-Lutheran Debates 
The theology of Word and Sacrament is a key point at which Bonhoeffer’s 
engagement with currents in Reformed-Lutheran arguments have bearing. In this 
section I will recount both Barth’s critique of the Lutheran tradition and the defence 
mounted by Bonhoeffer’s colleague Franz Hildebrandt. As background, Bonhoeffer 
and Hildebrandt first met in Seeberg’s seminar one day before Bonhoeffer’s 
dissertation defence.3 Bethge remarks that ‘their friendship was spiced by a lifelong 
private feud: Hildebrandt attacked Bonhoeffer for his dubious mixture of Hegelian 
and Barthian categories, and Bonhoeffer counterattacked by criticizing Hildebrandt’s 
dependence on Harnack’.4 This chapter takes its cue from Hildebrandt’s 
characterisation, showing how Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel seeks modifications 
from Barth’s critique of Lutheran Eucharistic theology. Although Bonhoeffer is 
clearly not as thoroughly committed to Hegel’s work as Hildebrandt, he nevertheless 
sides with his fellow Lutherans in defending an emphatic est. 
4.1.1. Karl Barth's Critique of the 'Predicate of Identity' 
Throughout the 1920s, Barth levels a Reformed critique of Luther’s view of 
the Eucharist, particularly in its alleged outworking in Hegel and Feuerbach. Barth 
                                                            
3 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 138. 
4 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 138. Wolf-Dieter Zimmermann pitches Hildebrandt as an idealist 
influenced by Friedrich Brünstad over and against Bonhoeffer as a dialectical theologian. 
Zimmermann, I Knew, 78. 
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critiques Luther’s claim that all doctrinal clarification is paraphrase of the hoc est 
corpus meum. The est is an affirmation that lacks the Reformed ‘but’, Barth’s 
shorthand for the Reformed assertion that the finite cannot contain the infinite, 
finitum non capax infiniti. Barth's position is worth elaborating for a study of 
Bonhoeffer's reception of Hegel given the importance of Barth's influence, not only 
during this decade but throughout Bonhoeffer’s career.5  
Barth makes his objection clearest in a 1923 exposition and critique of 
Luther’s doctrine of the Eucharist.6 He identifies three levels of signification in 
Luther’s 1519 position: the symbolic bread and wine, the action of eating and 
drinking, and the reception of Christ’s ‘real presence’. In the latter Barth claims that 
the union is so emphasised that ‘the promised becomes possession, the likeness 
becomes identity’.7 He continues that Luther’s identification of the two is no mere 
‘slip in logic, but the purpose which manifests itself with compelling inner necessity 
in the whole intent of Luther’s doctrine of the Lord’s Supper’.8  
Barth goes on to observe variance in Luther’s position, claiming that Luther 
argues against neither transubstantiation nor consubstantiation. Rather, the Reformer 
emphasises real presence, focusing his attack on those who make either position 
regarding how this occurs ‘a necessary article of faith and law’. Luther’s critique of 
over-precision in describing the change of the bread is grounded in his insistence on 
Christ’s three words of institution. Barth narrates Luther’s various defences, whether 
consubstantiation or the doctrine of ubiquity, as ‘only paraphrase of the “This is my 
                                                            
5 For a good recent account of the relation between Barth and Bonhoeffer's writings, as well as 
their correspondence and personal contact, see van 't Slot, Negativism, 35-55. 
6 Karl Barth, ‘Luther’s Doctrine of the Eucharist’, in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 
1920-28, trans. Louise Smith (London: SCM, 1962). 
7 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 99. 
8 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 99. 
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body” [Hoc est corpus meum] which for him settled the whole matter’.9 Barth mocks 
‘the passion with which he nailed himself to these three letters when he wrote them 
with chalk on the conference table at Marburg’, claiming that the basis of faith must 
be higher than mere insistence on this phrase’s grammatical construction.10 He 
identifies this as the ‘predicate of identity’ in Luther’s later writing.11 
Barth claims that Luther never understood the emerging Reformed objection 
to his position, identifying both a Reformed emphasis on the Ascension and an 
‘objection of the threat to the glory of God involved in the acceptance of a definite 
given object of contingent revelation’.12 In conclusion, he claims that while 
Reformed theology could go a long way with Luther,  
when the last word falls, the Lutheran Yes may be crossed with the 
Reformed But—not with No—to complete and explain it, 
remembering that when the last word falls, that road is a closed circle. 
The point from which Luther began is again reached; the point where 
identity again becomes likeness, where the critical question must again 
arise so that the divine answer may be and may remain the truth.13 
 
Barth thus tries to reopen the dialectic, claiming that had Luther opened again what 
he closes with ‘identity’, Zwingli—in his ‘undialectical assertion’ that consisted of 
‘only the But without the Yes’—would have been unable to oppose him.14 As it is, 
Barth looks to Calvin who he sees to speak both Yes and But, thus showing a way out 
of the ‘historical cul-de-sac’.15 
Barth’s criticism of Luther’s doctrine is closely related to his critique of both 
Hegel and Feuerbach. In a 1920 lecture, Barth notes that the most important 
Lutheran doctrine to impress Feuerbach was that of the incarnation and, relatedly, the 
                                                            
9 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 109. 
10 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 110. 
11 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 110. 
12 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 108. 
13 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 110-111. 
14 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 111. 
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Eucharist. He claims that Luther’s ‘enthusiastic overemphasis’ on locating deity in 
‘the man Jesus’, insisting that the Eucharistic bread ‘must be fully the glorified body 
of the ascended Christ’, led to an orthodoxy in which ‘the predicate of the divine 
glory belonged to the humanity of Jesus as such and in abstraction’.16 Barth 
continues that this enthusiasm overrides the Reformed finitum non capax infiniti and 
opens the possibility for a reversal of distinctions between heaven and earth, God and 
humanity, ‘forgetting the eschatological boundary’. In a parting shot, Barth claims 
that ‘Hegel in exploiting this possibility perhaps simply demonstrated how good a 
Lutheran he was, how consistent to his professed adherence’.17 
Barth’s critique of Hegel, within a larger challenge to Lutheranism, continues 
in his later writings. In his work on Reformed confessions, he observes a concern 
with direct Christological immediacy, which can lead to a speculative materialism 
that leaves no distinction between nature and God.18 Meanwhile, in the Göttingen 
Dogmatics he identifies the genus majestaticum as the ‘heart’ of Lutheran 
Christology.19 He notes that this idiomatic theological teaching about the relation 
between divine and human makes possible a certain type of thought, which the 
German ‘temper’ [Gemüt] takes in two directions. One of these is an ‘inclination to 
the apotheosis of the historical given’, remarking that the passage from Luther’s 
teaching to Hegel is not so long as it appears.20  
In summary, Barth is clearly concerned with the loss of a boundary between 
God and humanity. To this end, he criticises Luther for falling into an undialectical 
                                                                                                                                                                        
15 Barth, ‘Doctrine’, 111. 
16 Barth makes specific reference to the Lutheran doctrine of ‘idiomatic communication’ in the 
‘majestic nature’ of the risen Christ in his essay 'Feuerbach', 230. 
17 Barth, ‘Feuerbach’, 230. 
18 Karl Barth, Die Theologie der reformierten Bekenntnisschriften (1923) (Zürich: Theologischer 
Verlag, 1998), 286-87. 
19 Karl Barth, Unterricht in der christlichen Religion, Vol. III (1925-26) (Zürich: Theologischer 
Verlag, 1985), 53. My thanks to Carsten Card-Hyatt for this reference. 
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assertion of the est, forging an ‘identity’ between the real, whole presence of Christ 
and the material element. This is a threat to divine glory in that it ties God to a 
contingent article without qualification. Barth’s critical line against Luther and select 
heirs prompts a blunt counter-argument that draws on Hegel to reiterate Luther’s 
insistence on the force of the est. 
4.1.2. Franz Hildebrandt's Defence of the Est 
 Franz Hidebrandt takes issue with Barth’s position in his doctoral 
dissertation, Est: Das Lutherische Prinzip, championing Hegel as a contemporary 
reiteration of Luther’s position at Marburg.21 Hildebrandt follows Hegel in 
emphasising receptive belief over and against the ‘objective’ priestly act of 
consecration attributed to Catholicism.22 Nevertheless, Hildebrandt resists 
overcorrection towards bare subjectivity by adopting Hegel’s characterisation of the 
‘Reformed’ position as a ‘spiritless’ recollection of the past.23 He ends this section by 
claiming that Lutherans and Hegelians occupy a theoretical common ground against 
the way the question is posed by both ‘Catholic’ and ‘Reformed’ proponents.24 
Hildebrandt writes that the statement ‘only in faith’ becomes the ground of 
‘objectivity’ rather than a barrier to it.25 In his account, the Eucharistic element does 
not remain in the brute materiality of Rindfleisch—colloquially ‘beef’ or more 
literally ‘cattle-flesh’—but rather becomes Geistfleisch, ‘spirit-flesh’. Hildebrandt 
states that the distinction is better rendered in the German differentiation between 
                                                                                                                                                                        
20 The other direction is that of the Romantics with their ‘passionate desire’ for immediacy. 
Barth, Unterricht, 56-57. 
21 Franz Hildebrandt, Est: Das Lutherische Prinzip (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1931), 58. 
22 Hildebrandt, Est, 58 
23 Hildebrandt, Est, 60. 
24 Hildebrandt, Est, 64. 
25 In contrast, the Reformed position becomes the barrier [Grenz] to such objectivity. 
Hildebrandt, Est, 60. 
 168 
leiblicher, ‘bodily’, and leibhaftiger, ‘embodied’.26 This is the manner in which God 
can be present and, while necessarily apprehended in the heart, no merely ‘spiritual’ 
entity.27 Hildebrandt regularly places Lutheranism between opposed pairs, stating 
that it remains neither with ‘spirit’ nor ‘body’ in isolation.28 The summary is set in a 
Hegelian key: ‘reality is called here no longer Ding-lichkeit, but rather in the 
pregnant sense, Wirk-lichkeit; objectivity is alone to be understood from faith and the 
spirit’.29  
Hildebrandt’s interest in overcoming the object-subject divide nevertheless 
maintains the importance of personal encounter, an element shared with Barth and 
Bonhoeffer. For instance, Hildebrandt employs the Pauline counsel to ‘discern the 
body’, emphasising the ‘living personal unity’ of Christ, while speaking of ‘Christ 
himself, who is in his “personal Daseinsform.”’30 To this end, he also seeks to 
overcome divisions between the ‘earthly’ and the ‘transfigured’ body as well as those 
between the ‘person’ and ‘work’ of Christ.31 Finally, Hildebrandt claims that 
emphasis on the person of Christ overcomes the whole ‘realist’ manner of posing the 
question: ‘Human and God do not stand opposed as subject and object, rather as “I” 
and “You”’.32 This leads him to state, in an emphasis familiar to Bonhoeffer, that a 
Christ ‘in himself’ [an sich] is of ‘no use’; citing Luther, testimony must be given to 
a Christ ‘for you’ [für euch]’.33 
Hildebrandt goes beyond Bonhoeffer in his explicit adoption of Hegel’s terms 
for art for a contemporary Lutheran position. For instance, he states that Reformed 
                                                            
26 Hildebrandt, Est, 60-62. 
27 Here he cites Luther’s reference to the Devil as a mere spirit, ‘without flesh or bone’. 
Hildebrandt, Est, 60. 
28 Hildebrandt, Est, 61. 
29 Hildebrandt, Est, 64. 
30 Hildebrandt, Est, 59. The final citation is taken from Georg Lasson, Grundfragen der 
Glaubenslehre (Leipzig, 1913). 
31 Hildebrandt, Est, 59, 82. 
32 Hildebrandt, Est, 82. 
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theology does not overcome the viewpoint of ‘representation [Vorstellung]’, which 
makes it difficult to conceptualise ‘real presence’.34 Hildebrandt thus contrasts the 
Reformed ‘representational’ view, rendered in the shorthand significat, with the 
Lutheran ‘concept’ as rendered in the est.35  He even states that the Hegelian 
formulation of a ‘higher “reason” [höhere “Vernunft”]’ is anticipated in Luther’s 
Marburg struggle against base ‘reason’.36 Moreover, Hildebrandt follows Hegel in 
stating that philosophy and religion have a common object, claiming that philosophy 
works towards the Idea as ‘result’. In particular, Hegel’s use of the proofs of God’s 
existence are seen to be intelligible in light of the Lutheran claim to finitum capax 
infiniti. Proceeding from here, Hildebrandt argues that the finite is not ‘for itself’ [für 
sich], but rather must be ‘sublated [aufgehoben] in the infinite’.37 There is a 
necessary movement from the ‘barrier of bare “existence”’ towards the kingdom of 
God.38  
From the angle of religion or theology, Hildebrandt claims that through the 
Lutheran framework the glory of God leads from the infinite to the finite. He states 
that thinking this ‘concrete unity’ is the original question of Christology, one that 
must unfurl and be settled in the Eucharist debate, that is, ‘the Idea of God-
humanity’.39 This leads to his clearest statement of alliance to Hegel and an ‘Idealist’ 
project: 
But that is the exact meaning of the “cur deus homo”: that God does 
not remain “in himself” [an sich], rather goes out in his “Other-Being” 
and through this comes to himself. That is the step from Hellenism to 
Christianity, from heathenism to Christian Idealism: that the Idea 
[Idee] becomes historical reality in “this” human. That finally is the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
33 Hildebrandt, Est, 82. 
34 Hildebrandt, Est, 72. 
35 ‘Est und Significat’ is the first section heading under Vorstellung. Hildebrandt, Est, 64-66. 
36 Hildebrandt, Est, 75. 
37 Hildebrandt, Est, 76. 
38 Hildebrandt, Est, 76. 
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step from Reformed scepticism to Lutheran philosophy: that the 
finitum capax infiniti and faith in the Logos become flesh is the 
beginning of all human knowledge [Erkenntnis].40 
 
In this statement Hildebrandt gathers up several prior references to John’s gospel in 
claiming that the Logos is the centre of reality. 
 Hildebrandt links the Johannine Logos and Hegel’s project, claiming that 
‘Lutheran speculation gives visibility back to John’s Gospel'.41  The fourth 
evangelist’s opening claim, in which Christ is described as ‘being rightly, truly, 
naturally God, a priori’, indeed, ‘described as Creator and also creature as in a flash 
of lightning’ becomes, Hildebrandt states, the petitio principii of all theology, the 
Word of God that is the basis of the Hoc est corpus meum.42 In contrast, Bonhoeffer 
claims that Hegel’s thought does not manage to get beyond a merely human ‘logos’ 
in the end; rather, Hegel’s method of self-negation only serves to affirm itself. As I 
have shown in the previous chapter, Bonhoeffer therefore employs the Gegenlogos in 
an attempt to confront human reflection anew, reinstating process into Christological 
reflection.  
4.2. Christ as Word 
 In this section I consider the process of verbal transmission in the 
community. I first trace Hegel’s articulation of doctrine, showing it as an act of the 
community indwelt by the Holy Spirit and so expressive of a reconciling Geist. 
Bonhoeffer’s own presentation of Christ as Word is then presented, with a particular 
focus on his Luther-inspired ‘sacramentalising’ of the sermon. I argue that 
Bonhoeffer’s key difference from Hegel here can be found in his turn away from 
                                                                                                                                                                        
39 Hildebrandt, Est, 77. 
40 Hildebrandt, Est, 83. 
41 Hildebrandt, Est, 66. The likeness of Hegel's project to John's gospel is also drawn in Adams, 
Eclipse, xviii, 224. 
42 Hildebrandt, Est, 65-66. 
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doctrinal transmission to an emphasis on preaching as Christ’s ‘real presence’. This 
move is related to Bonhoeffer's attempt, in Sanctorum Communio, to recover the 
'Word before Geist’.  
4.2.1. Hegel on the Doctrinal Formation of Community 
 Hegel's concern over 'external' forms of authority and a 'fetishising' of the 
figure of Christ lead him to sideline Christ’s distinctive agency in the process of 
doctrinal transmission. This occurs in two ways: first, Hegel’s emphasis on spirited 
doctrinal development leads him away from the idea that Christ speaks directly, in 
‘contingent’ encounters, which Bonhoeffer will maintain; second, while Hegel 
speaks of doctrinal education, he makes no mention of the verbal encounter of 
preaching, a stark contrast with the ‘exclusive’, even sacramental character 
Bonhoeffer grants to it. I will treat each of these decisions in turn. 
 First, Hegel’s construal of doctrinal development leads him away from claims 
to communal reception of the external ‘Word of Christ’. This is most starkly 
expressed when he states, ‘the community in itself is what produces this doctrine, 
this relationship. The latter is not something produced from the word of Christ, so to 
speak, but through the community, the church’.43 Hegel’s statement must be parsed 
carefully, for it would be a misreading to see this as reference to a purely ‘immanent’ 
human plane. While Hegel wants to highlight the communal role in doctrine, this is 
always the community in which the Spirit is active. He notes this first with relation to 
the belief that perceives Christ as God: ‘the community begins with faith, but on the 
other hand faith is produced in it by the Spirit’.44 He elaborates this in explicitly 
naming the different form of ‘production’ brought about by Pentecost: 
                                                            
43 LPR III, 254; VPR III, 198. This citation features as the epigraph that opens my thesis. 
44 LPR III, 248; VPR III, 191. 
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The first question is: What does this Spirit know? It is itself an object 
[for its own knowing] because it is Spirit. Now what is its content, 
what is its doctrine? Its content is that this objective Spirit likewise 
posits itself, realizes itself in the community; it now posits itself 
subjectively, or is subjectively posited, just as it was objectively 
posited.45 
   
Such citations show the complexity of the Geist at work after Pentecost. At times 
Hegel specifies the Holy Spirit, but otherwise the dividing line between human 
community and Spirit of God is precisely what he seeks to challenge. Suffice it to 
say that there is no purely human production; doctrine as a ‘social construct’ 
presupposes the agency of the divine Spirit. So too the larger social Geist to unfurl 
from the church into a Protestant state. 
 In his reaction to trends in 'objectification', Hegel does not provide Christ 
with an ongoing ‘external’ position. He acknowledges that it is possible to remain 
primarily with the ‘representation of the Son’, but this would be to remain with the 
more ‘objectified’ form of religion he attributes to Catholicism. Such an 
objectification can also, he notes, apply to the Spirit, such that there is ‘greater stress 
on sensible perception than on spiritualization, and the Spirit essentially became an 
object’.46 Against these tendencies, Hegel employs a theatrical metaphor to speak 
instead of how the ‘Spirit exists for Spirit’ as the spectator of a drama has herself 
objectified in the form of a chorus on stage.47 God as Spirit takes up this mediatorial 
task to ensure the human community is never ‘self-raised’:  
Thus this inverted moment [the third] is that the infinite Spirit does not 
abide in itself in an objective way but rather brings forth Spirit in itself 
because it begets itself in self-consciousness. … For it is one-sided to 
view faith in the form of subjectivity in such a way that the 
community, the individual self-consciousness, raises itself up and is 
                                                            
45 LPR III, 252; VPR III, 196. 
46 LPR III, 253; VPR III, 197. 
47 LPR III, 246; VPR III, 189. 
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the productive factor. All activity is mediated; what is to be brought 
forth must already exist in and for itself.48 
 
Hegel’s statement demonstrates the claim that the community’s production of 
doctrine not only avoids historical proofs, and so the one-sidedness of sensible 
immediacy, but also a merely human definition of itself. The history of the Christ 
event that has achieved reconciliation, with the attendant outpouring of the Spirit, 
inaugurates the community and so remains its ‘presupposition’.49 
 Second, while Hegel acknowledges the importance of the teaching office, his 
emphasis on doctrine as a ‘presupposition’ elides the verbal event of the preached 
word. Hegel’s use of the term ‘presupposition’ is thoroughly rational, implying a 
verbal, didactic process. He explicitly states that faith is ‘not feeling’; rather, it is ‘an 
object of consciousness, and this antecedent truth alone is the ground that determines 
feelings’.50 Hegel’s critique is that feeling ‘locks particular subjectivity within itself’, 
remaining overly susceptible to the ‘natural’ will; on the contrary, ‘Spirit conquers 
feeling, purifies and determines it’.51 It is worth noting here Hegel’s ongoing dispute 
with his Berlin colleague Schleiermacher, whom he took to prioritise feeling over 
reason—a characterisation of Schleiermacher that Bonhoeffer also holds. 
In order to discipline such feelings, Hegel acknowledges the importance of 
the teaching office to develop the consciousness first intuited in the Spirit’s witness. 
He states: 
[Doctrine] is, it exists, it has value, it is acknowledged and 
immediately presupposed. But it does not exist in a sensible 
fashion…rather, spiritual truth exists only as known, and the fact that it 
also appears includes the fact that the mode of its appearance is 
                                                            
48 LPR III, 253-54; VPR III, 197. 
49 LPR III, 254-55; VPR III, 194-95. 
50 LPR III, 258; VPR III, 200. 
51 LPR III, 259; VPR III, 200. 
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precisely this, that it is taught. The church is essentially the teaching 
church…52 
 
The church has clear verbal authority in forming subjects. In Hegel's continuing 
focus on the spirited form of knowing, he relieves his inquiry from the question of 
the church’s historical use of textual resources, whether scripture and its 
commentaries or the theological tradition of writings. This is in part because of his 
basic commitment to a strong emphasis on the witness of the Spirit—‘a mediation 
that annuls all mediations’—rather than on merely ‘contingent’ grounds or 
authority.53 The primary issue for him is to state that the church’s doctrine is 
‘cultivated by present Spirit’, and as such, holds authority over its development.54  
 Hegel's concern with external authority and miracles, characteristic of 
'positive' religion, particularly Catholicism, leads him to emphasise community 
production over reception—a key point of difference with Bonhoeffer, who will 
focus on the latter. Hegel seeks to avoid appealing to ‘contingent, indifferent, 
external [occasions], subjective in character, just as an accidental incident stirred an 
individual’s heart’.55 Rather, ‘the faith of the community rests solely on reason itself, 
on Geist, i.e. a mediation that annuls all mediations. Hence it is necessarily expressed 
as a faith of many, engendered by God’.56 With this last line, Hegel cites Adam’s 
first recognition of Eve as a pattern for ‘the divine Idea that exists in itself is in man, 
[who is its] image; this image is God—"Geist of my Geist”—a testimony to God’.57 
Faith is not feeling, he argues, but a ‘form of objective truth’ and therefore ‘the 
ground that determines feelings’.58 Even in the ongoing interpretation of texts 
                                                            
52 LPR III, 264; VPR III, 202-3. 
53 LPR III, 258; VPR III, 199. 
54 LPR III, 259-60; VPR III, 201. 
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‘Nothing [is simply] created from itself: it is the Geist of the community as a whole 
[that creates]. [The] doctrine of the church [is] not produced in the church but is 
cultivated by the present Geist’.59 Such development, though, is not to suggest that 
doctrine is incomplete and must be passed off to merely human actors. Rather, 
‘Doctrine is developed in the community itself only as something already 
presupposed and complete’.60 Such completion shows it to be a divine given, a 
revelation, which then unfurls both in the church’s consciousness as well as ‘through 
the cultivation of thought and philosophy’.61  
This expansive ideal, particularly in Hegel’s sense of movement beyond 
clergy and ecclesial ritual, relegates the instigating divine address into the 
background as human subjects become ‘the active expression of Geist’.62 As Hegel 
concludes his section on faith and doctrine, he speaks of an ‘altered relation’ to the 
church’s origin. If Christ’s own word, and indeed his polemical teachings, present 
earlier forms, so too with the early age of the Spirit: 
It is no longer the case that man is elevated to absolute significance by 
the outpouring and decree of the Spirit, but rather that this significance 
is something that is known and acknowledged. It is the absolute 
capability of the subject, both within itself and objectively, to share in 
the truth, to come to the truth, to exist in the truth, to attain to the 
consciousness of truth. This consciousness of doctrine is here 
presupposed and present.63 
 
A rare mention of the act of preaching, as an outworking of this presupposition, 
comes in Hegel’s characterisation of the way Catholics externally dispense the 
articles of religion. He states that lay persons are 'excluded from the self-knowledge 
of doctrine' and therefore 'conduct themselves receptively' vis-à-vis the clerical office 
                                                            
59 LPR III, 259; VPR III, 201. 
60 LPR III, 263; VPR III, 202. 
61 LPR III, 263; VPR III, 202. 
62 LPR III, 268; VPR III, 208. 
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through which the church is 'the external proprietor and dispenser of the means of 
grace’.64 The pejorative account of ‘pure receptivity’ shows Hegel’s critical distance 
from Bonhoeffer’s adoption of Luther’s emphasis on receptive hearing before the 
divine Word. Bonhoeffer’s differentiated theology of the Word allows him to speak 
both of receptivity to the divine Word as the reality of the church precisely as a 
means to a critical position vis-à-vis clericalism.   
Considering the necessity of the church as semper reformanda, it is important 
to note that Hegel acknowledges the flaws in communal transmission. Indeed, his 
claim to the subject’s ‘absolute capability’ is in sharp contrast to his disappointment 
in the then-contemporary church’s teaching office. In the final section, ‘The Passing 
Away of the Community’, Hegel claims that the community will endure in spite of 
its teachers, else he would end on a discordant note. He states that those entrusted to 
transmit doctrine have abandoned those for whom truth can only exist as 
representation, those who lack an ‘ever-insistent reason’, and those who have trouble 
controlling their impulses. Hegel claims that the teachers have instead ‘found their 
satisfaction in finitude, subjectivity, and precisely therefore in vanity’.65 As such, 
they cannot serve the people, leaving religion in such a state that it must ‘take refuge 
in philosophy’.66 The movement from doctrinal transmission within the church 
community to the necessary refuge of philosophy raises the question of the emergent 
character of the university in Hegel’s day.  
As a related biographical observation, Hegel never himself took to preaching. 
His decision against the pastorate had many elements, from the poor quality of the 
Tübingen instructors to the influence of his close friends Schelling and Hölderlin, but 
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65 LPR III, 296; VPR III, 231. 
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the low marks received for his sermons were a likely factor.67 This latter fact leads 
Hodgson to link Hegel’s neglect of the preaching encounter in his Lectures to a 
negative personal experience.68 To this might be added Hegel's intense personal 
rivalry with Schleiermacher, who was a renowned preacher in Berlin. Not all can be 
reduced to these associations, of course, particularly as Hegel had a bad experience 
of public speaking in general, a fact that was certainly also an impediment to his 
lecturing in philosophy.69 It did not stop Hegel in his chosen vocation, however; he 
loved the work of philosophy and persisted in it. As a result, his tortured oral 
delivery actually came to coincide with his content, at least in the Romantic 
appropriation of his persona.70 His neglect of the preached encounter, then, should be 
related more to his emerging vocational and institutional priority.  
In any case, Hegel tends to shift doctrinal transmission to the philosophers, an 
‘isolated order of priests’ within the university. This turn to the deliberative lecture 
hall is one reason why he does not delve into the preaching event, leaving aside the 
kind of rhythmic efficacy that Reformation thinkers have long placed in the 
preaching of the Word. This is the witness that Bonhoeffer seeks to recover in his 
Berlin lectures a century later. 
                                                            
67 See Pinkard, Hegel, 21-28, cf. 282. The observation that Hegel stopped attending church while 
in Frankfurt is also not incidental. See Dorrien, KRHS, 166-67. 
68 Hodgson goes on to suggest that Hegel's replacement of the proclamation of the Word with a 
'sacramental understanding of divine presence’, which allegedly gives it an 'ecumenical cast’. 
Hodgson, 'Introduction', in Theologian, 37. This is an unnecessary, likely harmful sacrifice for the 
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Pinkard, Hegel, 327-330. 
70 Pinkard remarks that although Hegel’s lecture style irritated many, his followers ‘were 
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his great “interiority,” of the depths of his genius struggling to bring those dark, difficult thoughts to 
the light of day, rather than being the expressions of an anxious man doing something that he loved 
but which also burdened him with no small amount of agitation and anxiety’. Pinkard, Hegel, 327. 
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4.2.2. Bonhoeffer on Christ’s Address in Preaching 
 In the Christology lectures, Bonhoeffer’s section entitled ‘Christ as Word’ 
offers his theology of the Word in a broader sense before focusing on the event of 
preaching. He begins in a manner reminiscent of Hegel, emphasising ‘truth’ over 
‘feeling’ [Gefühl] in a shared suspicion of Schleiermacher’s project.71 Moreover, 
Bonhoeffer observes the logos as a point of meeting:  
Because the human being has a logos, therefore God encounters the 
human being in the logos. Therefore the human being [is] the Homo 
Sapiens. The truth of the human logos therefore originates in the 
Word, because the Word alone communicates clear and unambiguous 
meaning…The Word interprets itself according to its nature. This 
clarity and consonance is the reason why it is universally valid.72 
 
The emphasis on the logos at the point of inception calls to mind that which has been 
identified as a starting point for Hegel’s philosophical project. 
 Having expressed these similarities to Hegel, however, Bonhoeffer makes a 
sharp turn, qualifying that ‘the logos of God is not to be identified with, or analysed 
by, the human logos’.73 He then asserts that there are two mutually exclusive 
‘structures’ of the Word, the first of which is an ‘Idea’ [Idee].74 In this 
characterisation, Bonhoeffer argues against two related notions: an atemporal aspect 
and susceptibility to human possession. Here as elsewhere Bonhoeffer works with a 
composite foil and does not name his opponent. However, it is likely that 
Bonhoeffer’s resistance to an 'Idea' that is ‘eternally at rest within itself’ has Hegel’s 
Idea in view. Recall that Bonhoeffer states elsewhere in the Christology lectures that 
Hegel’s philosophy, with its Idea-Appearance classification, is one of the most 
sophisticated expressions of a resolutely human logos. Moreover, Bonhoeffer’s 
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critique of an Idea that is directly accessible to any person, who need ‘only take 
possession of it’, recalls Hegel’s account, forged as it is by opposition to the 
selectivity implied by the doctrine of predestination.  
In contrast to his characterisation of the all-too-human ‘Idea’, Bonhoeffer 
presents the Word as ‘Address’ [Anrede].75 Rather than being at the prerogative of 
human thought, Bonhoeffer asserts that the Word-as-spoken ‘is wholly subject to the 
freedom of the one who speaks. By nature it is a one-time event, a new event every 
time’.76 This spoken encounter is what leads to the formation of the community. 
Rather than an Idea that ‘remains essentially within itself’, Bonhoeffer claims that 
the Word as Address ‘is only possible as Word between two persons, as address and 
answer [als Anrede und Antwort], responsibility’.77 Hegel would certainly 
acknowledge Bonhoeffer’s claim that ‘truth happens only in community between two 
persons;’ indeed, this is the socialising move that Bonhoeffer picks up via Seeberg’s 
use of Hegel.78 Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the Address of the present 
Christ retrieves the resurrected agency of the Gottmensch that Hegel has set aside. 
Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the freedom of God in address and answer is 
reminiscent of Barth’s later response to Hegel. In Protestant Theology in the 
Nineteenth Century, Barth poses the well-known question of whether Hegel could do 
for Protestantism what Aquinas did for Roman Catholicism.79 Although Barth sees 
Hegel to accept the ‘positive and historical nature of revelation’, affirming an 
emphasis on the uniqueness of Christ, he nevertheless argues that ‘with Hegel God 
and man can never confront one another in a relationship which is actual and 
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77 Verantwortung, ‘responsibility’, is related to antworten, ‘to answer’. DBWE 12, 316, alt.; 
DBW 12, 298. 
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indissoluble, a word, a new word revelatory in the strict sense, cannot pass between 
them, it cannot be uttered and cannot be heeded’.80 Rather, in Barth’s 
characterisation, ‘when God manifests himself the philosopher of religion has 
already understood him’.81 This calls into question God’s sovereignty and freedom, 
for which Barth seeks to reclaim the doctrine of predestination.82 
It should be maintained that Bonhoeffer is not strictly Barthian, particularly 
insofar as Barth goes on to criticise Hegel for indicating that ‘the church is necessary 
for God himself, for in it he can be the mind of the church’.83 While Bonhoeffer 
wants to preserve God’s freedom, notably through the language of ‘address’, he also 
wants to follow Hegel more closely in rooting his inquiry in the church, the 
community that has the ‘mind of Christ’. Bonhoeffer’s theology of the Word seeks to 
convey the way in which Christ will both reveal himself and hide; he thus retrieves 
the notion of the Deus absconditus that has little place in Hegel’s revelatory religion. 
This reclaimed prerogative is summarised in the claim that ‘Christ is not timelessly 
and universally accessible as an Idea; instead he is heard as Word only there where 
he allows himself to be heard’.84 This emphasis neither renders God inaccessible nor 
results in the kind of Barthian ‘split vision’ that Bonhoeffer seeks to counter in his 
affirmation of the est. Rather, the acknowledgement of contingency serves to 
accentuate the God-human one’s ‘commitment to humankind’.85  
An explicit discussion of preaching comes in Bonhoeffer's final paragraph of 
the section ‘Christ as Word’, where he further distinguishes his account from Hegel 
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85 DBWE 12, 317; DBW 12, 298-99. 
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by retrieving the ‘exclusive status’ of the sermon in Reformation thought.86 
Bonhoeffer specifies this status through the Lutheran claim that Christ is truly given 
in the preached Word, which is to say that preaching itself holds sacramental status.87 
In this way, Bonhoeffer’s approach mirrors the way in which Luther is seen not to 
‘verbalise’ the Sacrament, but rather ‘to sacramentalise the Word’, claiming that the 
preached Word is truly able to give Christ.88  
Bonhoeffer’s high view of the preaching event is set in relief to Hegel’s 
notion of the ‘objective Geist’ in which the preacher is embedded. Bonhoeffer asserts 
that Christ’s presence is not the ‘objective Geist of the community out of which it 
preaches, but rather his presence is preaching’.89 As Bonhoeffer’s previous treatment 
of objective Geist was a partial affirmation, this statement cannot be read as a brute 
dismissal of Hegel’s notion. As noted in my treatment of Sanctorum Communio, it is 
'individual Geist' Bonhoeffer seeks to preserve: first, the 'mind' of Christ, from which 
follows the individuation of his addressees within the community.  
Bonhoeffer’s claim to the spoken Word as Sacrament is underscored in his 
later Finkenwalde lectures on homiletics, in which he makes reference to both the 
‘est of the sermon’ and the ‘est of the Lord’s Supper’.90 Both encounters offer ‘the 
same measure of reality’, though in a different form.91 The Word and sacrament are 
thus very closely aligned: ‘the word is something real; there is a sacramentum verbi 
(sacramentum audibile)’. As noted about the earlier Christology lectures, and in 
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pronounced difference to Hegel's omission of the preached word, Bonhoeffer drew 
on Luther's 'hypostatization of the Word’, the sacramentum verbi.92 While 
Bonhoeffer stresses the importance of a preacher’s assurance in the present Christ, 
though, this is not to be presumed without commitment to ‘pure doctrine’, the 
preaching of the ‘simple, clear, unanimous word of the gospel’.93  
 Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on the preached Word and its reception, drawn from 
the Lutheran confessions, had significant implications for the practice of his 
homiletics classes. Oral delivery was only to be heard, while analysis was relegated 
to sermon manuscripts.94 In Bethge's recollection: 
It initially seemed strange to his students that their sermons, however 
hesitant and inadequate, were treated in all seriousness as the 
expression of the true and living voice of Christ. Nothing, insisted 
Bonhoeffer, is more concrete than the real voice of Christ speaking in 
the sermon.95 
 
Although this emphasis led to rumours of 'enthusiasm' at Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer 
continued to recognise the academy as providing a corrective to sermons, even if it 
never rendered the pulpit obsolete.96 As a result, alongside church confessions 
Bonhoeffer delved deeply into exegetical literature, with his papers from the time 
containing several Greek word studies.97 
Bonhoeffer’s Finkenwalde lecture series on homiletics highlights the 
magisterial presence of Christ in preaching. He states that, ‘In the proclaimed Word, 
Christ steps into the congregation, which is waiting for and calling on Christ…In the 
proclaimed Word, [Christ takes up his congregation], as the Word of the Father that 
                                                            
92 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 443. 
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took away the sins of the world’.98 First, confrontation, a Gegenlogos, must occur; 
Bonhoeffer states the preached Word is not merely instruction or goal, but rather ‘the 
clear Word of Christ brings the Spirit and breaks our will’.99 The confrontational 
language calls to mind Bonhoeffer’s early paper on the ‘majesty’ of the Holy Spirit 
in Luther’s works, another theological distinction of this divine actor that bears 
comparison with Hegel’s reconciling social field of Geist.  
 Bonhoeffer's recovery of the preached Word shows him working with both 
Hildebrandt's Hegelian-Lutheranism and Barth. Bonhoeffer makes an unqualified 
affirmation of Christ’s ‘whole presence’, adapting Luther, as Hildebrandt before him, 
to claim ‘this is the human Word to which you should point and say, this is God!’100 
His rationale shows an employment of Luther’s insistence on whole presence, which 
he then chastens by dialectic:  
I cannot point to the human being unless I am pointing to this Jesus. 
Christ is in the church as the spoken Word in the form of both sermon 
and sacrament….I could not preach if I did not know that I am 
speaking God’s Word, and I could not preach if it were I who is 
supposed to be speaking God’s Word.101 
 
Bonhoeffer's claim to the concurrence of both divine and human words shows his 
Barthian influence, although without abandoning the Lutheran instinct which draws 
him, as Hildebrandt, to Hegel’s thought.  
The unique pedagogical context of Finkenwalde is noteworthy in tracing the 
biographical trajectory that runs alongside Bonhoeffer’s theological emphasis on 
preaching. In contrast to Hegel’s departure from seminary for an increasingly certain 
                                                            
98 DBWE 14, 513; DBW 14, 506. 
99 DBWE 14, 513; DBW 14, 506. He uses terms from the Greek New Testament to express the 
difference made by this address, distinguishing the anthropos psychikos and anthropos pneumatikos. 
100 DBWE 12, 318; DBW 12, 299-300. Hildebrandt cites Luther's claim that 'this is the human 
being to whom you should point and say, this is God!’in Est, 82. Luther’s original text is ‘Hic homo 
est deus, hic deus est homo’, taken from ‘The Babylonian Captivity of the Church’ See DBWE 12, 
318n44. 
 184 
sense of vocation as a professor in the modern university, Bonhoeffer becomes 
increasingly disillusioned with the academy as he knew it—no doubt in connection 
with the political climate of his times. Along with Bonhoeffer’s theoretical focus on 
the church since his first dissertation, his instruction becomes increasingly based 
within the ecclesial institution. This move is especially evident in his founding role 
as an instructor at Finkenwalde, tellingly named the ‘preacher’s seminary’, in which 
he led a small group of men through a semi-monastic rule of life. Of course, his 
teaching there drew on a lifetime’s experience of sermon delivery and reception. 
4.3. Christ as Sacrament 
 Having shown Bonhoeffer's pronounced difference with Hegel on the 
preached Word in the community, I now turn to their respective views on the Lord's 
Supper. I observe Hegel's polemic against hastily-drawn Catholic and Reformed 
foils, as well as his interest in seeing Lutheran Eucharistic 'knowing' expand 
outwards into a state of cultivation. Bonhoeffer's treatment of the Eucharist is 
characterised by recurrent reference to the 'hiddenness' of Christ along with the 
rejection of ‘Reformed’ questions that do not precede from the unity of Christ's 
person. Nevertheless, he makes the perhaps surprising acknowledgement of the 
'relative right' of Hegel’s secularisation of the Lord's Supper.  
4.3.1. Hegel on Consciousness and Consumption 
 Hegel has already set his inquiry in the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion apart from an interest in ecclesiastical history. This move is related both to 
his challenge to the historical verification of proofs and his focus on forms of 
knowing. In discussing the community’s doctrine, he states that the ‘empirical aspect 
of such production, by means of church gatherings, councils, etc., does not concern 
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us here’. Continuing his dissociation from confirmation in historical acts, he notes 
that ‘this content is to be justified by philosophy, not by history; what the Spirit does 
is no history [Historie]’.102 
Hegel’s ensuing representation of confessional differences, as shown in his 
treatment of three traditions on Eucharistic theology, is brief and inadequate for 
readers with a theological interest.103 It does not include Orthodox or Anglican 
accounts, nor does it differentiate between intra-confessional strands, notably 
combining Calvin and Zwingli in the Reformed type. Hegel’s philosophical intent 
shows him to be less interested in a confessionally descriptive exercise than a 
taxonomy that can frame his account of knowing, conditioned by the language of 
mystical union.104  
 Hegel first presents the Catholic position as that of ‘severe objectivity’. The 
host is venerated ‘as such, even when not partaken of’.105 He draws an analogy with 
Catholic doctrine, which is a matter for ‘obedience’ rather than ‘insight’, a 
distinction played out in clericalism.106 Later Hegel notes that the priest’s 
consecration entails that ‘Christ is present in the host in a sensible, bodily, unspiritual 
way’, and thus ‘the divine’ is eaten in an ‘empirical fashion’.107 Externality prevails 
in a manner reminiscent of the ‘positivity’ he identified in the Christian faith in his 
early writings, namely, the essence of religion consisting in ‘lip service, external 
actions, inner feelings, and a historical faith’.108 On the theme of sacraments, Hegel 
sees Catholic clericalism to mean that reconciliation for the people is only ‘external’, 
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in contrast to a Protestant polity in which priests have a primarily pedagogical 
function, while ‘all in the religious community are equal before God as the present 
spirit of the community’.109  
While Hegel’s view of Catholicism varies throughout his life, he sees it as a 
‘paradigmatically unmodern form of Christianity’.110 Hegel was raised in an 
atmosphere of anti-Catholic sentiment in Württemberg. He becomes more open to it 
in his youth, but his post-Jena years see him return to a dismissive view of the 
tradition, an attitude partly driven by his battles with Catholic ‘old Bavarians’ as well 
as Schlegel’s actions as a Catholic convert.111  
Turning to the other pole, Hegel represents the Reformed confession as 
immersed in subjectivity. He portrays it as ‘a memorial, an ordinary psychological 
relation’, continuing that it is caught in the ‘prose of the Enlightenment and of mere 
understanding, and in the contingency of subjective particularity’.112  Elsewhere 
Hegel states that the Reformed view is a ‘spiritless, merely vivid recollection of the 
past—not the divine presence, no actual spirituality’.113 Remarkably, this depiction 
conflates the views of Zwingli and Calvin, although clearly more representative of 
the former.  
 Stepping back from these two characterisations, Hegel claims that Catholic 
and Reformed traditions are each attempting to articulate the antithesis between God 
and humanity. He states that the various ‘churchly representations are themselves 
attempts at a resolution of this antinomy, this implicit and explicit antithesis between 
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the divine and the finite’.114 In one rendition, he refers to them as three 
representations which together constitute the ‘major moments in the existence of the 
community’—a parallel to the larger structure of the lecture series.115 The antithesis 
is finally overcome in a third tradition through the Spirit’s enactment of ‘an internal 
repetition of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ in the members of the 
church’.116 The natural will dies away through confession and repentance, exchanged 
for ‘glorification and majesty’ in the sacrament.117  
It is, unsurprisingly, the Lutheran view of the Eucharist which offers this true 
union of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. Hegel conveys this by locating consecration at 
the moment of partaking, ingestion ‘in the faith and spirit of each one himself’.118 
Hegel renders the act as Genuß, ‘consumption’, diction that evokes physical 
satisfaction and enjoyment.119 However, his acknowledgement of the physical is 
regularly qualified by claims to the action and indwelling of Geist, such as when 
Hegel claims that the Last Supper is the site ‘where the consciousness of 
reconciliation with God is given to man in a sensible, perceptible fashion—the 
indwelling and lodging of Geist within’.120 He wants to make clear that his is no 
mere religious ‘positivity:’ ‘Hence the sensible as such must be validated, 
transformed or transubstantiated into the divine substance itself; the two become 
one’.121 
 The existence of the community is ‘completed’ by partaking in the presence 
of God. Hegel elaborates: 
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It is a question of precisely the conscious presence of God, of unity 
with God, the unio mystica, the self-feeling of God, the feeling of his 
immediate presence in the subject. This self-feeling, however, since it 
exists…presupposes a movement, a sublation of difference, so that a 
negative unity issues forth.122 
 
The claim to God’s ‘self-feeling’ in the subject and the ‘sublation of difference’ 
might call into question the ensuing personal identity of the believer—the ‘individual 
Geist’ that Bonhoeffer seeks to preserve. It is thus worth noting that Hegel’s 
longstanding opposition to ‘external’ modes of validation is meant to counter 
precisely the subjugation of personal agency. As Hodgson notes, Hegel’s language of 
‘mystical union’ is that through which ‘single individuals make themselves their 
own’.123 This can be compared with Hegel’s analogy between eating and 'cultural 
development' in the Phenomenology, which depicts individual students in the process 
of 'living off that inorganic nature and in his taking possession of it for himself’.124 
Such appropriation in the ‘sensible communion’ passes beyond the language 
of ‘representation’ in much religious teaching to an ‘immediate certainty’.125 Further, 
as Hegel will speak of the ‘progressive spiritualization of the subject’, it must be 
recalled that Geist is not incorporeal for Hegel, nor is it a sphere to be distinguished 
from rationality. In other words, his terms of union do not merely repeat the 
subjectivist error he identifies in Reformed views.  
4.3.2. Bonhoeffer on the Eucharistic Est 
Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the sacrament begins with further insistence on the 
animating force of the divine Word. Assuming that Eucharist and Word are 
intertwined, Bonhoeffer nevertheless distinguishes the reception of bread and wine. 
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He begins the section entitled ‘Christ as Sacrament’ by stating that ‘Christ is wholly 
Word, and the sacrament is wholly Word’, going on to add that ‘the sacrament is 
different from the Word in that it has its own right to exist in the church as 
sacrament’.126 It is that Word which is ‘in the form of Natur’, engaging human 
beings ‘as Word in bodily form’.127  
Perhaps because the section on the sacrament raises the issue of confessional 
differences, Bonhoeffer makes an aside about the way that doctrine, as 'idea’, comes 
to obscure the present address of Christ. In contrast to Hegel’s focus on the 
transmission of doctrine in the spirited community, Bonhoeffer draws a stark initial 
contrast to emphasise the presence of the Christ who speaks: 
As Jesus Christ, the sacrament is essentially Word. The church’s 
answer to [the understanding] of Christ as doctrina, as generalised 
truth, is to maintain that Christ is sacrament, which means that in his 
essence, he is not doctrina. This refutes the error that Christ is only an 
idea and does not exist in both history and nature.128 
 
The division of ‘Idea’ from ‘history and nature’ shows that Bonhoeffer’s unspecified 
foil cannot be immediately associated with Hegel. Nevertheless, Hegel’s interest 
clearly takes him in the direction of doctrinal transmission in the movement of Geist, 
without specifying the personal address of Christ that Bonhoeffer clearly wants to 
reclaim.  
Just as Hegel made reference to the importance of believing reception, so 
Bonhoeffer states that ‘whoever believes in the Word in the sacrament has the whole 
sacrament’.129 Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer complicates belief by referring to the 
biblical language of the ‘form of offense’. Rather than asking about the ‘union’ of 
divinity with humanity, Bonhoeffer claims that Christological inquiry should be 
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much more about ‘the hiddenness of the God-human who is present in his humiliated 
state’.130 As with his wordplay regarding the ‘how’ and ‘who’ questions, Bonhoeffer 
counters inquiry into Vereinigung, ‘union’, with an emphasis on Verhüllung, 
‘hiddenness’—a dynamic that Hegel does not entertain. Moreover, Bonhoeffer 
preserves the ‘humiliation’ of Christ, even as the sacrament is administered by the 
‘exalted’ Christ.131  
Bonhoeffer’s treatment of Luther’s texts raises the question of confessional 
differences, of which he shows himself well aware. Indeed, Bonhoeffer's markings 
indicate he questioned Hegel’s statement that eucharistic differences are more cultic 
than doctrinal. In facing the range of confessional questions, Bonhoeffer first 
explicitly aligns himself with Luther’s claim that nothing needs to be said beyond the 
words of institution. That is, the phrase hoc est corpus meum, ‘this is my body’, 
assures the church of the whole and present Christ. As Bonhoeffer renders Luther’s 
interest, ‘everything depends on the concurrency and presence of the human being 
Jesus Christ in his church’.132 This is in contrast to his depiction that in the Reformed 
view of the sacrament the Logos ‘remains extra, outside it’.133  
Bonhoeffer next offers an extended treatment of Luther’s doctrine of ubiquity 
and, indeed, the genus majestaticum against which Barth writes. This does not mean 
that the presence of Christ falls into the problem of human possession that Barth 
suggests, for Bonhoeffer quotes Luther’s specification that Christ is given only in the 
Word-sacrament when received in faith. This qualification helps to challenge the 
tenuous line of connection Barth draws between Luther and Feuerbach, in which he 
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includes Hegel.134 After exploring Luther’s doctrine of ubiquity and ubivolipresence, 
Bonhoeffer critiques them for entertaining ‘the Reformed question within Lutheran 
theology’, that is, the ‘how’ question that analyses Christ’s constitution rather than 
asking ‘who’ he is as a unified person.135  
4.4. Christ as Community: Outlining the Revelatory Body 
 In this final section, I consider the communal body that is formed through 
Word and Sacrament. I first show an additional reason why Hegel would avoid the 
biblical language of the 'body of Christ', namely, his focus on how doctrinal 
transmission, as well as the forms of knowledge and authority shown in eucharistic 
consumption, lead to broader political 'cultivation'. However sympathetic Bonhoeffer 
is to this extension, Bonhoeffer’s interest in ecclesial distinction leads him to 
foreground the term 'body' when he comes to his final account of the tri-fold form, 
‘Christ as Community'. In a later work, Bonhoeffer will then qualify his use of 
Hegel's 'Christ existing as community' by speaking not only of the church as body of 
Christ but distinguishing Christ as head, although he still acknowledges the 'relative 
right' in Hegel's secularisation of the claim to 'real presence’.  
Hegel's omission of the term 'body of Christ' for the confessional community 
likely has to do with his view of how revelation unfurls beyond the church. A key 
characteristic that Hegel attributes to Protestantism is the resourcing of an expansive, 
general Bildung, or ‘cultivation’. While this theme will be treated in the ensuing 
chapter, a few remarks from Hegel's personal correspondence are broadly 
representative. First, in 1810, as rector of a Nuremberg Gymnasium, Hegel resisted 
religious control over lower schools because he saw this as a subordination of 
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teaching to the clerical estate.136 After defending a reform-minded school against 
closure, an initiative led by a Catholic official, Hegel remarked to his colleague 
Friedrich Niethammer about the grateful public response, which he took to reveal 
that Protestants ‘esteem their institutions of Bildung’ as highly as the churches. He 
continues: 
Protestantism does not so much consist in any particular creed 
[Konfession] as in the spirit of reflection [Nachdenken] and higher, 
more rational Bildung, not the training for this or that type of 
usefulness. One could not have attacked them at a more sensitive spot 
then their institutions of study.137 
 
This remark is part of a chain of correspondence that reveals Hegel’s enduring view 
on the role of church and educational communities.138 Hegel's 1816 letter to 
Niethammer underscores this difference: 
Our safeguard is thus not the aggregate of council pronouncements, 
but is rather only the common Bildung of the community. Our more 
immediate safeguard is thus the universities and general institutions of 
instruction. All Protestants look upon these institutions as their Rome 
and council of Bishops…The sole authority [for Protestants] is the 
intellectual and moral Bildung of all, and the guarantors of such 
Bildung are these institutions…general intellectual and moral Bildung 
is what is holy to Protestants. To Catholics, however, it is something 
optional, since what is sacred is in the church, which is separated off in 
a clergy.139 
 
This remark does not so much indicate what Protestants in Germany believed at the 
time; in Pinkard's words, it is an expression of what Hegel took as ‘the internal, 
logical dynamics of the Protestant commitments’.140 It is a bold and counterintuitive 
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138 Pinkard comments that from Hegel's involvement in the ongoing Bavarian disputes during his 
time in Nuremberg, ‘Hegel never wavered again in his assessment of Protestantism and the way in 
which it, and not Catholicism, embodied the tendencies in the secular-religious ideals of modern life’. 
Pinkard, Hegel, 293. 
139 Briefe, II, #309; Letters, 328; cited in Pinkard, Hegel, 294n73. 
140 Pinkard, Hegel, 294. 
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statement given how Protestant thought has emphasised the sole authority of 
Scripture from its inception.  
 Bonhoeffer explicitly draws on the biblical witness to frame his treatment of 
Word and Sacrament by the claim to the church as body of Christ. Bonhoeffer begins 
by stating that the ‘presence of Christ as Word and Sacrament’ is to ‘Christ as 
community’ just as ‘reality’ is to ‘form’.141 Indeed, the church is the creature of the 
Word and only as such is it uniquely able to understand the revelation of the Word of 
God.142 Bonhoeffer presses past the nuance to the term ‘as’, echoing the eucharistic 
est in the statement that ‘the community is itself Word of God’.143 In relating the 
reality of the Sacrament to the form of the church, Bonhoeffer states that the Word 
takes bodily form in this way. Here too he abandons ‘reserve’ in stating that: 
It is not a mere image [Bild]; the community is the body of Christ [die 
Gemeinde ist Leib Christi]. It is so in reality. The concept of the body 
as applied to the community is not a functional concept referring to the 
members but is instead a concept of the way in which the Christ exists 
who is present, exalted, and humiliated.144 
 
Here Bonhoeffer refers to 1 Corinthians 12 and Ephesians 5, noting the way in which 
the latter treats the body as distinct from the head but nevertheless emphasises the 
unity.145 
In a 1935 Finkenwalde lecture, Bonhoeffer refers again to the ‘body of 
Christ’ to qualify his modified Hegelian phrase ‘Christ existing as community’.146 He 
continues to draw the relation between Christ and community very closely: ‘he who 
is the community [Gemeinde] itself is also its Lord. But not the heavenly head of the 
                                                            
141 DBWE 12, 323; DBW 12, 305. 
142 DBWE 12, 323; DBW 12, 305-6. 
143 DBWE 12, 323; DBW 12, 305-6. 
144 DBWE 12, 323; DBW 12, 306. 
145 These biblical texts are noted in several students’ notes, with Zimmermann explaining that 
the separation of the members from the head in Ephesians is ‘not originally Paul’s’, though not ‘in 
contradiction’ to the apostle’s view. See DBWE 12, 323n66. 
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earthly body, but also as the head wholly connected with the earthly body’.147 He 
then speaks of the relation between Christ and church members by using the term 
‘juxtaposition’ [Gegenüber], literally 'over-against’.148 Although the translator’s term 
‘juxtaposition’ does not necessarily convey the oppositional force of the German 
term taken alone, it suits the context in which Bonhoeffer adds connection by 
drawing on the deutero-Pauline language of the body—a vital connection with 
anatomical difference. The trope of the ‘head’ as that which wills and directs the 
body is crucial for Bonhoeffer’s account, which seeks to convey the closeness of 
Christ’s presence while emphasising his primary role in the speech event of 
preaching. 
More significantly for the purpose of this study, Bonhoeffer speaks of such 
juxtaposition by referring to there being both identity and non-identity. Along with 
calling the relation between head and body a juxtaposition, he terms it a ‘non-
identity’ [nicht-Identität].149 Though Bonhoeffer writes about a 'non-identity’, this is 
not a blunt opposition to Hegel's alleged philosophy of identity. In fact, Bonhoeffer 
uses forms of thought similar to Hegel's own combinations, continuing that there is 
both 'identity and non-identity of the subject with the community'.150  These are not 
two parts that fit together, but two wholes set in juxtaposition. Such statements bring 
Bonhoeffer close to that acknowledged hallmark of Hegel's own thought, the 'claim 
to combine the seemingly uncombinable’, inviting further research into their 
respective post-Kantian projects.151 The attempt to unify two 'wholes' that appear in 
                                                                                                                                                                        
146 See DBWE 14, 449; DBWE 14, 438. 
147 DBWE 14, 450; DBWE 14, 438-9. 
148 DBWE 14, 450; DBWE 14, 438-9. 
149 DBWE 14, 450; DBWE 14, 438-9. 
150 DBWE 14, 451; DBW 14, 439. 
151 Taylor's phrase refers to Hegel's argument for 'an identity between identity and non-identity' 
in his 1801 work The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy. See Taylor, 
Hegel, 48. 
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opposition also leads to Bonhoeffer's claim to presence while preserving an 
eschatology: 'Christ is wholly in the community and yet the one-who-will-return'.152  
Bonhoeffer's retrieval of language of the 'body of Christ' is not an utter 
rejection of Hegel's claims about the scope of Protestantism. The tone of qualified 
appreciation is evident in comments Bonhoeffer makes on Hegel’s ethical extension 
of the Lord's Supper, as found in a 1939 letter to Theodor Litt.153 Commenting on 
Litt's account of 'Protestant historical consciousness’, which treats the relation 
between Christian faith and the world, Bonhoeffer acknowledges Hegel's vision: 
Here also lies, then, the relative right of the idealistic, particularly the 
Hegelian system: for what else does it mean that the Hegelian 
philosophy of religion comes to its point in the doctrine of Christ's 
real presence in the Lord's Supper other than the greatest 
secularisation precisely of this Christian truth?154 
 
Bonhoeffer continues that 'in turn the neglect of this origin of all Christian thought, 
namely, of the Word become flesh' is a 'relative wrong’. His verdict, which shows his 
reception as Christologically intent, is that Jesus Christ—'the name that bursts 
asunder…Hegelian anthropology'—must yet be named.155  
 Although Bonhoeffer claims, and maintains, the importance of naming Jesus 
Christ, his interest in Hegel's 'secularisation' of the unity expressed in the sacrament 
remains with him. As Bayer argues, in key places Bonhoeffer marginalises the 
Sacrament's 'element and institution' in favour of a generalisable 'sacramental 
principle' of unity.156 In so doing, Bonhoeffer is said to remain 'under the spell' of 
                                                            
152 DBWE 14, 451; DBW 14, 439. 
153 This letter is particularly valuable to this study because it shows Bonhoeffer self-consciously 
speaking to a philosopher 'as a theologian’. DBWE 15, 111-12; DBW 15, 112-14. 
154 Bonhoeffer is replying to Litt's Der deutsche Geist und das Christentum (1938) and 
Protestantisches Geschichtsbewußtsein (1939). DBWE 15, 112; DBW 15, 113. 
155 DBWE 15, 112; DBW 15, 113-14. 
156 Oswald Bayer, 'Christus Als Mitte: Bonhoeffers Ethik Im Banne Der Religionsphilosophie 
Hegels?' in Leibliches Wort: Reformation und Neuzeit im Konflikt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 
260-61. 
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Hegel's philosophy of religion.157 Further work is therefore required in considering 
how 'real presence' might be identified in light of Bonhoeffer's speculations about 
'religionless Christianity' in his prison theology.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have set Bonhoeffer's treatment of Word and Sacrament 
against the backdrop of Hegel’s own. I have argued that Bonhoeffer’s ecclesiology 
differs markedly from Hegel in his emphasis on the preached Word, which he, 
following Luther, affords sacramental status. While Hegel takes interest in the 
communal transmission of doctrine, he does not take up the confrontational aspect of 
the preached Word as the means of Christ’s presence in community. Bonhoeffer’s 
account of preaching, framed as it is in a theology of the Word that shares much with 
Barth, nevertheless preserves a Lutheran view of the ‘whole’ Christ present in 
Sacrament—a doctrinal commitment from which Hegel develops his account of 
knowing. In this way, the exploration of Word and Sacrament most clearly shows 
how Bonhoeffer’s project can be seen as a combination of Barthian and Hegelian 
categories. 
Bonhoeffer's enduring appreciation for Hegel is shown in his later 
acknowledgement of the 'relative right' contained in Hegel's view of real presence in 
the Lord's Supper. Noting the Eucharist as the consummate point to Hegel’s 
philosophy of religion, Bonhoeffer acknowledges it as the 'greatest secularisation' of 
Christian witness to the Word made flesh. At the same time, Bonhoeffer recovers the 
particular body and name of Jesus Christ as a challenge to Hegel’s account. As I will 
show in the ensuing chapters, this has significant implications for the political 
aspects of Bonhoeffer’s reception. 
                                                            
157 Bayer, 'Mitte', 245. 
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Part Three – The Body of Christ Through ‘World History’ 
 
Chapter Five – From Revolution to Right? Polities of Freedom 
 
The concept of freedom is highly valued in German intellectual history 
as well (idealism). But it requires further definition. Being free from 
something is experienced only in being free for something. 
 
- Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ‘Thoughts on William Paton’s 
The Church and the New Order in Europe’ 
 
Introduction  
 Jesus' socio-ethical teaching, which was inextricably bound up with 
Christology for Bonhoeffer, comes to the fore in this chapter. I draw the link between 
Bonhoeffer's criticism of Hegel's 'docetic' tendency and the manner in which Hegel 
relativises the social ethic of the Sermon on the Mount. Hegel paints Jesus’ teaching 
in French revolutionary colours, interpreting it as a necessary but 'passing' political 
doctrine. Bonhoeffer reacts consistently by seeking to recover the scriptural record of 
Christ's 'Address' to condition political action in the present. Bonhoeffer therefore 
uses the Sermon on the Mount as the basis for his monastic community in pursuit of 
a new polity of freedom. 
The argument of this chapter is twofold. First, I show Bonhoeffer's deliberate 
recovery of material Hegel had marginalised, namely, the then-contemporary 
political import of the Sermon on the Mount. Such retrieval is tied to Bonhoeffer's 
fuller reclamation of 'confessional space' after the church-state mergers attempted in 
Hegel's time and ensuing 'Erastian' tendencies. Second, I argue that Bonhoeffer 
should not be styled as a 'revolutionary' over and against Hegel as state apologist. I 
therefore show the similarities in their post-revolutionary thought, as they both 
affirm elements of the French Revolution while critiquing its trajectory towards 
'absolute' freedom. I also read Bonhoeffer’s statement that the Christ-community 
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receives ‘not recognition, but rejection’ by the world in light of his Finkenwalde 
context as well as his earlier claim to ecclesial resistance as a mode of ‘ultimate 
recognition’ of the state’s true vocation.  
 The historical conditions behind these two interpretations of Jesus' teaching 
are critical to this chapter. Hegel lectured as a professor at the University of Berlin in 
the 1820s, serving as a civil servant in what he considered the focal point of German 
culture. He also wrote at a time of Protestant confessional mergers and a new level of 
state integration following the upheaval of the Napoleonic incursions. Bonhoeffer 
worked as both a minister and university lecturer through the 1930s, but such civil 
service is alternately resigned and taken from him because of state-church tensions. 
As a result, Bonhoeffer comes to direct an illegal preacher's seminary, training 
students to reclaim Lutheran 'confessional space’. 
 Bonhoeffer's circuitous vocational course exposes the stark difference 
between his and Hegel's time. Bonhoeffer saw himself to be working in a period of 
political philosophical deficit; as Rades observes, Bonhoeffer saw Hegel's concept of 
'authority [Obrigkeit]' as inadequate for a time in which the authority 'had turned 
against the people’.1 Although this leads Bonhoeffer to unprecedented action against 
the state—the assassination of its leader, over which Bonhoeffer deliberates while 
writing his Ethics—his target has to be differentiated from the state about which 
Hegel spoke. I therefore propose care in interpreting Bonhoeffer's claim that the 
Christ-community should expect 'not recognition, but rejection' in the world. The 
contextual difference between the figures is critical to my account, for Hegel 
acknowledges the possibility of a Geist-less age, which would require the kind of 
oppositional stance Bonhoeffer takes. 
                                                            
1 Rades, 'Bonhoeffer', 7n11. 
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This chapter is critical to an account of Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel, as 
the endeavour can be regarded with suspicion by those who take Hegel as a Prussian 
state apologist—a characterisation that has been linked to the totalitarian state of 
Bonhoeffer's time. To take one well-known example, the year of Bonhoeffer's death 
Karl Popper claimed that there was an 'identity' of Hegelian historicism and the 
philosophy of modern totalitarianism’.2 Popper casts Hegel as the 'first official 
philosopher of Prussianism’, his philosophy of identity allegedly serving to justify 
the existing order, leading to 'an ethical and juridical positivism' in his time.3 He goes 
on to assert the likeness between Hegel's 'world-historical personality' and an 
irrational dictator, as though this served as an endorsement.4   
Turning to Bonhoeffer criticism, Hegel has been taken to lay the groundwork 
for a Prusso-German state against which Bonhoeffer revolts. In one account, 
Bonhoeffer plays the role of 'reluctant revolutionary', attempting ‘to break the 
dominant Hegelian paradigm’ that is taken to accord with the National Socialist 
agenda.5 Support for this narrative comes from Bonhoeffer’s falling-out with 
Seeberg’s enthusiasm for nationalist expansion.6 The association of Hegel with the 
Machtstaat is understandable in light of neo-Hegelian directions, as Andreas 
                                                            
2 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume II, The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, 
Marx, and the Aftermath (1945), 5th edition reprint (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977), 22, 78. 
3 Popper, Open, 30, 41. 
4 Popper, Open, 61-63. 
5 In John Moses’ account, Hegel is said to have ‘resolved the tension-loaded dualism that 
characterized the life of states previously by postulating that the divine will was manifest on earth by 
monarchical states, and most clearly through the most powerful state’. The author attributes a far 
richer social conceptuality to Hegel with respect to the church, one that had positive effects for 
Bonhoeffer: ‘Bonhoeffer won from Seeberg, together with a firm grasp of Hegelian method, the 
concept of “Christ existing as community,” in short, a highly refined comprehension of the church as 
the body of Christ functioning in human society’. See John Moses, A Reluctant Revolutionary: 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Collision with Prusso-German History (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009), 10-
13, 36-37. 
6 Hegel is set alongside Leopold von Ranke, with the latter's followers Erich Marcks and Max 
Lenz, on a trajectory towards the Third Reich. John A. Moses, 'Bonhoeffer's Germany: The Political 
Context’, in Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, ed. John de Gruchy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 6-8. 
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Grossmann admits.7 Nevertheless, my argument joins the 'plea for another Hegel’, by 
showing the critical rational principle that Hegel brings to bear on state action, one 
which bears comparison with Bonhoeffer's own conviction that the state can forfeit 
its vocation as the upholder of right and reason.  
5.1. The Sermon on the Mount as Revolutionary Teaching 
 This first section traces Bonhoeffer's divergence from Hegel in his sense for 
the political contemporaneity of Jesus' teaching. I first show how Hegel's treatment 
of the Sermon on the Mount reveals his concern about religious fanaticism. In 
particular, I examine his claim that Jesus' message was a form of sans-culottism—a 
reference to the French revolutionaries whose militarised trajectory led to the Terror. 
Bonhoeffer is similarly interested in the revolutionary edge of Jesus' teaching, only 
in his case to break with contemporaries' theologies of orders, which he saw to 
constrain the church's ethical call. This aim leads him to strong language about the 
breach Jesus makes between his community and every natural or historical order, 
including the state. Nevertheless, I call into question the typical association drawn 
between Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard on Jesus' 'revolutionary' teaching, arguing that 
Bonhoeffer is closer to Hegel in his concerns with a type of religious fanaticism that 
threatens social orders. 
5.1.1. Hegel on Jesus’ Sans-Culottism 
Hegel has an equivocal view of Jesus' teaching, articulating it as necessary 
and yet limited, even fatal, in its abstract appeal. This is first shown in the early 
essay, 'The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate’, in which Hegel characterises Jesus as 
a 'beautiful soul' who had to hold the Kingdom of God in his heart over and against 
corrupt Roman and Jewish cultures. In Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel 
                                                            
7 Grossmann, 'Neo-Hegelianism', 249. 
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claims that the words of the Sermon on the Mount, particularly the Beatitudes, are 
‘among the greatest that have ever been uttered’, a claim he ties to their 
revolutionary potential.8 Spoken within the context of Roman mastery over the 
Jewish people, the sermon offers ‘a final means of annulling all superstition and lack 
of freedom’. Hegel relates this teaching in dramatic terms: 
In all of this is found a language of inspiration that displaces all 
other human interests, eradicating them completely—penetrating 
tones that shake everything up; and, as Hermes led souls forth from 
their bodies and thus out of the temporal sphere, so [these words 
are] addressed to [those] who are done with the world and with 
whom the world is finished.9  
 
Hegel's  initial focus is on Christ’s probing words regarding intention and the 
disposition to love, which are tied to a break with establishment, most proximately 
the Judaism of Jesus’ time. The ensuing freedom is embedded in Protestant cultures 
through the presence of the Luther Bible.  
Hegel's tone turns increasingly critical as he considers the revolutionary 
excess that Jesus' teaching could provoke, particularly in light of the events he had 
been following in France. Drawing a term from the French Revolution, Hegel 
describes Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom as ‘sans-culottism’.10 The term alludes 
to the peasants and labourers distinguished by wearing trousers, pantalons, rather 
than the breeches, or culottes, of the nobility and bourgeoisie, although members of 
the upper class showed their political sympathies by going sans culottes. 
Significantly for Hegel's critique, it is the sans-culottes who were militarised and 
came to enforce the Reign of Terror, in which those suspected of lacking 
revolutionary conviction were subject to arbitrary judgement, with often fatal results.  
                                                            
8 LPR III, 185; VPR III, 144. Hegel's favourite passage, by his wife Marie's account, was 
Matthew 5:8, 'Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God’, a phrase Hegel cited regularly in 
his lectures. See Pinkard, Hegel, 577. 
9 LPR III, 185; VPR III, 144-5. 
10 LPR III, 188; VPR III, 146n22. 
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 The abstract nature of Jesus' call to equality is not sustainable and comes into 
fatal conflict with the state of the time. Hegel intimates the violence necessary to 
quell Jesus' foment: 
freedom and equality were affirmed such that all spirituality, all 
laws, all talents, all living relations had to disappear before this 
abstraction, and the ordinances of the state had to come from 
elsewhere and be forcefully asserted against this abstraction.11 
 
In considering the cross as the interruption of Jesus' early community, Hegel 
highlights the ‘civil dishonour’ of his execution as ‘a direct expression of a complete 
revolution against all that is established and regarded as valuable’.12 Observing that 
the cross corresponds to the gallows of his own time, Hegel states that as the 
‘positive content’ of the execution is simultaneously the kingdom of God, it claims 
all ‘inner loyalties’ away from existing human corporate life.13 In short, Hegel makes 
the counter-establishment aspects of the cross a striking, contrastive precedent to the 
ensuing formation of the community.  
 The allusion to the French Revolution drives Hegel's qualification of Jesus' 
teaching in three ways. First, while acknowledging that the kingdom proclamation 
entails the breaking of familial ties, extended later into property relations, Hegel self-
consciously avoids a more thoroughgoing challenge to the state.14 Second, he notes 
that the ‘contraction’ of established orders back to the ‘simple heart’ involves a 
political retreat that can lead to fanatic violence.15 Third, Hegel speaks of the 
teaching as given in the form or ‘representation’ to evoke feeling; as such, it is yet to 
be codified as doctrine.16 Hegel claims that the distinctive qualities of Jesus’ 
                                                            
11 LPR III, 197; VPR III, 152-3. 
12 LPR III, 205; VPR III, 161. 
13 LPR III, 206; VPR III, 161-2. 
14 LPR III, 189, cf. 196; VPR III, 147, cf. 151. 
15 LPR III, 185; VPR III, 147-8. 
16 LPR III, 192; VPR III, 149-50. 
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instruction ‘in the church partly take on another character and partly are set aside’.17 
In brief, for Hegel the vital revolutionary potential of Jesus’ teaching must be 
‘established’ with the inauguration of the spirited community, the Christian church as 
a constituent part of the realised state.  
Before turning to Bonhoeffer, it is worth observing that Hegel's association of 
Jesus with the sans-culottes runs counter to his own historicist convictions. In the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel criticises appeals made, during 
the French Revolution, to Greek and Roman historical precedents.18 He asserts that 
'[e]ach age and each nation finds itself in such peculiar circumstances…that it can 
and must make decisions with reference to itself alone (and only the great individual 
can decide what the right course is)’.19 In spite of this observation, Hegel's interest in 
the French Revolution leads him to an anachronistic portrayal of Jesus' teaching, 
diminishing the 'singularity' he elsewhere claims for the appearance of Christ. 
5.1.2. Bonhoeffer on Jesus' Unbounded Community 
 Jesus' revolutionary call appealed to Bonhoeffer as he sought to diverge from 
his contemporaries' focus on the theology of 'orders' grounded in creation. 
Bonhoeffer abandoned his own suggestive work on the orders around 1933.20 The 
more that periodicals sought a creation theology, with substantial works produced by 
Gogarten, Althaus, Elert, and Hirsch, 'the more disparaging Bonhoeffer's silence 
became’.21 Bonhoeffer thought that another treatment of creation orders was not the 
theme that was needed, as it could all too easily serve the Reich's programme. In 
                                                            
17 LPR III, 194; VPR III, 149. Along with doctrinal development, he makes the stronger claim 
that the ‘natural will’ is overcome such that ‘the world is given an entirely different form’. LPR III, 
211; VPR III, 166. 
18 LPWH, 21. 
19 LPWH, 21. 
20 He left this project just as the Lutheran theologian Walter Künneth was making the theme the 
foundation for his two-kingdoms doctrine. Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 459. 
21 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 459. 
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Bethge's account, Bonhoeffer saw 'that the time for considering a "theology of order" 
was over; the time for a "breakthrough theology" had come'.22  
The search for a 'breakthrough' theology led to the 1937 publication of his 
well-known work Discipleship [Nachfolge]. In the work, Bonhoeffer retrieves the 
counter-cultural posture of the community through accenting the moment at which 
Christ says 'Folge mir nach!'23 This is most memorably expressed in Bonhoeffer's 
famous line that ‘every call of Christ leads into death’.24 The political subtext for 
Bonhoeffer's exposition is clear when he comments on Christ’s call to turn the other 
cheek rather than follow the Old Testament law of retribution:  
with this statement, Jesus releases his community from the political 
and legal order, from the national form [völkischen Gestalt] of the 
people of Israel, and makes it into what it truly is, namely, the 
community of the faithful that is not bound by political or national 
ties.25  
 
When it comes to the language of breach, Bonhoeffer’s focus is on the notion of 
‘immediate’ perception or ethical relations to the natural ‘orders’. These bonds, he 
claims, have been disrupted.  
 The point is to reinstate the centrality of Christ, who is ‘in the middle’, 
having deprived people of 'every immediate connection' to given realities.26 This 
breach, Bonhoeffer claims, is critical for the shape of ethical deliberation—and, 
indeed, philosophy: 
If it were only a matter of weighing ideals against each other, then 
by all means a balance should be sought, which then could turn to 
the advantage of a Christian ideal, but this should never be one-
sided. From the point of view of idealism, or from the perspective 
of ‘responsibilities’ of life, it would be inexcusable to radically 
                                                            
22 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 459. Bethge makes reference to Bonhoeffer's work Dein Reich Komme. 
23 DBWE 4, 46; DBW 4, 32. 
24 This is the editors’ literal rendering of the German Jeder Ruf Christi fährt in den Tod. DBWE 
4, 87n11. 
25 DBWE 4, 132; DBW 4, 135. 
26 DBWE 4, 93-94; DBW 4, 88. 
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debase the natural orders of life by confronting them with a 
Christian ideal of life.27 
 
In contrast to these foils, Bonhoeffer claims that Jesus' call issues a break with all 
unmediated relationships, whether natural or historical, claiming that immediacy is a 
'delusion’.28 Although Bonhoeffer has more proximal targets, it is worth noting that 
in the 1933 seminar Bonhoeffer and his students followed Hegel's critique of 
Schleiermacher on the 'immediacy' of sensed dependence.29 
 Bonhoeffer equivocates on the endurance of social ‘orders’ in light of Jesus’ 
revolutionary call. On the one hand, he issues a polemic against contemporary 
Lutheran appeals to the orders of creation by speaking about how Jesus’ call ‘breaks 
the ties with the naturally given surroundings in which a person lives’.30 On the other 
hand, Bonhoeffer’s hesitancy about a larger scale social revolution becomes clear in 
two key sections: his warning against enthusiasm and his treatment of the Pauline 
counsel to vocational stability.  
 First, warning against enthusiasm, Bonhoeffer speaks of an ‘ambiguity’ that 
emerges in the section on ‘hidden righteousness’ in Matthew 6, following as it does 
on the previous chapter’s treatment of the visibly ‘extraordinary’ quality of the 
Christian life. He claims that there is a great danger in those who go about ‘despising 
and destroying the world order’, an outcome brought about by 'enthusiasts' 
indifference to this age’.31 These people, he warns, attempt to style Jesus ‘as a 
                                                            
27 DBWE 4, 94; DBW 4, 89. 
28 Bonhoeffer here engages contemporaries such as Friedrich Gogarten and Emil Brunner. It is 
with reference to the latter that Bonhoeffer claims the importance of persisting with Christ’s real 
presence as mediator rather than merely an inception point, which has implications for his 
engagement with Hegel: ‘Theology makes a serious mistake whenever it uses Jesus’ mediation 
between God and human persons to justify immediate relationships in life’. This context is provided 
by Kuske and Tödt in DBW 4, 90n7, 91n8; cf. DBWE 4, 95; DBW 4, 90. 
29 Rades, 'Bonhoeffer', 17. 
30 DBWE 4, 93; DBW 4, 87. This claim counters contemporaries such as Althaus, who claimed 
that such a break is a possibility but only as an exception, not a rule. Paul Althaus, Kirche und 
Volkskampf (Gütersloh, 1928), 31; cited in DBW 4, 88, n3. 
31 DBWE 4, 146; DBW 4, 150. 
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Schwärmer, a revolutionary enthusiast who wanted to turn the world upside down, 
who instructs his disciples to leave the world and build a new world’.32 
Second, reticence about overturning the broader social order is also evident in 
Bonhoeffer’s treatment of the counsel, found in 1 Corinthians 7:20-24, that 
Christians should remain in their vocations. This is the text that Max Weber noted as 
crucial to Luther’s ambivalence about a change in social station.33 Bonhoeffer picks 
up the Lutheran tradition by trying to synthesise Jesus’ call, which cuts through the 
ties of occupation and family, with Paul’s counsel to remain in the station in which 
one was called. Having noted the freedom conferred by baptism into the community, 
Bonhoeffer states that slaves may ‘therefore remain as slaves’ with a strained attempt 
at exposition: 'would a revolution which simply overturned the existing order of 
society not obscure the awareness of God’s new ordering of all things through Jesus 
Christ, and the establishment of his community?'34 Such equivocation is later 
developed in Bonhoeffer's reflections on the French Revolution, in which his 
criticism of its appeal to 'absolute freedom' bears significant likeness to Hegel's 
account. 
 Bonhoeffer’s reticence about overturning the 'orders' is a key challenge to the 
likeness often drawn between Discipleship and the work of Søren Kierkegaard.35 
Bonhoeffer's claims to the revolutionary edge in Jesus' teaching have been compared 
positively with Kierkegaard's interpretation while they are contrasted to Hegel’s 
thought in the cross-referencing of the critical edition. For example, when 
Bonhoeffer claims, in an exposition of Jesus’ relation to the Law in the Sermon on 
                                                            
32 DBWE 4, 147, alt.; DBW 4, 151. 
33 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1920-21 rev. ed.), trans. 
Talcott Parsons (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), 44. 
34 DBWE 4, 238; DBW 4, 254-55. 
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the Mount, that ‘it is obvious that Jesus is not to be understood here as a 
revolutionary’,36 this is contrasted with Hegel’s claim that Jesus’ revolutionary 
teaching breaks away from ‘everything established’.37 The implication is that 
Bonhoeffer breaks with Hegel's reading of Jesus and the Law, even though the 
context shows them to be saying the same thing.38  Matters are different with 
Kierkegaard: on the command to love one's enemies, Bonhoeffer comments that 
Jesus' early disciples provoked opponents ‘who feared a growing revolutionary 
danger’.39 This statement is cross-referenced to Kierkegaard’s assertion that ‘the 
objection against Christianity (and this was right at the time when it was most 
evident what Christianity is) was that it was unpatriotic, a danger to the state, 
revolutionary’.40   
 While I acknowledge that Bonhoeffer's emphasis on 'following-after' is 
particularly indebted to Kierkegaard, I argue that Bonhoeffer's call to revolution 
requires further examination. Moreover, my fuller account of Hegel's views of the 
established order will show that Hegel was critical of empty, or merely positive, 
social forms, especially those that claim a divine right.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
35 Kuske and Tödt acknowledge that Kierkegaard’s treatment of the ‘extraordinary’ element in 
the Christian faith ‘omits the inference of “orders,” which is important to Bonhoeffer’. DBW 4, 
147n153. 
36 Bonhoeffer is dealing with a section on kindred, but first refers back to Jesus’ claim from 
Matthew 5:17-20, ‘Do not think that I have come to abolish the law or the prophets; I have come not 
to abolish but to fulfill’. DBWE 4, 121, emphasis mine; DBW 4, 122. 
37 DBW 4, 122n81. The association is picked up in the English edition without the citations; see 
DBWE 4, 121n81. 
38 Hegel claims that Jesus broke with the 'established order of Judaism' as that order was 
expressed through laws prohibiting picking corn on the Sabbath or healing a man’s withered hand. 
Jesus’ unwillingness to submit to such restrictions by waiting until the next morning marks the 
kingdom as the proclamation that brings ‘all such ordinances’ to an end. Hegel goes on to speak about 
the breaking of family and other social ties. LPR III, 188; VPR III, p. 146. 
39 DBWE 4, 137; DBW 4, 140. 
40 This is cited from Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers in DBW 4, 140n131, cf. DBWE 4, 
137n131. The editors note that Bonhoeffer had marked the passage in his own edition. 
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5.2. Similarities in Post-Revolution Critique 
 Having traced Hegel and Bonhoeffer's accounts of Jesus' 'revolutionary' 
teaching, with divergent claims for its contemporaneity, the next section treats their 
common criticism of a revolutionary claim to 'absolute’ freedom. The following 
section traces the commonality in Hegel and Bonhoeffer's critiques of 'abstract 
freedom', of the kind they saw pursued in the French Revolution. I argue, therefore, 
that Bonhoeffer's claim to Jesus' revolutionary teaching does not ultimately 
undermine the strong emphasis on community that he holds in common with Hegel. 
In short, Bonhoeffer is not speaking for an abstract form of freedom of the kind 
criticised by Hegel; in fact, his own critique of the Terror confronts the nihilism that 
can emerge from social upheaval—a dynamic he identifies in his own time.  
5.2.1. Hegel on the Need for an Actualised State 
Hegel has a complex and critical relation to the French Revolution, as seen in 
his response to Rousseau's political thought. Hegel is appreciative of elements of 
Rousseau’s concept of the volonté générale, for it places human will at the political 
centre rather than appeals to order based on divine will, nature, or the mere 
possession of office. Nevertheless, Hegel argues that Rousseau goes too far in 
breaking down distinctions in the legislative process with a view to everyone 
participating equally.41 He therefore describes the quest for ‘absolute freedom’ to 
issue in thoroughgoing ‘negativity’, one in which ‘all the social estates, which are the 
spiritual essences into which the whole divides itself, are effaced’.42 In Hegel's view, 
                                                            
41 Hegel is critical of the truly 'general' scope of will in Rousseau, such that custom and forms of 
representation are dismantled to produce an undifferentiated citizenry. This leads to the dangerous 
consciousness that, in Hegel's depiction, 'the world is quite simply its will, and this will is the 
universal will’. PhG §584. Taylor summarises Hegel's differences with Rousseau, noting that the two 
figures play out a 'vital debate of modern times which is far from finished’. Hegel, 185-86. 
42 PhG §585. 
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the state requires differentiation through mediating institutions that included class 
roles known as the 'estates [Stände]’.  
The 'effacement' of social orders takes a fatal turn, as signalled in the heading 
under which the Revolution is discussed in the Phenomenology: 'Absolute Freedom 
and Terror'.43 The loss of all social distinctions mean that neither a 'positive work nor 
a positive' can be produced; all that remains is the 'negative act…the fury of 
disappearing’.44 The fearful outcome of the Revolution is the instability of the 
'universal will' without mediation and no hope of 'positive' establishment. This leaves 
the individual in a precarious position. As soon as one's will is suspected of errancy 
it faces a harrowing end: suppression not 'through external necessity but through the 
universal will which it itself aspires to be’.45 Hegel states that this suppression of the 
individual is judged on the basis of 'disposition' without recourse to appropriate legal 
procedure. It results in ‘the coldest, emptiest death of all, having no more meaning 
than chopping off a head of cabbage or swallowing a mouthful of water’.46 The banal 
imagery alludes to the method of execution that marked the Reign of Terror under 
Robespierre, a period in which it was common practice to 'guillotine on behalf of the 
whole’.47 This is the outcome when sans-culottism is left unchecked. 
While there is no going back to a time before 1789 for Hegel, a new form of 
state settlement is required. The French revolutionary government holds a precarious 
position: ‘it is merely the victorious faction which is called the government, and 
precisely because it is a faction, there is the immediate necessity of its overthrow’.48 
The result is the creation of an opposition between the people and the government 
                                                            
43 PhG §582-598. 
44 PhG, §590. 
45 Taylor's paraphrase of the turn narrated in the Phenomenology. See Hegel, 187. 
46 PhG, §590. 
47 The phrase is taken from Pinkard, Hegel, 213. 
48 PhG, §591. 
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that seems to be 'interposing itself between them and the general will’.49 In short, 
Hegel observes that the Revolution's ideological commitment to abstract principles 
lead to ‘self-devouring’ outcomes.50 True to the genre of the Phenomenology, 
Hegel's criticism therefore segues into a new form of Geist. In this case he speaks of 
how 'absolute freedom passes over from its self-destroying actuality into another 
land of self-conscious spirit'.51 As Taylor points out, the reference to another Land is 
literal as well as figurative, for Hegel turns from revolutionary France to his own 
homeland.  
 True to Hegel's sense of historical movement, the turn to Germany retained 
continuities with French influence. Hegel welcomed the spread of revolutionary 
ideals through the French campaign along with the reorganisation of German lands, 
support expressed in his editorship of a pro-Napoleonic newspaper.52 This involved 
him in tensions with nationalist responses that grew in strength after Napoleon’s fall, 
making Hegel’s position tenuous.53 Hegel would continue to teach on the shape of 
post-revolution philosophy, keeping French history in appreciative view.54  As an 
expression of that early solidarity, Hegel habitually toasted the storming of the 
Bastille on July 14, even when such an association was risky in light of the political 
                                                            
49 Stephen B. Smith, 'Hegel and the French Revolution: An Epitaph for Republicanism', Social 
Research 56:1 (Spring 1989), 250. 
50 The term is Smith’s, as he articulates Hegel’s allusions to the hunt for those suspected of being 
‘enemies of the people’ during the Reign of Terror. Smith, ‘Epitaph’, 253. 
51 PhG, §595. 
52 He did this while living in Bamberg, Bavaria from 1807. Bavaria was a prosperous kingdom in 
alliance with the French, but there remained a strong collective memory of the glory of Medieval 
Germany set over and against foreigners. Pinkard, Hegel, 243-47. 
53 See Pinkard, Hegel, 302. 
54 At the beginning of the 1820s memoirs about Napoleon by those who had accompanied him 
into exile began appearing, much to Hegel’s interest. In an 1827 trip to Paris, he met with with 
Auguste Marie Mignet, whose anti-restorationist Histoire de la Révolution française jusqu’en 1814 
had been published in 1824. See Pinkard, Hegel, 514-15, 555-58. 
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climate of his day.55 Such revolutionary sympathies were rejuvenated even in his 
later years through a trip to Paris in 1827.56  
 There is a strong religious dimension to Hegel's criticism of French politics. 
In a set of lectures delivered in 1831, the final year of his life, he claims that 
'Catholic states' set religion and the state in 'mutual opposition' once subjective 
freedom appears in the people as a whole.57 He comments: 
Thus the French, for example, who adhere to the principle of secular 
freedom, have in fact ceased to belong to the Catholic religion, for this 
religion can make no concessions but consistently demands 
unconditional submission to the church in all matters. In this way, 
religion and the state are in mutual contradiction.58 
 
Hegel later refers to Robespierre's Terror as an extreme case of the split between 
'conviction' and political constitution. The recurrent, contemptuous assertion of 
conviction is the troubling dynamic he identifies in 'our age’.59  
 Hegel acknowledges that Protestant political settlements can also lead to 
absolutism, but this eventuality only underlines his emphasis on the faculty of 
philosophy as integral to state 'realisation'. He identifies the pathway to 'arbitrariness, 
tyranny, and oppression' in a context in which 'laws of the state are recognised as 
rational and as divine on account of this presumed original harmony [unity of 
religion and the state], and religion does not have its own principles which contradict 
those which apply within the state’.60 It is the imperative 'to know' what is rational in 
                                                            
55 Pinkard, Hegel, 451. 
56 Pinkard, Hegel, 561. 
57 Hegel cites the example of Charles X, whose abdication at the July Revolution of 1830 
showed the French still incapable of a political settlement. Hegel, 'The Relationship of Religion to the 
State (1831)' in Political Writings, 230, 233. 
58 Hegel, 'Relationship’, 231. 
59 Hegel, 'Relationship’, 233. 
60 Referring to the end of the Stuart monarchy in seventeenth-century England, Hegel states that 
claims to the ruler's divine authorisation provoked opposition from the claim to divine legitimation 
among the people. Revolution and the beheading of the king seem inevitable in Hegel's telling, 
because knowledge of the divine will is, in Protestant faith, 'not a particular prerogative but something 
open to everyone’. Hegel, 'Relationship’, 227-28. 
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law and social ethics that leads Hegel back to the importance of the cultivation of a 
people through philosophy. Hence the importance of the philosophical faculty in 
guarding against tyranny.  
 For all Hegel's interest in the French Revolution, it is not surprising that he 
would seek to offer a philosophical critique from within a state structure rather than 
calling his own people to revolt. Early in his Philosophy of Right he again criticises 
negative freedom, or 'freedom of the void’, which he describes as 'the flight from 
every content as from a restriction’.61 Hegel was convinced that the bearer of abstract 
rights requires a ‘location’ in family, civil society, and constitutional state. His work 
therefore comes to show an embedded, reforming approach to his contemporary 
structure of governance. 
5.2.2. Bonhoeffer on the Nihilism of Absolute Freedom 
 In the 1940-41 Ethics manuscript 'Heritage and Decay’, Bonhoeffer discusses 
the French Revolution as he compares differences in the secularisation process 
between Protestant and Catholic peoples. As Hegel before him, Bonhoeffer writes 
out of the Protestant tradition that sees the radical character of the Revolution as 
necessary because Catholicism offered no room to the modern spirit.62 In 
Bonhoeffer's words, because of the Catholic relation to the state, 'the process of 
secularization quickly became revolutionary, antichurch, even anti-Christian’.63  
 Bonhoeffer appreciates the liberation of 'reason' that emerged from the 
Revolution, its articulation of human rights, and its concept of the nation vis-à-vis 
the Volk. The movement is pictured as light and fresh breeze that 'cleared up 
prejudices, social conceits, hypocritical proprieties, and stifling sentimentality’.64  
                                                            
61 PR (Knox), §5. 
62 See DBWE 6, 114-15n52; DBW 6, 105n47. 
63 DBWE 6, 114; DBW 6, 105. 
64 DBWE 6, 115; DBW 6, 106. 
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Bonhoeffer continues that such intellectual candour, including on matters of faith, 
was a great good, because contempt for rationalism 'is a suspicious sign of a deficient 
desire for truthfulness'.65 Newly liberated reason is linked to an appreciation of the 
discovery of human rights, for which Bonhoeffer cites the 1789 Déclaration des 
Droits d'Homme et du Citoyen at several points, including reference to Rousseau's 
volonté générale, its expression in law, and the claim that the 'source of all 
sovereignty resides in the nation’.66 Bonhoeffer continues that 'the nation is a 
revolutionary concept. It takes the side of the Volk against governing authority, of 
becoming against being, of the organic against the institutional’.67 This occurs 
through the liberation of the Volk, who find themselves 'mature enough to take their 
affairs into their own hands’.68  
 Bonhoeffer locates Prussia as a foil to the dynamic view of the nation to 
emerge from France. It is a 'very grotesque historical error' to claim that Prussia is 
the birthplace of nationalism, for 'no state structure was more alien, more 
antagonistic, to nationalism than Prussia’.69 Prussian government was suspicious of 
the national cause, Bonhoeffer continues, 'combating the revolution of the "grande 
nation" and its intrusion into Germany’.70 The Prussian concept of the 'state' is here 
set against both nationalism and internationalism, leading Bonhoeffer to claim that it 
is 'abendländischer than that of the Revolution’.71 The Prussian state gave way, 
however, to French victory, creating a 'new spiritual unity [geistige Einheit] of the 
                                                            
65 DBWE 6, 115; DBW 6, 106. 
66 DBWE 6, 118-120; DBW 6, 109-11. 
67 DBWE 6, 120; DBW 6, 110-11. 
68 DBWE 6, 120; DBW 6, 110. 
69 DBWE 6, 120; DBW 6, 111. 
70 DBWE 6, 121; DBW 6, 111. 
71 DBWE 6, 121, alt.; DBW 6, 111. The English translation renders several distinct terms as 
'western’, or 'the West’, but Bonhoeffer in fact differentiates Abendland (Germany in a middle 
European collective) from die westlicher Völker, a group that includes France. I have left these 
instances untranslated to show the difference. 
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Abendland’, which consists in 'the liberation of humanity as ratio, as the mass, and as 
a Volk’.72  
Bonhoeffer’s comments could be construed as a rejection of Hegel, who is 
frequently cast as a Prussian apologist. Such over-simplification would not do justice 
to Hegel’s nuanced political thought, however; the fact that Bonhoeffer considers 
Prussia through and after French influence indicates where Hegel's mediating 
position should be set. That Bonhoeffer would agree on the need of a mediated 
settlement is clear when he continues, in terms reminiscent of Hegel, about the 
destructiveness of a claim to absolute freedom. 
 Bonhoeffer alludes to Robespierre's Terror to critique an enduring element in 
the new 'spiritual unity' of the West post-revolution. Looking back to the French 
Revolution, he states that there is synergy between the three identities of humanity—
ratio, Masse, Volk—in the struggle for liberation, but 'after freedom is achieved they 
become deadly enemies’.73 Bonhoeffer elaborates: 
This new unity carries the seeds of its own destruction. It is further 
evident—and here a basic law of history becomes clear—that the 
desire for absolute freedom leads people into deepest servitude…The 
liberation of the masses ends in the horrible reign of the guillotine. 
Nationalism leads directly to war. Human liberation as an absolute 
ideal leads to the self-destruction of human beings. At the end of the 
road travelled by the French Revolution lies nihilism.74 
 
The claim that the absolute freedom of the revolution leads to 'nothingness' should 
call Hegel's account to mind.75  
 Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer draws the trajectory of the French Revolution into 
his own time by commenting on the ensuing revolt. He describes the 'masses’, 
                                                            
72 DBWE 6, 122, alt.; DBW 6, 112 
73 DBWE 6, 122; DBW 6, 112 
74 DBWE 6, 122; DBW 6, 112-13. 
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referred to as the 'fourth estate’, as driven by 'undeserved misery' to set a 'law of 
need' against 'the law of blood and the law of reason’.76 This surge is 'violent and 
short-lived’, yet Bonhoeffer continues the shift from late-eighteenth century France 
to his own context: 'We who live today stand at the peak, and in the crisis, of this 
upheaval’.77 Bonhoeffer then treats the emerging 'godlessness' and 'anti-church' 
sentiment that has emerged after the Revolution. His appraisal is curt: 'Having lost its 
unity that was created by the form of Jesus Christ, the Abendland is confronted by 
nothingness’.78 The nothingness is not a static void, however; it is a living and active 
force that deceptively animates social realities only to discard them as its victims. 
Among its prey, Bonhoeffer includes 'life, history, family, Volk, language, faith’.79  
 Bonhoeffer broadly locates his own view of freedom, and so his critical 
vantage point on the French Revolution, with reference to German idealism. This is 
shown in an essay written around the same time, in which Bonhoeffer takes 
exception to the assumption of a western, in this case 'Anglo-Saxon', notion of 
freedom.80 Bonhoeffer claims: 
The concept of freedom is highly valued in German intellectual history 
as well (idealism). But it requires further definition. Being free from 
something is experienced only in being free for something. Being free 
solely in order to be free, however, leads to anarchy.81 
 
Bonhoeffer's reference to the role of idealism in German history shows the 
importance of distinguishing this legacy from revolutionary histories including those 
                                                                                                                                                                        
75 In the section in which 'nothingness' is treated as the outcome of absolute freedom, Hegel is 
conspicuously absent, while Heidegger's concept of 'creative nothingness' is referenced in its place. 
See DBW 6, 119n106. 
76 DBWE 6, 119; DBW 6, 109. The German Mandarins' dislike for the masses that raised Hitler 
to power is observed in Ringer, Mandarins, 445-46. 
77 DBWE 6, 119; DBW 6, 109. 
78 DBWE 6, 127; DBW 6, 118-19. 
79 DBWE 6, 128; DBW 6, 119. 
80 As exemplified in the British ecumenist William Paton, whose 1942 book treated the place of 
the church in European reconstruction 
81 DBWE 16, 532; DBW 16, 540. 
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of France and America. For Bonhoeffer, the 'western' ideal of freedom contained an 
element of threat to German heritage.82 This lineage is not adopted uncritically by 
Bonhoeffer, but 'western' readers ought to take particular care in interpreting him in 
light of this identification. In any case, Bonhoeffer's treatment of the 'self-devouring' 
outcomes of a particular revolutionary view of freedom will lead him to speak of an 
alliance with those from his national heritage who appeal for restraint.  
5.3. Hegel on the Cultivation of the State 
 The current section traces Hegel's political thought following on from his 
critique of the French Revolution. Hegel’s vision of the university as the 'focal point' 
of the state is considered, particularly his role as a professor who sought to cultivate 
other civil servants to take up the opportunities afforded by the Napoleonic 
incursions. In so doing I trouble the notion of Hegel as merely a Prussian state 
'apologist’, showing the critical principle he embeds in his view of state 
actualisation. I then clarify the points to which Bonhoeffer will take exception, as 
expressed in Hegel's address on the Augsburg Confession: the diminishment of 
confessional particulars and a church-state integration that tended towards 
Erastianism.  
5.3.1. Prussian State Apologist? 
 Hegel gave good reasons for opponents to suspect his subservience to the 
governing class. His writings saw the system of constitutional monarchy as worth 
preserving, and so was an 'apologist' in that sense, although it is important to note 
                                                            
82 Bonhoeffer's teacher Adolf von Harnack had been among the German intellectuals who, in 
1917, painted Woodrow Wilson as another Napoleon, intent on imposing a 'western European idea of 
freedom [westeuropäische Freiheitsidee]' on Germany. The comparison is made in Adolf von 
Harnack, 'Wilsons Botschaft und die deutsche Freiheit', in Die deutsche Freiheit. Fünf Vorträge 
(Gotha: F.A. Perthes, 1917), 3; cited in Michael DeJonge, 'Bonhoeffer’s Concept of the West’, in 
Bonhoeffer, Religion, and Politics, eds. Christiane Tietz and Jens Zimmermann (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2012), 44. That same collection contains a speech by by Friedrich Meinecke, who traces the 
German, 'substantial' view of freedom from Luther's portrayal of freedom and subjection through Kant 
and Fichte's depiction of the rational law and Hegel's view of freedom in submission to state authority. 
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that he set forth a highly qualified role for the monarchs.83 Hegel was particularly 
critical of those he saw to support a royalist autocracy, particularly with crude claims 
to rule by might and divine authorisation.84 Such rule would be enriched, and held to 
account, by those training for government service in the university, the site in which 
Hegel could contribute to that 'cultivation of the universality of thought' that he 
identified as 'the absolute value in education [Bildung]'.85 Problems emerge in this 
role, such as when he claimed his status as a civil servant to defend his political 
philosophy against a critical review in a paper backed by the government, even to the 
extent of invoking censorship laws.86    
 Hegel saw his professorship in philosophy, a role he placed at the 'focal point' 
of society, to ensure that critical rationality continues the process of state reform. 
Hegel’s move to the University of Berlin in 1818 involved him in an institution for 
which Schleiermacher had adopted Kant’s argument that philosophy have a focal 
status.87 It is thus no surprise that Hegel, in his inaugural Berlin lecture, claims his 
own discipline at the centre:  
Here, the cultivation [Bildung] and flowering of the sciences is one of 
the most essential moments – even of political life. In this university – 
as the central university – the centre of all spiritual culture 
                                                            
83 Hegel thus sees the forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to come together in a 
whole. PR, §272-73. Pinkard claims Hegel's view that the monarch was to 'dot the i's' of the bills 
presented by ministers did not please the royals. For Hegel, he claims, this titular headship was 'to 
express the ungrounded, or self-grounded nature of the state, without further appeal to natural or 
divine law. Pinkard, Hegel, 486-7. 
84 Hegel makes scathing references to Swiss Jurist and Romantic reactionary Karl Ludwig von 
Haller's work Restoration of Political Science, published in 1816-20, for an alleged support of a 
royalist autocracy. He paints von Haller's attempt to retrieve the pre-Napoleonic Prussian order, 
endowed with a divine patrimonial authority, as an exercise in 'wretched inanities' and 'utter 
thoughtlessness’. Hegel takes particular issue with von Haller's association of 'might' with rule, 
particularly when associated with contingent nature rather than justice. Hegel also criticises von 
Haller's claims to divine revelation, relayed in terms of 'religious feeling’. See Hegel's extended 
footnote to PR, §258, which spans pages 231-33 in Knox edition. 
85 Hegel, PR, §20. 
86 See Pinkard, Hegel, 497-98. 
87 For a recent treatment of Schleiermacher's blueprint for the university, see Purvis, University, 
110-165. 
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[Geistesbildung] and of all science and truth, namely philosophy, must 
also find its place and be treated with special care.88 
 
This context shows a new magisterial claim for Hegel’s discipline, calling into 
question the traditional position of philosophy as handmaiden to theology as queen 
of the sciences.89  
Not only does Hegel claim philosophy as central to the university, but 
Germany must become the discipline's leading guardian. This is because, in his 
estimation, other nations have retained the disciplinary title but lost its true sense.90 
Hegel was certainly critical of philosophical practice in Germany, even admitting 
that the homeland state of the science had never looked so bad.91 Nevertheless, he 
used his appointment at Berlin in order to appeal to his young students to turn 
inwards, cultivating the rationality that can properly animate political action.92 
Hegel’s claim to custodianship of the ‘sacred light’ of philosophy, given its flight to 
Germany for survival, is part of his ongoing polemic against both Catholicism and 
France.93  
 Hegel’s alleged role as upholder of the Prussian status quo is often tied to one 
infamous assertion. In the introduction to Philosophy of Right, he states that 'what is 
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational'.94 The phrase appears to legitimise 
the 'positive' political settlement of Hegel's time, although one contemporary’s 
                                                            
88 G.W.F. Hegel, ‘Inaugural Address, Delivered at the University of Berlin (22 October 1818)’, 
in Political Writings, 182. 
89 Adams characterizes Hegel as a servant frustrated with the queen, though not one who goes so 
far as to supplant her. Adams, Eclipse, 178. 
90 Hegel, ‘Inaugural’, 183. 
91 The remark is likely aimed at the alleged subjectivism shown in his philosophical colleague 
Fries, the self-declared Kantian, as well as the close influence of Schleiermacher, whose power in the 
Academy of Sciences ensured that Hegel would never represent his discipline there. See Hegel, 
Political Writings, ed. Dickey and Nisbet, 300n6. 
92 Hegel, ‘Inaugural’, 182, 185. Dickey and Nisbet comment that Hegel’s reference to the ‘inner 
life of spirit’ is not, as one of his early critics claims, a Protestant retreat from political life into 
Mandarinism; rather, for Hegel, ‘insight is the point of departure for instilling rationality into the 
political process’. See Hegel Political Writings, ed. Dickey and Nisbet, 299-300n5. 
93 Hegel, Political Writings, ed. Dickey and Nisbet, 301n11. 
94 Hegel, PR, 'Preface’, 20. 
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account reveals the nuance behind the statement.95 As Pinkard argues, the phrase is 
thus better rendered as 'what counts as rational is what is efficacious'.96 Taylor 
similarly argues that Hegel's position of 'seeing the rational in the actual is not 
necessarily conservative’, particularly when the rationality in question 'is an active 
one which is transforming the real’.97 In Taylor's account, Hegel vigorously rejects 
'legitimist' thought, remaining 'poles apart' from those who argue for remaining with 
positive institutions.98  
 As a Prussian civil servant who held to an active, critical rationality, Hegel 
came into several skirmishes with the government. The ruling class put frequent 
pressure on professors, including Hegel, in their intermittent hunts for 
'demagoguery’.99 Moreover, when Hegel's friend and former student Eduard Gans 
takes up Hegel's course on the Philosophy of Right in 1831, its antimonarchical, 
revolutionary tone provokes the Prince to take up his concerns with Hegel.100  
Such episodes are important to recall given the legacy of interpretation that Hegel 
merely upheld the established order of his day.101 
                                                            
95 The poet Heinrich Heine studied with Hegel and counted himself among those who thought 
the professor was 'servile’. As a result, Heine once questioned Hegel directly about the troubling 
phrase, in response to which Hegel 'smiled peculiarly' and remarked, 'It could also be rendered, 
"everything that is rational must be,"' only to look about hastily to see who might have heard. The 
episode is recounted in Pinkard, Hegel, 497. 
96 Pinkard argues for this rendition by drawing the phrase in line with similar statements from the 
Science of Logic and lecture notes. Pinkard, Hegel, 458. 
97 Taylor claims that his thought was therefore 'easily transposable' by Marx for his account of 
the proletariat. Taylor, Hegel, 424. Compare Jürgen Habermas' claim that 'in order not to sacrifice 
philosophy to the challenge posed by the revolution, Hegel elevated revolution to the primary 
principle of his philosophy. Only after he had fastened the revolution firmly to the beating heart of the 
world spirit did he feel secure from it’. Jürgen Habermas, 'Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution’, 
in Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (London: Heinemann, 1974), 121. 
98 Taylor therefore argues that Hegel should not be interpreted as making a similar case to 
Edmund Burke, with whom he is often associated. Hegel's own contemporary Prussian opponents will 
be treated below. See Taylor, Hegel, 423. 
99 Given the risks involved in the content of Hegel's teaching, Pinkard notes that his self-assured 
and sarcastic style did not help his reputation among ruling conservatives. Instances are recounted in 
Pinkard, Hegel, 437-40, 452, 504, 549. 
100 Pinkard, Hegel, 655. 
101 This influential case is made in the 1857 study, Hegel und seine Zeit by Rudolf Haym, which 
attacked Hegel as a supporter of the Restoration government. The fact that Hegel’s family granted 
Haym access to Hegel’s papers provided weight to his charge, though it grew out of disaffected 
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The nuance of Hegel’s political stance has been obscured throughout his 
reception history, with effects that include the underestimation of his positive 
influence on figures such as Bonhoeffer. Summarising Hegel's early reception 
history, Pinkard states that ‘Hegel, the great partisan of the Revolution, gradually 
came more and more to assume in the minds of posterity the shape of a narrow-
minded Prussian apologist’.102 Commenting on this line of interpretation, Taylor 
summarises the lamentable turn from Hegel's vision: 
It was forgotten what track Hegel had thought Prussia to be on in the 
1820s, and above all, what he meant by divinity and the state. So 
naturally both friends and enemies attributed to him the then current 
grounds for giving one's highest earthly allegiance to the Prussian 
German state, which were a mixed appeal to traditional authority and 
modern chauvinistic nationalism. That such an appalling salad of the 
merely positive and the sub-rational should be attributed to Hegel, the 
philosopher of a rational cosmic order, is one of the great ironies of 
modern intellectual history. Such are the penalties of too great 
originality.103 
  
Reference to the merely positive and 'sub-rational' fits much of the propagandistic 
ideology against which Bonhoeffer wrote, so Taylor's distinction is important to bear 
in mind when turning to the Third Reich. To set Hegel firmly in his own context, he 
is best understood as an advocate of modern European reform movements such as 
those carried by Baron von Stein and Prince von Hardenberg in Prussia.104 
 A sturdy of the background to Hegel’s political opinions calls into question 
Kierkegaard’s characterisation. In Kierkegaard's Practice in Christianity, one of 
Bonhoeffer's sources for the Discipleship materials, Jesus' teaching is claimed to 
cause 'offence', not only because of he claims to be the 'God-man' but because he is 
                                                                                                                                                                        
nationalism. This suspicion was supported by the fact that Hegel’s legacy was claimed by 
conservatives to express a nationalist state such as that eventually brought about by Otto von 
Bismarck. See Pinkard, Hegel, 663-64. 
102 Pinkard, Hegel, 663. 
103 Taylor, Hegel, 457. 
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set as an individual against the established order.105 Claiming that such offence 'will 
happen in our day also’, Kierkegaard links Hegel's reference to the individual's 
conscience as a 'form of evil' to the manner in which Hegel ‘deified the established 
order’.106 Kierkegaard comes to Hegel after typifying a 'Pharisaical' establishment 
that had become an 'empty, indeed, an ungodly externality', against which Christ 
'emphasizes inwardness in contrast to empty outwardness'.107 The accuracy of this 
portrayal is questionable given Hegel’s own polemic against externality, which will 
be treated in the following section. 
5.3.2. From Augsburg to the Merged Church 
 Hegel sees 'Germany proper' to occupy a distinct place on the world-
historical stage. It is here that freedom has reached its cumulative expression, centred 
in the 'unity of the divine and human nature’, from which unfolds religion, the state, 
and science with their respective forms of self-consciousness.108 It is this realm, 
within which Hegel places his own project, that the Idea shows its fuller 
development in state polity.109 Hegel pictures the state, within which he includes its 
Protestant confessional expressions, through the image of the human nervous 
system.110 As noted earlier, he does not refer to the church itself with the Pauline 
language of the body—an omission that Bonhoeffer will seek to rectify. 
 Hegel's address on the Tercentenary of the Augsburg Confession, delivered in 
1830, shows both his diminishment of confessional distinction as well as his 
reformist inclinations. In speaking about the expansion of Protestant liberty to a 
citizenry marked by critical reason, Hegel diminishes distinctions between clergy 
                                                                                                                                                                        
104 See Allen Wood, 'Introduction’, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ix-xi. 
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107 Kierkegaard, Practice, 86. 
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and laity, a move motivated by his continual criticism of 'superstition' and 
'servitude'—characteristics of a prior, Catholic settlement.111 What made the Diet of 
Augsburg so remarkable, in Hegel's view, was that both lay political leaders and 
clergy renounced their separate claims of authority. As a result, these 'orders were 
completely abolished' such that the 'unseemly division was sublated’.112 He continues 
that the split into two civil powers was over: 'the commonwealth, by divine authority, 
should be internally one’. Then, in a statement indicative for critics of Hegel's 
alleged deification of the established order, he states that 'the laws pertaining to the 
state and citizens' are 'divinely sanctioned’.113 The address ends with a statement of 
gratitude to King Friedrich Wilhelm, noting royal patronage of the university.114 
 Hegel’s claim to a divine sanction for the law must be understood alongside 
his powerful statements for continued state reform. From the start, Hegel shifts the 
historical focus from church leaders and doctors of theology to the princes and other 
political leaders who adopted Protestant doctrine.115 Such broad ownership of the 
task of reform has significance for the present, a requirement rooted in Lutheran 
doctrine: 
Those who condemn the Reformation of the evangelical religion in the 
manner described above should take heed lest, in denouncing Luther’s 
sedition, they glory in their own obedience and zeal towards the laws 
and civil authorities merely because they deny divine truth altogether 
and ascribe all religious doctrine to human invention and opinion.116 
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Hegel’s contrast case, it turns out, is the 'piety' of French kings, which led them to 
suppress Protestant subjects. German leaders should rather rule on the basis of 
justice, guaranteeing the security and freedom of the people: 'they neither know nor 
recognise any kind of sanctity but this’.117  
 Two key elements of Hegel’s narrative contrast with Bonhoeffer's attempt to 
retrieve the distinctive ecclesial body, even if space does not permit a fuller account 
of Hegel's reception of Luther's 'two kingdoms' doctrine. First, there is a 
diminishment of a confessional claim to the church's unique polity and forms of life. 
Hegel works largely with generalisations and there is a glaring lack of engagement 
with Luther's teachings or the content of the confessions.118 This is understandable in 
light of Hegel's 'indifference' to the confessional allegiance of citizens, in Bayer's 
view, as the state 'has risen above the confessional divide' in a gain which must never 
be reversed.119 Bayer continues that such elevation leads to an emphasis on the 
citizen's 'free subjectivity' for ethical conviction that is not dependent on the 
recurrence of speech acts embedded within the material forms of worship, including 
the exchange of auricular confession.120  
 Second, Hegel's claim to unity is embedded within a larger movement that 
has been termed 'Erastian modernity'.121 In the early nineteenth century, Prussian 
leaders effected political changes in order to bring the church into union with the 
state by overcoming confessional divides. As one example, powers are invested in 
the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Education, a sub-department of 
                                                            
117 Hegel, 'Augsburg', 195. 
118 A point noted in Purvis, University. 
119 Oswald Bayer, 'Theological Ethics: Ethics of Freedom’, in Freedom in Response: Lutheran 
Ethics: Sources and Controversies, trans. Jeffrey F. Cayzer (Oxford University Press, 2007), 81. 
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the Ministry of the Interior, founded in 1808.122 This political initiative helped pave 
the way towards the merger of Lutheran and Calvinist churches into one Protestant 
Unionskirche in 1817.123 Such legal changes were met with resistance, particularly 
when they braved liturgical uniformity. From 1830-34, the period immediately 
following Hegel's address on Augsburg, such controversy involved government 
suspension or imprisonment of dissenting clergy.124 
 Hegel's Augsburg address lacks reference to Luther and Melanchthon's 
writings, much less to dissenting voices among contemporary church leaders. This is 
understandable given that the vision of Staatskirchentum was not rooted primarily in 
Reformation thinking; the main sources of this merger were the 'revolutionary-
Bonapartist example' and German idealism. In Howard's view, the latter influence, 
with Fichte and Hegel as prime examples, 'depreciated the moral and pedagogic 
value of the church (as a concrete historical institution)' in favour of the Kulturstaat 
ideal.125 The change in the concerns of piety, as intimated in Hegel's address, 
followed on from Prussian ministers' 'subordinating the Protestant ecclesiastical 
polity to Prussia's nationalist raison d'état and bureaucratic apparatus'.126 It is 
therefore not surprising that, as Adams observes, Hegel is among those modern 
philosophers who effectively 'have no church whose practices they might 
describe'.127   
Ernst Troeltsch, a key source for Bonhoeffer’s writings, gathers Hegel's 
account into a larger Lutheran framework for 'modern civilisation’, which he defines 
                                                            
122 Howard, Protestant, 229-30. 
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as 'essentially an anti-Catholic freedom from sacerdotalism and from 
monasticism’.128 This freedom is circumscribed, however, by a 'renunciation of 
ecclesial independence;' even when government shows tyrannical signs, Lutheranism 
tends to show 'the yielding spirit’.129 As a result, Troeltsch identifies Prussian and 
German conservatism, having been restored after the effects of the French 
Revolution, as the easiest fit for Lutheran doctrines and so determinative for the early 
twentieth century.130 In Troeltsch's estimation, right before the First World War, this 
had taken an authoritarian turn. Such a turn, related to Hegel but also distinct from 
his own project, provoked Bonhoeffer’s reaction. 
In a break from Luther’s claim, Hegel shifts the role of discerning church-
state relations to the state: 'in contrast with the church's subjective conviction, the 
state is the one that knows [das Wissende]'.131 Such statements jar with Bonhoeffer's 
attempt to reclaim the church as guardian of that distinction. Bonhoeffer uses spatial 
language to narrate this larger movement in Lutheranism to an above-below 
relation.132 A late essay of Bonhoeffer's picks up the theme when he traces how 
modern Lutheranism has become indebted to Hegel: 
Here the state is the fulfillment not of the universal rational nature of 
humanity but of the creative will of God in the people. The state is 
essentially a Volksstaat…indeed, in the final honing of this teaching it 
becomes the actual subject of these realities—thus of the people, of the 
culture, of the economy, of religion. It is “the real God” (Hegel).133 
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This movement can lead, Bonhoeffer observes, to the forfeiture of the state's 
vocation: 'Where the state becomes the fulfillment of all spheres of human life and 
culture, it forfeits its true dignity, its specific authority as government’.134  
Bonhoeffer's response, delivered from a seminary training ministers about the proper 
church-state distinction from the Lutheran confessions, seeks to respond to such state 
overreach. Given this background, it is predictable that Bonhoeffer's initiative in 
improvised 'monasticism' was pejoratively described as 'Catholic'. The label meant 
opposition for Hegel, and so was inimical to the unity he saw as possible for the 
Protestant state. 
5.4. Bonhoeffer's Retrieval of Confessional Space 
 In this section I argue that insofar as Bonhoeffer can be said to break with a 
'Hegelian paradigm’, this has to do with recovering 'confessional space’. I first trace 
Bonhoeffer’s own dissent from what he termed the 'intertwining' of church and state, 
which he carried out with a combination of theologically and politically resonant 
terms. Speaking against a 'docetic-idealist ecclesiology’, he reclaims the biblical 
image of the church as body of Christ—a deployment of his Hegel-inspired claim to 
unity between Christology and ecclesiology. Intent on real presence, Bonhoeffer 
employs the politically charged term Lebensraum, repositioning a term for national 
expansion within the 'weakness' that characterises the Word.  
5.4.1. Visibility for the Ecclesial Body 
 In his two dissertations, Bonhoeffer had argued for a form of theological 
Wissenschaft that was vitally tied to the church. At the intersection of social-
philosophical and theological concepts of the person, Bonhoeffer maintains that 
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personal, ecclesial involvement is required for a true understanding of the 
communion of saints: 
But the nature of the church can only be understood from within, cum 
ira et studio [with passion and study], never by nonparticipants. Only 
those who take the claim of the church seriously—not relativizing it in 
relation to other similar claims or their own rationality, but viewing it 
from the standpoint of the gospel—can possibly glimpse something of 
its true nature.135 
 
Bonhoeffer continues that the church could be subjected to sociological study as a 
‘public corporation’, in which case theological reflection would be superfluous. 
While ceding the disciplinary integrity to studying ‘empirical’ initiation rites, 
Bonhoeffer’s interest is theological reflection performed in the Spirit.136 This interest 
is carried on in the subsequent Act and Being, a work Bonhoeffer casts as a form of 
kirchlichen Denken, or 'ecclesial thinking’.137  
 Bonhoeffer had initially sought to work in both the seminary and university, 
hoping to overcoming the divide between the two. However, in August 1936 his 
right to teach at the University of Berlin was rescinded, in part because he was 
directing a seminary that had come under government suspicion.138 Although 
Bonhoeffer would not last in the role in which Hegel found his long-awaited 
vocational fulfilment, he claimed that directing the seminary became his most 
professionally fulfilling role, the first work about which he had no reservations.139  
                                                            
135 DBWE 1, 33, alt.; DBW 1, 18. 
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 At Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer was in the midst of not only articulating 
community but creating an institution—in this case, an improvised monasticism. 
Although the universities provided education for ministers, Bethge remarks that they 
did not provide 'training’.140 Finkenwalde sought to fill this gap by structuring its 
days on a series of monastic practices, the inspiration for which came in large part 
from Bonhoeffer's visits to Anglican seminaries and communities.141 The day's 
services were framed with the scriptural 'Word’, as readings took the form of a lectio 
continua, seeking to cover the entire Bible without omission.142  
 With the previous century’s movement of ‘deconfessionalisation’ in view, 
there were two notable curricular distinctions at Finkenwalde. First, Bonhoeffer 
trained the students in historic Lutheran confessions. From the inaugural summer 
onwards, Bethge recalls that Bonhoeffer devoted more time to classes on the 
confessions than to any other subject, filling a perceived gap in their education 
through passionate discussions about their relevance for the present.143 This content 
provided for opposition to the ‘German Christians’ as well as a renewal of church 
independence from the state. In the intertwined areas of theology and policy, 
Bonhoeffer taught that the confessions were the way in which the church exercised 
the office of the keys, binding and loosing.144   
 Second, Bonhoeffer attempts to redraw the distinction between church and 
state with terms that recall his longstanding criticism of Hegel. In the lecture 'The 
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Visible Church in the New Testament', Bonhoeffer asks what kind of space the 
church can claim in the world, which raises the issue of 'the entire theological dispute 
with the state’.145 Here he flags the danger of a 'docetic-idealist [ecclesiology]’, for 
which 'the essence of the church understood as being merely the semblance of 
corporeality of an idea [Scheinleiblichkeit einer Idee] that cannot really claim any 
space in the world’.146 In discussing this problem, Bonhoeffer claims that recent 
years have made the church newly aware of boundaries, whereas previously it saw 
itself as a 'broader space and body’.147 This question explains the difference between 
the university faculty's 'science' [Wissenschaft] and the 'community' [Gemeinde].148 
Given the unique formation of the church in 'its own empirical experiences’, 
including 'the blows it receives’, Bonhoeffer asks 'how can one delimit 
epistemologically the space of the church from the spaces surrounding it?'149 
 In distinguishing the unique 'mind' of the church, Bonhoeffer offers several 
potential resolutions between church and state, using a classification that reflects the 
influence of Troeltsch's Social Teaching of the Christian Churches.150 Bonhoeffer 
notes that the claim of 'intertwining [Ineinander]' between church and state is held by 
'Rothean theology’.151 For Troeltsch, Richard Rothe and Hegel are paired in a 
discussion on 'mysticism and spiritual idealism’, a section that follows his treatment 
of church and sect types.152 Troeltsch speaks of the effectiveness of mysticism within 
the philosophy of religion, as shown in Hegel's reference to Jacob Boehme, over and 
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against 'the naïve age-long dominion of the positive and the particular’.153 Along 
with the earlier mysticism, 'it lives in and on communities which have been brought 
into existence by other ruder energies’, meaning that it tends to see beyond 
'confessional unities' as expressions of the ecclesiastical spirit.154  
 Hegel's lack of reference to confessional distinctions, as well as his hasty 
typology of views on the Eucharist, would have provided Troeltsch with compelling 
data for this claim. Troeltsch goes further, however, claiming that Rothe and Hegel 
envision a new settlement in which religion no longer needs to be connected to the 
'decaying churches’. In his words, 
Richard Rothe and Hegel did not prophesy in vain that the Church 
would become merged in the state, that is, the complete autonomy of 
the religious ‘mind’ directly united with the collective reason and its 
social organization.155 
 
Troeltsch continues that though Rothe identified problems in such a form of 
spirituality, it was nevertheless the 'logical result of the evolution of Christianity’.156  
 Rather than engaging directly with the terms of a 'Rothean' theology, 
Bonhoeffer first exposits of the language of Geist in the New Testament. Bonhoeffer 
dwells on the narrative of Pentecost with its language of the Spirit as a presence that 
is sent. He speaks of 'the church of the Spirit that has come’, while also making the 
present claim that 'the Spirit comes’.157 He emphasises how the Spirit's coming on 
the community is linked to its visibility in contrast to the world. Bonhoeffer also 
states that the church is 'the historical reality of the Holy Spirit, which forbids all 
docetism’.158 This is a strange claim at first, for docetism is a Christological heresy. 
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Given Bonhoeffer's desire to pronounce the church community, one might have 
expected him to say that the Spirit forbids Erastianism. However, given his 
modification of Hegel's phrase, 'Christ existing as community’, to speak of the 
church is to speak of the present Christ, and it is 'docetism' that threatens the 
recurrent contemporaneity of the historical Jesus, with his bold social ethic.   
 Bonhoeffer also responds to a 'docetic-idealist ecclesiology' by speaking of 
the visibility of Christ's body. He draws on 1 Corinthians 6:19, claiming a double 
meaning for the individual member: 'Your body, which is simultaneously the body of 
the community, is the body of Christ'.159 This segues into a rare reiteration of the 
Hegel-inspired phrase of his early writings—in this version, 'Christ exists as 
community [Christus existiert als Gemeinde]'—to combat a view that Christ is only 
present as the proclaimed Word.160 Reference to the body allows Bonhoeffer to 
further distinguish the contours of the church from Troeltsch’s characterisation of the 
tradition of 'mysticism and spiritual idealism'. Against what Bonhoeffer elsewhere 
terms 'mystical fusion’, he pronounces the independence of each member and, 
indeed, the living head. He conveys this through the language of 'juxtaposition' 
[Gegenüber] of the community and Christ, a non-identity [nicht-Identität]', reasoning 
that 'otherwise it would be Christ mysticism [Christusmystik]'.161  
5.4.2. Weakness of the Word, Strength of the Idea 
 Bonhoeffer's attempt to reclaim ecclesial visibility employed not only biblical 
theology but the politically charged term Lebensraum, or 'living space’.162 The term 
Lebensraum was used in Third Reich propaganda for German expansionist claims 
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across Europe, so Bonhoeffer is employing terms of seizure and occupation. In 
Discipleship, Bonhoeffer claims that the church's need for Lebensraum takes it 
beyond proclamation and order into daily communal living.163 Claiming the visibility 
of the community is an attempt to retrieve the original force of Luther's emergence 
from the monastery, which is also pitched in the language of an assault.164  
 Bonhoeffer's employment of the term Lebensraum risks association with 
crude appeals to a Volk’s growth and strength.165 Turning from his own earlier vision 
of militant expansion, however, Bonhoeffer speaks of the church's claim to space as 
characterised by suffering and rejection. Such conditions are appropriate to the 
'Word': 
The Idea is strong. But the Word of God is so weak that it suffers to be 
despised and rejected by people…The Word accepts the resistance it 
encounters and bears it. It is a cruel knowledge: nothing is impossible 
for the Idea, but for the gospel there are impossibilities. The Word is 
weaker than the Idea. Likewise, the witnesses to the Word are weaker 
than the propagandists of the Idea.166 
 
Bonhoeffer's reference to propaganda likely targets National Socialist propagandists 
such as Joseph Goebbels.167 Against this strong political machine, Bonhoeffer makes 
clear that the community of Jesus' disciples should not give in to the temptation to 
grasp at effectiveness.  
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 Predictably, Third Reich propaganda is a far easier target than Hegel. Given 
that the 'Idea' is one of Hegel's terms of art, on which Bonhoeffer has engaged him 
explicitly in the Christology lectures, it is worth considering the comparison between 
Word and Idea more fully. This is particularly so as Bayer argues for a retrieval of 
the 'language event' for Luther's hermeneutic, emphasising the Word's 'finite form' 
and the limits of its address, over and against Hegel's development of the Idea.168  
 It is true that Hegel's Idea has remarkable potency: as the rational, it develops 
organically from its own 'immanent' life into an internally differentiated constitution 
of the state.169 Hegel's image of organic wholeness gives the state's development a 
certain inexorability. He claims that 'patriotic disposition' receives its content from 
aspects of the 'organism' that is 'the development of the Idea to its differences and 
their objective actuality’.170 The wholeness of the Idea is likened to the manner in 
which the body requires every part working in 'identity with the others’, or, rather 
more grandly, to the claim that God is not reducible to a list of attributes but has a 
life that must be intuited 'in itself’.171 
 On the other hand, for Hegel the Idea is not merely strength, at least in the 
assertive form Bonhoeffer attacks. Hegel's criticism of the French Revolution led to 
his critique of those in his own land who sought to force political change on the basis 
of abstract rational principles. As Taylor observes: 
Hegel cannot accept the vision of those Aufklärer who would design a 
rational state and they try to put it into operation like an engineering 
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plan, be this a state on utilitarian principles or one founded on the 
general will.172 
 
Hegel's trust in the organic unfurling of the Idea led him to oppose attempts at 
'constitutional engineering’.173 Indeed, although Hegel claims that the Idea is 
efficacious as the rational, he never saw his vision of the reformed state realised.174  
 Along with Hegel’s rejection of certain ‘shows of strength’, a comparison of 
Bonhoeffer's Word and Hegel's Idea must consider that Bonhoeffer's claim to the 
Word's weakness still involves power, albeit in a veiled form.175 In Bonhoeffer's 
rendition, the Idea's strength is claimed to have Stärke, while the Word has Kraft. 
Significantly, the latter may bear closer resemblance to Hegel's claim to the 'cunning' 
[List] of reason that cannot merely be equated with sheer violence.176  
 Such a comparison also brings the complex relation between Hegel's 
language of the positive and negative into play. Against the notion that sheer 
'positivity' could be taken as strength, Hegel's Idea suffers a candid confrontation 
with negativity.177 His successors could not always match his patience with 
negativity, however, resulting in a stance Kierkegaard satirises as those who voice 
'prayers offering thanks to God and Hegel that they are not like those negative ones 
but have become positive'.178 It is the positive thinker who, following Hegel, 'knows 
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all about world history and our Lord's most private thoughts'.179 In contrast, it is the 
'subjective, existing thinker' who does not give in to a 'chimerical mediation' but 
'holds open the wound of the negative'.180  
 The comparison between Bonhoeffer's Word and Hegel's Idea requires 
further elaboration. For now I return to this section's focus on ecclesial polity. One of 
Hegel's purposes with the Idea, as the unique territory of the speculative philosopher, 
is an attempt to overcome forms of representational thought that are less stable, more 
given to fanaticism. In this way, religion is liable to a form of political weakness. 
Hegel's integrative vision for the state rises above the potential fractiousness of 
confessional adherence. Bonhoeffer's argument for a distinctive 'confessing church' 
cuts against this tendency, and it certainly came to know the stance of 'weakness' in 
its rejection by the regime. Rites controversies did not end in the early half of the 
nineteenth-century. 
5.5. Suffering Body, Spiritless Age: The Hiddenness of Recognition 
  Having argued for Bonhoeffer's claim to 'confessional space' as the key 
difference from Hegel, this final section asks whether Bonhoeffer’s commitment 
entails a breach of 'recognition' in Hegel's sense. I begin with a treatment of 
Philosophy of Right in order to show the nuance in Hegel’s claim that humanity's 
rational end lies in the state, even as the state's end is the happiness of its citizens 
through actualizing freedom. Specifically, I note Hegel’s three exceptions to such 
integration: first, there are forms of ‘religious opposition’ that set people apart; 
second, in a ‘spiritless’ age, some individuals and groups may have to turn inwards; 
third, although some political bodies do not receive recognition, their ‘strength of 
existence’ precedes such express formulation. 
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I then turn to Bonhoeffer’s statement that the Christ-community can expect 
‘not recognition, but rejection’ in the world, abandoning the claim to right. I argue 
that Bonhoeffer’s challenge is framed by contextual concerns, such as the ordinands’ 
approval of ministers taking civil court action against church government and the 
eventual dissolution of the seminary. I also locate the statement within an ongoing 
series of texts, recalling that Bonhoeffer had earlier stated, in 1933 polemics over the 
Aryan Paragraph, that the church’s resistance, even to the point of forceful 
intervention, can be a form of ‘ultimate recognition’, that is, opposing the state for 
the sake of the state's true vocation.  
Finally, I trace Bonhoeffer’s observation that a state of cultural ‘decay’ had 
driven the remnant-state of his own time to seek an embattled alliance with the 
church. He narrates a set of concepts that could well summarize Hegel’s state 
vocation—including ‘right’, ‘science’, and ‘cultivation’—in a process of returning to 
their ecclesial origin after a period of estrangement. Such an account of ‘recognition’ 
shows Bonhoeffer’s distinct appropriation insofar as he reclaims, after Hegel’s 
unitive project, the remnant-state joining the church by learning to bear the mark of 
suffering that was central to Luther’s ecclesiology. 
5.5.1. Hegel on Mutual Recognition and Religious Oppositions  
 Hegel's desire for the preservation of local custom is linked to his view of the 
conditions of freedom. A hallmark of Hegel's philosophy is that self-consciousness is 
socially constituted. In Smith's words, 'Freedom, for Hegel, is a predicate not of 
individuals but of people or communities’.181  This process of self-consciousness is 
not a smooth symmetry; it typically requires struggle, the threat of death, settled 
relations of mastery and enslavement, and the liberation that comes through labour, 
                                                            
181 Smith, 'Epitaph’, 245-46. 
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as this is classically shown in Hegel's master-slave dialectic. Nevertheless, Hegel is 
interested in development beyond the cusp of death, and his abiding interest in the 
inter-relations of the various practices and institutions within a culture have led to a 
position aptly described as 'holism’.182 At the heart of this social dynamic lies 
Hegel's term of art, 'recognition [Anerkennung]’.183 
 In the Phenomenology, Hegel speaks of self-consciousness through the 
encounter of two irreducible selves. He begins with a representation of the 'activity 
of one’, but does not remain there, for the 'other' is not merely an object of desire but 
is also self-sufficient.184 Hegel argues against 'one-sided activity’, for both must 
bring about the movement outside the self, for the self.185 Each self-consciousness 
comes 'only by way of this mediation’, which is to say, '[t]hey recognize themselves 
as mutually recognizing each other’.186 
 The theme of recognition is picked up in Philosophy of Right as Hegel 
describes the relation of the individual's 'right' to that of the state. His resistance to 
one-sided accounts is expressed in the relation between the individual subject and the 
state's legal responsibility, which he seeks to mediate by means of 'the right of the 
rational’.187 Along with legal judgements, Hegel uses the concept of recognition as 
the means for integrating civil services: 'This universality, as the quality of being 
                                                            
182 Houlgate, Hegel, 10. 
183 For a treatment of the philosophical background to this term, see Robert Pippin, 'What is the 
Question for which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?' European Journal of Philosophy 
8:2 (2000): 155-72. 
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[Fürsichsein], and it is for itself only in the being-for-itself of the other. Each is the middle term [die 
Mitte] to the other’. PhG, §184. 
186 PhG, §184. 
187 PR, §132. 
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recognized, is the moment which makes isolated and abstract needs, means, and 
modes of satisfaction into concrete, i.e. social ones’.188  
 Although recognition is central to Hegel's social theory, his concessions show 
that it is not mere legitimation of the established order. Hegel claims that humanity's 
'rational end' lies in 'life in the state’, even as the state's end is the happiness of its 
citizens through actualising freedom.189 Nevertheless, there are three exceptions to 
such integration: first, there are forms of 'religious opposition' that set people apart; 
second, in a 'spiritless' age, some individuals and groups may have to turn inwards; 
third, some political bodies do not have official recognition in a particular historical 
moment, although they are duly constituted. These will be elaborated briefly in turn. 
 In Hegel’s first treatment of the act of ‘recognition’ in Philosophy of Right, 
he notes various exceptions for religious communities. In one aside he addresses the 
historic issue of peoples that have a 'religious constitution’. Referring to the histories 
of 'Jewish and Mohammedan Völker', he acknowledges that a 'religious viewpoint 
may further entail a higher opposition which precludes that universal identity that 
recognition requires'.190 This glancing reference to opposition is not developed here, 
as Hegel spends more time on the then-contemporary question of sectarianism for the 
post-Enlightenment state. Religion is thus offered a qualified space in Hegel's state 
constitution, although he remains concerned with fanaticism.191 These concerns arise 
                                                            
188 PR, §192. 
189 PR, §75, 265. 
190 PR, §331. 
191 Hegel states that religion should not be spoken of in 'wholly general terms', but should be 
distinguished because 'we rather need a power to protect us from it in some of its forms and to 
espouse against them the rights of reason and self-consciousness'. He gingerly treats the religious 
forms of relation he terms 'feeling, representation, faith’, noting their liability to fanaticism that casts 
aside social institutions and orders. In this respect, a pietistic, uneducated claim to seeking 'guidance 
from the Lord' is of particular concern to him. PR, §270. 
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because of the church’s self-estimation 'as an end in itself, while the state is a mere 
means'.192  
 Second, Hegel acknowledges times in which an individual or group becomes 
estranged from their social world and turn within. Citing the examples of Socrates 
and the Stoics, he narrates the process thus: 'When the existing world of freedom has 
become unfaithful to the better will, this will no longer finds itself in the duties 
recognized in this world and must seek to recover in ideal inwardness alone that 
harmony which it has lost in actuality’.193 Such flight is only permitted, Hegel 
qualifies, 'in ages when the actual world is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettled 
existence’.194 He returns to the example of Socrates in the ruin of Athenian 
democracy, going on to acknowledge that 'in our times' there are various forms of 
disconnection between existing order and the individual's right to bestow 
recognition.195   
 Third, Hegel claims that some political bodies go without international 
recognition for a time. Just as the individual subjects were 'self-sufficient' in the 
Phenomenology, so every 'Volk as state' is 'a sovereign and independent entity'.196 As 
such, a state is entitled to be seen as sovereign 'in the eyes of others, i.e. to be 
recognized by them'.197 Nevertheless, Hegel acknowledges that there can be a 
political body that does not yet have express recognition even though it knows itself 
duly constituted. This observation is given as a brief commentary on Napoleon's 
statement that 'the French Republic is no more in need of recognition than the sun 
                                                            
192 PR, §270. Alongside this ecclesial vantage point, Hegel is seeking to challenge the claim that 
religion is the basis of the state, as held by Friedrich von Schlegel and other Romantics. This is noted 
by Houlgate in PR, 355n242. 
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197 PR, §331. 
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is’.198 Hegel remarks that these words relay 'that strength of existence which itself 
carries with it a guarantee of recognition, even if this is not expressly formulated’.199  
5.5.2. ‘Community of Strangers’: Bonhoeffer on the Mark of Non-Recognition 
 Bonhoeffer's reference to the church as the Volk Gottes appeals to something 
like the 'higher opposition' that Hegel concedes in the 'religious viewpoint’. Still, this 
is not to relegate Bonhoeffer's claim to the 'former times' of peoples Hegel associates 
with the religious view, for Bonhoeffer is serious about the church's space in 
modernity. As he says elsewhere, the two kingdoms belong in an 'inseparable' 
relation. Nevertheless, his simultaneous conviction that the two belong together 
'without confusion' leads him to reclaim a polity of 'non-recognition’. This is 
especially the case given the Third Reich under which Bonhoeffer lived, a political 
establishment that has a strong claim to being, in Hegel's terms, a 'Geist-less' age. 
 In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer states that the Christ-community will go without 
'recognition' in the world. This is because the way of the cross is not only suffering, 
which might itself be seen as tragic and noble, but rejection with its attendant 
dishonour.200 The disciples will likewise receive ‘not recognition [Anerkennung], but 
rejection’. Bonhoeffer acknowledges that this is difficult to apprehend in a context 
the has lost the distinction between the 'citizen's existence' and the call of a 
Christian.201 This lack of recognition involves abandoning the claim to right.202 On 
Jesus' beatitude for the 'meek', Bonhoeffer comments that the community of 
                                                            
198 PR, §331. The saying is attributed to Napoleon before the 1797 Peace of Campo Formio, a 
period in which a coalition of states led by England, including Holland, Spain, and Portugal, 
attempted to bring down the revolutionary republic. See PR, §329n2. 
199 PR, §331 A. 
200 DBWE 4, 85; DBW 4, 77-8. 
201 DBWE 4, 87; DBW 4, 80. 
202 This is in contrast to the habit at the time of ministers taking action against church 
governments in civil courts. Though ministers were winning these cases, a fact which delighted the 
Finkenwalde ordinands, Bonhoeffer expressed the limited value of these lawsuits as merely creating 'a 
better-informed republic from a badly informed republic’. Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 444. 
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strangers [Fremdlingsgemeinde] renounce every right of their own for Christ's 
sake.203  
 Bonhoeffer developed this position through an exegesis of the Sermon on the 
Mount—Jesus' teaching that Hegel classed as sans-culottism. The Lutheran 
confessions also framed Bonhoeffer’s alternative, so he claims Luther directly in 
teaching that suffering was 'among the marks of the true church'.204 At another point, 
Bonhoeffer cites a preparatory document for the Augsburg Confession, which makes 
reference to a community that is 'persecuted and martyred on behalf of the gospel'.205 
This sense of estrangement is heightened by owning terms of derision employed by 
the National Socialist regime such as ‘rootless’ or ‘nationless’.206 
 Bonhoeffer's emphasis on contrastive visibility to the point of non-
recognition would seem to be a repudiation of a core term in Hegel's political 
philosophy. Indeed, the terms of derision aimed at Bonhoeffer's monastic experiment 
echo Hegel's own foils; the Finkenwalde community was suspected within the 
broader church of 'Catholic practices, enthusiastic pacifist activities, and radical 
fanaticism’.207 Unsurprisingly, the year the seminary was shut down, twenty-seven of 
Bonhoeffer's former seminarians were imprisoned for disobeying government 
prohibitions.208 
 Although Discipleship speaks in stark terms about the 'break' Jesus 
inaugurates with communal orders, including the state, I argue that this should be 
contextualised by Bonhoeffer’s writings that claim such a breach as a form of 
                                                            
203 DBWE 4, 105; DBW 4, 104. 
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'recognition' in its own right. As Hegel before him, Bonhoeffer held that the state 
could forfeit its true vocation to uphold right.209 This is famously expressed in the 
1933 essay, 'The Church and the Jewish Question', in which Bonhoeffer makes his 
controversial claim about the church's direct intervention in state affairs. This is the 
paradoxical expression of the church's 'ultimate recognition' of the state, by which it 
opposes the state precisely in its calling to preserve it.210 
 The suffering of the revelatory community provides Bonhoeffer with the 
opportunity to specify the mediator through whom recognition occurs. Bonhoeffer is 
a fierce critic of claims to 'immediate' knowledge, as was Hegel before him.211 The 
difference comes largely through Bonhoeffer's reclamation of the language of 'call' 
and his sustained emphasis on the hiddenness of revelation, as expressed in the 
following comment: 
Ever since Jesus called, there are no longer natural, historical, or 
experiential immediacies for his disciples. Christ the mediator stands 
between son and father, between husband and wife, between 
individual and Volk, whether they can recognize him or not.212 
 
The term 'recognition' is again invoked, though this time Christ is explicitly named 
alongside the church as the one passed over. Such recognition can only come, 
Bonhoeffer later observes, in faith.213  
 Faith perception is required because Bonhoeffer argues for a unitive form of 
recognition from a site ‘external’ to the civil sphere. The unity of Christian faith and 
the world must be claimed only through the name of Jesus Christ, Bonhoeffer states 
in a letter, which is to say that it occurs 'solely because God became a poor, 
                                                            
209 Hegel's position, which I explore in 6.2.1, is argued vis-a-vis the treatment of Jewish citizens. 
210 DBWE 12, 366; DBW 12, 354. 
211 Hegel had claimed that self-consciousness only occurred by way of mediation between 
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212 DBWE 4, 95; DBW 4, 90. 
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wretched, unknown, unsuccessful human being, and because God wants to be found 
from now on solely in this poverty, in the cross'.214 The clear, unambiguous 
statement of 'Protestant historical consciousness' therefore comes through a name 
that invokes a counterintuitive form of 'this-worldliness'.215 
 Bonhoeffer's linkage of mediation and suffering reveals the strong conviction 
that underlies his modification of Hegel's 'God existing as community’. Using similar 
language as Hegel about the move away from attachments to this world, Bonhoeffer 
places the cross not as an unfortunate end, either to Christ's life or ours, but ‘the 
beginning of community with Jesus Christ’.216 Rather than the crucifixion as an 
isolated, once-for-all occurrence, it is the recurrent site of union: ‘The cross is 
suffering with Christ. Indeed, it is Christ-suffering [Christusleiden]’.217 From there, 
Bonhoeffer speaks of ongoing communal acts like forgiving sins with this hybrid 
term: such acts, performed by church members, are ‘the Christ-suffering required of 
his disciples’.218 This is because no disciple is greater than the master, and Christ is 
the one 'whose whole life is described in the Apostles' Creed with one word: 
suffered’.219  
5.5.3. Return to the Origin: Remnant State and Church in Ethics 
 Having shown that Bonhoeffer's articulation of the suffering body of the 
church is a form of ultimate, albeit hidden, recognition, I now turn to later writings 
that make such an alliance more explicit. In the 1940-41 Ethics manuscript 'Heritage 
and Decay', Bonhoeffer tries to retrieve the proper distinction between church and 
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state—no small feat after years of ‘Erastian modernism’ and the hostile takeover of 
the church by the National Socialists of his day. Bonhoeffer states that 'as long as the 
earth remains’, the two ‘must never be mixed together, yet never torn apart'.220 He is 
employing a clear ‘Chalcedonian logic’ to reinstate a properly understood two-
kingdoms doctrine over and against what he terms ‘Pseudo-Lutheranism’.  
 Bonhoeffer continues by speaking of an alliance between the church and that 
element of the state that still preserves right and reason, its mandate from God. The 
necessity of this alliance comes because of the aftermath of the French Revolution, 
which, for all its contributions to human rights, provided precedent for a 'mass' that 
seeks freedom from typical social restraints, such that 'the foundation for historical 
life—trust in all its forms—is destroyed’.221 This leads to the statement that explains 
the manuscript title: 'The Abendland is about to repudiate its historical heritage. It is 
becoming hostile to Christ. This is the unique situation of our time, and it is actual 
decay’.222 
 Two countering forces are claimed against this dissolution. The first bearer of 
history is the 'restraining force' [Aufhaltende], an invocation of the biblical 
katechōn.223 Bonhoeffer identifies this as the 'ordering power of the state' that God 
uses to preserve the world, though it is neither God nor 'without Schuld’.224 In 
Bonhoeffer's estimation of his age, the 'restrainer' is reduced to a 'remnant’.225 In 
appealing to the katechōn, Bonhoeffer alludes to the notion also developed in this 
time by then-contemporary legal theorist Carl Schmitt; Bonhoeffer does not dwell 
long with the state, however, much less the Third Reich for which Schmitt wrote. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
219 DBWE 14, 60; DBW 14, 48. 
220 DBWE 6, 112; DBW 6, 102. Clifford Green identifies the allusion to Chalcedon in DBWE 6, 
112n39. 
221 DBWE 6, 130; DBW 6, 122. 
222 DBWE 6, 132; DBW 6, 123. 
223 DBWE 6, 131; DBW 6, 122-23. 
 245 
 The church is the second body to bear the historical heritage that has been 
abandoned—an expansion of the Finkenwalde curriculum. Here the language of the 
church as 'body’, which Bonhoeffer pronounces in his engagement with Hegel, 
comes to the fore. He states that 'The corpus christianum has broken apart. The 
corpus Christi stands over against a hostile world’.226 The relation of 'over against’, 
gegenüber, picks up the way that Bonhoeffer has taken exception to the language of 
Identität in the Finkenwalde materials, in which Christ was head 'over against' the 
church. Here it is the church as a whole set against the 'body of Christendom’.227 The 
church carries out its role in part through preserving the people's historical legacy 
that runs through the Middle Ages and Reformation, but its proper force is the 
proclamation of the risen, historical Jesus.  
 With the proclamation of Christ at the centre, the church shows itself an ally 
to the 'restraining force' in the preservation of 'elements of order’. Bonhoeffer's list 
reads as a set of Hegel's key themes: 'Right [Recht], truth, science [Wissenschaft], art, 
cultivation [Bildung], humanity, freedom, and patriotism’. The alliance comes about 
because, given the process of 'decay' he identified in the early 1940s, these elements 
'after long wanderings, find their way back to their origin’.228 Many of the terms that 
Hegel set as the preserve of philosophy, particularly Recht and Bildung in the current 
chapter, are claimed by Bonhoeffer to have originated in, and to be in a period of 
return towards, the church.229   
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Bonhoeffer’s strategy, in which he calls for terms that have become the 
preserve of philosophy to rediscover their bearings in the church, features elsewhere 
in his writing. As Eberhard Jüngel observes, with respect to 'death of God' language, 
a period of 'alienation' began with Hegel.230 This was 'against Hegel's intention’, 
Jüngel claims, but the migration of such language went from theology to philosophy 
and then came to be used in an anti-theological manner.231 Bonhoeffer therefore 
'prepared the way' for the return of such talk to its home in theology.232 The drive for 
such a return would also be taken up by Barth, who argued that Hegel's rich 
theological basis was not too demanding for modern thought, but not demanding 
enough; it may well prove to have taken too little from theology.233 
 At the same time as Bonhoeffer reaches out to Hegel's terms, however, he 
maintains, as did Luther before him, that it is the church that truly discerns the right 
relation between church and state. He therefore calls back from Hegel the sense that 
the state is the one that appears as custodian of the distinction. Bonhoeffer adds that 
this alliance is not a bid for political power, but remains part of the church's mark of 
suffering, for its 'suffering is infinitely more dangerous to the spirit of destruction 
than the political power that it may still retain'.234 This 'mark' comes in part because 
of the destruction of historical heritage in that day, but also because the church is to 
candidly bear the 'guilt’, alongside the blessing, of its historical predecessors.235   
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Conclusion 
 It is not a question of whether or not Jesus' teaching is taken as revolutionary, 
as both Hegel and Bonhoeffer see the Sermon on the Mount as a breach with the 
social 'orders' of the time. Moreover, both thinkers equivocate over the language of 
revolution, as shown in their similar criticism of the 'absolute freedom' instantiated in 
the French Revolution. Hegel and Bonhoeffer's respective readings of the Sermon on 
the Mount can be explained, in part, by their different political contexts. As a 
university professor and civil servant, Hegel seeks to establish revolutionary reform 
from within the Prussian state structure, a task he understands as the German 
philosophical culmination of the political opportunity afforded by the Napoleonic 
incursions. A century later, Bonhoeffer has fallen out with a Third Reich government 
that increasingly seeks to absorb both the church and the university structure in 
which he once taught. He therefore looks to Jesus' sermon in order to found a new 
monastic community that can instantiate a renewed distinction between church and 
state, not least because it is a body that foregoes the 'recognition' of the world.  
 How, then, are Hegel and Bonhoeffer to be related on what I have called 
'polities of freedom'? Providing the political backgrounds to Hegel's Augsburg 
address, I have argued that Hegel did not merely uphold established order but argued 
for a robust citizenry marked by critical reason. Bonhoeffer's issue with positivist 
authoritarianism therefore had more to do with the political settlement unique to his 
time. Where Bonhoeffer differs more deeply, however, is by taking exception to 
Hegel's diminishment of confessional difference towards the integration of church 
into the state body. This background, I have shown, helps to explain Bonhoeffer's 
charge of 'docetic-idealist ecclesiology', against which he emphasised the church as a 
political body in its own right. Bonhoeffer’s polemic is not sheer opposition, 
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however, but a claim to the ‘hiddenness’ of recognition and so the possibility of 
embattled alliance for the sake of right and reason. In Bonhoeffer’s distinctive 
rendition, such alliance occurs through the shared experiences of suffering which 
have long marked the church. 
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Chapter Six - Confessing Volk: Nation, ‘Race', and the Shape of History 
 
 
 Church history is the hidden centre of world history. 
 
    - Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio 
 
Introduction 
While the previous chapter treated Hegel’s reformist support for the Prussian 
polity of his own day, the current chapter turns to his attempt to think beyond the life 
of any one people. As part of his philosophical project, Hegel sought to trace a 
reciprocal relationship between the Geister of individuals and those of the Völker 
within a larger 'world-historical' movement. Nevertheless, a common line of critique 
against idealism, or 'identitarian thinking' is that it results in the subordination of 
ethnic and political difference. Even though Hegel's sociality of reason involves a 
process of 'self-emptying' towards mutual recognition, it is common to hear that this 
is not a truly socio-ethical encounter but the work of one culturally prejudiced mind.1 
In the wake of the Shoah that irreparably marked Bonhoeffer's time, this concern is 
all the more acute.2 Such concern marks the work of Wayne Floyd, who has argued 
that Bonhoeffer’s ‘dialectic’ bears significant similarity to Adorno’s later critical 
reception of Hegel. Floyd’s account Bonhoeffer’s dialectic along similar lines, 
intimating that it had to retrieve true ‘otherness’ through a suspension in thought. 
The Shoah must be taken seriously in both Hegel and Bonhoeffer criticism. 
Moreover, the similarities between Adorno’s philosophical critique of Hegel and 
Bonhoeffer’s work are well worth identifying. The purpose of the current project, 
however, is to seek a nuanced account of Hegel's thought vis-à-vis Bonhoeffer’s own, 
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and such later concerns can neglect Hegel’s habit of critiquing ‘one-sided’ accounts, 
including the nationalism of his own time. Moreover, it is important to attend to 
Hegel’s claim that the state can forfeit its own 'principle' and so incur guilt in its 
treatment of foreigners—a notion that should be compared to Bonhoeffer's claim of 
the state's ability to 'self-negate'. Finally, a strictly oppositional construal of the two 
figures limits investigation into problematic aspects of Bonhoeffer's thought, whether 
in his early claims to national expansionism or his characterisations of Jewish 
difference.  
Challenging an oppositional account between Bonhoeffer and Hegel on the 
theme of nations within ‘world history’, this chapter shows their similar concern to 
challenge 'one-sided' national accounts. I then explore the implications of 
Bonhoeffer’s turn from an account of the ‘shapes of Geist’ towards the ‘form of 
Christ’ as a trans-national confessing community. From the start, Bonhoeffer has 
been critical of accounts that rely on ‘some Geist entity, called Volksgeist, that arises 
of its own natural strength from metaphysical depths’.3 Moreover, Bonhoeffer’s 
theme of ‘revelation in hiddenness’ is deepened by how he learned the importance of 
seeing history in a view ‘from below’. As a result, Bonhoeffer's language of the 
hidden centre, conditioned by a certain race-critical reception of Hegel, offers 
promise for challenging 'centrist' accounts of history, particularly those located on the 
North Atlantic.  
Before tracing this reception, it should be noted that Bonhoeffer offers a 
qualified acknowledgement of historical progress even as he modifies historicism 
through an appeal to eschatology. In other words, it is not enough to trouble Hegel's 
high stakes for the historical as the 'world's court of judgement' by stating that 'history 
                                                                                                                                                                        
2 The term Shoah is employed rather than the more familiar 'Holocaust' in order to avoid 
sacrificial or redemptive overtones. 
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is not an eschatology'.4 'There really are times of acute morality and self-evaluation, 
of the soul coming to itself, as Hegel had hoped', Bonhoeffer admits in an early essay, 
'However, the greater the knowledge, the greater the sin'.5 Rather than a sole focus on 
progress in the shapes of Geist, Bonhoeffer states, 'at every moment the judgement of 
God is present in history through the word of God', which suggests that 'every 
moment is the end of history, and yet it is not the end'.6 This is an early example of 
how Bonhoeffer both affirmed and qualified the importance of historical 
actualisation. In other words, his use of eschatology does not merely point to the age 
to come, for his theological response to Hegel remains with the claim that 'the body of 
Christ is a real presence in history'.7 
Finally, in speaking of a 'world-historical' account, it is important to 
acknowledge the differences between Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer's approaches. Hegel 
understood the role of the philosophical historian to be retrospective analysis. 
Although he wrote timely political essays and often made asides on contemporary 
events in the classroom, he attempted to separate his role as a lecturer from that of the 
political actor. Hegel’s account of the 'cunning of reason' requires the scientific 
discipline of a university faculty that has no business with 'prophecy'. In contrast, 
Bonhoeffer is not primarily engaged in retrospective analysis, although he often 
comments on the effects of historical events, such as the 1914-18 War, on national 
consciousness. As an ecclesio-political actor, he writes out of deliberation from roles 
that include Confessing Church minister and agent with the Abwehr. Moreover, while 
Hegel treats the church as an integrated element in the state body that is his primary 
                                                                                                                                                                        
3 DBWE 1, 103; DBW 1, 66. 
4 The phrase is part of Levinas' response to Hegel. See Levinas, Totality, 241. 
5 This citation is taken from Bonhoeffer's paper on the church and eschatology, submitted for a 
seminar with Reinhold Seeberg, who evaluated it in January 1926. DBWE 9, 319-20; DBW 9, 348-49. 
6 Bonhoeffer draws on Leopold von Ranke's critique of Hegel, particularly in his comment that 
'every age is in direct relationship with God. DBWE 9, 319-20n60; DBW 9, 348-49. 
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object of concern, Bonhoeffer's interest lies in 'confession' towards a renewed 
ecumenical and trans-national consensus. 
6.1. 'The True is the Whole’: An Abolition of Difference?  
 Bonhoeffer had marked Hegel's claim that 'the true is the whole' in his copy 
of Phenomenology without comment, and his work often seeks to challenge ‘one-
sided’ accounts.8 It is that very phrase of Hegel’s that Adorno would later invert to 
'the whole is the false' as he challenges Hegel’s legacy by linking claims of totality 
with anti-Semitism.9 To begin the consideration of this important intersection, the 
present section traces the different trajectories in Hegel reception among which 
Bonhoeffer’s own account must be located. I first follow a recent argument that 
seeks to differentiate Hegel from the Neo-Hegelians of Bonhoeffer’s time, arguing 
that this differentiation is required for a nuanced account of reception. This 
exploration shows how neo-Hegelians ‘racialised’ Hegel’s Geist in a manner 
congruent with Third Reich policies. Such a trajectory is contrasted with another line 
of Hegel reception that was influential on Bonhoeffer’s thought, namely, the race-
critical perspective of W.E.B. Du Bois.10   
6.1.1. Hegel among the Neo-Hegelians? The Racial Restrictions of Community 
 Andreas Grossmann offers a telling survey of leading neo-Hegelian thinkers 
during the emergence of the Third Reich. Grossmann dates the beginning of the neo-
Hegelian period to a 1910 speech by Wilhelm Windelband in Heidelberg, calling for 
                                                                                                                                                                        
7 DBWE 1, 211; DBW 1, 142. 
8 NL-PhG, 21. 
9 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, 50; cited in Floyd, Dialectics, 193-94. Floyd states that 
however much Adorno is still Hegelian, 'the genocide' as 'absolute integration' is burned into his mind. 
Floyd, Dialectics, 268. 
10 The term 'race' is used advisedly, as the concept has been construed in very different ways. Du 
Bois' own list of races changed over time, and he would easily slip between talk of 'race' and talk of 
'nation'. His 'odd assortment' includes, at one point, the Slavic, English, Romance, Negro, Semitic, 
Hindu, and Mongolian. See Appiah, Lines of Descent, 83-93. 
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progress from neo-Kantianism.11 The 1920s then showed a renewed interest in 
Hegel, appealing to holistic vision and a unity of philosophy and life.12 The 
movement should be examined against the backdrop of legal and constitutional 
battles during the Weimar years, during which the desire for national unity was acute 
and led to an 'ideologisation of jurisprudence’.13 Out of this time, it is lawyers 
educated in legal philosophy and legal history, such as Karl Larenz and Gerhard 
Dulckeit, who sought out Hegel's resources.14  
 Grossmann comments that the ‘Hegel’ of these neo-Hegelians is 
‘characterised by anti-liberalism and anti-individualism’, who became a figure 
adopted to justify the Third Reich after 1933.15 In particular, Karl Larenz picks up 
the notion of a people's spirit, or Volksgeist, transforming the term that previously 
referred to a people’s distinctive culture into 'an ideology permeated by racist 
thought, a requirement, so to speak, to include exclusion (which meant concretely: of 
the Jews) in its own definition’.16 In Larenz's writings, Jews, as they did not have 
German blood and so were not members of the Volk, were not members of the 
community under law. While they would have a qualified legal status, they were to 
be kept from certain positions in the legal process, such as that of a judge or jury 
member.17 Larenz claims that ‘Objective spirit’, the term Bonhoeffer appropriates in 
his first dissertation, is held by the völkisch community for which ‘spirit and blood 
were to merge in a single entity’.18 Exclusion along ‘bloodlines’ was accompanied 
by reinterpretations of the legal status of each member of the Volk, with individual 
                                                            
11 Grossmann, 'Neo-Hegelianism', 234. 
12 Works by Heinrich Levy and Hermann Glockner develop the contours of this movement, with 
the latter providing its name. Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 234. 
13 This phrase comes from Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 253n24.. 
14 Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 235. 
15 Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 244. 
16 He points out that this particular use of the term comes largely from J.G. Herder via 
Montesqieu, rather than directly from Hegel. Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 244. 
17 Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 247. 
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sacrifice necessary for the sake of the whole.19 Such accounts provide ample material 
for Popper’s account of the transmutation of Hegel's Geist into blood in modern 
'racialism’.20 
 Writing on legal developments in that era, Carl Schmitt claims that, on the 
day of Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933, ‘Hegel, so to speak, died’.21  Schmitt's 
argument is a criticism of Hegel, suggesting that the opposition formerly set between 
civil society and state has become obsolete in light of the new arrangement of 'state, 
movement, and people’. In subsequent writings, Schmitt claims that the notion of 
'concrete orders' can be attributed to Hegel. The leading order is unsurprising: 
'Hegel's state is the concrete order of all orders, the institution among all 
institutions’.22 In spite of such ready usage of Hegel's thought, Schmitt admitted in 
1936 that the struggle for Hegel continued; it was uncertain 'whether the living Hegel 
could be found today in Rome, in Berlin, or even in Moscow'.23 
 The assumption of a trajectory between Hegel's account of the Idea and 
National Socialist ideology was explicitly contested in Bonhoeffer's time. Herbert 
Marcuse challenged the 'Hegel to Hitler' line in the 1941 publication Reason and 
Revolution, arguing that it is precisely the demotion of Hegel’s critical reason that 
allowed for National Socialism to come into its own. Marcuse states that Hegel’s 
dynamic, rational conception of society stood in contrast with the Nazi conception of 
the Volk as ‘a natural reality bound together by “blood and soil” and subject to no 
                                                                                                                                                                        
18 Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 244. Cf. Larenz, ‘Die Aufgabe der Rechtsphilosophie’, 224. 
19 Every member’s tiered position, or Gliedstellung, sets one in a set of social obligations, such 
as family or class, in which obligations come prior to rights and the language of individual sacrifice is 
understood as necessary. Grossmann, ‘Neo-Hegelianism’, 247-8. 
20 Popper, Open, 73-75. 
21 Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg, 1933), 32. 
22 Carl Schmitt, Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Hamburg: 
Henseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1934; second edition, Berlin, 1993), 39; cited in Grossmann, 'Neo-
Hegelianism', 256n62. 
23 Carl Schmitt, 'Faschistische und national-sozialistische Rechtswissenschaft', in Deutsche 
Juristenzeitung 41 (1936), 619-20; cited in Grossmann, 'Neo-Hegelianism', 256n62. 
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rational norms or values’.24 He therefore cites numerous National Socialist assaults 
on Hegel’s political theory, adopting Schmitt's dictum of Hegel's death.25 
6.1.2. Race-Critical Reception: The Work of W.E.B. Du Bois 
 It would have been difficult for Bonhoeffer to articulate 'concrete sociality' 
while avoiding the pitfalls of contemporary neo-Hegelians.26 He did not only know 
the German academic context, however, and his intercultural exchanges were 
significant to his critical response to neo-Hegelianism. This section traces an often 
unacknowledged critical line of Hegel reception that Bonhoeffer learned during his 
period of study in America, namely, the race-critical perspective of W.E.B. Du Bois. 
This is a unique critical appropriation, showing an alternate line of reception to the 
racialising dynamic of German neo-Hegelians.27  
 Hegel functioned as a resource and critical foil for Du Bois in two primary 
ways, both of which were shaped by Du Bois' exchange studies at the University of 
Berlin from 1892-94.28 First, Du Bois' 1903 The Souls of Black Folk, which was on 
Bonhoeffer’s course list at Union, makes clear his appropriation of Hegel's thought.29 
The first essay, titled 'Of Our Spiritual Strivings', contains Du Bois' well-known 
                                                            
24 Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (1941), Second 
Edition (London: Routledge, 1955), 413. 
25 Marcuse, Reason, 419. 
26 In Floyd's words, such an articulation had to be carried out 'without playing into the hands of 
one of two camps, either one of the varieties of post-Hegelian ‘positivism’ or the prevalent anti-
critical, if not downright anti-rational, neo-Romantic ethos of Germany' between the wars. See Floyd, 
Dialectics, 115-16. 
27 The background also serves to complicate the claim that Bonhoeffer was oblivious to an 
'unmasking' type of Marxist criticism. It is also claimed that Bonhoeffer's Hegel is 'pre-Marx’. See 
Floyd, Dialectics, 116, 269. Floyd works primarily with Act and Being, neither considering 
Bonhoeffer's later sources nor his intercultural exchange. 
28 Du Bois' exchange period in Berlin then marked a time of 'personal liberation' from the 
confines of racialising categories, and he eagerly inhabited his role as a member of the 
Bildungsbürgertum. Nevertheless, Du Bois witnessed both anti-semitism and claims to the inferiority 
of 'mulattoes' by racial romanticist Heinrich von Treitschke—a figure who had a complex appeal for 
Du Bois. Most importantly, Du Bois found debates over the 'Social Question' by the Historical School 
a helpful analogue to his own scientific study of the 'Negro question past and present’. See Appiah, 
Lines, 27-43. 
29 Appiah claims that Du Bois is 'showing his readers the Geister…of a black Volk’. Though the 
focus of this exposition is on Herder's legacy, Appiah makes note of Hegel at several points. Appiah, 
Lines, 45-47. 
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depiction of 'double-consciousness’, one of the most widely cited in African-
American letters: 'One ever feels his two-ness—an American, a Negro; two souls, 
two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body'.30 
Among the many allusions contained in this passage, Du Bois adopts Hegel’s 
dissatisfaction with this internalized division evoked by the color-line from a fixed 
state into a dynamic pair with both history and future, adopting a drive towards 
reconciliation.31 Unsatisfied with one-sided solutions, Du Bois holds a 'longing to 
attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In 
this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost'. Du Bois then speaks of 
the anticipated end of his striving: 'to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture' in 
terms that echo Hegel’s own emphasis on common 'ethical life', Sittlichkeit.32  
 Second, Du Bois appropriated the concept, shared with Hegel, of the unique 
'political expressivism' of each Volk. This entails a collective 'spirit' that seeks 
reflection, articulation, and nourishment in social institutions.33 Such commitment to 
a particular Volk within the larger nation helps to explain why Du Bois cannot be 
easily plotted among other Hegel-inspired American philosophers in the period. In 
Shamoon Zamir’s words, Du Bois refuses 'to subsume the negative particularity of 
African-American experience into historicist teleologies', particularly those that 
claim American exceptionalism.34 Such estrangement had been shown throughout 
Du Bois’s student days, during which he adopted voluntary segregation over and 
                                                            
30 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003), 9. 
31 Shamoon Zamir notes several parallels between “Strivings” and the Phenomenology, claiming 
that Du Bois makes several creative adaptations—such as having a veil descend rather than lift. Zamir 
traces how Du Bois' studies at Harvard gave him significant exposure to Idealist philosophy, including 
a study of Hegel’s Phenomenology with George Santayana. See Shamoon Zamir, Dark Voices: 
W.E.B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888-1903 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
113-15. 
32 Du Bois, Souls, 9-10. 
33 Robert Gooding-Williams, In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in 
America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 4, 140. 
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against the “recognition,” a key term in Hegel’s social ethic, afforded by white 
culture at the time.35 Although Du Bois resisted racialised political settlements, he 
worked tirelessly for true 'recognition’. In one example that is particularly relevant to 
Bonhoeffer’s life, Du Bois attended the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference along with 
representatives of the NAACP to advocate on behalf of people of colour.36 The 
attempt to meet the American president was denied, and the act of advocacy is rarely 
mentioned in connection to the Treaty, at least relative to the resentment and 
eventual expansionist sentiment expressed by Germans such as Bonhoeffer.   
 Du Bois' writings influenced Bonhoeffer's understanding of racial segregation 
during Bonhoeffer's exchange studies in New York in 1930-31.37 This influence can 
be seen in two extant writings. First, in a church report at the end of his Union year, 
Bonhoeffer writes that in Harlem 'one gets to see something of the real face of 
America, something that is hidden behind the veil of words in the American 
constitution saying that "all men are created equal."'38 This image of the veil is one 
evocative image drawn from Du Bois’ Souls. Second, Bonhoeffer’s 1939 
retrospective adopts a related image from the same work, placing 'the color-line' in 
English in parentheses as a short hand for the 'segregation of races’.39 Unfortunately, 
further elaboration is not available as Bonhoeffer’s essay on African American 
                                                                                                                                                                        
34 This observation comes in a chapter comparing Du Bois with Dewey, Royce, and the St. Louis 
School. Zamir, Dark Voices, 126, cf. 119-33. 
35 Du Bois reflects that “to a white Harvard student of my day, a Negro student who did not seek 
recognition was trying to be more than a Negro.” Autobiography, 85-86. 
36 Williams, Black Jesus, 54-55. 
37 Bonhoeffer encountered Du Bois’ writings in a Union course on “Ethical Viewpoints in 
Modern Literature” with Reinhold Niebuhr and Harry Ward. Du Bois' 1903 The Souls of Black Folk 
was at the top of the course reading list. In course notes, Bonhoeffer comments on W.E.B. Du Bois’ 
criticism of Booker T. Washington, judging that Washington tends “to agree with the statement of the 
inferiority of the black race” while approving Du Bois as “more race-proud!” DBWE 10, 421; DBW 
10, 392. 
38 DBWE 10, 321; DBW 10, 282. 
39 DBWE 15, 440; DBW 15, 433. 
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literature from this year has been lost.40 Given this gap in documentary evidence, 
Reggie Williams does significant work to illustrate Bonhoeffer’s source materials.41  
 Williams makes a convincing case that Du Bois and other African American 
writers are crucial for Bonhoeffer's critical vantage point on racialising tendencies in 
Germany. Nevertheless, Williams tends to read Bonhoeffer’s Harlem influences over 
and against a monolithic German intellectual background, which presumably 
includes Hegel. I call attention to Du Bois' own exchange period in Germany in order 
to depict something of the mutuality Bonhoeffer would later claim between nations 
in the task of 'confession’. In particular, Du Bois' appropriation of Hegel shows that a 
Hegelian legacy cannot be relegated to the German neo-Hegelians whose influence 
was seen in the laws against which Bonhoeffer would write. At the very least, it 
suggests a counter-reading to the view that Hegel's thought leads to the subordination 
of difference.42 
Du Bois' writings would have had a certain congeniality for Bonhoeffer, 
insofar as they drew on a similar academic and cultural milieu. Beyond references to 
Weber or Hegel, however, Du Bois' account of black folk expression was articulated 
in genres that resonated with Bonhoeffer's own attempt to reclaim the language of 
ecclesial 'confession': 'sorrow songs', credal statement, and figural accounts of Christ. 
While these genres might be classified as 'representative' thought by Hegel, their 
rooting in a particular Volk and their claim to an irreducible aesthetic form set them 
alongside Bonhoeffer's challenge to the primacy of conceptual thought. 
                                                            
40 The letter attempting to retrieve the essay is printed in DBWE 12, 95; DBW 12, 51. 
41 Williams, Black Jesus, 75. 
42 Other race-critical receptions involve the qualified use of Hegel as a means to critiquing 
totalising race constructions. For example, Frantz Fanon speaks of the elusive goal of mutual 
'reconnaisance’, using Hegel’s master–slave dialectic to argue for the necessity of true struggle in 
order to transcend merely 'white freedom and white justice’. Fanon sees America to afford such open 
conflict, in contrast to the indifference and paternalism characteristic of the French. See his subsection 
'Le Nègre et Hegel', in Peau Noire, Masques Blancs (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), 195–200. 
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First, Du Bois highlights the 'sorrow songs' in his account of black folk.43 The 
'sorrow songs' sustain a note of lament against American national progress, though 
this is not to abandon the earlier unitive vision as Du Bois names these songs the 
'singular spiritual heritage' of the nation.44 Bonhoeffer collected several recordings of 
what Du Bois styled the 'sorrow songs' during his exchange in New York, playing 
them for students on his return to Germany.45 Black music was one of the ways 
Bonhoeffer expressed lament over his own country’s ominous claims to 
exceptionalism. Second, Du Bois’ folk expression is shown in his employment of the 
genre of credal 'confession’. His short work Credo, from the 1920 collection 
Darkwater, begins with the phrase, 'I believe in God, who made of one blood all 
nations that on earth do dwell'—an allusion to Acts 17:26.46 Du Bois continues that 
his pride can stand against injustice, knowing that 'men may be brothers in Christ, 
even though they be not brothers-in-law’.47 The content of Du Bois' creed calls to 
mind some of Bonhoeffer's own emphases.48 Third, and finally, Du Bois was 
influential in figural narratives of Christ as a means of criticising racial injustice. His 
parable 'Jesus Christ in Texas' recounts the incarceration of a black man alongside 
the visit of an evidently Jewish stranger. In light of the narrow categories of the 
region, the stranger is taken as 'a mulatto, surely, even if he did not own the Negro 
blood, their practiced eyes knew it’.49 When the black man seeks to escape and is 
subsequently lynched, the shadowed form strung from the tree is backlit by a great 
                                                            
43 Du Bois presents these as the irreplaceable folksong, the Volksdichtung of Afro-America, 
showing his Herderian tendency. Appiah, Lines, 46-47. 
44 Du Bois, Souls, 155. 
45 Bonhoeffer also collected NAACP pamphlets, likely including The Crisis, which would have 
been edited by Du Bois. See Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 150. 
46 W.E.B. Du Bois, 'Credo', in Darkwater: Voices From Within the Veil (1920; repr. New York: 
Dover, 1999), 1. 
47 Du Bois, 'Credo’, 1. 
48 For instance, the Acts text holds a significant place in the Lutheran catechism Bonhoeffer 
wrote with Hildebrandt to highlight trans-ethnic unity. See Williams, Black Jesus, 112. 
49 W.E.B. Du Bois, 'Jesus Christ in Texas', in Darkwater, 72. 
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burning cross on which hangs the enigmatic stranger, who promises the lynched man 
he will join him in paradise.50  
Du Bois' parable is an apt segue to Bonhoeffer’s homeland interventions, as it 
illustrates the way that black and Jewish persons are caught up together before the 
'practiced eyes' of racism. The connection helps to convey how Bonhoeffer is 
engaged in a similar critical project insofar as he resolutely depicted a Jewish, as 
opposed to an Aryan, Christ. That black and Jewish struggles are linked in 
Bonhoeffer’s mind seems evident in his later reference to the black church under the 
Rassenfrage, the 'race question', echoing the Judenfrage about which he wrote.51 The 
next section turns to Bonhoeffer’s critical vantage point on legal developments in his 
homeland that followed on from his time in America.  
6.2. State Responsibility Before the Jewish People 
 This section situates Bonhoeffer’s argument on the so-called ‘Jewish 
question’ against the background of Hegel’s views on Jewish ‘emancipation’ in early 
nineteenth-century Prussia. I argue that for all their circumstantial differences, both 
figures turn the ‘Jewish question’ into an interrogation of the state’s own character 
while critiquing its exclusionary impulse. First, I show that while Hegel holds a 
supersessionist view of Judaism as a religion, he goes so far as to claim that the state 
can incur guilt by neglecting the claim that Jews, qua human beings, have on civil 
rights. Second, I trace Bonhoeffer’s forceful argument for the state’s purpose in 
preserving the rights of Jewish persons, even as he maintains theological 
ambivalence about Jewish ‘estrangement’ among the nations. I argue that the 
                                                            
50 Du Bois, Darkwater, 77. 
51 This habit of framing another person or race as a question calls to mind Du Bois’ demurral at 
the constructs of others: 'To the real question, How does it feel to be a problem? I answer seldom a 
word’. Du Bois, Souls, 8. 
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primary difference between them lies not in the call for the state to uphold rights but 
in the strong role Bonhoeffer accords to the church in ensuring that it does so. 
6.2.1. Hegel’s Post-Enlightenment Account: Supersession and Civil Rights  
Hegel has often come under critique for his supersessionist view of Judaism. 
As Yirmiyahu Yovel states, Hegel worked with a theological abstraction and so 
showed himself to be a historical philosopher cut off from the real history of 
postbiblical Judaism.52 Such abstraction was, in the words of Amy Newman, rooted 
in Hegel’s view that Christ's coming as a Jew entailed that universal Christianity 
could 'effectively and conclusively subvert particularistic Judaism'.53 This is partly 
why Hegel diverges from other contemporary portrayals of Judaism that employ 
images of immortality, such as mummification.54 Newman ends her contextualisation 
of Hegel's account, set within an overarching German Protestant discourse on the 
'death of Judaism' that includes infamous statements by Schleiermacher and Kant, 
with a chilling line about the 'death event' of Judaism 'requiring only the formulation 
of effective strategies to this end'.55 She thereby points to the complicity of a long 
tradition of Christian discourse that is linked to the violence perpetrated against the 
Jewish people, particularly in the Shoah.  
 Hegel indeed saw Christianity to ‘sublate’ Judaism, although it is 
questionable whether his critique of religion was primarily about its interrelation 
with national particularity.56 Hegel’s critique appears to focus on an alleged 
                                                            
52 Yirmiyahu Yovel, Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 89. 
53 Amy Newman, 'The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to Hegel', 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXI/3 (1993), 475. 
54 The longstanding imagery of the Jewish people as a mummy is contextualised within the 
Egyptian craze in Berlin in the 1820s. See Newman, 'Death', 475-79. 
55 Newman, 'Death', 480. 
56 On the one hand, Hegel points out that 'the Jewish God is only a national God, has restricted 
himself to this nation'. This follows Hegel's logic of divine movement, that the sublime God is fated 
to, in Taylor’s paraphrase, 'enter into the rawest particular'. On the other hand, particularism is not the 
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'abstraction' between divine purpose and communal reason. In his portrayal of 
Judaism, commandments 'appear only as something given by God, as something 
prescribed and immutable, something eternally and firmly posited'.57 Although Hegel 
concedes that Judaism carries with itself the drive to know wisdom, such that cultic 
activities would be seen as 'rational' and so connected with Sittlichkeit, he argues that 
such wisdom is 'undeveloped and does not penetrate into feeling'.58 As a result of 
such abstraction, Hegel claims that the Jewish people's political constitution is 
superseded by the later Protestant church from which rational ethical life emerges in 
its many forms.  
Nevertheless, in the Prussian ethical settlement about which he wrote, Hegel 
held his supersessionist view of the religion alongside considerable support for 
Jewish civil rights. In §209 of Philosophy of Right he states the goal of his work as a 
Professor with these well-known words:    
It is part of education [Bildung], of thinking as the consciousness of 
the individual in the form of universality, that I am apprehended as a 
universal person in which [respect] all are identical. A human being 
counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, 
Catholic, Protestant, German, Italian, etc.59  
 
The combination of a supersessionist view of religion and advocacy for universal 
rights shows Hegel’s philosophy to be conditioned by an Enlightenment account of 
recognition beyond religious and ethnic identifications.60 Nevertheless, the latter 
commitment was not to be taken for granted. As Shlomo Avineri observes, other 
nineteenth-century thinkers who showed affinity with Hegel’s work opposed Jewish 
                                                                                                                                                                        
ultimate concern for Hegel, who admits both that Judaism speaks of an expanding knowledge of God 
and that Christianity has its own national expressions. See LPR II, 371-73; VPR II, 575-77. 
57 LPR II, 374; VPR II, 578. 
58 LPR II, 374-75; VPR II, 578. 
59 PR, §209. 
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emancipation precisely because of their negative view of Judaism.61 Expansive as 
Hegel’s claim would appear, then, it was vulnerable to those who claimed that Jews, 
because of their religion or lack of ‘education’, remained incapable of participating 
in civil life.62 Hegel therefore returns to the subject of Jewish rights in an extended 
note to §270. 
 Hegel’s note on religious minorities is concerned with the state’s response to 
anomalous cases: those groups that, because of their religious and, at times, ethnic 
commitments could exempt themselves from certain duties. He begins by discussing 
Quakers and Anabaptists, who decline military service. Hegel says here that the state 
can ‘tolerate’ such dissent, foregoing the right it has to claim defense against its 
enemies, if it otherwise exists in a position of strength. He then acknowledges that it 
would similarly be ‘contrary to formal right’ to grant civil rights to the Jews as they 
are not only members of a particular religious group but also belonged to a ‘foreign 
people [Volk]’.63 The reference to formal right likely picks up on the earlier reference 
to the state’s own ‘strict rights’ to demand full allegiance, as expressed through 
military service. 
 On the question of this second anomalous group, which belongs to another 
religion and ‘people’, Hegel challenges the ‘fierce outcry raised against the Jews’. 
Echoing the language of §209 cited earlier, he states that the problem with 
judgements on the basis of these factors ‘ignores the fact that they are, above all, 
humans’.64 Humanity, Hegel continues, is not ‘a mere superficial, abstract quality’ 
                                                                                                                                                                        
60 Relatedly, Yovel remarks that although Hegel had rejected an Enlightenment critique of 
religion, he shows himself conditioned by that very stance in his approach to Judaism. See Yovel, 
Dark Riddle, 82.  
61 Avineri contrasts Hegel’s view with that of the young Hegelian Bruno Bauer, who opposed 
emancipation partly because Jews maintained their religion. See Shlomo Avineri, ‘A Note on Hegel’s 
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64 PR, §270 (Knox, alt.), Hegel's note. 
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but rather the basis for the ‘feeling of oneself as counting in civil society as a person 
with rights’.65 In contrast to those who argued that Jews should not be granted such 
recognition on account of their foreignness, Hegel claims that it is within the state’s 
power to evoke that feeling which inheres in Jewish persons qua human beings. 
Hegel has begun to turn the ‘Jewish question’ into a reflection on the state’s 
own identity. He then asserts that if the state had not bestowed rights, and so avoided 
or even perpetuated this people’s foreignness, then the lack of recognition would run 
both ways: 
the Jews would have remained in that isolation [Trennung] with which 
they have been reproached, and this would rightly have brought blame 
[Schuld] and reproach [Vorwurf] upon the state which excluded them; 
for the state would thereby have failed to recognize its own principle as 
an objective institution with power of its own.66 
 
Remarkably, Hegel speaks of the state incurring ‘reproach’ [Vorwurf], mirroring the 
reproach that had been visited on the Jews in their isolation. In effect, the 
aforementioned ‘outcry’ is being turned against the state that performs the exclusion. 
Hegel then acknowledges that although the call to exclude Jews, as both religious 
and ethnic foreigners, ‘claimed to be based on the highest right, it has proved in 
practice to be the height of folly’.67 He therefore ends with support for the 
government policy in force at the time of his writing.   
The background of the Prussian government policy that Hegel deems ‘wise 
and dignified’ reveals the political ambiguities involved in claiming the rights of 
Jews qua human beings. A proposal initiated in 1808 on the legal status of Jews in 
Prussia sought to make progress towards citizenship rights for influential Jews, a 
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trajectory that sought to avoid formation of a ‘state within a state’.68 Following on 
from this initiative, the 1812 Edict recognised Jews who were legally resident as 
‘native residents and Prussian citizens’, entailing civil rights on the fulfilment of 
certain requirements in that legal context.69 The Edict proposal set forth by State 
Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg had included clearer steps towards Jewish 
involvement in state offices and the military, but alterations by the King intimated a 
series of deferrals to come.70 In any case, the 1812 Edict became the basis for 
Hardenberg and Humboldt’s advocacy for uniform emancipatory laws across the 
German Confederation at the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Their efforts were not 
successful, however, and Jewish civil status remained dependent on the regulation of 
individual German states, many of which sought to roll back freedoms gained during 
French occupation.71 As Jews could not move freely between German states, they 
could not always act to improve their situation.  
Emancipation was often entangled with judgement over Jews’ level of 
‘cultivation’. This shifting criterion was shown in the intra-governmental debates 
that lay behind Prussia’s relatively more progressive Edict. Although Humboldt 
argued that the granting of rights should not be based on pre-existing ‘regeneration’, 
his view did not prevail; rather, as Sorkin observes, ‘the intellectuals who formulated 
the ideology of emancipation between 1806 and 1830 enunciated the doctrine of the 
tutelary state and argued for emancipation on the basis of regeneration’.72 This 
argument was even picked up by many among the Jewish educated bourgeoisie, the 
                                                            
68 The proposal was written by State Minister Friedrich Leopold von Schrötter. Different 
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Gebildeten.73 Because this line of argument met with a variety of responses, the 
majority of the Jewish educated class did not assimilate, i.e. pursue intermarriage, 
conversion, or the severance of ties with the Jewish community, and so came to form 
a unique German-Jewish subculture.74 
In light of this context, it is significant that Hegel’s treatment of civil rights 
emphasises the fellow humanity of Jews rather than the demonstrated level of 
‘cultivation’ achieved by some. In this respect, he remains closer to Humboldt’s 
position. Such likeness is further shown by the way in which Hegel’s views on 
Jewish inclusion were expressed in the academic context, particularly his advocacy 
for the inclusion of Jewish students against strains of nationalism and anti-
Semitism.75 
In summary, Hegel’s supersessionist critique of the religion of Judaism is 
held together with an argument against the exclusion of Jews from civil society 
because of religious or ethnic identity. While Hegel is upholding an incomplete, 
bureaucratised status quo—this is hardly Bonhoeffer’s call for the church to ‘seize 
the wheel’ of the state that fails to grant due rights—he offers a powerful critical 
vantage point, namely, that the state which merely reinforces the isolation of 
foreigners can thereby show itself estranged from its own basic principle.  
On the question of state responsibility toward the Jewish people, then, 
Hegel’s political philosophy proves difficult to appropriate for the exclusionary 
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policies of German National Socialism. The argument against a ‘Hegel to Hitler’ 
trajectory is set forth by T.M. Knox, who cites Hegel’s claim that Jews are to be 
counted as human beings with rights rather than subject to discrimination on account 
of religion or ‘race’.76 Later National Socialist policies may claim the ‘highest right’ 
of state prerogative but, following Hegel’s logic, they deserve utter reproach.  
6.2.2. Bonhoeffer on the Church’s Response to State 'Self-Negation' 
 Bonhoeffer was confronted with the 'Jewish question' largely because of legal 
developments that tested the boundary between state and church. The ‘Law for the 
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service’ of April 7, 1933 sparked widespread 
church deliberation about the status of its ministers and members of Jewish descent. 
In particular, the 'Aryan paragraph' led the Deutsche Evangelische Kirche (DEK) to 
consider the removal of Jewish pastors from office, even questioning whether Jewish 
persons would remain members of the church. The universities were involved in the 
debate, with the theological faculty at Erlangen issuing an expert opinion.77 
Bonhoeffer's well-known essay, 'The Church and the Jewish Question', shows 
a willingness to leave the state to its own task, although he then brings that task 
under scrutiny with a robust 'two-kingdoms' doctrine.78 Bonhoeffer writes that 
‘[w]ithout doubt one of the historical problems that must be dealt with by our state is 
the Judenfrage, and without doubt the state is entitled to strike new paths in doing 
so’.79 These new paths occur on the church's watch, however, for 'the church alone 
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knows what history is and what the state is, pace the university's interpretive seat’.80 
Bonhoeffer then argues that the path indicated by the infamous 1933 law shows the 
state endangering its own 'character as state [Staatlichkeit]’.81  
Calling the state's integrity into question leads to Bonhoeffer's controversial 
claim about times in which the church might have to intervene directly in state 
affairs. In his powerful image, the church may be called 'not just to bind up the 
wounds of the victims beneath the wheel but to seize the wheel itself'.82 He explains 
this by observing that the state can fail both by providing too much law and order, 
e.g. intervening in church affairs, and by providing too little law and order, e.g. 
depriving citizens of their rights. The combined misprision leads to a two-fold result: 
'the church would find itself in a statu confessionis, and the state would find itself in 
the act of self-negation [Selbstverneinung]'.83 This is the paradoxical expression of 
the church's 'ultimate recognition' of the state, by which it opposes the state precisely 
in its calling to preserve it.  
Bonhoeffer's shift to the church's knowing has a problematic aspect, for he 
largely accepts the construction of ‘the Jews’ as a social problem.84 He does try to 
shift the discourse, however, arguing that for the church Jewishness should not be 
considered a 'racial concept' so much as a religious one.85 Bonhoeffer therefore 
explicitly resists the prioritisation, by theologians such as Althaus, of an order of 
race. In his ‘Theses on the Aryan Paragraph in the Church’,86 Bonhoeffer states, ‘the 
church is not a community of people who are all the same but precisely one of people 
                                                            
80 DBWE 12, 363; DBW 12, 350. 
81 DBWE 12, 364; DBW 12, 351-52. 
82 DBWE 12, 365; DBW 12, 353. 
83 DBWE 12, 366; DBW 12, 354. 
84 See Stephen Haynes, The Bonhoeffer Legacy: Post-Holocaust Perspectives (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2006), 65-66. 
85 Bonhoeffer understands the discourse as a racialising one, later arguing against churches 
erecting a 'racial law' for membership. DBWE 12, 368; DBW 12, 356. 
 269 
foreign to one another who are called by God’s Word. The Volk of God is an order 
over and above all other orders’.87 The act of baptism, a constitutive part of the 
‘Word’ in Lutheran tradition, inaugurates this order, binding members with 
‘indissoluble ties’.88 These ties appears stronger than those that bind the Völker 
together in Bonhoeffer’s Barcelona lecture; in the Berlin theses, water proves thicker 
than blood.89  
Bonhoeffer's reasoning, framed by the conviction of a 'state of confession', 
shows that the church can also forfeit its calling. The logic of exclusion derived from 
the Aryan paragraph has the consequence of vocational self-negation: sacrificing a 
single member, ‘the church would no longer be the church’. Insofar as the civil 
restrictions of the Aryan Paragraph are adopted by the church, Bonhoeffer argues 
that the remaining pastors ‘should prefer to stand by those with lesser rights rather 
than to benefit from the privileged status in the church. They must see their own true 
service, which they can still perform for their church, in resigning from this office as 
pastor as a privilege’.90  
While Bonhoeffer's criticism of legal change in 1933 is promising, his shift to 
the 'religious' concept retains a problematic, long-standing ambivalence about the 
ongoing role of the Jewish Volk. He states that ‘[t]he church of Christ has never lost 
sight of the thought that the “chosen people,” which hung the Redeemer of the world 
on the cross, must endure the curse of its action in a long suffering-history 
[Leidengeschichte]’.91 No state can deal with the Jews entirely, he claims, because of 
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this wandering in salvation history; homecoming only comes through conversion in 
this narrative.92 He also maintains, in the course of argumentation, the depiction of 
Judaism as a legalistic, externalised form of religion.93  
6.3. The Limits of Völkisch Thinking 
This section begins with Hegel's criticism of nationalist thinking among 
contemporaries as well as the constraints he puts on his own world-historical 
account. I then show Bonhoeffer's formative experience with 'revelatory community' 
at the intersection of Africa and America, acknowledging that he writes from an era 
beyond Hegel's account. Finally, I show how Bonhoeffer seeks to transcend national 
limits by speaking of a form of catholicity that draws together both ecclesial 
'multiplicity' and 'unity' insofar as national histories have determined them. Although 
this shows his emerging difference from Hegel's assimilation of the church into the 
realised Prussian state, Bonhoeffer's expression employs a dialectic mode of thinking 
similar to Hegel's own. 
6.3.1. Beyond Hegel's Germany: Dark Continent, Future Land 
 Hegel sees the German cultural context, as shaped by the arrival of 
Christianity, to have a focal position in the movement of Geist between 'world-
historical realms’.94 Hegel lists several 'worldly' consequences of the arrival of the 
Christianity in the Roman world and its subsequent development of doctrine for the 
life of the state. The first is that freedom has been actualised for human beings as 
such, regardless of ethnic or religious identities, entailing the abolition of slavery.95 
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There is also a new valuation of individual inwardness as well as state autonomy.96 
Hegel's subsequent reference to the 'Germanic [germanisch]' incorporates a broad 
range of European peoples, although his emphasis on the Lutheran Reformation and 
Teutonic character lead him to prize 'Germany proper [das eigentliche 
Deutschland]'.97 
 Hegel’s particular form of 'centricity' involves dealing with the national 
limitations that make up the philosopher's temporal location. In Philosophy of Right, 
he states that ‘it is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its 
contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age’.98 
In contrast to Kant, categories of thought are not fixed and eternal; for Hegel there 
are changing historical preconditions of knowing.99 Nevertheless, this is to be 
matched with the notion that philosophy, in apprehending the 'concept’, is the 
'supreme blossom' of this entire shape of history.100 Truth is seen as neither eternal 
nor historical—a  false dichotomy for Hegel, who articulates them as inseparable.101 
As with many of his claims to unity, there has been an ensuing debate over how 
much Hegel acknowledged the national and temporal limitations to his thought.  
 Hegel's multi-faceted notion of Geist involves a reciprocal relation between 
an individual and her people. This is shown in his admiration for the Greek city-state, 
which was seen as a harmonious whole antecedent to fragmented modern societies. 
The admiration for such social harmony is clear from Hegel's early essays on 
Christianity, in which he opines on the beauty of a people related in love. His early 
expressivist statements also show how linguistic, even rational, constructions are 
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always those of a particular Volk. Thus, when faced with the strong elements of 
provincialism in his own Volk, a motivating question to his early work was, in 
Pinkard's words: 
could "Germany" remain "Germanic" in the conditions of the modern 
world? Or does "Germany" necessarily have the same fate that Hegel 
at the time ascribed to ancient Greece or to the Jews - that, having 
played its role on the world stage, it now is fated to sink gradually into 
oblivion?102 
 
The combination of love and fear is partly behind Hegel's criticism of narrow 
nationalist interests. As the previous chapter has traced, Hegel was of two minds 
about the French Revolution, a fact that Pinkard ties to his position as a ‘mixture of 
hometowner and reformer’.103 Hegel’s sympathies with the ‘hometowners’ come 
from being raised as the son of a Württemberg civil servant, a background that left 
him suspicious of Kantian appeals to universal reason that seemed to discount the 
influence of local customs.104 Hegel was therefore ready to take a calculated position 
about appeals to universal right after Napoleon; Pinkard claims that Hegel 
maintained that ‘unadulterated hometown life was clearly a thing of the past’, and yet 
‘it could not simply be abolished, since the simple, “unmediated” abolition of 
hometown life would undermine the authority of the reform movement 
altogether’.105  
 Although Hegel warned against the effacement of local customs by the 
claims of universal right, he could be devastatingly critical of entrenchment in 
particular traditions. In personal correspondence, Hegel mocked  'old Bavaria'—a 
term used to distinguish the region that preceded post-Napoleonic expansion, setting 
apart its inhabitants from 'foreigners'—by referring to 'Barbaria’, a play on the Latin 
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term Bavariae.106 Hegel also coined the memorably ‘scathing pun’ that renders those 
who celebrated Deutschtum, ‘Germandom’, as the Deutschdumm, the ‘German-
dumb’.107 In Hegel’s view, such particularism could entrench pockets of resistance to 
the expansion of rights suitable to the modern era.  
 Hegel's awareness of limitation to national thinking nevertheless coincides 
with an admittedly 'Eurocentric' account. This is related to his conviction that a 
philosophical account of world history takes seriously the geographical and climatic 
conditions of peoples as either help or hindrance to the emergence of Geist—here, 
again, a rationally actualising social field marked by the consciousness of freedom. 
'The state as the bearer of history' is in this way 'the unity of spirit and nature' in the 
words of Hodgson and Brown; awareness of natural environs is therefore not a mere 
appendix to Hegel's account.108 Such a 'natural basis' to history contributes to Hegel's 
focus on Europe, for he sees Geist to emerge most effectively in those nations 
located in the temperate, broad breast of civilisation, impeded by neither torrid nor 
frigid conditions. It is also the reason that certain peoples are peripheral to his 
account of history. 
 Two continents are peripheral to the 'centre' in Hegel's account, while being 
of particular interest in light of Bonhoeffer's ecumenical, intercultural engagements. 
First, Hegel makes the portentous claim that for Africa “history is in fact out of the 
question,” lacking the unifying emergence of spirit and so consigned to “a succession 
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of contingent happenings.”109 His claim that the continent is not a historical nation is 
based in his idea that it has no self-reflective narrative expressed through the state.110 
This judgement is partly based on the absence of a written archive, but partly the 
ideology that instances of ‘development’ must come from external influence.111 
Hegel claims that the continent is 'enclosed within itself'; 'Africa proper', he asserts, 
is 'removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle 
of night'.112   
 Second, Hegel sees the Americas as yet to emerge as historical actors in their 
own right. For both North and South America, he recounts how native—in his view 
'purely natural' and inferior—cultures were either destroyed or withdrew from 
European colonial expansion.113 Hegel associates the political stability of American 
continents according to external religious difference: North America has grown in 
industry and civil order, achieving 'firmly established freedom;' South America still 
has republics based on force, and so undergoes 'continuous revolutions'.114 
Reiterating his judgement on Catholic influence in the state, he claims that the 
difference lies in the fact that Spanish settlements imposed Catholicism, while North 
America is Protestant.115  
 The American character of this Protestantism is suspect, however, as it lacks 
the relative unity of European countries, 'where deviations are limited to a few 
confessions’.116 As might be expected, Hegel casts American religious expressions in 
pejorative terms: 'innumerable sects' lead to caprice and instances of enthusiasm; on 
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the whole, it is hard to see a cohesive state emerge from such an 'anarchy of 
worship’.117 Emergence as a unique historical actor nevertheless lies ahead, for 
Hegel acknowledges a need to break from past and present influence, as well as his 
own limitations: 
It is up to America to abandon the ground on which world history has 
hitherto been enacted; what had taken place there up to now is but an 
echo of the Old World and the expression of an alien life; and as a 
country of the future, it is of no interest to us here, for prophecy is not 
the business of the philosopher.118 
 
Hegel’s reticence to forecast is another way of expressing his well-known aphorism 
that the owl of Minerva flies only at night. 
 Hegel's reticence about predicting a future, one that involves emergence 
beyond the 'Old World’, shows that he does not hold to a superficial 'end of history’. 
As his appreciative critique of the French Revolution would suggest, Hegel wrote of 
global history with the potential of such upheavals in plain view. He therefore kept 
himself from pre-empting either future events or the judgment of later historians.119 
As Pinkard observes, Hegel’s 'Eurocentricity' involves prioritising 'the way in which 
European culture embodied a fundamental "negativity" about itself'.120 Such a self-
critical posture has its limits, of course; to take but one example, Hegel's degrading 
characterisation of Africa contributed to a tradition that adversely affected the 
continent’s future prospects.  
 Before turning to Bonhoeffer, it is worth noting Du Bois' revision of the 
historical record after Hegel’s influential account. Du Bois is to be counted among 
the later historians who took up the task of ‘negative’ critique, appraising Hegel’s 
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world-historical account for its rationality, which is to say, in Hegel’s terms, its 
contribution to freedom.121 The title of Du Bois' work The World and Africa: An 
Inquiry into the Part which Africa has Played in World History conveys his full 
frontal challenge to the 'Authority' that claims an account of the globe can be written 
which ignores 'black folk'.122 In the work, Du Bois rejects the omission of Africa 
from truly “historical” peoples as 'scientifically unsound and also dangerous for 
logical social conclusions'.123 This is only one of Du Bois’s many interventions in the 
historical record, to which might be added his initiative with the Pan-African 
Congress and a later move to Ghana for work on the Encyclopedia Africana. Du 
Bois’s research into African cultures leads him to increasingly attempt to think 
beyond modern western forms in articulating 'black subjectivity'.124 As noted above, 
his race-critical thinking would affect Bonhoeffer’s own account of the revelatory 
community. 
6.3.2. Bonhoeffer’s Confession as a Transnational Dialectic 
 Given that Hegel left Africa and the Americas on the periphery of his 'world-
historical' account, it is fascinating to trace Bonhoeffer's reflections on 'Christ 
existing as community' in light of his experience in the African American church. 
Bonhoeffer's emphasis on thinking the community as a 'whole' goes back to 
Sanctorum Communio, in which he sought an articulation of the Gesamtgemeinde 
that was not reducible to the churches' state of 'empirical' division. There he claimed 
the desire to express God’s totality of will and the one Spirit who works through 
estrangement. Bonhoeffer’s ensuing exchange period in New York exposed him to 
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the depth of ecclesial division, particularly during his participation in the black 
church.125  
Bonhoeffer's attempt to think through the divisions in German and American 
communities is powerfully expressed in his 1939 essay 'Protestantism Without 
Reformation'.126 Significantly, it is written during Bonhoeffer's flight from his 
homeland—and experience of 'statelessness' unrivalled in Hegel's life. This 
contributes to his appreciative tone for the 'multiplicity' of church life in America, a 
nation of peoples fleeing persecution. As Bethge observes, 'this time the refugee and 
person turning back home could appreciate the nation of refugees’.127 Moreover, 
Bonhoeffer’s sense of national exile makes it increasingly difficult for him to think 
catholicity—in his own words, 'for any thoughts of the Una sancta to make 
headway'.128 The experience of displacement is a crucial but often overlooked 
element of the essay that challenges an easy claim to unity.  
Bonhoeffer’s attention to such socio-political realities is often attributed to 
his training at Union, which would include Du Bois’ texts.129 Indeed, it is significant 
that although Bonhoeffer notes how American churches lack theology, he himself 
does not spend much time engaging with the theological implications of opposing 
Christologies of colour; rather, his treatment of the 'race question' proceeds as a 
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series of social critiques.130 While there is a marked change from this period, the 
difference between theology and politics, or Europe and America, cannot be posed 
too sharply for two reasons. First, Bonhoeffer’s modification of Hegel’s thought for 
the expression 'Christ existing as community' links theology to the church’s socio-
historical realities. In other words, his critical commentary on a racially segregated 
ecclesial and political reality is another way of posing that famous biblical riposte to 
sectarianism: 'is Christ divided?'131 Second, Bonhoeffer’s broader philosophical 
background is not as apolitical as some Americans might suppose. In his time at 
Union, Bonhoeffer was suspicious of 'radically empirical' thinkers and the 
widespread local assumption that questions of Kantian epistemology were 
nonsense.132 Such provincialism sets aside the political implications of Idealism, 
insulating America’s own philosophico-ethical nexus from challenge.  
 The political edge of Bonhoeffer’s critique is shown as he refers back to his 
German philosophical tradition, and the ecclesial memory from which it grows, for a 
vision of holism and critique of the isolated particular. He writes that America’s 
foundational attempt to protect multiple churches, as people were fleeing persecution 
in Europe, contributed to a dynamic in which 'the remaining communities have more 
a denominational than an ecclesial self-understanding’.133 As a result, segregation 
could continue by another name, or set of nominations; no truly 'ecclesial' self-
understanding, bound to the confession of catholicity, would allow white 
congregants to forbid black members from kneeling to pray in their midst. 
                                                            
130 Drawing on the literature he had encountered at Union, Bonhoeffer remarks that 'the fact that 
today the "black Christ" of a young Negro poet is pitted against the "white Christ" reveals a 
destructive rift within the church of Jesus Christ’. He records racialized segregation in pastoral office, 
seating priority, and access to the communion table. As a result, 'the common worship service became 
for Negroes more and more a farce’. DBWE 15, 456-7; DBW 15, 453-45. 
131 See 1 Corinthians 1:11-13. 
132 Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 160-61. 
133 DBWE 15, 440; DBW 15, 434. 
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In diagnosing the problem with denominationalism, Bonhoeffer uses broad 
philosophical brush strokes to differentiate national expressions of polity.134 He first 
notes the influence of nominalism in America, which he glosses as the view that: 'the 
existing particular has priority before the whole in the sense that the particular and 
empirically given is the real, while the whole is merely a notion, a name. The 
particular stands at the beginning, unity at the end’.135 He contrasts this with 
'German-Continental' philosophies such as idealism, for which 'the whole is the 
original reality, and the particular is merely that which has fallen away from the 
unity’.136 Although Bonhoeffer’s foil of 'nominalism' is underdeveloped, it can be 
traced back to an enduring concern with the isolated particular.137  
Bonhoeffer contrasts a German philosophical tradition that emphasises 
thinking the unified whole with the American nomination of particular churches. 
This was not merely to dismiss the American tradition, however. In fact, Bonhoeffer 
held the unfulfilled wish of extending his Union fellowship to investigate 
Pragmatism, an interest that stemmed from reading through the works of William 
James.138 More importantly, he is not primarily interested in transmitting a 
philosophical legacy; Bonhoeffer’s determinative vocation is as a theologian, so 
these philosophical bearings serve to orient him back to the German memory of a 
united church.139 
 Bonhoeffer’s critique of the American philosophical tradition and its 
expression in church polity leads him to speak of the unifying task of 'confession’. 
                                                            
134 He notes that these broad strokes are insufficient. DBWE 15, 443; DBW 15, 437. 
135 DBWE 15, 443; DBW 15, 437. 
136 DBWE 15, 443; DBW 15, 437. 
137 It would be worth comparing Bonhoeffer's critique of atomism with Hegel's depiction of bare 
particularity as a 'bad infinite' if taken apart from universal considerations. Bonhoefer has Hegel's 
underlined. NL-VPR I, 212. 
138 See Bethge, Bonhoeffer, 161. 
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Throughout the essay he is interested in the struggle for a theological statement of 
belief, a profession such as that adopted in his homeland as the distinguishing mark 
of the Confessing Church over and against the German Christians. In comparison, 
Bonhoeffer sees the American church to lack vigour, speculatively accounting for 
this in terms of a history involving flight from persecution in Europe. 'There is no 
room for strife in asylum’, he observes, expressing concern over how subsequent 
generations merely inherit a divided settlement without undergoing the struggle for 
truth.140 Compartmentalization is not only shown by generations, but with respect to 
how churches think of themselves vis-à-vis the confessions of other peoples. 
Bonhoeffer therefore warns that particular church movements should not be placed 
into a boring 'convenient and dead schematisation' such that, for instance, the social 
gospel is seen as 'typically American’.141 Such a non-threatening mode of inquiry is 
'false because it dissolves from the outset the mutual obligation the churches have for 
each other’s proclamation and doctrine’.142   
The call for 'mutual obligation' between churches, a confessional link that 
goes beyond mere socio-historical difference, should be read against elements of 
German paternalism in the essay. It is true that Bonhoeffer is concerned with how the 
struggle for 'one true church' that marks the German Reformation is marginalised in 
America.143 Nevertheless, Marsh misrepresents Bonhoeffer’s posture by claiming 
that 'the essay fairly burns with contempt for the "denominations of America."'144 
Perhaps related to the absence of any mention of the black church in Marsh’s 
summary of the essay, the attribution of contempt obscures the serious criticism that 
                                                                                                                                                                        
139 Bonhoeffer claims in this essay that Idealism and realism are “based on philosophical-
methodological demands derived from theological insights.” They are thus not sufficient as 
background to the properly theological question. DBWE 15, 443; DBW 15, 437. 
140 DBWE 15, 447; DBW 15, 442. 
141 DBWE 15, 438; DBW 15, 432. 
142 DBWE 15, 438; DBW 15, 432. 
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denominational lines fall conveniently along the lines of segregation, creating a 
dynamic of avoidance over the so-called 'race question’.  
Rather than a one-sided polemic against America, Bonhoeffer insists on 
drawing the two nations together in the confessional task, as shown by his 
unequivocal statement that it is 'the same church-community of Jesus Christ that is at 
stake, both in America and among us’.145 He therefore takes care in how he describes 
his host nation, respecting the different historical contours of confession across the 
ocean: 
For American Christendom, the unity of the church of Jesus Christ is 
not so much something that is given originally by God and already 
exists as it is something that is demanded and should be. Church is 
less origin than it is goal.146 
 
This aspect of the American churches mean they have a key role in recovering lost 
catholicity, for Bonhoeffer sets the two nations in a dialectical relationship, each 
pointing towards a Christ who is not reducible to one political economy:  
where unity is understood as origin and goal alike, the life and work 
of Christendom, which seeks and finds the unity of the fragmented 
church, grows from the foundation of the life and work of Jesus 
Christ, in whom all unity of the church is fulfilled.147 
 
The dialectic relationship is that America ‘poses the question of multiplicity’, while 
Germany ‘poses the question of unity’, with both queries necessary to thinking the 
church as one.148 For the time being, such credal confession reveals the need for 
confession as corporate penitence. Bonhoeffer therefore ends the essay by 
                                                                                                                                                                        
143 DBWE 15, 442; DBW 15, 436. 
144 Marsh, Strange, 283. 
145 He later remarks that the different national patterns of secularisation can be better understood 
in the contrast. DBWE 15, 439, 453 DBW 15, 432, 449. 
146 DBWE 15, 443; DBW 15, 437. 
147 DBWE 15, 445; DBW 15, 439. 
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identifying the enduring effects of America’s racialising history as both guilt 
[Schuld] and future problem.149  
6.4. Between Shapes of Geist and the Form of Christ 
This final section considers Bonhoeffer's experiment in a historical account 
of the 'form of Christ' in Ethics. In contrast to Hegel's emphasis on knowing the 
Gestalten of particular 'spirits' of the peoples, Bonhoeffer speaks of the singular 
Gestaltung of Christ. Such language shows Bonhoeffer's alternative to what he calls 
a 'docetic-idealist ecclesiology', bringing the community of real presence to bear on 
the ‘natural basis’ of world history. For Bonhoeffer, to speak of the church is to 
speak of a particular body, and therefore the language of 'form' is a way of narrating 
either cultural acceptance or rejection of the Christian community, while maintaining 
that encounter with the Jewish people cannot cease. This provides a segue into 
related claims for diasporic peoples, leading to his argument for moral perception 
from the 'underside of history'.  
6.4.1. Hegel on the Shapes of Geist and Cunning of Reason 
 Although reason operates with a certain cunning, Hegel claims that different 
Geister have particular 'shapes' or 'forms' that can be discerned. In the 
Phenomenology, he refers to the transition between epochs as ushering in a 'new 
world, new shape of spirit [Geistesgestalt]’.150 Hegel also speaks about the different 
'Gestalten of consciousness'.151 This language is often associated with particular 
lands, as shown in the transition between France and Germany. Hegel's later 
Philosophy of Right acknowledges limitations on the diverse 'spirits of peoples', 
which Hegel otherwise regards as independent, ethical wholes. As a result, he points 
to a higher level of Geist: 
                                                            
149 DBWE 15, 456; DBW 15, 453. 
150 PhG, §808. Earlier he refers to the Formen of spirit. PhG, §29. 
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The principles of the spirits of peoples [Volksgeister] are in general 
restricted on account of their particularity, for it is in this particularity 
that, as existent individuals, they have their objective actuality and 
their self-consciousness. Their deeds and destinies in their relations to 
one another are the manifest [erscheinende] dialectic of the finitude of 
these spirits, and out of it arises the universal spirit, the spirit of the 
world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises 
its right—and its right is the highest right of all—over these finite 
spirits in world history as the world's court of judgement 
[Weltgericht].152 
 
This comment occurs in the transition from Hegel’s discussion of right and 
recognition between states to the limitations of any one state within the turmoil of 
international relations, with their contingencies and the play of passions, interests, 
and force.153 
 For Hegel, such historical conflicts have a 'rational' character, even if that 
reason operates by a 'cunning' that makes it difficult to identify. In other words, 
Hegel claims that history is comprised of 'identifiable' or 'classifiable' elements.154 
The terms are helpful in showing what a claim to Weltgeist entails: not a pantheistic 
entity so much as a quality to world events that can be ‘minded’, even if only in 
retrospect. Although Hegel can name the arbitrariness of individual deaths, as he did 
in his treatment of the French Revolution, he remains committed to tracing a broader 
emergence of the 'consciousness of freedom' that is the mark of reason. History may 
be a 'slaughter bench’, in his stark admission, but it is not without purpose. Of 
course, Hegel’s claim to ‘rationality’ active in history came to seem increasingly 
absurd in light of the slaughter that took place in the two wars through which 
Bonhoeffer lived.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
151 PhG, §36. 
152 PR, §340, cf. p. 475-76. As Wood notes, the phrase Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht is 
often attributed to Hegel himself, but the phrase is actually taken from Schiller's poem 'Resignation’. 
153 PR, §340 (Knox). 
154 Adams, Eclipse, 113-115. 
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 In any case, the discernment of reason's course, at least in its higher forms, is 
only available to some. Hegel therefore remarks on the pathos of those individuals 
who lead world history: 
At the vanguard of all actions, including world-historical actions, stand 
individuals as subjectivities giving actuality to what is substantial. 
They give life to the substantial deed of the world spirit and they are 
therefore immediately at one with that deed, though it is concealed 
from them and is not their aim and object.155 
 
These individuals will not necessarily receive public honour for their roles, as such 
recognition awaits the philosopher who can discern what has taken place.156 The 
autonomy of the world-historical figures role is necessary, however, insofar as 
history is guided by a logic immanent to human activity; the course of events is not 
at the mercy of some transcendent ‘absolute’, a kind of puppet-master that governs 
reality.157  
 For Hegel, retrospective philosophical judgement is the action through which 
the work of providence can be perceived. He writes that education can bring this 
discernment, criticising those who claim that providence is 'inscrutable and 
incomprehensible’, likely including Kant's admission in the essay 'Towards Perpetual 
Peace’.158 Such perception, however, is not necessarily at the forefront of states, 
peoples, or the individuals who lead them. Their respective constitutional interests 
show an awareness of Geist at a certain level, but with respect to world Geist 'they 
are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of this inner activity', while as Geist 
prepares for its next stage, 'the shapes which they take pass away'.159 In contrast to 
                                                            
155 PR, §348 (Knox). 
156 PR, §348 (Knox), cf. 362-63n318. 
157 Houlgate, Hegel, 24-25. 
158 The link is drawn by Houlgate, PR, 362n316. 
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this ignorance of a certain level, the philosophical historian can come to know how 
Geist is to be discerned, both as and beyond these particular shapes.  
 In the later Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel identifies a 
discrepancy between intention and outcome in a passage where he also defines the 
historian's concern: 
The deeds of the great men who are the individuals of world history 
thus appear justified not only in their inner significance (of which the 
individuals in question are unconscious), but also in a secular sense. 
But from this latter point of view, no representations should be made 
against world-historical deeds and those who perform them by moral 
circles to which such individuals do not belong.160 
 
Napoleon is a prime example of Hegel's characterisation of the world-historical 
figure through whom the cause of freedom progresses, often malgré lui. Hegel's 
doctrine of the ‘cunning of reason’ meant that he saw it as a personal tragedy but not 
a fatal blow to ideals of freedom that would reach their culmination in German 
idealism.161 Napoleon does not come at the end, for only Hegel can put in conceptual 
form what Napoleon accomplished.   
 Hegel's focus tends to neglect the victims of larger historical movements, 
whether revolution or expansion.162 He also makes statements of chilling disregard 
for those peoples who are not dominant. Hegel speaks of the way a particular Volk is 
'assigned a moment of the Idea', and therefore 'entrusted with giving complete effect 
to it in the advance of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world spirit'.163 
This role has a 'natural' basis, involving geographical placement and the 
                                                            
160 Hegel LPWH, 141. He continues that the philosophy of world history does not 'refrain from 
judgement' so much as leave individuals unmentioned, 'for what it has to record is the activity of the 
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161 See Pinkard, Hegel, 311. 
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anthropological conditions through which it has risen to dominance. Nevertheless, it 
is a position the Volk holds only once on the world stage: 
In contrast with this its absolute right of being the bearer of this 
present stage in the world spirit's development, the spirits of the other 
peoples are without rights, and they, along with those whose epoch has 
passed, no longer count in world history.164 
  
The clear implication is that stronger nations will set the terms for those of inferior 
cultivation. These passages show the susceptibility of Hegel's thought to hierarchical 
and racialising accounts.165 Moreover, it is hard to find space for the act of lament 
within the broader movement.166  
 Hegel's broad vision of history also lacks a distinctive role for church figures 
vis-à-vis the ‘political’ actors in world-historical drama. Adams puts this point 
sharply: 'the world-historical individuals are not the saints, who follow Christ, but 
Alexander the Great and Napoleon who precede and supplant him'.167 This gap is set 
in relief by Bonhoeffer's own instinct to place 'church-history' at the centre of world 
history. Christ as community, a real bodily presence whether acknowledged or 
rejected by the social order, is the focal point of Bonhoeffer’s experimental account.  
6.4.2. Bonhoeffer on the Form of Christ and the ‘View from Below’ 
 In Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer qualified his appropriation of objective 
Geist by stating that ‘it is not my intention to call Hegel forth from the grave’, 
                                                            
164 PR, §347 (Knox). This comment might be compared with §351, in which Hegel speaks of the 
right of civilised nations 'to regard and treat as barbarians those who lag behind them in the substantial 
moments of the state’. 
165 Pace Houlgate's observation that Hegel gives no priority to racial difference, claiming that the 
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Hegel, 23, 175. 
166 Martin Wendte argues that the late Hegel undercuts both the particular victim of history and 
the sovereignty of the God who might respond to it. See Martin Wendte, 'Lamentation Between 
Contradiction and Obedience' in Evoking Lament: A Theological Discussion, ed. Eva Harasta and 
Brian Brock (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 86. 
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making particular reference to how Hegel positions the Geister of peoples as 
‘moments’ in the dialectical evolution of Geist.168 Even so, Bonhoeffer’s early 
nationalism showed disregard for the lives of others. In 1929 Bonhoeffer made an 
early foray into providential history, striking a number of similar tones to Hegel. The 
lecture was written with a view to educating his expatriate congregation about the 
intellectual crisis in the homeland in the wake of the war and Versailles settlement.169 
Entitled 'Basic Questions in a Christian Ethic', it includes a section on war that 
defends, even 'sanctifies', shedding blood on behalf of one's Volk.170 More 
disturbingly, it speaks of a nation heeding the call to expansion under the 'Lord of 
history’, even if that means disregarding the lives of other peoples.171 Bonhoeffer's 
main difference from Hegel in this lecture, as a twenty-three year old pastor, is the 
inscrutability of the divine will behind such acts of displacement in world-history; 
the tragic actor knows only the constraints of the 'world's laws’, which bind him to 
blood and soil. 
In comparison with Bonhoeffer’s Barcelona series, his later writings show a 
clear shift away from the inscrutable 'Lord of history' to the revealed Christ. In 
Ethics, his experimental account of national histories is oriented both with respect to 
the churches and, therefore, how church-state relations depict either the form of 
incarnation or crucifixion. The essay does retain, however, a focus on 'the West’. In 
'Heritage and Decay’, Bonhoeffer leaves several peripheral continents by stating that 
'one can only speak of historical heritage in the Christian West'.172 Bonhoeffer goes 
                                                            
168 DBWE 1, 102n134; DBW 1, 65 [SC-A]. 
169 DBWE 10, 325; DBW 10, 285. While working as a pastor in Barcelona, Bonhoeffer observed, 
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on to speak of European nations finding their unity 'through the form of Christ’.173 At 
first, this appears to be a retreat from the promising trans-Atlantic exchange that 
includes the African American church to a European frame of reference. 
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer's use of Christological form in history resources the 
deconstruction of superficial Eurocentrism for two reasons. 
First, it is critical to understand that Bonhoeffer is not defining the West as a 
monolith but as an arena of historical contest. He distinguishes a middle European 
group, led by Germany, from 'the West'. Bonhoeffer refers to German self-
understanding, including its unique political philosophy of freedom through terms, 
such as Mitteleuropa and Abendland, which are distinct from Britain, France, and the 
United States as der West, nuanced diction that Michael DeJonge notes is obscured 
in translation.174 These two collectives are defined according to their relation to the 
community of the church, which is to say, the form Christ has taken in the world. 
Bonhoeffer associates the 'Western' view of historical continuity with the incarnation 
of Christ; specifically, the Roman heritage represents 'antiquity's bonding with and 
assimilation into Christianity’.175 This is carried on in the Roman Catholic church 
and national contexts such as France, Italy, and England.176 In contrast, Bonhoeffer 
claims, for Germany 'the tension, or even the break, between antiquity and 
Christianity (inherent in the Greek heritage) was strongly felt’.177 This historical 
break is conveyed as a thought form of crucifixion. Each is, however, only a one-
sided account: 
                                                            
173 DBWE 6, 110; DBW 6, 100. 
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175 DBWE 6, 106; DBW 6, 96. 
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But because Christ is both the incarnate and the crucified, and wills to 
be recognized as both equally, the proper reception of the historical 
heritage of antiquity is still an open Abendland task. The Germans [die 
Deutschen] and Western peoples [westlichen Völker] will be brought 
closer together by the search for a common solution to this problem.178 
 
Rather than locating Christ with either heritage, it is working through this cultural 
opposition that leads to the form of Christ. It is a resolution similar to Bonhoeffer's 
claim to catholicity as the encounter between German holism and American 
multiplicity.179  
 Second Bonhoeffer's account retains elements of his deepened awareness of the 
'underside' of history, particularly through the experience of diasporic peoples. The 
trans-national turn to 'confession' as socially constitutive, born of Bonhoeffer's 
experience as exchange student and refugee, marks a shift from Hegel's organic view 
of the state. Influenced as he was by early Greek philosophy, Hegel did not conceive 
of fully human life beyond the state, even that very state in which one was born.180 In 
contrast, Bonhoeffer's expression of a church polity requires attending to the 
diaspora.  
 The dialectic of the West is opened out by Bonhoeffer's insistence on a 
particular diaspora: 'Western history is by God's will inextricably bound up with the 
people of Israel, not just genetically but in a genuine, unceasing encounter'.181 This 
leads him to argue against the racialising currents of his time: 'driving out the Jew(s) 
from the West must result in driving out Christ with them, for Jesus Christ was a 
                                                            
178 DBWE 6, 107; DBW 6, 96. 
179 Bonhoeffer locates himself within the German heritage, and so favours the Abendländisch 
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180 Inwood, Dictionary, 280. 
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Jew’.182 Significantly, the historical status of the Jews, through the person of Christ, 
relativises the Germanic völkisch past. Germany has its encounter with Christ 
through the form of Roman Christianity, but when Germany breaks with antiquity it 
can no longer reinstate its indigenous past. Although this ethnic past 'remains with us 
by nature, as a species or, if one will, a race', Bonhoeffer continues; 'It is not, and 
never can become, a historical heritage'.183 There is only one way to truly temporal 
consciousness: 'Jesus Christ has made [the West] into a historical unity'.184 As a 
result, Bonhoeffer sees his nation as closer, in a sense to the Jewish people than to its 
own völkisch past. 
 Bonhoeffer’s reference to the Jewish diaspora should be read alongside another 
passage of the Ethics that reveals his continued awareness of those who live ‘behind 
the veil’ even as he composes this account of the ‘West’. Bonhoeffer recounts how 
he attempted to convince a prominent church leader in Germany to join international 
reaction to the 1931 Scottsboro case in Georgia, claiming that the sentencing of nine 
young black men was a 'terrible miscarriage of justice'. In response to the church 
official’s refusal to protest the sentencing, on the basis of allegedly Lutheran 
understanding of vocation, Bonhoeffer counters with Nietzsche’s exhortation to 'love 
of the farthest'.185 This recollection shows that Bonhoeffer’s account is open to 
extension through further work on Du Bois that calls to mind the lives of 'diaspora 
blacks' who express the 'ambivalences' of modernity and its history of 
enslavement.186 
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 The reference to the Scottsboro case in Ethics shows how Bonhoeffer had 
begun to see history in a new manner. At the turn of the year 1942-43, reflecting on 
ten years of acute Kirchenkampf, Bonhoeffer acknowledges what he has learned: 
It remains an experience of incomparable value that we have for once 
learned to see the great events of the history of the world from below, 
from the viewpoint of the outcasts, the suspects, the maltreated, the 
powerless, the oppressed and reviled—in short from the viewpoint of 
the suffering.187 
 
Commenting on this passage, Gustavo Gutiérrez observes that Bonhoeffer does not 
here offer a critical analysis of the structures of oppression. Nevertheless, Gutiérrez 
argues that Bonhoeffer's new sense for the 'limitations of his own theological 
enterprise' provides a point of departure for what he calls 'theology from the 
underside of history'.188 However, limited, this movement reveals a striking departure 
from German idealist tendencies in 'metahistory', making Bonhoeffer's account an 
important critical voice for the work of philosophical and theological accounts of 
history.189    
6.5. Polycentric History? Beyond Appeals to Antiquity 
 Hegel's world-historical account is 'polycentric' in the sense that there is a 
shift in dominance between peoples over time. Although he recognises the 
culminating moment of the Prussian state of his own time, this awareness did not 
preclude the future shift to another people at the 'centre'. His demurral to speculate 
on the American future on the world stage shows some reticence for one who had 
lived through the French Revolution. Nevertheless, in important ways his negative 
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characterisations of certain continents had a constraining effect on their profiles 
among the nations. Moreover, Hegel's broader movement of the shapes of Geist 
tends to pass over the lament and Christ-identification of peoples under the 
dominance of others. Such inattention shows a philosophy too quick to resolve the 
Good Friday at its heart.190  
 Bonhoeffer does not speak of polycentricity so much as a 'hiddenness' to the 
singular form at the centre. This claim to concealment is not to be fully associated 
with viewing history from the 'underside’, to borrow Gutierrez's expression. Rather, 
it is to say that the 'form' of Christ is not reducible to the church's place within the 
life of any one people—even, pace Hegel, within the realised Lutheran state. The 
way the church, 'Christ existing as community', is the 'hidden centre' of history 
requires thinking in intercultural dialectics. In the case of German-American 
exchange, it requires envisioning the whole that gathers up both unity and 
mulitiplicity.  
The appeal of such trans-national exchange was heightened as Bonhoeffer 
observed cultural ruin from a German prison. In a letter written to Bethge from 
prison in 1944, Bonhoeffer reprises his theme of German cultural inheritance. 'How 
far’, he asks, 'does "culture" still depend on classical antiquity?'191 Bonhoeffer 
observes that the notion of history as a continuum comes from Hegel, who saw that 
history 'culminating in "modernity", that is, in his own philosophical system'. He 
then expresses his own ambivalence about that solution, stating that 'our conception 
of cultural formation [Bildungsbegriff]' can neither idealistically consider classical 
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antiquity the foundation nor eliminate it.192 Rather than re-entrenching a classical 
education, Bonhoeffer continues, perhaps a more important cultivation involves 
'encounters with other peoples and countries' as a 'real cultural experience that goes 
beyond politics or business, beyond snobbery'.193 The line of thought is disrupted by 
a radio announcement and sirens signalling oncoming aircraft, which Bonhoeffer 
records alongside his observation that prisoners could see the daytime air raids on 
Berlin. 
Conclusion 
This final chapter has considered how Bonhoeffer's experimental accounts of 
the relations between peoples compare to Hegel's 'world-historical' account. This has 
involved distinguishing racialising neo-Hegelian accounts under the Third Reich 
from race-critical approaches to Hegel such as that represented by Du Bois. Such 
distinctions cleared the way to show how Hegel used reason to constrain the power 
of the state, as shown in his claim that the state can forfeit its own principle by 
depriving the Jewish people from their rights. This is one example of my attempt to 
complicate the frequent association made between Hegel's claim to the 'whole' and 
the subordination of difference.  
 I then showed how Bonhoeffer's interest in thinking the whole abandoned his 
earlier claim to völkisch drives for a developing account of ecumenism. To that end, 
he regularly criticises 'one-sided' accounts of church life and polity, placing them 
into a dialectic from which alone a true confession of catholicity might emerge. 
Bonhoeffer therefore relates the 'multiplicity' of American denominations to the 
emphasis on 'unity' in his German philosophical heritage and ecclesial memory. I 
ended by considering the difference made by Bonhoeffer's language of the 'form of 
                                                            
192 He is engaging with Spengler's account of decline, which he terms a 'biological-
morphological' account. DBWE 8, 321; DBW 8, 354. 
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Christ' in contrast to Hegel's 'shapes of Spirit'. I argued that although Bonhoeffer’s 
dialectic of incarnation and cross is embedded within a Eurocentric frame, his better 
ecumenical instincts lead to a fuller reckoning with voices from the 'underside of 
history', particularly diasporic peoples. As a result, the question raised by 
Bonhoeffer’s encounter with Du Bois’ work remains: what Christ-identification must 
yet be expressed by those whose bodies were subjugated by cultures that saw 
themselves bearing Greek and Roman antiquity? 
  
                                                                                                                                                                        
193 DBWE 8, 321; DBW 8, 355. 
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Epilogue: The Figure of Antigone 
 In the Phenomenology Hegel speaks of a form of thought beyond the eternal 
conflict of laws that was expressed in Greek tragedy. He went on to express this 
vision at a university that sought to foster a newly integrated state settlement. In stark 
contrast, the university and civil service under the Third Reich could not effectively 
resist the 'brutality of the emerging political style'.1 Bonhoeffer's own achievement 
was to similarly renounce accounts of tragedy, even though his historical context has 
been described as such.2 He ultimately chose a path of transgressive politics that led 
to the rejection and 'civil dishonour' that he emphasised in the life of Christ. 
Although their political contexts differed dramatically, as I have highlighted 
throughout the thesis, both Hegel and Bonhoeffer claimed a reconciling form of 
thought that renounced an ultimately tragic clash between laws. They made this 
claim with reference to a common source, Sophocles’ Antigone, and their respective 
treatments of this figure are the subject of this epilogue.  
 Antigone features in one of the early shapes of Geist in Hegel's 
Phenomenology. Hegel is drawing on Sophocles’ play, which portrays two figures 
who are required to do something that is both right and, at the same time, a wrong 
that leads to their own destruction: Creon, as defender of the civic state, outlaws the 
provision of proper burial rites for his nephew Polyneices because of a traitorous 
attack; Antigone, as defender of the household law, provides these rites for her dead 
brother. As a result of Antigone's transgression, Creon sentences her to be buried 
alive, leading to her suicide and a chain of events that ruin Creon's own family. From 
Antigone's vantage point, she is caught in the midst of the 'unwritten and unerring 
                                                            
1 Ringer notes that the mandarins' opposition through a sense of 'intellectual cultivation and good 
form' was ineffectual after 1933. Ringer, Mandarins, 438-40. 
2 To take only one example, Ringer concludes that the 'decline of the German Mandarins' in the 
universities was less melodrama than tragedy. Ringer, Mandarins, 449. 
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law of the gods’, which lives forever, with no clear point of origin.3 When Antigone 
acts to bury her brother, she commits the crime in full knowledge of the law she 
transgresses. Hegel comments that  
In terms of this actuality and in terms of its deed, ethical consciousness 
must recognize its opposite as its own. It must acknowledge its guilt: 
'Because we suffer, we acknowledge that we have erred’.4 
  
Hegel sees Antigone’s tale as the absolute example of tragedy, for the protagonist 
sees only one side of the law, what he calls 'reality without justification'. In Taylor's 
summary, 'this immersion in partiality is their pathos'.5 For Hegel, this account of 
mutual destruction exposes the dissolution of the harmonious ideal of Greek 'beauty'. 
This is not, of course, where Hegel's journey ends, for the impasse of Greek tragedy 
leads a period of societal alienation in the movement toward renewed unity. A form 
of consciousness is sought that can encompass both laws, leading onwards to the 
simple unity of 'absolute knowing' that surmounts the tragedy endemic to Greek 
thought. It is a remarkable achievement for Hegel to deliver this vision in the midst 
of the Napoleonic incursions, with the place of traditional mediating institutions in a 
tenuous state threatened both by the forceful new administration and the reactionary 
impulses it provoked. 
 Bonhoeffer makes reference to Antigone and Creon in a comparison between 
Greek tragedy and Luther's gospel. In Ethics, he describes a set of narratives in 
which characters 'are all subject to the claim of two eternal laws that cannot be 
                                                            
3 PhG, §436. 
4 PhG, §469. 
5 Taylor, Hegel, 502. When Hegel revisits Antigone in Philosophy of Right, he makes explicit 
the gendered presentation, with 'family piety' as the law of woman and the 'public law’, or law of the 
state as the place of the man. PR, §166. On a biographical note, Hegel's treatment of Antigone is one 
of a series of treatments of the sanctity of relations between brother and sister, which are likely based 
on his close relationship with his strong-willed sister Christiane. Though close, the siblings endure a 
painful period of estrangement. Nevertheless, Christiane's life is characterised by devotion to her 
brother, one of the probably reasons she commits suicide a month after his death. Pinkard, Hegel, 315-
17, 661. 
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reconciled in one and the same life; one pays for obedience toward one law with 
guilt for breaking the other'.6 Neither character can be proven right because 'the 
structure of life is transgression [Schuldigwerden] against the laws of the gods'.7 
Bonhoeffer argues that abendländische thought in general, and Protestant ethics in 
particular, have been shaped by this view of conflict such that they do not recognise 
that the Christian message has 'overcome this insight'.8 In contrast, Luther does not 
speak of ultimate conflict but 'the unity of God and the reconciliation of the world 
with God in Jesus Christ; not the inevitability of becoming guilty, but the plain and 
simple [einfältig] life that flows from reconciliation; not fate, but the gospel as the 
ultimate reality of life’.9 Bonhoeffer's proximal conflict is likely with his 
contemporary neo-Lutheran ethicist Werner Elert's use of the language of tragedy 
and fate.10 His turn to simplicity draws on his resolution to the characterisation of the 
'cleaving' mind he shared with Hegel. 
 Bonhoeffer claims that a tragic, conflictual view of reality characterises both 
'enthusiasm' and 'secularism' in contrast to a true reading of the Sermon on the 
Mount.11 Both positions understand the Christian and the worldly as principles 
locked in 'eternally insoluble conflict', disregarding the fact of God becoming 
human.12 The tragic view is foreign to Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, one of several 
Christian teachings that 'do not grow out of bitter resignation over the irreconcilable 
rift between the Christian and the worldly'.13 As I have shown, Bonhoeffer differs 
                                                            
6 This is taken from the 1942 manuscript 'History and Good [2]’. DBWE 6, 265; DBW 6, 264. 
7 DBWE 6, 265, alt.; DBW 6, 264. 
8 DBWE 6, 265; DBW 6, 264. 
9 DBWE 6, 265; DBW 6, 265. 
10 The connection is noted and elaborated with citations from Elert's work by Tödt, et al. in DBW 
6, 265n59. 
11 Bonhoeffer uses the term Schwärmerei, which I have rendered 'enthusiasm’. The English 
translation opts for 'sectarianism’, reading this section against the background of Troeltsch's typology. 
DBWE 6, 237n71. 
12 DBWE 6, 237; DBW 6, 236. 
13 DBWE 6, 238; DBW 6, 237. 
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from Hegel's view of the sermon as a necessary but unsustainable radicalisation. His 
treatment of Jesus' Sermon on the Mount rather speaks of 'joy and blessedness, even 
in martyrdom', however estranged from socio-political progress.14 While 
acknowledging such apparent conflicts between state and Christ-community, 
Bonhoeffer does not retreat from the claim to Christ as the hidden centre of the 
revelatory community, and so the world. 
 Bonhoeffer's challenge to claims of tragedy in the Ethics are intimated in a 
handwritten fragment from a few years prior. The exact context is unknown, though 
it dates from the inception of the Finkenwalde community, after which state pressure 
on Bonhoeffer's activities would only increase. In the midst of this clash of laws, 
Bonhoeffer wrote out the following exhortation: 
Let us never pity ourselves, let us never be tragic. There is nothing 
tragic about our suffering. Let us realize that through suffering God is 
conforming us to his likeness, that our suffering is only part of God's 
suffering and that finally the victory and triumph is his.15 
 
The fragility of the manuscript form calls to mind Bonhoeffer's claim that the Word 
is the form of weakness when contrasted with the Idea. Although Bonhoeffer's Ethics 
articulates a vision of renewed alliance between church and remnant-state, the age of 
opposition in which he lives means that he would not live to complete the 
manuscript. Rather than bemoaning the fact, speculating on all that Bonhoeffer might 
have yet written, it is worth attending to his death as a consummate ethical statement 
rather than a tragic end. This may seem a weak conciliatory expression, but such is 
the character of 'revelation in hiddenness'.
                                                            
14 DBWE 4, 89, 103-4; DBW 4, 83, 102-3. 
15 NL, A 54.15.  
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Conclusion and Contributions 
1. Revisiting the Humboldt Monuments 
 'Their death is an obligation to us’. With these words, the Humboldt 
University monument recognises Bonhoeffer as one of several political figures who 
fell in the struggle against fascism. How would Bonhoeffer account for such a 
brutally vanquished group, rendered visible by the monument’s contorted fists 
protruding between iron bars wrapped in barbed wire? The concrete experience of 
suffering under the regime became the site from which Bonhoeffer, a Christian 
leader who sought to recover Luther’s ‘marks’ of the church, formed alliance with 
those who acted on behalf of the remnant-state in order to preserve right. Moreover, 
Bonhoeffer had begun to identify with those who lived and died ‘behind the veil’, 
excluded from recognition because of racial or national ties. Such vicarious action 
was rooted in a theological ethic succinctly expressed by his Hegel-inspired refrain, 
‘Christ existing as community’.  
Does Hegel’s death also pose an obligation to ‘us’? What about the other 
monument that bears a solitary bust identified only by a single name? It would be all 
too easy to claim that the Hegel monument, without place name or date, depicts the 
‘timelessness’ and ultimate ‘confinement to the self’ that Bonhoeffer attributed to 
idealism. However, while Bonhoeffer had serious critiques to level against Hegel, 
this nuanced account of his reception has shown that the two Humboldt monuments 
are not as different as they appear. It was at that same university, after all, that 
Bonhoeffer expressed obligation to his predecessor by selecting Hegel’s lectures for 
a seminar in the Summer of 1933. For all Bonhoeffer’s ensuing disillusionment with 
the academy of his time, he did not reject the vocation of Wissenschaft even as he 
sought to acknowledge Christ as its ‘hidden centre’. Moreover, in his late writings 
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Bonhoeffer acknowledged that he was conditioned by a commitment to freedom that 
passed from Luther to the philosophy of idealism.  
2. Disruption of the Word: How Does the Community Reveal? 
This account of Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel centres on the recurrent 
question of what makes a ‘revelatory community’. That is, how does a specific 
community’s forms of life, sacred texts, even the members themselves, express the 
divine being in whom they believe? Moreover, to what extent can this ‘revelatory’ 
aspect be extended to those social bodies among which the community is embedded? 
I have argued that Bonhoeffer's modification of Hegel invokes a background in 
which divine 'authorisation' serves to enhance a religious public’s commitment to the 
rights and dignity of outsiders, to cultural preservation, and to the self-critical 
vigilance shown in habits of confession and forgiveness. Making this case has 
involved showing that Bonhoeffer carries out a more complex variation on Hegel’s 
thought than is often recognized. My approach has thus drawn on Adams’ recent 
argument that Hegel’s interest in theological claims is primarily for the diagnostic 
power of their underlying logic, through which one can identify false oppositions 
that obstruct theological discourse. 
As Bonhoeffer recognised, however, the shift to ‘underlying logic’ comes at a 
cost. The derivation of a political philosophy from an exact verbal claim, such as the 
Augsburg Confession or Christ's words of institution, raises the persistent question of 
what is both gained and lost in transposition. As Bonhoeffer and Hegel each asked, 
how far can a specific material form of worship—this bread and wine, this body—
unfold into a people’s ethical life? While Bonhoeffer could acknowledge the 
‘relative right’ in Hegel’s secularisation of the Lutheran Eucharist, he asserted that 
Jesus must nevertheless be named.  
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I have not argued, in other words, that Bonhoeffer is merely Hegelian; 
indeed, his critique of Hegel drove many of his theological counter-emphases. In 
particular, Bonhoeffer emphasised the being and action of that distinctive person 
who is the revelatory ‘body’. He persistently referred to Christ existing as 
community and critiquing the ‘docetic-idealist ecclesiology’ that emerged from 
Hegel’s support for church-state merger. Relatedly, Bonhoeffer resisted the use of 
Christology for an ‘Idea’ in a manner that obscured the personal contingency of 
‘Address’ or the real presence encountered in Sermon and Eucharist. In these 
respects, Bonhoeffer’s project is on a trajectory with later critiques of a ‘sacramental 
principle’ that is identifiable beyond the material forms of worship.1  
 Nevertheless, I have acknowledged that Bonhoeffer’s account of revelatory 
community follows Hegel by redeploying a Christological form of thought, that is, a 
logic derived from creedal expressions about Christ’s person. For instance, he speaks 
of the two kingdoms as ‘never mixed together, yet never torn apart’ in order to 
challenge what he calls the ‘two-realm thinking’ of Pseudo-Lutheranism. Moreover, 
Bonhoeffer’s treatments of intercultural encounter refer to the ‘form of Christ’ in a 
dialectical and historically conscious approach that bears resemblance to Hegel’s 
relation between ‘shapes of Geist’. This particular substitution provides a marked 
contrast to Hegel insofar as Bonhoeffer’s account is beholden to the ‘view from 
below’—a vicariousness tied to the recovery of Luther’s conviction that suffering 
was a mark of the revelatory community. Bonhoeffer’s experiments along these lines 
have been critiqued for seeming to employ Christology as a ‘structuring principle’ of 
reality. 
                                                            
1 Wannenwetsch critiques a ‘sacramental principle’ of divine presence in creation through the 
works of Leonardo Boff and William Temple, tracing this instinct back to Hegel’s ‘absorption’ of the 
material forms of worship. See Bernd Wannenwetsch, Political Worship, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(Oxford, 2004), 41-44. 
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Bonhoeffer’s articulation of a ‘disruption’ of the Word vis-à-vis Hegel’s 
account of community is captured well by the juxtaposed epigraphs that opened this 
thesis. Hegel predominantly speaks of doctrine as a community production, ‘not 
something produced by the Word of Christ, so to speak’. Such an opposition 
provokes Bonhoeffer’s description of Christ in terms of Address, not Idea; a living 
person, not doctrine. Even though Bonhoeffer would appropriate much from the 
social vision captured in the term ‘objective Geist’, he maintained the Word as a 
counter to ‘idealist Geist-monism’ just as a rock stood in the path of a stream. 
Bonhoeffer reprioritises the Word before Geist, which had several applications, 
including careful exegetical work on Genesis in response to Hegel’s Aristotelian 
protology. 
 While Bonhoeffer’s reclamation of the ‘external’ Word could be taken as a 
strictly oppositional account, I have traced not only Bonhoeffer’s strong counter-
emphasis but also his positive appropriations. This is most evident in the 
Christological modification of Hegel's phrase 'God existing as community', which 
provides a syntax for Bonhoeffer to attempt to reconcile competing accounts of 
revelation. In other words, Bonhoeffer’s externalisation of the Word does not revert 
to the outward forms of authority, ‘positivism’, or fetishism against which Hegel 
argued. Bonhoeffer seeks to retain the notion of ‘real presence’ not only ‘in’ but ‘as’ 
community. The community remains revelatory, but that should not obviate Christ’s 
claim that ‘this is my body’. 
3. Eclectic and Christologically Intent: A Posture of Reception 
I have characterized Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel as both eclectic and 
Christologically intent. The term eclectic suggests the freedom to appropriate the 
more promising aspects of Hegel’s philosophy. As Yovel comments, even if one 
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takes exception to Hegel’s account of ‘absolute knowing’, there remains ‘a treasure 
of fertile, often profound, Hegelian ideas and thought patterns by which one can 
philosophize in a dialectical and historically conscious manner’.2 While Bonhoeffer 
is skeptical of Hegel’s expansive claim for reason, he nevertheless shows himself 
heir to a dialectical and historically conscious patterns of thought, as evidenced in his 
treatment of intercultural exchanges between Germany and ‘the West’.   
As the term eclectic comes from a period of disciplined exposition, having 
been applied to Bonhoeffer’s approach by a student in the 1933 Hegel seminar, it 
should not suggest dilettantism. Bonhoeffer’s counsel in the seminar was to ensure 
one read with a view to what the philosopher intended within the whole of a given 
work. To that end, I have sought to give fuller presentations of Hegel's texts and the 
contexts from which they arose, rather than only treating the historically effective 
'Hegel' of Bonhoeffer's time. I have focused on the texts that Bonhoeffer worked 
with most—Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion and Phenomenology of Geist—
while consulting other significant works, particularly Philosophy of Right and 
Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, in order to fill out the background of 
Hegel's accounts of politics and history.  
The fuller comparative presentation of Hegel’s work in the thesis has 
attempted to get beyond caricatures and hasty dismissals. Bonhoeffer himself 
regularly worked with a composite foil of ‘idealism’, which is ironic given that he 
critiqued Hegel for the loss of personal distinctions in rendering a collective. The use 
of this foil means that Bonhoeffer’s critiques require investigation into his source 
texts. Such investigation uncovers that, for example, Bonhoeffer’s critique of 
idealism as a ‘timeless’ mode of thinking lands insofar as Hegel works with a ‘de-
                                                            
2 Yovel continues that such a stance is ‘free from the illusions of much of contemporary analytic 
philosophy (the illusion of a timeless, univocal truth ruled by some formal canon)’. See Yovel, Dark 
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tensed’ concept but it has to reckon more fully with Hegel’s strong historicist 
convictions. Given the sheer range of topics raised by the notion of ‘revelatory 
community’, I have not been able to offer a comprehensive account of Hegel’s 
relevant terms. I have sought rather to set a precedent for accounts of Hegel’s 
reception in early twentieth-century theology by dealing closely with his primary 
texts and questioning lingering allegations that Hegel’s work is on a trajectory 
toward the Third Reich. 
Along with identifying Bonhoeffer’s reception as eclectic, I have shown that 
his approach to Hegel is Christologically intent. Bonhoeffer changes the subject— 
from ‘God’ to ‘Christ’ existing as community—in every use of Hegel’s phrase. That 
specification involves Bonhoeffer's reclamation of a robust Christology of the Word, 
as expressed through his emphasis on preaching and the manner in which Christ 
‘counters’ a reductive Menschenlogos. While sharing an appreciation of the Lutheran 
Eucharist with Hegel, Bonhoeffer challenges the manner in which this claim to 'real 
presence' is secularised such that the distinctive ‘form’ of Christ becomes assimilated 
into ethical life. It turns out that a great deal is lost when a body becomes logic, or 
confessing churches are merged with the state, hence the importance of Bonhoeffer’s 
critique of a ‘docetic-idealist ecclesiology’. Against a background of 
‘deconfessionalisation’, a movement in which Hegel’s philosophy takes part, 
Bonhoeffer calls for a distinctively ‘confessing’ church.  
These Christological reclamations are undergirded by Bonhoeffer’s 
awareness that Hegel's philosophical project is significantly derived from Christian 
doctrine. He does not only identify Hegel's heterodoxy and react by sheer 
confrontation or revolt. Rather, Bonhoeffer calls for philosophy to return to its origin 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Riddle, 101. 
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after a period of estrangement. The necessity of such alliance had become 
increasingly acute as the Third Reich contributed to what Bonhoeffer called the 
decay of right, reason, and history. While I acknowledge the problematic aspects of 
Hegel’s thought that could be appropriated by the state of which Bonhoeffer wrote in 
the 1930s and 1940s, I have sought to accentuate those aspects that Bonhoeffer 
would have found congenial.3 
4. ‘Luther to Idealism’: Further Inquiry in a Tradition 
‘Where in the world was freedom spoken of more passionately than in 
Germany, from Luther to the philosophy of idealism?’, Bonhoeffer asks in his essay 
‘After Ten Years’.4 The question alludes to the critical period of transmission from 
the Reformer to Hegel. Given Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on retrieving Lutheran 
‘confession’, further work is now required to draw out the distinctly Lutheran shape 
of Hegel's logic. Responding to Adams’ account of Hegel's 'Chalcedonian logic', 
how much is Hegel’s Chalcedon specified by the communicatio idiomatum, or the 
persistent est? Such work would help to indicate how much Bonhoeffer receives 
from Hegel uniquely, and how much Bonhoeffer is responding to Hegel’s mediation 
of Luther.5  
 A fuller account of Lutheran forms of thought would have to further deal 
with one of Luther’s most problematic legacies, which is adopted by Hegel and 
Bonhoeffer to varying degrees: a longstanding Christian caricature of, and 
ambivalence towards, the Jews. Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel took place during 
                                                            
3 Knox observes that National Socialist ideology could lay claim to Hegel’s political philosophy 
when it came to the unity of national life or the merging of church and state. He continues, however, 
that ‘it is only if half its doctrine is ignored that the Philosophie des Rechts can be interpreted as an 
apologia for the most criticized aspects of National Socialism’. Knox specifically mentions Hegel’s 
commitment to ‘subjective freedom’ and rightful treatment of the Jews. See Knox, ‘Hegel and 
Prussianism’, 27-8. 
4 DBWE 8, 41; DBW 8, 24. 
5 Michael DeJonge’s forthcoming study, Bonhoeffer’s Luther (Oxford University Press, 2017), 
will be helpful in making this determination. 
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the Shoah, a horrific event that has since marked Christian and Jewish theologies. 
While I have sought to show Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s respective calls for the state 
to uphold the rights of Jewish persons, I have also indicated their complicity in a 
longstanding narrative of supersession. Further inquiry into the Lutheran shape of 
Hegel’s philosophy should interrogate the combination of a supersessionist view of a 
people’s religion with a claim to that same people’s civil rights. Such a question 
extends beyond a historical contextualisation of Hegel toward contemporary 
concerns in theology and ethics. 
5. Contributions to Contemporary Theology 
This thesis offers contributions to three key discourses in academic theology: 
the theological reception of Hegel, the doctrine of ecclesiology, and the disciplinary 
relation to philosophy. First, with respect to theological receptions of Hegel, the 
present work comes at a time of renewed interest in the ‘impact of idealism’ on 
twentieth-century thought, even as major theologians remain unrepresented.6 The 
present study shows how Bonhoeffer’s engagement with Hegel shapes many of his 
key concerns and creative retrievals. Hegel’s influence should therefore be more 
fully recognised by students of Bonhoeffer’s works.7 Along with filling an 
acknowledged gap in critical literature on Bonhoeffer, my work has implications for 
translation and indexing choices, as I have argued with respect to terms such as 
Aufhebung. 
Second, with respect to ecclesiology, Bonhoeffer’s modification of Hegel has 
a great deal to offer recent discourse over ‘ecclesial ethics’. Responding to trends in 
                                                            
6 Adams appeals for such studies with particular reference to major German theologians, 
including Barth and Bonhoeffer, in the introduction to The Impact of Idealism, Volume 4: Religion, 
ed. Nicholas Adams (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 21-22.  
7 As David Fergusson remarks, the student of contemporary theology cannot bypass Hegel’s 
influence, particularly with respect to the renaissance in Trinitarian theology and the interest in more 
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late-twentieth century ecclesiology, Fergusson suggests that theologians find 
resources to more clearly articulate the Word of God extra nos.8 Bonhoeffer provides 
vivid accounts of the externality of the Word, memorably rendered as the 
Gegenlogos, without forfeiting a strong Lutheran identification of divine presence 
and human community. Given emphases on practices and virtue cultivation, ecclesial 
ethics has also been said to lack a robust account of the witness of the Spirit.9 I have 
therefore highlighted moments in which Bonhoeffer speaks of the Holy Spirit, often 
as a means of distinguishing divine action from the community’s ‘objective Geist’. 
Insofar as Bonhoeffer does not develop a lengthy pneumatology, my reception 
account suggests that the pervasiveness of Geist in Hegel’s project led Bonhoeffer 
towards Christology as the doctrinal locus necessary for his time. 
Third, Bonhoeffer’s work with Hegel is a significant case study in the 
relation between theology and philosophy. As I have shown, Hegel both receives and 
encourages the ascent of philosophy among the disciplines in the newly founded 
University of Berlin. Bonhoeffer seeks to reverse this shift by critiquing 
philosophical concepts from the standpoint of theological sources. He therefore 
speaks to an era of renewed theological confidence, which draws on challenges to 
‘secular reason’.10 At the same time, Bonhoeffer is neither arrogant nor anxious in 
his disciplinary location. He can freely offer a qualified appreciation of Hegel and, 
indeed, employ Hegelian concepts in theological service. Such eclectic appropriation 
takes place within the larger appeal from Bonhoeffer Ethics that, in light of 
                                                                                                                                                                        
dynamic accounts of the life of God. ‘Hegel’ in Blackwell Companion to 19th Century Theology, ed. 
David Fergusson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 73. 
8 See David Fergusson, Community, Liberalism, and Christian Ethics, New Studies in Christian 
Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71-2,189n81. 
9 The risk of pneumatological deficiency is highlighted in Reinhard Hütter, ‘The Church as 
Public’, Pro Ecclesia 3 no 3, 1994, 357-61.  
10 For an influential representative work in English theology, see John Milbank, Theology and 
Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006).   
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Germany’s cultural crisis in the 1940s, philosophical concepts return to their origin 
in theology.  
6. Contributions to Contemporary Ethics 
How, then, might Bonhoeffer’s reception of Hegel be received for 
contemporary ethics? In this final section, I briefly indicate three areas for which the 
exchange over ‘revelatory community’ is pertinent: ‘non-metaphysical’ accounts of 
community; the ‘recognition’ of cultural and ethnic difference; and religious 
pluralism. These are all areas that call into question how much of Hegel’s project  
remains significant for contemporary ethics. After all, many aspects of Hegel’s 
broader political and historical vision are no longer tenable given current social 
fragmentation, religious diversity, and the rise of that religion which did not fit into 
Hegel’s progressivist account: Islam.11 
First, current philosophical treatments of Hegel often seek to develop 'non-
metaphysical' accounts of community.12 While this might suggest a diminished 
interest in theology, it is worth noting that Bonhoeffer welcomed the alliances that 
could form in the wake of a certain era’s metaphysics. Speaking about a broad 
ethical coalition that sought to oppose Hitler’s fascism, he states that it was ‘not 
metaphysical speculation, not a theological postulate of the “logos spermatikos”’ that 
drew people into proximity with Christ, but ‘the concrete suffering of lawlessness, 
organized lies, of hostility to humankind and acts of violence’.13 Just as such 
suffering turned others towards Christ, Bonhoeffer continues, it awakened the Christ-
community to the breadth of its responsibility. Relatedly, in his later prison letters 
                                                            
11 See David Fergusson, 'Hegel', in The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology, 
ed. David Fergusson, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 73. 
12 The Hegel 'renaissance is a ‘puzzling’ phenomenon, understandable only because of those 
‘nonmetaphysical’ interpreters who have rendered him more acceptable to a secular, positivist age. 
See Frederick Beiser, ‘Introduction: The Puzzling Hegel Renaissance’, in The Cambridge Companion 
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Bonhoeffer would describe ‘religionless Christianity’ as a form of faith that leaves 
behind ‘the temporally conditioned presuppositions of metaphysics, inwardness, and 
so on’.14 Theologians who would follow Bonhoeffer’s lead would do well engage 
with this non-metaphysical current in Hegel scholarship. To that end, a comparative 
account of Hegel’s and Bonhoeffer’s critiques of ‘positivism’ would be 
worthwhile.15 
 Second, while the limits of Hegel’s cultural location have come up during the 
course of this thesis, his suggestive work on ‘recognition’ has informed 
contemporary proponents of multiculturalism. This can be seen in the work of 
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, who has featured as an interpretive voice 
throughout this thesis. Taylor has deployed Hegel’s thought towards articulating a 
social vision that preserves difference in a greater unity.16 Relatedly, German 
idealism has featured significantly in recent discussion surrounding a theological 
account of race. As Carter argues, the Kantian legacy involves a problematic 'mutual 
encoding of the racial and theological so as to yield the cosmopolitical'.17 
Meanwhile, Dorrien's account claims that idealist convictions are crucial for any 
'vital progressive theology' while exposing the disturbing, at times 'savage', ironies in 
its legacy surrounding race.18 In light of this compromised legacy, Bonhoeffer’s 
                                                                                                                                                                        
to Hegel and Nineteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Frederick Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 3-5. 
13 DBWE 6, 344-45; DBW 6, 347. 
14 DBWE 8, 364; DBW 8, 405.  
15 Bonhoeffer states that he seeks to extend Barth’s critique of religion beyond the point where 
Barth turned back to a ‘positivism of revelation’. DBWE 8, 363-4; DBW 8, 404-5. 
16 See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the ‘Politics of Recognition’, ed. Amy Gutman 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). For an account of Taylor’s reception of Hegel in 
the Canadian context, see Robert C. Sibley, Northern Spirits: John Watson, Geroge Grant, and 
Charles Taylor, Appropriations of Hegelian Political Thought (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2008).  
17 J. Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), 5. 
18 Dorrien devotes a final section of his monumental work to the theme ‘Idealism as White 
Supremacist Ordering’, dealing particularly with Kant’s view of racial hierarchy. See KRHS, 2, 542-
549. His term ‘savage irony’ comes from an earlier discussion of Hastings Rashdall. 
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interaction with race-critical receptions of Hegel point towards a possible line of 
critique and repair.  
Third, with respect to religious pluralism, it should be remembered that 
Bonhoeffer claimed the Christ-community would receive ‘not recognition, but 
rejection’ in the world. The mere hope of ‘recognition’ may be an indicator of how 
Christians have left faith in God for a rationalised world.19 In contrast, Bonhoeffer’s 
particularist account of faith community involves the strong claim that the church 
can only be properly understood from within its unique forms of life. Christiane 
Tietz has suggested that this claim can be extended towards the conditions for 
knowing other faith communities.20 This helps to nuance Bonhoeffer’s retrieval of 
the ‘visibility’ of the church, which does not entail that the revelatory community is 
to be recognised as one Volk among the Völker. Indeed, Bonhoeffer's claim to the 
‘hiddenness of revelation’ can be rendered as a variation on what Bernd 
Wannenwetsch calls the 'trans-visibility' of the church.21 In this way, the question of 
revelatory community requires further work on the relation between specific faith 
claims and the forms of logic they evoke.
                                                            
19 I am re-appropriating Bonhoeffer’s comments about how the Reformation led to a 
‘desacralisation’ of the world, which prepared the ground for rational science and many who thereby 
left behind their faith in God. DBWE 6, 114; DBW 6, 104.  
20 See Christiane Tietz, 'Bonhoeffer's Strong Christology in the Context of Religious Pluralism' 
in Carter and Green, eds., Interpreting, 193. 
21 The term is suggested with reference to the 'hidden' quality of the church, drawing on Luther's 
thought. Bernd Wannenwetsch, 'Ecclesiology and Ethics', Oxford Handbook of Theological Ethics, 





Translations of German and French texts are my own, with my alterations to English 
translations are noted with ‘alt’. All citation emphases are original unless otherwise 
noted. 
 
Primary Sources – G.W.F. Hegel  
 
Separate English and German abbreviations will be given in the case of differing 
pagination for key works employed by Bonhoeffer. Date of publication is included if 
during the author’s lifetime; date of delivery is provided in the case of lectures.  
 
 
Werke  Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl 
Markus Michel (1970). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 
1970. Abbreviated as Werke with volume number.  
 
ETW Early Theological Writings. Translated by T.M. Knox. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1948. 
 
EL Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline. Part I: 
Science of Logic. Translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. 
Dahlstrom. Edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Cited by paragraph (§) 
with additions (A). 
 Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I (1817, rev. 1827, 
1830), Werke VIII. 
 
PhG  Phenomenology of Spirit. Parallel German / English Version. 
Translated by Terry Pinkard (Forthcoming, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013 Draft Version). Cited by paragraph (§). 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), Werke III. 
 
PR Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. 
Edited by Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991. Outlines of the Philosophy of Right. Translated by 
T.M. Knox. Edited by Stephen Houlgate. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
Cited by paragraph (§) with remarks (R) and additions (A). 
Translations will be taken from Nisbet unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821), Werke VII. 
 
LHP / VGP Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6, Volume III, 
Edited by Robert Brown Translated by R.F. Brown and J.M. 
Stewart. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 312 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4. Edited 
by Garniron and Jaeschke. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1986. 
LPR I / VPR I Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part I: The Concept of 
Religion, edited by Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984. Citations will be taken from the 1827 
lectures unless otherwise indicated. 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (1821, 1824, 
1827, 1831), edited by Walter Jaeschke (1983).  
 
 
LPR II / VPR II Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part II: The 
Determinate Religion. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985. Citations will be taken 
from the 1827 lectures unless otherwise indicated. 
 Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (1821, 1824, 
1827, 1831), edited by Walter Jaeschke (1984). 
 
LPR III / VPR III The Christian Religion - Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Part 
III: The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute Religion. Edited and 
Translated by Peter C. Hodgson. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for the 
American Academy of Religion, 1979.  
 Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (1821, 1824, 1827, 
1831). Edited by Georg Lasson (1929).  
 
LPWH Lectures on the Philosophy of World History – Introduction: 
Reason in History. Edited by Johannes Hoffmeister. Translated 
by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
LPWH I Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Vol. 1: 
Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-3. Edited by Robert F. 
Brown and Peter C. Hodgson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011.  
 Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte (1822-
1831) 
 
NL-VPR I Bonhoeffer Nachlass 7.A.26: Der Begriff der Religion, 12. Band 
der Lasson Ausgabe 2. Teil. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 
1925. 
 
NL-VPR II Bonhoeffer Nachlass 7.A.26: Die Bestimmte Religion. 13. Band 
der Lasson-Ausgabe. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1927. 
 
NL-VPR III Bonhoeffer Nachlass 7.A.26: Die Absolute Religion. 14. Band 
der Lasson-Ausgabe. Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1929. 
 
NL-PhG Bonhoeffer Nachlass 7.A.26:  Phänomenologie des Geistes 2. 




SL Science of Logic. Translated and edited by George Di Giovanni. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.  
 Wissenschaft der Logik (1812, 1816), Werke V-VI.  
 
 
Primary Sources – Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
 
 
Separate English and German abbreviations will be given unless reference is made 
to a specific critical note. Date of publication is included if during the author’s 
lifetime; date of delivery is provided in the case of lectures. 
 
 
DBWE 1   Sanctorum Communio. A Theological Study of the Sociology of the 
Church. Edited by Clifford J. Green. Translated by Reinhard Krauss 
and Nancy Lukens. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998. 
 
DBW 1   Sanctorum Communio. Eine dogmatische Untersuchung zur 
Soziologie der Kirche (1930). Edited by Joachim von Soosten. 
München: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1986.  
 
DBWE 2   Act and Being. Transcendental Philosophy and Ontology in 
Systematic Theology. Edited by Wayne Whitson Floyd, Jr. Translated 
by Martin Rumscheidt. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996.  
 
DBW 2   Akt und Sein. Transzendentalphilosophie und Ontologie in der 
systematischen Theologie (1931). Edited by Hans-Richard Reuter. 
München: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1988.  
 
DBWE 3   Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1-3. Edited 
by John W. de Gruchy. Translated by Douglas Stephen Bax. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997.  
 
DBW 3   Schöpfung und Fall: Theologische Auslegung von Genesis 1-3 (1933). 
Edited by Martin Rüter and Ilse Tödt. München: Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1989. 
 
DBWE 4   Discipleship. Edited by Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey. 
Translated by Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss. Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2000.  
 
DBW 4   Nachfolge (1937). Edited by Martin Kuske and Ilse Tödt. 2nd. ed. 
München: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1994.  
  
DBWE 5   Life Together [and] Prayerbook of the Bible: An Introduction to the 
Psalms. Edited by Geffrey B. Kelly. Translated by Daniel W. Bloesch 
and James H. Burtness. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996.  
 
DBW  5   Gemeinsames Leben (1939). Das Gebetbuch der Bibel (1940). Edited 
by Gerhard Ludwig Müller and Albrecht Schönherr. München: 
 314 
Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1987. 
 
DBWE 6   Ethics. Edited by Clifford J. Green. Translated by Reinhard Krauss, 
Charles West and Douglas W. Stott. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2005.  
 
DBW 6   Ethik. Edited by Ilse Tödt, Heinz Eduard Tödt, Ernst Feil, and Clifford 
Green. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1992; second 
edition 1998.  
 
DBWE 8   Letters and Papers from Prison. Edited by John W. de Gruchy. 
Translated by Isabel Best, Lisa E. Dahill, Reinhard Krauss, and Nancy 
Lukens. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010. 
 
DBW 8   Widerstand und Ergebung. Edited by Christian Gremmels, Eberhard 
Bethge, and Renate Bethge with Ilse Tödt. Gütersloh: Chr. 
Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998.  
 
DBWE 9   The Young Bonhoeffer: 1918-1927. Edited by Paul D. Matheny, 
Clifford J. Green and Marshall D. Johnson. Translated by Mary 
Nebelsick, 2002.  
 
DBW 9   Jugend und Studium 1918-1927. Edited by Hans Pfeifer with Clifford 
Green and Carl-Jürgen Kaltenborn. Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1986.  
 
DBWE 10   Barcelona, Berlin, New York: 1928-1931. Edited by Clifford J. Green. 
Translated by Douglas W. Stott. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008. 
 
DBW 10   Barcelona, Berlin, Amerika 1928-1931. Edited by Reinhart Staats and 
Hans Christoph von Hase with Holger Roggelin and Matthias 
Wünsche. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1992.  
 
DBWE 11   Ecumenical, academic, and pastoral work: 1931-1932. Edited by 
Victoria J. Barnett, Mark S. Brocker, and Michael B. Lukens. 
Translated by Anne Schmidt-Lange, with Isabel Best, Nicolas 
Humphrey, and Marion Pauck. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012. 
 
DBW 11   Ökumene, Universität, Pfarramt, 1931-1932. Edited by Eberhard 
Amelung and Christoph Strohm. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1994.  
 
DBWE 12   Berlin: 1933. Edited by Larry Rasmussen. Translated by Isabel Best 
and David Higgins. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009. 
 
DBW 12   Berlin 1932-1933. Edited by Carsten Nicolaisen und Ernst-Albert 
Scharffenorth. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1997.  
 
DBWE 13   London: 1933-1935. Edited by Keith Clements. Translated by Isabel 
Best. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007. 
 
 315 
DBW 13   London 1933-1935. Edited by Hans Goedeking, Martin Heimbucher 
and Hans- Walter Schleicher. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1994.  
 
DBWE 14   Theological Education at Finkenwalde: 1935-1937. Edited by H. 
Gaylon Barker and Mark S. Brocker. Translated by Douglas W. Stott. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014. 
 
DBW 14   Illegale Theologenausbildung: Finkenwalde 1935-1937. Edited by 
Otto Dudzus und Jürgen Henkys with Sabine Bobert-Stützel, Dirk 
Schulz, and Ilse Tödt. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/ Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1996.  
 
DBWE 15   Theological Education Underground: 1937-40. Edited by Victoria J. 
Barnett. Translated by Victoria J. Barnett, Claudia D. Bergmann, 
Peter Frick, and Scott A. Moore. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2012. 
 
DBW 15   Illegale Theologenausbildung: Sammelvikariate 1937-1940. Edited by 
Dirk Schulz. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1998.  
 
DBWE 16   Conspiracy and Imprisonment: 1940-1945. Edited by Mark Brocker. 
Translated by Lisa Dahill. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2006.  
 
DBW 16   Konspiration und Haft 1940-1945. Edited by Jørgen Glenthøj, Ulrich 
Kabitz and Wolf Krötke. Gütersloh: Chr. Kaiser/Gütersloher 
Verlagshaus, 1996.  
 
DBWE 17 Indexes and Supplementary Materials. Edited by Victoria J. Barnett 
and Barbara Wojhoski. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014. 
 
DBW 17 Register und Ergänzungen. Edited by Herbert Anzinger and Hans 





Abromeit, Hans-Jürgen. Das Geheimnis Christi. Dietrich Bonhoeffers Erfahrungsbezogene 
Christologie. Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1991. 
 
Adams, Nicholas. The Eclipse of Grace: Divine and Human Action in Hegel. Chichester: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2013. 
 
Adams, Nicholas. ‘Eschatology Sacred and Profane’. International Journal of Systematic 
Theology 2, no. 3 (November 2000): 283-306. 
 
Appiah, Kwame Anthony. Lines of Descent: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
 
Avineri, Shlomo. ‘A Note on Hegel’s View of Jewish Emancipation’. Jewish Social Studies 
Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 1963): 145-51. 
 316 
 
Barth, Karl. Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-28. Translated by Louise Smith. 
London: SCM Press, 1962. 
 
Barth, Karl. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century (1952). London: SCM Press, 
1972. 
 
Barth, Karl. Unterricht in Der Christlichen Religion, Vol. III (1925-26). Zürich: 
Theologischer Verlag 1985. 
 
Barth, Karl. Die Theologie Der Reformierten Bekenntnisschriften (1923). Zürich: 
Theologischer Verlag, 1998. 
 
Barth, Karl. On Religion: The Revelation of God as the Sublimation of Religion. Edited and 
translated by Garrett Green. London: Bloomsbury, 2007. 
 
Bayer, Oswald. ‘Christus Als Mitte: Bonhoeffers Ethik Im Banne Der Religionsphilosophie 
Hegels?’ In Leibliches Wort: Reformation Und Neuzeit Im Konflikt, 245-64. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992. 
 
Bayer, Oswald. Freedom in Response - Lutheran Ethics: Sources and Controversies. 
Translated by Jeffrey F. Cayzer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Bayer, Oswald. Martin Luther's Theology: A Contemporary Interpretation. Translated by 
Thomas Trapp. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2008. 
 
Beiser, Frederick. ‘Introduction: The Puzzling Hegel Renaissance’. In The Cambridge 
Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy. Edited by Frederick 
Beiser, 1-14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Bennett, Jana Marguerite. Water Is Thicker Than Blood: An Augustinian Theology of 
Marriage and Singleness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Bethge, Eberhard. Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography. Revised ed. Translated by Edwin 
Robertson, et al. Edited by Victoria J. Barnett. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2000. 
 
Brandom, Robert. A Spirit of Trust: A Semantic Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology. Pre-
Publication Draft Version, 2014. 
 
Brito, Emilio. La Christologie De Hegel: Verbum Crucis. Paris: Beauchesne, 1983. 
 
Brown, David. Continental Philosophy and Theology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987. 
 
Burbidge, John W. Historical Dictionary of Hegelian Philosophy. Toronto, ON: Scarecrow 
Press, 2001. 
 
Busch, Eberhard. Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts. Translated 
by John Bowden. London: SCM Press, 1976. 
 
 317 
Butler, Judith. Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France. 
Second Ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
 
Carter, J. Kameron. Race: A Theological Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Clark, Adam and Michael Mawson, eds. Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and 
Contemporary Scholarship. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013. 
 
Crites, Stephen. Dialectic and Gospel in the Development of Hegel's Thinking. University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. 
 
De Graaff, Guido. ‘Intercession as Political Ministry: Re-Interpreting the Priesthood of All 
Believers’. Modern Theology 32, no. 4 (October 2016): 504-21. 
 
DeJonge, Michael. ‘The Presence of Christ in Karl Barth, Franz Hildebrandt and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Yearbook, no. 4 (2009-10): 96-115. 
 
DeJonge, Michael. Bonhoeffer's Theological Formation: Berlin, Barth, and Protestant 
Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 
DeJonge, Michael. ‘Bonhoeffer's Concept of the West’. In Bonhoeffer, Religion, and 
Politics, edited by Christiane Tietz and Jens Zimmermann. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 
2012. 
 
DeJonge, Michael P. ‘Bonhoeffer's Two-Kingdoms Thinking in 'the Church and the Jewish 
Question'‘. In Christ, Church and World: New Studies in Bonhoeffer's Theology and 
Ethics, edited by Michael Mawson and Philip Ziegler, 141-60. London: Bloomsbury 
T&T Clark, 2016. 
 
Derrida, Jacques. Glas (1974). Translated by John P. Leavey and Richard Rand. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986. 
 
Dews, Peter. The Idea of Evil. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. 
 
Dorrien, Gary J. Kantian Reason and Hegelian Spirit: The Idealistic Logic of Modern 
Theology. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil (1920). New York: Dover, 1999. 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk (1903). New York: Barnes & Noble, 2003. 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. The World and Africa:  An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played 
in World History. Edited by Henry Louis Gates. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007. 
 
Du Bois, W.E.B. The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois (1968). Edited by Henry Louis 
Gates. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Dumas, André. Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian of Reality. Translated by Robert McAfee 
Brown. London: SCM Press, 1971. 
 318 
 
Dunning, Stephen. The Tongues of Men: Hegel and Hamann on Religious Language and 
History. Missoula, MN: Scholars Press, 1979. 
 
Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi, ed. Race and the Enlightenment. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
1997. 
 
Fanon, Frantz. ‘Le Nègre et Hegel’. In Peau Noire, Masques Blancs, 195-200. Paris: 
Éditions de Seuil, 1952. 
 
Fergusson, David. ‘Hegel’. In The Blackwell Companion to Nineteenth-Century Theology, 
edited by David Fergusson, 58-75. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. 
 
Fergusson, David. ‘Divine Providence’. In The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern 
European Thought, edited by Nicholas Adams and et al., 655-74. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 
 
Floyd, Wayne Whitson, Jr. Theology and the Dialectics of Otherness: On Reading 
Bonhoeffer and Adorno. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. 
 
Floyd, Wayne Whitson, Jr. ‘The Search for an Ethical Sacrament: From Bonhoeffer to 
Critical Social Theory’. Modern Theology 7, no. 2 (1991): 176-93. 
 
Floyd, Wayne Whitson, Jr. ‘Encounter with the Other: Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel in 
the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’. In Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation, edited 
by Peter Frick, 83-119. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. 
 
Forde, Gerhard O. The Preached God: Proclamation in Word and Sacrament. Edited by 
Mark Mattes and Steven Paulson. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2007. 
 
Gilroy, Paul. Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double-Consciousness. London: Verso, 1993. 
 
Gooding-Williams, Robert. In the Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in 
America. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. 
 
Green, Clifford and Guy Carter. ‘Foreword’. In Interpreting Bonhoeffer: Historical 
Perspectives, Emerging Issues, edited by Clifford Green and Guy Carter. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 
 
Green, Clifford J. Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality. Revised Ed. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
1999. 
 
Green, Garrett. ‘Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theory of Religion’. 
Journal of Religion 75, no. 4 (October 1995): 473-86. 
 
Grossmann, Andreas. ‘German Neo-Hegelianism and a Plea for Another Hegel’. The Impact 
of Idealism: The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought. Vol. II: Historical, 
Social, and Political Thought, edited by John Walker, Nicholas Boyle, and Liz 
Disley, 232-59. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2013. 
 
 319 
Gutiérrez, Gustavo. ‘The Limitations of Modern Theology: On a Letter of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’. In The Power of the Poor in History: Selected Writings, 222-34. 
London: SCM Press, 1983. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. ‘Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution’. In Theory and Practice. 
London: Heinemann, 1974. 
 
Haynes, Stephen. The Bonhoeffer Legacy: Post-Holocaust Perspectives. Minneapolist: 
Fortress Press, 2006. 
 
Hildebrandt, Franz. Est: Das Lutherische Prinzip. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1931. 
 
Hodgson, Peter C. ‘Alienation and Reconciliation in Hegelian and Post-Hegelian 
Perspective’. Modern Theology 2, no. 1 (1985): 42-63. 
 
Hodgson, Peter C. Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Holm, Jacob. ‘G. W. F. Hegel's Impact on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Early Theology’. Studia 
Theologica - Nordic Journal of Theology 56, no. 1 (2002): 64-75.  
 
Houlgate, Stephen. Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
 
Houlgate, Stephen. An Introduction to Hegel: Freedom, Truth and History. 2nd ed. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2005. 
 
Howard, Thomas Albert. Protestant Theology and the Making of the Modern German 
University. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
 
Hunsinger, George. ‘Barth, Barmen, and the Confessing Church Today’. In Disruptive 
Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, 60-88. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2000. 
 
Hyppolite, Jean. Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by 
Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1974. 
 
Inwood, Michael. A Hegel Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
 
Jenson, Matt. The Gravity of Sin: Augustine, Luther, and Barth on the Homo Incurvatus in 
Se. London: T&T Clark, 2006. 
 
Jüngel, Eberhard. God as the Mystery of the World. Translated by Darrell L. Guder. From 
the Third Revised German ed. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1983. 
 
Kaufmann, Walter, ed. Hegel’s Political Philosophy. New York, NY: Atherton Press, 1970. 
 
Kidd, Colin. The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 
 320 
1600-2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Kierkagaard, Søren. Philosophical Fragments / Johannes Climacus. Edited by Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Practice in Christianity. Edited by Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. 
 
Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Edited by Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong. Vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Kirkpatrick, Matthew D. Attacks on Christendom in a World Come of Age: Kierkegaard, 
Bonhoeffer, and the Question of ‘Religionless Christianity'. Oregon: Pickwick, 2011. 
 
Knox, T.M. ‘Hegel and Prussianism’. In Hegel’s Political Philosophy, edited by Walter 
Kaufmann, 13-29. New York: Atherton Press, 1970. 
 
Kojève, Alexandre. Introduction à la Lecture de Hegel (1947). Edited by Raymond 
Queneau. Gallimard, 1968. 
 
Lauer, Quentin. Hegel's Concept of God. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1982. 
 
Lauer, Quentin. A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1993. 
 
Lehel, Ferenc. Dietrich Bonhoeffers Hegelseminar: Nach Aufzeichnungen Von Ferenc 
Lehel. Internationales Bonhoeffer Forum: Forschung Und Praxis 8, edited by Ilse 
Tödt. München: Chr. Kaiser, 1988. 
 
Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. Translated by Alphonso 
Lingis. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969. 
 
Marcuse, Herbert. Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (1941). 
Second Ed. London: Routledge, 1955. 
 
Marsh, Charles. ‘Human Community and Divine Presence: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 
Theological Critique of Hegel’. Scottish Journal of Theology 45, no. 4 (1992): 427-
48. 
 
Marsh, Charles. Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of His Theology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Marsh, Charles. Strange Glory: A Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. New York: Knopf, 2014. 
 
Mawson, Michael. ‘Christ Existing as Community: The Ethics of Bonhoeffer's 
Ecclesiology’. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2012. 
 
Mawson, Michael. ‘The Spirit and the Community: Pneumatology and Ecclesiology in 
Jenson, Hutter and Bonhoeffer’. International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, 
 321 
no. 4 (Oct 2013): 453-68.  
 
Mawson, Michael. ‘Theology and Social Theory-Reevaluating Bonhoeffer's Approach’. 
Theology Today 71, no. 1 (Apr 2014): 69-80.  
 
Meyer, Michael A., ed. German-Jewish History in Modern Times, Volume 2: Emancipation 
and Acculturation 1780-1871. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
 
Moses, John A. ‘Bonhoeffer's Germany: The Political Context’. In Cambridge Companion 
to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, edited by John W. De Gruchy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Moses, John A. ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Repudiation of Protestant German War Theology’. 
Journal of Religious History 30, no. 3 (Oct 2006): 354-70.  
 
Moses, John A. A Reluctant Revolutionary: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's Collision with Prusso-
German History. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009. 
 
Newman, Amy. ‘The Death of Judaism in German Protestant Thought from Luther to 
Hegel’. Journal of the American Academy of Religion LXI, no. 3 (1993): 455-84. 
 
O'Regan, Cyril. The Heterodox Hegel. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1994. 
 
O'Regan, Cyril. Anatomy of Misremembering: Von Balthasar's Response to Philosophical 
Modernity, Volume I: Hegel. Herder & Herder, 2014. 
 
Pangritz, Andreas. Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Translated by Barbara 
and Martin Rumscheidt. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2000. 
 
Pangritz, Andreas. ‘Dietrich Bonhoeffer: ‘Within, Not Outside the Barthian Movement’’. In 
Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation, edited by Peter Frick, 245-82. Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008. 
 
Pannenberg, Wolfhart. ‘The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel’. In 
Basic Questions in Theology, Volume Three. London: SCM Press, 1973. 
 
Pinkard, Terry. Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994. 
 
Pinkard, Terry. Hegel: A Biography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Pinkard, Terry, ‘Semantic Self-Consciousness: Brandom on Hegel’. Language and 
Modernity Conference, Freie Universität Berlin, 19-21 June, 2014, 2014. 
 
Pippin, Robert B. Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
 
Pippin, Robert B. ‘What Is the Question for Which Hegel's Theory of Recognition Is the 
Answer?’ European Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 155-72. 
 322 
 
Pippin, Robert B. Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
 
Pippin, Robert B. Hegel on Self-Consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
 
Plant, Stephen. ‘“In the Sphere of the Familiar:” Heidegger and Bonhoeffer’. In Bonhoeffer's 
Intellectual Formation, edited by Peter Frick, 301-28. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2008. 
 
Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945). Vol. II, The High Tide of Prophecy: 
Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. 
 
Purvis, Zachary. Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016. 
 
Rades, Jörg Alfred. ‘Bonhoeffer and Hegel: From Sanctorum Communio to the Hegel 
Seminar with Some Perspectives from the Later Works’. Dissertation First Draft and 
Quotations: University of St. Andrews, ca. 1983-1989. 
 
Rasmussen, Joel. ‘Kierkegaard, Hegelianism and the Theology of Paradox’. In The Impact of 
Idealism The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume IV: Religion, edited 
by Nicholas Adams, Nicholas Boyle, and Liz Disley, 91-113. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013. 
 
Ringer, Fritz K. The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 
1890-1933. Reprint Edition. Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1990. 
 
Robinson, David S. ‘Peccatorum Communio: Intercession in Bonhoeffer's Use of Hegel’. 
Studies in Christian Ethics 28, no. 1 (Feb 2015): 86-100.  
 
Rumscheidt, Martin. ‘The Significance of Adolf Von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg for 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’. In Bonhoeffer's Intellectual Formation, edited by Peter Frick. 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. 
 
Rüsen, Jörn. ‘Idealism in the German Tradition of Meta-History’. In The Impact of Idealism: 
The Legacy of Post-Kantian German Thought, Volume II: Historical, Social and 
Political Thought, edited by John Walker, Nicholas Boyle, and Liz Disley, 331-43. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
Schliesser, Christine. Everyone Who Acts Responsibly Becomes Guilty. Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2008. 
 
Shanks, Andrew. Hegel's Political Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991. 
 




Singer, Peter. Hegel. Very Short Introductions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Slane, Craig. ‘The Death of Moses: Why Moses?’ In Who Am I? Bonhoeffer's Theology 
through His Poetry, 213-42. London: T&T Clark, 2009, 2009. 
 
Smith, R. Gregor, ed. World Come of Age: A Symposium on Dietrich Bonhoeffer. London: 
Collins, 1967. 
 
Smith, Stephen B. ‘Hegel and the French Revolution: An Epitaph for Republicanism’. Social 
Research 56, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 233-61. 
 
Sorkin, David. The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780-1840. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. 
 
Tappert, Theodore, ed. The Book of Concord. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Hegel and Modern Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
 
Taylor, Charles. Multiculturalism and the ‘Politics of Recognition’. Edited by Amy 
Gutmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2007. 
 
Theunissen, Michael. The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, 
Sartre and Buber. Translated by Christopher Macann. London: MIT Press, 1984. 
 
Tietz, Christiane. ‘Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dietrich Bonhoeffer’. In Bonhoeffer's 
Intellectual Formation, edited by Peter Frick. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008. 
 
Tietz, Christiane. ‘Bonhoeffer on the Uses and Limits of Philosophy’. In Bonhoeffer and 
Continental Thought: Cruciform Philosophy, edited by Brian Gregor and Jens 
Zimmermann. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009. 
 
Tietz, Christiane. ‘Bonhoeffer's Strong Christology in the Context of Religious Pluralism’. 
In Interpreting Bonhoeffer, edited by Clifford Green and Guy Carter, 181-96. 
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 
 
Tietz-Steiding, Christiane. Bonhoeffers Kritik Der Verkrümmten Vernunft: Eine 
Erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999. 
 
Troeltsch, Ernst. The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches (1912). Vol. 2. Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992. 
 
van 't Slot, Edward. Negativism of Revelation? Bonhoeffer and Barth on Faith and 
Actualism. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015. 
 
von Harnack, Adolf. History of Dogma. Volume I. Translated by Neil Buchanan. Edinburgh: 
Williams & Norgate, 1894. 
 324 
 
Wannenwetsch, Bernd. ‘Ecclesiology and Ethics’. In The Oxford Handbook of Theological 
Ethics, edited by Gilbert Meilaender and William Werpehowski, 57-72. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Wannenwetsch, Bernd. ‘The Whole Christ and the Whole Human Being’. In Christology 
and Ethics, edited by F. LeRon Shults and Brent Waters. Cambridge: Eerdmans, 
2010. 
 
Ward, Graham. ‘How Hegel Became a Philosopher: Logos and the Economy of Logic’. 
Critical Research on Religion I, no. 3 (2013): 270-92. 
 
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1820-21). Translated by 
Talcott Parsons. Revised ed. London: Routledge 2001. 
 
Wendte, Martin. ‘Lamentation between Contradiction and Obedience: Hegel and Barth as 
Diametrically Opposing Brothers in the Spirit of Modernity’. In Evoking Lament: A 
Theological Discussion, edited by Eva Harasta and Brian Brock, 77-98. London: 
T&T Clark, 2009. 
 
Westphal, Merold. History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology. Brighton: Harvester Press, 
1982. 
 
Westphal, Merold. Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity. Albany, NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1992. 
 
Westphal, Merold. ‘Kierkegaard and Hegel’. In The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 
edited by Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino, 101-24. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
 
Wilkes, Nicola J. ‘Life and Health: Bonhoeffer's Normative and Divergent Accounts of 
Private Confession of Sin’. Theology Today 71, no. 1 (Apr 2014): 58-68.  
 
Williams, Rowan. ‘Hegel and the Gods of Postmodernity’. In Shadow of Spirit: 
Postmodernism and Religion, edited by Philippa Berry and Andrew Wernick, 72-80. 
London: Routledge, 1992. 
 
Williams, Rowan. ‘Logic and Spirit in Hegel’. In Post-Secular Philosophy: Between 
Philosophy and Theology, edited by Phillip Blond, 116-30. London: Routledge, 
1998. 
 
Williams, Reggie. Bonhoeffer's Black Jesus: The Harlem Renaissance and an Ethic of 
Resistance. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014. 
 
Williams, Reggie. ‘Developing a Theologia Crucis: Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the Harlem 
Renaissance’. Theology Today 71, no. 1 (Apr 2014): 43-57.  
 
Williams, Rowan, ‘Centres and Margins: Bonhoeffer's Christ’. Hulsean Lectures, University 
of Cambridge, February 16, 2016. 
 
 325 
Williams, Robert R. Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other. Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1992. 
 
Yerkes, James. The Christology of Hegel. Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1978. 
 
Yovel, Yirmiyahu. Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews. Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998. 
 
Zamir, Shamoon. Dark Voices: W.E.B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888-1903. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Ziegler, Philip. ‘Christ for Us Today - Promeity in the Christologies of Bonhoeffer and 
Kierkegaard’. International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 1 (Jan 2013): 25-
41.  
 
Ziegler, Philip, ‘Completely within God's Doing: Soteriology as Meta-Ethics’. Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Doctrine and Ethics I Conference, University of Aberdeen, 
December 12, 2014. 
 
Zimmermann, Jens. Humanism and Religion: A Call for the Renewal of Western Culture. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
 
 
